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ABSTRACT: 
The Royalist War Effort in the north midlands was an organised system 
run, for the most part, by commissions of array composed generally of men 
with a vested interest in the communities over which they ruled. A 
financial system created by these men was based very much on the regular 
collection of a property tax. The funds which this tax raised was used to 
create an army based in the area, under the command of Henry Hastings, Lord 
Loughborough. This army was created from the units raised in the north 
midland shires during the summer and autumn of 1642 and used initially in 
the Edgehill campaign. The army eventually grew to be around five thousand 
strong and was commanded by men drawn from a broad social spectrum 
stretching from the titled gentry to below yeoman status. 
The birth of this regional war effort was the result of the King's 
attempt in late 1642 to regain ground in the area lost to local 
parliamentarians. The culmination of the work came a year later when, 
following the successful intervention of the Northern Army, the north 
midlands royalists were able to control the vast majority of the region. 
Thus at the end of 1643, the royalists had a power base from which to launch 
initiatives into any part of the country. 
The intervention of the Scots in January 1644 forced the Northern 
Army to return north and put the royalists on the defensive as far south as 
the north midlands. Successive internecine struggles between north midlands 
royalist officers and administrators and the continuous drain on the army's 
manpower, caused by other royalist regional commanders using various units, 
led to a severe weakening of the royalist war effort in the area. The 
culmination of this was the economically draining presence of the armies of 
Prince Rupert and George Go'r-ing, -which alsö; -, für er reduced the North 
Midlands Army's manpower. The-defeat of,,.: thes . 
armies, and the Northern Army 
at Marston Moor, plunged the north midlands ink' chaos and, weakened as it 
was, it almost collapsed enEirely.. under. parli4i'J tarian pressure. 
For the rest of the war the area witnessed a battle of attrition as the 
parliamentarians steadily encroached upon former royalist territory. Three 
interventions by the King showed that the area's war effort could have been 
resurrected but nothing ever came of this and the war ended here, as elsewhere, 
with the succession of garrisons surrendering to parliament's forces. 
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Introduction 
In the of summer 1642, the King created a field army which he led 
south and with which he fought the battle of Edgehill. In so doing, he 
drained the north midland counties of royalists and left the stage open 
for local parliamentarians to gain control of pockets of territory. In 
response, Charles, at the end of the year, dispatched several of his army 
officers home to their native counties to establish a royalist power base 
in the north midlands. The result was that within six months, a royalist 
war effort was forged on a footing capable of creating a self-sufficient 
regional association on the five counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire. 
This system was created and run by the returned officers along with 
the commissions of array, originally created to raise troops and funds in 
June, July and August of 1642. The resurrected commissions became 
primarily a financial administration which organised taxation levies and 
other sources of income throughout the region, aimed at paying for the 
growing army which the officers created by virtue of their personal 
commissions rather than through the now generally defunct military powers 
of the commissioners. The system reached its height in the first months 
of 1644, when domination of the five counties was almost complete. The 
defeat of the northern royalists at Selby and later Marston Moor plunged 
the north midlands royalist war effort into a chaos from which it was 
unable to extract itself before it had lost large areas of territory. 
During the subsequent eighteen months the royalists' ability to levy taxes 
shrunk as their territory contracted and, correspondingly, the size of the 
military forces declined rapidly. However, upon each of the three 
occasions when the King's Field Army was present in the region, the 
ensuing military strength enabled the north midlands royalists to extend 
their taxation system over the areas where they had temporarily regained 
control. These episodes revealed the latent abilities still within the 
system, which, given good fortune, could come into effect. 
This thesis examines, in depth, the regional structure of the 
royalist system in the north midlands. At all times the area is seen as 
an integral unit and not as a collection of five quite separate counties. 
Studies which have hitherto envisaged the counties as islands unto 
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themselves have, it is felt, obscured the true nature of the royalists' 
provincial war effort. Within the superstructure the nature and 
composition of the several commissions of array and their tax systems will 
be analysed with respect to their organisation and methodology. The 
social and familial status of the commissioners and the officers will also 
be studied and the results given in both tabular form during the course of 
the text, and in biographical form in the various appendices. It will be 
shown that whereas the commissioners, for the most part, were established 
county figures with some experience of local government, their military 
associates were not. In some cases this led to a conflict of interest 
between these two groups of royalist activists. Many of the officers were 
careerists and sought social advancement through their war time 
activities, whilst the commissioners were, to a greater extent, intent 
upon preserving not only their communities, but also their hold upon them. 
The ensuing power struggle did not lead to the destruction of the royalist 
war effort, but it did nothing to strengthen it in the face of external 
military pressures. 
As well as the examination of the financial administration, the 
army which the royalists built up in the area will be reconstructed, 
regiment by regiment, in order to redress the view of it which has 
hitherto been left to history. The impression left by the dependence upon 
largely hostile descriptions of the army, has"been that the royalist 
regional commander, Henry Hastings, was merely a guerrilla leader in 
charge of various bands of land-locked pirates. This is a serious 
misrepresentation: the North Midlands Army was an army in every sense of 
the word, consisting of over forty regiments. This high number of units 
was however its main drawback. All regiments were drastically 
under-sized, and as a result, over staffed with officers, thereby proving 
a drain on resources. 
The final section of the thesis consists of an analysis of the rise 
and fall of the royalist control over the five counties, from the frantic 
activity at the end of 1642 to the slow steady reduction of the royalist 
fortresses at the beginning of 1646. It will be shown here that the 
royalist hold on the region was never complete and that this weakness 
contributed to the collapse after the middle of 1644. It will also become 
evident that the continuous drain on resources and manpower imposed on the 
region by royalist commanders outside the north midlands was another 
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important factor in the decline. The effect that this decline had upon 
the royalist cause as a whole, is taken into account in the thesis' 
conclusion. 
Some of the results of the research which has gone into the production of 
this thesis have appeared in several published articles written by the 
present author, namely: 
Lord Loughborough, Ashby de la Zouch and the English Civil War, Ashby 
Museum, Ashby, 1984. 
'Henry Hastings and the Flying Army of Ashby de la Zouch', Transactions of 
the Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society, Vol. LVI, 
1980-1981. 
'Henry Hastings and the Royalist Cause in the East Midlands', Palmer M., 
ed., The Aristocratic Estate: The Hastings Family in Leicestershire and 
South Derbyshire, East Midlands Studies Unit, Loughborough, 1982. 
'The Civil War Battle of Cotes', The Leicestershire Historian, Vol 3, 
No. 3,1984-1985. 
'Leicestershire's Royalist Officers and their War Effort in the County, 
1642-1646', Transactions of the Leicestershire Archaeological and 
Historical Society, Vol LIX, 1984-1985. 
'Contribution and Assessment: Financial Exactions in the English Civil 
War 1642-1646', War and Society, Vol. 5, No 1,1986. 
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Chapter One 
The Royalist War Effort in the North Midlands: An Introduction 
This thesis is the study of one group of counties formed into an 
Association by the royalists in early 1643 and placed under the command of 
Henry Hastings, the second son of the Earl of Huntingdon. The counties 
concerned are Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland and 
Staffordshire. The part played by each of these counties in the civil war 
has, to a greater or lesser extent, received some consideration from 
historians but they have not hitherto been treated, as a group. 
R. E. Sherwood's Civil Strife in the Midlands, though an honest attempt to 
see the midlands as a whole, is concerned more to narrate events than to 
analyse the structure and organisation of either of the rival war efforts 
in the region. 1 
Regional participation in other areas of Britain during the civil 
war has been studied and the results have provided both inspiration and 
guidance for the present work. Clive Holmes has furnished us with 
detailed work on the parliamentarian Eastern Association, whilst Ronald 
Hutton has analysed the royalist war effort in Wales and the west. 2 Peter 
Newman's work on the northern counties is, as. -. yet, unpublished, 
but his 
thesis is a further example of a thorough and penetrating study of 
regional activity during the civil war. 3 The north midlands provided 'a 
vital link between the north and the west and both Newman and Hutton have 
indicated the value of a study of this area in contributing to an overall 
picture of the way in which the royalists fought the war. 
In addition to considering the counties as a region this thesis 
will examine the personnel, the army officers and Commissioners of Array, 
who together operated the royalist war effort in the area. The social and 
familial status of the men involved will be considered along with their 
political, administrative and educative experience previous to the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1642. A comparison will be made between the 
two groups, administrators and soldiers, to see whether or not their 
backgrounds were similar. This may shed light on the difficulties which 
the two groups experienced in working together. More generally, such a 
study will, in tandem with Peter Newman's pioneering work on the analysis 
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of royalist officers over the rank of captain, and with B. G. Blackwood's 
statistical survey of Lancashire's royalist officers, indicate from which 
social groups the king was able to draw support. 4 The structure of the 
parliamentarian administration will be briefly considered along similar 
lines so that the social origins and experience of the two rival groups 
can be compared. 
The final section of this thesis will examine the effectiveness of 
the royalist administration and the royalist army in action by looking at 
the course of the first civil war in the north midlands. This will focus 
on the attempt first to win and then to maintain a position of domination 
in the region: a position they lost after the summer of 1644. 
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned firstly with a 
review of the work already produced on the royalist war effort in the 
north midlands, which will indicate why the further study undertaken here 
was thought necessary. Secondly, the chief sources used in this thesis 
will be reviewed and consideration given to their value and limitations. 
Finally, the aims of the thesis will be restated and an indication of the 
structure of the rest of the work will be given. 
Previous Work 
a) On the Royalist War Effort 
The way in which the royalists ran their war effort has received 
recent attention in Joyce Malcolm's book Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King 
Charles, produced in 1983.5 Malcolm examined the diverse elements of the 
entire war effort, from the central and local administrations to the 
propaganda machine. Her conclusion was that it was an elitist 
organisation which suppressed local initiative and crushed the counties 
with harsh financial demands. The royalists neither wanted nor encouraged 
through their press the active participation of the lower orders of 
society in any other way than to provide generals with 'cannon fodder'. 
The result was, she maintains, a royalist army made up of Welsh, Irish and 
a large proportion of mercenaries. Undoubtedly this view owes much to her 
over-dependence on printed sources and Clarendon who certainly held the 
King's army in no high esteem. Thus, though the work is an attempt at an 
overview it is highly coloured by its use of (hostile) parliamentarian 
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propaganda. Dr Wanklyn and Peter Young point out in a rejoinder to 
Malcolm's article on Charles' recruitment drive in 1642, she is blinded by 
making 'little effort to compare or collate royalist and parliamentarian 
sources'. 6 
Of more practical value is the factual study, by J. Ensberg, of 
royalist finances, written in 1966.7 Ensberg analyses the upper echelons 
of the royalist financial management. He details the powers of the 
treasury over the local commissions and briefly refers to the methods by 
which money was collected within the counties. However, in this he only 
looks at the system employed in Oxfordshire and does not extend it to a 
wider sphere. His work, read in conjunction with F. C. Dietz's examination 
of the issues and receipts of the exchequer for the early Stuart period, 
remains useful as an introduction to the complexities of royalist 
financing. 8 
Ian Roy's study of the royalist army at Oxford, which predates 
Ensberg'*s work by three years, gives an excellent insight into the command 
structure at the royalist capital. 9 Roy explores the organisation of the 
military effort at Oxford and analyses the power of the Council of liar. 
He emphasises the difference between this which was at least 
semi-permanent and councils of war in the provinces which were perhaps 
irregular or ad hoc. Some generals, such as Rupert or Lord Goring rarely 
made use of a council. Roy's work was made possible by seventy sets of 
minutes from the Oxford Councils of War, which are still in existence, 
unlike any of the councils in the north midlands, for which only fragments 
of their deliberations survive. In conjunction with Ensberg's brief work, 
Roy's study provides us with a comprehensive picture of how the royalist 
war effort functioned in the Oxford region but does little to indicate how 
royalists in other areas operated. 
Indeed, in the counties little has been done on the operation of 
the royalist war effort. Within the north midlands the chief studies of 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire are heavily weighted towards the 
parliamentarians and their war effort. Both theses on Derbyshire, those 
of A. M. Morton Thorpe and Lynn Beats, are chiefly dependent upon 
parliamentarian source material though the former does examine the gentry 
of both sides. 1° Similarly, as Patricia Lloyd concentrates upon the 
personnel and politics of the town of Nottingham, the bias is obviously 
towards the parliamentarians who held the town throughout the war, rather 
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than towards the royalists who were based at Newark. 11 On the other hand 
J. T. Pickles' study of Staffordshire does concentrate upon the royalists 
and how they fought the war in their county. 
12 The problem with this 
thesis is that interpretation is restricted by acceptance of the confines 
of the county borders. 
Peter Newman in his work on the Northern Army does not accept such 
rigid confines. 13 His as yet unpublished thesis takes into account not 
only one county's contribution to the war but that of a whole region. 
This regional slant is important; restriction to county studies can 
obscure intercounty relationships and thus distort impressions of the 
civil war in the provinces. If a county outlook is maintained, then any 
appearance of a commander not from that county appears as an intrusion, as 
in the case of Henry Hastings' 'intervention' in Staffordshire and 
Derbyshire referred to in the works of Pickles and Beats, which will be 
further considered later. This was not how it would have been perceived 
in the first civil war, when Hastings was given control of a region, not a 
county, and operated outside his actual base of Leicestershire. There 
were cases of external intervention in the north midlands, but these were 
by Prince Rupert or other royalist commanders, not by the regional 
commander. We need to adopt a regional approach and cease to regard 
counties as islands in an hostile and foreign sea, a view which was much 
promoted by Alan Everitt yet which ignores both links between counties and 
geographical barriers to county unity of the sort Ann Hughes has 
identified. 14 A County study may be of value in studying some aspects of 
county society but seems wholly inadequate when examining a national war. 
By far the most extensive published study of the royalist war 
effort is the work of Ronald Hutton. 15 He examined the county groupings 
of the south west and the Marcher counties and the way in which they were 
controlled by their various commanders in chief from the end of 1642. He 
treats the commanders in a semi-biographical manner and looks at their 
operation of the royalist administration with reference to the various 
forms of financial exaction, excise , sequestration and contribution. 
Hutton firmly believes that the way in which the war was fought reflects 
the view, held by the participants, of the part they played in society. 
Those who owned much of the counties were naturally unwilling to 
overburden them, and thereby themselves, with taxation and thus came into 
conflict with those of lesser social standing who had less to protect. He 
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then asserts that revulsion against the war was a prime cause of Charles' 
defeat, but argues that this was not the revulsion against the King 
himself which Malcolm portrays, but dissatisfaction with the breakdown of 
the normal royalist or county administration. It is the high handedness 
of military necessity, practised by Lord Goring and Barnabus Scudamore, 
governor of Hereford, which are a chief cause of clubman risings or other 
examples of popular feeling. Hutton's work is of great importance as it 
breaks down county restrictions and views the royalist war effort on a 
much wider level, which is how it would have been seen at the time. In 
going further than the narrow geographical confines adopted by Ian Roy he 
extends our perception into the provinces where Oxford laws were tempered 
by local practicality. 
Hutton includes Staffordshire in his study. His justification for 
this is that Rupert began exercising a form of military suzerainity over 
the county from the spring of 1644. It was, however, originally part of 
the North Midland Association, under Hastings. Thus Hutton's book The 
Royalist War Effort prompts a study of this association, both to link 
Hutton's chosen region to that of Peter Newman's and to reconsider the 
position of Staffordshire within the royalist war effort. 
In the above section we have traced the development of studies 
concerning the royalist war effort from the work on Oxford and Oxfordshire 
through to the more recent examinations of provincial administrations 
which are separated by the north midland counties. This thesis is 
intended to fill that gap in the literature. 
b) Analysis of the Social Structure of the Royalist Activists 
Identification of royalist officers began, in a serious way in the 
1960s. Peter Young, who for years had collected information regarding 
these men, made his findings more generally available with the publication 
of his book Edgehill. 16 His subsequent works on the battles of Marston 
Moor and Naseby have formed supplements to this. '? The latter, however, 
contains some basic factual errors regarding the names of parliamentarian 
officers, which may be an indication of the need to be wary when 
consulting Young's works. Young is also guilty of not fully documenting 
his sources; nor does he make any attempt to analyse the officers in 
terms of social background and the like, being content to deal solely with 
6 
their military careers. This type of work was left to others and it was 
around ten years after the publication of Edgehill that studies of this 
kind began to appear. 
B. G. Blackwood's study of Lancashire gentry included tables 
statistically analysing the county's royalists and parliamentarians. 
Blackwood looked at their social and familial status and their experience 
of education or central and local government. 18 J. T. Brighton likewise 
worked on the officers and administrators of both sides in Derbyshire as 
well as the county's neutrals. 19 Peter Newman, in his thesis, identified 
the Northern army's officers, analysing them, firstly rank by rank and 
then as an entire group. His conclusions were that the royalist army he 
was dealing with was commanded chiefly by members of the gentry, rather 
than by the traditional military commanders, the aristocracy. He also 
indicated that the lower officer ranks contained members of the lower 
gentry and even elements from below gentry status. He said, 
It will be seen that in attempting to identify officers who 
had held local, national or court office, prior to 1642, or 
who had received university education, a remarkable lack of 
any such experience emerges. ' 
20 
Newman qualifies his statement somewhat by asserting that the absence of 
experience could be partially explained by the presence of a large 
proportion of catholic officers, who would have been excluded from holding 
such offices. Even so in work derived not only from his thesis, but from 
his mammoth directory of royalist field officers, 21 Newman presses his 
point about the social status of the officer cadre, 
From the commencement of real warfare, mere gentry and 
lesser men were well represented at all levels of field 
command in the royal armies. ' 
22 
Apart from Brighton's work and the list of royalists in the Newark 
garrison compiled by the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments in their 
book on the town's siegeworks, nothing has been done to analyse the north 
midlands officers. 23 This thesis will look at the officers of the North 
Midlands Army in the same terms as Newman examined those of the north to 
evaluate his judgement on the link between lack of an administratively 
7 
experienced officer corps and the high proportion of catholic officers. 
The proportion of catholics in the north midlands is accepted as being 
much lower per head of population than in the north and it will be seen if 
this has a significant effect on the analysis of the region's officer 
corp. A parallel study will be made of the Commissioners of Array 
appointed to the five counties in the area and comparisons made between 
the two bodies. 
c) Works on the North Midlands 
The geographical position of the north midlands alone ensured that 
it would play a major part in the first civil war.. This point was not 
lost on the inhabitants of Leicestershire in 1642 when they petitioned the 
King from 
In the midst of your Kingdom of England, and in the midst of 
our great fears and apparent dangers ... 
' 
24 
Nor has it been lost on J. P. Kenyon when he claims that Nottinghamshire, 
as well as other counties, were almost 'continuous war zones'. 25 Yet 
there has previously been no work dedicated to the region, though it will 
be shown work has been done on individual counties within it. Nor have 
general works given full consideration to the region, concentrating rather 
on specific incidents like Prince Rupert's relief of Newark in 1644 or the 
siege of Leicester in 1645. C. V. Wedgewood refers to Hastings, the 
central figure of royalist authority in the area, in the following terms: 
'that he maintained the Royalist cause with vigour and ferocity in 
Leicestershire. 26 Thereby, she chooses to mention only one of the five 
counties under his command! But she was following the example of 
Clarendon who, though also praising his vigour and effort, did not deal at 
length with this important midland general. To other historians, ranging 
from Woolrych to Young, Hastings and the midland shires generally only 
require a mention when he, or they, appear in the light of a more 
nationally known character, such as Rupert or Charles himself. Yet 
Hastings, his army and his command were constant celebrities in the civil 
war newsbooks of both sides. To the royalists he was noble and gallant: 
to parliamentarians a notorious 'rob carrier'. 
8 
Use was made of these news books and some other contemporary 
sources by John Nichols when he compiled his The History and Antiquities 
of the County of Leicestershire at the end of the eighteenth century. 
27 
In his work Nichols provided a chronological sequence of documents and 
extracts of documents connected to each other by brief statements. No 
attempt was made to interpret the events mentioned within the sources, nor 
was the bias or origin of them commented on. The documents available to 
Nichols were chiefly of parliamentarian origin and thus presented a, 
naturally, jaundiced view of the royalists, which, as said, Nichols did 
not seek to balance. Other county studies contain brief reflections of 
the civil war and, as with Nichols, refer to the pre-eminent families 
involved therein. Stebbing Shaw's History and Antiquities of the County 
of Staffordshire contains some reprinted civil war letters and tracts, 
references to which can be found later in this thesis. Stephen Glover's 
History, Gazetteer and Directory of the County of Derby contains the same 
selection along with two versions of the career of Sir John Gell, one of 
which is from the Gresley Manuscripts used extensively in this work. 28 
Thoroton's The Antiquities of Nottinghamshire and Wright's History and 
Antiquities of Rutland are in the same vein, often reproducing the same 
information as the above histories and, like the others, carry details 
useful to the compilation of biographies of the participants of the war. 29 
Also comparable with the above five county histories is A History of the 
Antiquities of the Town and Church of Southwell... which reprints 
documentary evidence of the civil war including 'Coritani Lachrymantes, 
being an historical account of the Civil Wars in this and neighbouring 
counties by Mr Savage'. This is an interesting memoir of the war but the 
veracity of its information has to be checked against other sources. 30 
In the nineteenth century several north midland counties received 
the attentions of historians with regard to their part in the civil war. 
In 1840, J. F. Hollings wrote The History of Leicestershire During the 
Great Civil War. 31 This account, based on a lecture delivered to the 
Leicester Mechanics' Institute, does not include references to source 
material but it would appear to be heavily dependent upon the documentary 
evidence provided in Nichols' history. As an antiquarian work Hollings' 
article is unrivalled for its attention to detail and the work by Hensman 
in the present century referred to below, though shifting the emphasis 
onto Hastings' contribution, is really only a reworking of this. 
9 
The growth of county history societies during the last century 
contributed to the number of published articles regarding the civil war. 
This is particularly true of Staffordshire and Derbyshire. No less than 
six such articles appeared in Collections for a History of Staffordshire 
and five in the Derbyshire Archaeological Journal, before 1900. Most of 
the Staffordshire work was done by Major General Wrottesley, who not only 
traced his own family's role in the war, but that of other prominent 
county families. In Derbyshire, J. C. Fox looked at sequestration in the 
county as well as county personalities. These articles, though useful in 
providing clues to source material regarding such individuals who 
attracted the attentions of historians, did not, as a whole, advance the 
understanding of the civil war to any substantial degree. They were of 
interest to the devotee of purely county or family history, but of little 
other value. 
This trend continued into this century with E. W. Hensman's two 
articles on the career of Henry Hastings. 32 Although they did bring 
Hastings into prominence, their dependence on the material supplied by 
Nichols limited their potential for saying anything original about the war 
in the area. Hastings thereby, remained very much in the role of a 
guerilla leader, a role implied by the parliamentarian press' treatment of 
him three centuries earlier. Work on other counties did nothing 
materially to alter this view. Introspective as they were, the view of 
Hastings was very much that he was an outsider interfering in their 
county's affairs, thereby they assigned to him the position of an intruder 
and not that of regional military commander. 
The most important relevant published county history of the civil war 
period is A. C. Wood's Nottinghamshire in the Civil War written in the 
1930s. 33 It is a well researched advance on the nineteenth century accounts. 
Wood examined the 'county community' before the appellation was in general 
usage. His relation of the war is more penetrating than previous work and 
a genuine attempt was made to see Nottinghamshire in relation to national 
events. That some of his conclusions and factual interpretation have now 
been superseded by further works does nothing to denigrate Wood's effort. 
Yet even he did not really place the county fully into a regional 
framework and again Hastings appears more as an outsider than a commander 
with responsibility for the county. Having said this, it must be pointed 
out that there is a little more justification in this case. The strength 
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of the Newark garrison and its special relationship with Hastings' 
immediate superior, the Earl, later Marquis of Newcastle, and its 
subsequent relationship with Prince Rupert, tended to give the town's 
governors a great deal of influence, if not control, within the county. 
The mutual dependence of Hastings and the succession of governors of 
Newark will be explored in Chapters Five and Six. 
The study of the county community during the civil war began in 
earnest in the 1960s and produced the county portraits of Kent by Alan 
Everitt, of Yorkshire by J. T. Cliffe and, during the ensuing decade, of 
Lancashire by B. G. Blackwood. 34 It was hoped that the county studies 
would give some indication of the nature of the struggle revealed in the 
controversy generally known as the 'storm over the. gentry'. Examination 
of the personnel of both factions, might reveal whether there was a 
significant economic decline amongst the aristocracy and an inverse rise 
in the wealth of the gentry. What did become apparent was the difficulty 
in making precise definitions between social groups and as a result the 
desired wide ranging conclusions were never reached. Instead the period 
saw a shift from the study of the gentry to the study of county society 
and thus the 'county community' came into prominence. Everitt felt able 
to state, that when people 
'spoke of their 'country' they did not mean England, but 
Wiltshire or Kent, Leicestershire or Northamptonshire, 
Cumberland or Durham: 
35 
In turn, however, the concept of the county community came under critical 
examination in the 1970s by Clive Holmes and Ann Hughes, amongst others. 36 
Whereas Everitt saw the county almost as an island entire of itself and 
generally at odds with central government, Hughes and Holmes pointed out 
that there were social and economic ties, within or between counties, 
unrestricted by administrative boundaries. Some aspects of county life - 
intellectual and religious ones, for example - transcended, not only 
borders with neighbouring counties, but also regional boundaries. This 
would imply that the attempts at centralism, or at least regionalism, made 
during the civil war were not wholly alien to the English counties of the 
seventeenth century in the way that county studies have generally sought 
to infer. Though this thesis is not concerned with the county community 
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debate, the fact that rigid adherence to county borders is no longer 
regarded as necessary to the study of the civil war in the provinces is 
important. The need to examine the regional effects of the war is given 
credence by these new views and thus there is no need to excuse the 
geographical scope of this thesis. 
The county community debate left its mark on the north midlands. 
Three of the five counties were the subject of such studies during the 
1970s and early 1980s. Rutland alone was not subjected to any such work 
and Leicestershire was not dealt with in any major work, perhaps due to 
the expectation that Alan Everitt might follow up his brief look at the 
county's community made in 1969: 
37 this did not materialise. Instead, 
one of Everitt's students at Leicester University's Department of English 
Local History presented him with a short dissertation which was later 
turned into an article. 38 In it, David Fleming cast doubt on Clarendon's 
assertion that the political divisions amongst the county's gentry 
previous to the war were essentially continued unchanged into the war. 
These divisions, between supporters of the Grey family and those of the 
Hastings faction, did, argued Fleming, break down upon the advent of war, 
with prominent opponents of the Hastings family adopting the same royalist 
stance as their former enemies. Fleming also indicated that the county's 
royalist faction contained the majority of the administratively 
experienced and legally trained members of the community. This must be 
borne in mind when reading Chapters Two, Three and Four, when statistical 
analyses of the royalist activists and parliamentarian committeemen are 
made. Fleming's work can be read in conjunction with Gruenfelder's study 
of the Hastings' electoral influence, which gives a picture of gentry 
allegiances. 39 
Nottinghamshire has scarcely been more fortunate in the attentions 
it has received from historians. It was as recently as 1983 that Patricia 
Lloyd completed a master's thesis examining the politics of the county 
town between 1640 and 1688.40 The study is limited by her deliberate 
concentration on Nottingham as opposed to the county, with the result 
that, with reference to the civil war Lloyd's emphasis is on the 
parliamentarians rather than an over view of both sides. Though 
undoubtedly an advance on the analysis of the parliamentarian 
administration given by Wood, it was never intended to convey a general 
impression of even this one county at war. 
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Staffordshire received a greater share of attention. The useful 
reproduction of the county committee minute books by Pennington and Roots 
in 1957, was prefaced by comprehensive interpretation of the county's 
parliamentarian war effort. As a guideline it has been of invaluable use 
in the writing of Chapter Three. J. T. Pickles' thesis of 1968 provided 
this with a counterpoise by being concerned with the county's royalists. 41 
Pickles made extensive use of Hastings' letters in the research for his 
work but still maintains the impression that he was an outsider rather 
than a regional commander. Pickles does, with some success, outline the 
quarrels between Hastings and the Staffordshire commanders but may be 
guilty of over-emphasising the harm this did to the royalist cause in the 
area. 
Derbyshire has received more attention than the other counties. 
Articles much in the vein of Cox's nineteenth century studies were written 
during the 1950s, but the 'seventies saw two theses devoted to the county. 
In 1971*A. M. Morton-Thorpe produced an M. A. thesis on the county gentry. 42 
He examined the major characters in a biographical manner and outlined the 
principal military events of the war in the county. In both, the study is 
limited in scope by its heavy reliance on parliamentarian sources and he 
reached very few conclusions about the nature of support for either side. 
A much more thorough and searching investigation of the county was made by 
Lynn Beats in 1978.43 Beats was concerned with the county gentry and the 
rival war efforts during the first civil war. She perceived that an 
inherent localism within the county was largely responsible for the 
collapse of the parliamentarian East Midlands Association under Lord Grey. 
This is in keeping with the general theme of the insular nature of 
Everitt's county communities, yet the argument suffers from a major 
imbalance. As will become apparent in Chapter Two, there is little 
surviving evidence regarding the royalist war effort in the county; thus 
Beats was, like Morton-Thorpe before her, heavily dependent on 
parliamentarian source material. If she had not been restricted by her 
county centred approach the conclusions may have been different. With a 
much wider study it is possible to dovetail what evidence there is from 
Derbyshire into information gleaned from other parts of the region and 
thereby create a much more developed picture. The response of the county 
to royalist regional policy will become apparent in Chapter Two, where 
such an exercise is carried out. In addition, with regard to Derbyshire, 
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there is the work by J. T. Brighton on the composition of the royalist and 
parliamentarian parties within the counties, as well as his narrative of 
the career of Sir John Gell. 44 
None of these county histories does anything to create an 
impression of the regionally operated war effort which was aimed at by 
both sides during the civil war, though Beats goes as far as suggesting 
that such a system was defeated by localism. The present author believes 
that individual studies of counties cannot, by their very nature, be 
sufficient judges of regional activity and that this thesis is necessary 
to define the existence of a regional organisation. This study will also 
remove Hastings from his present role as a guerrilla leader and outsider 
and consider him as a regional commander faced with the problem of 
controlling his territory in the face of opposition from indigenous 
parliamentarians. This and the need for further study of royalist 
activists and their war effort, provide ample reasons for the pursuance of 
this thesis. 
Sources 
Just as it was impossible to give an examination of all the 
secondary sources, which have dealt with the geographical and historical 
area, it is likewise so for the primary sources which form the basis bf 
this thesis. Instead, only a few will be looked at in any depth. These 
will be grouped into three sections - the war effort, the North Midlands 
Army and the course of the war itself. For details of the full range of 
the sources used the reader is referred to both the footnotes to each 
chapter and to the bibliography. 
There is little evidence regarding the central policies 'of the 
royalist war effort and this is reflected in the localities as well. 
Lists of the members of commissions of array are available in the 
transcripts of Sir William Dugdale contained in the Finch-Hatton 
manuscripts and in the records of the Clerks of the Chancery, also 
transcribed by Dugdale and later printed, but not published, by 
W. H. Black. 45 These are not, however, complete lists. The Finch-Hatton 
manuscripts do not give details of every commission appointed and the 
Chancery papers do not give full details of the membership of all the 
commissions contained within. Other names can be gleaned from the papers 
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of the Committee for Compounding and of the Committee for the Advance of 
Money. These latter contain cases of factual errors and should be used 
with care. 46 The period after the war was a time when local rivalries 
could be prosecuted thoroughly and false witness be borne against an 
unpopular neighbour, resulting in instances of unreliable evidence being 
presented to committees prosecuting royalists. 
Whilst parliamentarian state papers can be found in great number in 
the relevant calendars as well as in the collections made by Rushworth 
(contemporary) or Firth and Rait (1911) no equivalent exists for the 
royalists. Apart from the far fewer royalist state papers in the 
calendars, instructions issued to the Commissions - notably those for 
Northamptonshire and Worcestershire - do still survive. Only Rutland, of 
the north midland counties has such a document in existence. 47 As a 
result, a lot of the evidence comes from the few remaining accounts of 
village constables and headboroughs, the minor officials faced with the 
awesome task of collecting the war-time taxes from the local communities. 
These, combined with the instructions issued from above which do survive, 
present a picture of the royalist war effort in the region. A full 
discussion of the constables' accounts is given in Chapter Two. On 
occasion, evidence from contemporary newsbooks can be utilized, with 
caution. Both sides' propaganda machines were designed to obscure facts 
as much as, if not more than, to present them: Only the barest details of 
potential validity can be gleaned. They can give details of where a group. 
of commissioners, or committeemen, were at a particular time-but the 
accounts of their activity is dependent upon the author's bias. Thus, 
depending on who wrote about whom, commissions or committees would be 
plundering and issuing unlawful warrants or receiving the bounty of a well 
affected county. 
The parliamentarian war effort, examined for comparative purposes, 
can be perceived via the use of the central government sources cited above 
and also by the local evidence available. Only one of the region's 
committees left considerable details of its operations, that of 
Staffordshire. This has already been referred to in the form edited by 
Pennington and Roots. The original, held at the William Salt Library, 
Stafford, has also been consulted. The town council minutes of Nottingham 
and Leicester contain references to the activities of the respective 
committees; however the minutes of the committees have been lost. 48 
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Evidence for the identification of activists can be gained from all 
the above sources. The newsbooks are again fraught with pitfalls. Names 
of officers or others contained within them can be distorted by having 
originated in hearsay or in some cases can be entirely fictional. Even 
the pamphlet containing the names of the officers in both armies in the 
early stages of the war produced in 1642 and subsequently edited by 
Peacock in the nineteenth century is full of inaccuracies. 49 As a general 
rule it is safe not to accept names from this list unless they can be 
corroborated by evidence from another source. 
Commissioners' names can, of course, be found in the two Dugdale 
transcripts mentioned earlier, whilst there are two chief sources for the 
names of the officers also. The 'List of Officers. Claiming to the Sixty 
Thousand Pounds Etc Granted by His Sacred Majesty for the Relief of his 
Truly Loyal and Indigent Party'50 lists by regiment, with additional 
unregimented names at the back, the names of officers still alive in 1663 
who had been reduced to penury by their service to Charles I. The list is 
not without flaws. In the case of the Earls of Lindsey no distinction is 
made between the regiments raised by the father and the son; similarly no 
distinction is made between regiments raised in the first civil war and 
those raised subsequently. Details regarding individuals are scanty, 
simply rank, immediate superior, regimental commander and place of 
residence. In the case of the latter this may be recorded as London and 
Westminster, the place of residence whilst making the petition. Even when 
not so, it may not be the place of residence in 1642 which is necessary 
for this thesis. 
The notebook kept by Richard Symonds an officer of the King's 
Lifeguard, is very useful. 51 It contains a list of officers in Hastings' 
army during 1644. Symonds does not list all of the regiments, only those 
he has seen or heard of. That some of the information came to him by word 
of mouth is suggested by the spelling of some of the names. By combining 
these two sources with snippets of information gathered from other sources 
a list of three hundred and fifty six names was compiled for the North 
Midlands Army officer corps. 
Identifying their social background involved a variety of source 
material. Personal documents were few and existed for only a minority of 
individuals. General sources such as heraldic visitations and lists of 
university and Inns of Court entrants were consulted as were catalogues of 
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the names of J. P. s and deputy lieutenants in the State Papers in the 
Public Record Office. 52 
Confusion of names is common in all of the sources used. This is 
particularly true when there are two or more people of the same name. In 
Derbyshire alone, there is quite often no distinction made between Sir 
John Harpur of Swarkstone and Sir John Harpur of Caulke or between Sir 
John Fitzherbert of Norbury and Sir John Fitzherbert of Tissington. In 
each case the former was an active royalist and the latter was not. Even 
Hastings is not free of such confusions. When enobled he became Baron 
Loughborough of Loughborough, but is often referred to as Lord Hastings of 
Loughborough or just as Lord Hastings. The latter is particularly 
problematic as Lord Hastings is the courtesy title. given to the first son 
of the Earls of Huntingdon and therefore to Hastings' elder brother. Such 
errors have been continued into even recent secondary material. These 
instances all concern quite prominent figures and the potential for 
confusion is probably much greater when working with minor characters. 
The presence of no less than three John Lowes in Derbyshire regiments is 
one such point. On limited evidence it would have been quite easy to 
assume that there was only one man of this name who had transferred from 
one regiment to another. However successive evidence revealed three quite 
separate individuals. 
Problems occur when trying to place the royalist officers and 
commissioners into social groups, though with the latter it is often 
easier as some indication of rank is given along with their names in the 
commissions. In the greater number of cases the ascription of social rank 
is impossible. It would appear that they are either obscure lower gentry 
or were from the 'grey area'"just below gentry status. At that level, 
obscurity is important: by the implication that they were lower gentry or 
below, Dr Morrill's assertion that, 
'those at the tail end of the gentry are far less likely to 
have been involved in the Civil War than those at the top of 
the gentry. 1 
53 
is thrown into question. For those people who were in the ranks of the 
gentry, the distinctions between esquire and gentleman are made from the 
information gathered from a number of sources, both legal and personal. 
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There is much of value in the various tests of gentry status put forward 
by Dr Wanklyn and others and summarised by Dr Morrill. This thesis in 
some way uses a combination of them all. Title is derived from the 
heraldic visitations, upon which J. T. Cliffe based his examinations and 
upon common usage as applied to individuals at the time as adopted by Dr 
Blackwood. Even with such a high proportion of officers with obscure 
origins, important points can be made regarding the nature of royalist 
support in the north midlands and elsewhere as will be shown in Chapter 
Four. 
For the final area covered by this thesis, the description of the 
role played by the north midlands royalists and their war effort in the 
civil war, a wide variety of sources, including many already cited, have 
been employed. Correspondence between the officers and the commissioners 
plays an important role. Some of these are contained, in printed form, in 
publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission. The Hastings 
collection, the Portland Papers and the Rutland Manuscripts are three of 
the prominent ones. 54 Several of Hastings own letters, some of which 
appeared in Eliot Warburton's work on Prince Rupert and the cavaliers, are 
held at the William Salt Library and have been used extensively. 54 
Individual, or collections of, letters can be found in the footnotes or 
listed in the bibliography. The parliamentarian Sir George Gresley's 
copybook kept at the Derbyshire Record Office-=also contains transcripts of 
Hastings' (captured) letters: in particular there is an amusing sequence 
between Gell and Hastings regarding the latter's capture of the mayor of 
Derby. 56 
Contemporary biographies, journals and diaries are also important 
source material, perhaps the best known being Lucy Hutchinson's life of 
her husband John. 57 Lucy was notoriously biased in her treatment of 
people she did not like, of which there appear to be many on both sides 
during the war. Fortunately she is sufficiently candid to make such 
feelings obvious, thus cutting down the chance of taking all of what she 
says at face value. Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle's, biography of her 
husband the former Earl and then Marquis of Newcastle, contains many 
useful references to the north midlands as well as to the campaigns in the 
north. The diaries of both Sir Henry Slingsby and Sir William Dugdale 
have also been consulted. 58 Despite his being based in the south, Sir 
Samuel Luke's Journal contains many references to the situation in the 
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midlands as does the memoir of Colonel John Birch. 
59 Clarendon too, 
although all too infrequently, found time to comment on the region. 
60 All 
of the above are used in conjunction with each other and the various 
sources referred to earlier. Again the reader is recommended to consult 
both the footnotes and the bibliography for both specific and general 
details of the primary source material used. 
The Thesis: its Aims and Themes 
The broad aims of this thesis have already been referred to. These 
are the study of royalist war effort and the examination of the people who 
played an active role in operating it. The geographical limits are also 
the organisational ones: that is, the counties of Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, and Staffordshire, which were 
united under the command of Henry Hastings, Lord Loughborough. The need 
for studies of both more regional examples of royalist war effort and for 
a study of the north midland counties in particular, have been shown 
above, as has the need for further investigation of the social nature of 
active royalist support. This thesis will embrace these three elements in 
an attempt to provide an insight into the operation of the royalist war 
machine, not only in the north midlands but in the country as a whole, and 
will attempt to illuminate in particular the decline of royalist power - 
after the middle of 1644. Hastings' command was directly involved both in 
the build up to the defeat at Marston Moor and in the aftermath of the 
battle which had dire consequences for the royalist cause as a whole. The 
parliamentarian victory outside York swept away a substantial and 
important area of royalist control, both south of the Yorkshire border as 
well as north of it. This thesis is concerned with that area south of 
Yorkshire and will show that, just as Peter Newman has argued for the 
possibility of the north being regained by the royalists had they mounted 
a convincing and sustained effort to that purpose, the north midlands 
offered even more potential for a royalist resurgence. 
This work is organised on the following lines. Chapter Two is the 
examination of the war time royalist administration; the main methods of 
royalist finance are analysed, as are the commissioners of array for the 
region. These latter will be examined on a social and familial basis, 
with their political, administrative and educational experience taken into 
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account. The findings from this analysis will be presented in a 
statistical form; details regarding each individual are contained in 
Appendix One. Throughout the chapter, findings will, if possible, be 
related to statistics from other regions. 
Chapter Three will be a briefer, but similar, examination of the 
parliamentarian war effort, organised along the same lines. Information 
regarding individual committeemen can be found in Appendix Two. 
Throughout this chapter, comparisons will be made with the royalist system 
and personnel. 
Chapter Four is an analysis of the North Midlands Army. It is 
necessary at the beginning of the chapter actually to recreate the army in 
terms of its constituent regiments. It has rarely been considered an army 
as knowledge of its composition has been vague. Each regiment is examined 
with regard to size and evidence for inclusion in the army. As with the 
commissioners and committeemen, the officer corps are studied and findings 
presented statistically. Appendix Three contains details about individual 
officers. 
Chapter Five is the first of the two chapters dealing with the part 
played by the associated counties in the war. It details the rise of the 
royalists in the region and how they came to dominate the area by the end 
of 1643. It will also show how their hold was, even at this time, never 
complete and that outside interference and, indeed, Hastings' own success 
was to work against him and flaw the royalist achievement. The final 
section of the chapter is concerned with the campaign culminating in the 
relief of Newark in March 1644. This action revealed both the strengths 
and the weaknesses of the north midlands royalists, whilst at the same 
time advancing Prince Rupert's reputation to new heights. 
Chapter Six follows on with the critical period after Newark when 
the Yorkshire royalists were defeated at Selby and the Marquis of 
Newcastle was forced to take up refuge in York. The effects of this had 
dire consequences for the north midlands and the subsequent defeat at 
Marston Moor was to shape the area's future until the end of the war. 
Chapter Seven will draw together the elements contained within the 
previous five chapters. By doing so it will indicate how the story of the 
north midlands royalist war effort contributes to our understanding of how 
the royalists fought the civil war and, perhaps, of why they lost the 
struggle. 
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Chapter Two 
Royalist Administration in the North Midland Counties 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature of royalist 
administration during the first civil war in the north midlands. To do 
this, the chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, the 
establishment of the commissions of array is placed within the context of 
the events of summer and autumn 1642 and the failure of the commissioners 
to mobilise effectively the military forces, with severe consequences for 
the King's attempted creation of an army, will be studied. Secondly the 
nature and composition of the active commissioners will be examined with 
reference to their social, familial and administrative status. The final 
section will be concerned with the transformation of the commissions from 
their primarily military role to a chiefly financial one. Their methods 
of gaining income from the region's communities will be analysed in some 
depth. This will provide the basis for Chapter Four, a study of the 
regiments raised by those in receipt of individual commissions and which 
were dependent upon the income raised in the region. 
The Establishment of Commissions of Array: March to August 1642 
The King's departure from London in January 1642 made government 
difficult for parliament; without the King's signature they had no legal 
method of enacting laws. This was never more obvious than over the 
militia problem. Concerned by the dangers of the Irish Rebellion and by 
the possibility that the King might attempt to. raise military forces upon 
the pretence of going over to fight in Ireland, parliament desired control 
of the Trained Bands - England's semi-permanent militia. During February 
and early March protracted bargaining between parliament, attempting to 
establish such a control, and the King, determined to resist any such form 
of emasculation, resulted in a series of proposals and counter proposals 
with little common ground. Exasperation drove parliament into issuing 
their own Militia Bill as an ordinance, effective immediately, as if it 
were an act, but without the King's signature. 1 Though they expected the 
King would agree later, they had in effect, by issuing the Ordinance in 
the first place, established the method by which they would govern the 
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country during the war. 
With the Militia Ordinance, parliament replaced the Lords 
Lieutenant in the English and Welsh counties with men of their own 
choosing. These crown officials had been in existence since the previous 
century and had chiefly, and originally, been commanders of the counties' 
militia. During the early seventeenth century their remit expanded to 
embrace powers normally incumbent upon the High Sheriffs, the collection 
of recusancy fines and responsibility for vagrants. This, and other 
extensions of power, such as their responsibility for the collection of 
distraints of knighthood, caused resentment in the counties expressed most 
vehemently during the years following Charles' accession. A committee to 
examine the lieutenancy had, as a consequence, been established during the 
first session of the 'long' parliament with a view to restricting their 
powers. Yet the Militia Ordinance did not alter the lieutenants' power 
over the militia; it simply changed the personnel involved. 
Throughout England the Ordinance produced little immediate 
response. Several of the sitting Lords Lieutenants were reluctant to 
travel to Westminster to rescind their commissions. Eventually, however, 
the changes were made and in some cases caused local tension: in the 
north midlands, the changes were quite dramatic. In Derbyshire, the Earl 
of Rutland displaced the Cavendish family - long standing incumbents of 
the office. In Nottinghamshire, the Pierrepoint family were ousted by the 
Earl of Clare. Only in Staffordshire, where the sitting Lord Lieutenant 
was the parliamentarian Earl of Essex, was there no change. 2 In 
Leicestershire at least, the changeover represented the culmination of a 
long standing family rivalry. The joint Lieutenants the Earl of 
Huntingdon and his eldest son the Lord Hastings were ousted by the head of 
their great local political rivals, the Greys, in the person of the Earl 
of Stamford. Huntingdon and his son were also displaced from the 
lieutenancy of Rutland by the Earl of Exeter. In Leicestershire, the Grey 
family had long been attempting, with the alliance of several gentry 
families, to unseat Huntingdon. 3 The 1640 elections had seen the Hastings 
family going into political eclipse, despite having successfully fought 
off serious opposition to their parliamentary candidates during the 1620s. 
Stamford's appointment was very much the culmination of this power shift. 4 
Mistakes had been made. The Earl of Clare was not a man of action 
and it was soon clear that he was not able materially to assist 
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parliament's cause. The initiative was firmly with the old Lieutenant, 
Lord Newark, and he was the King's man. 5 Dependable though he was, the 
Earl of Essex could not be everywhere at once. He appointed Walter 
Wrottesley as. his Vice Lieutenant for Staffordshire. Wrottesley 
subsequently raised troops for the King and was probably an active 
commissioner of array. 6 It does not appear that the Earl of Exeter played 
any part in the raising or training of Trained Bands in Rutland. On the 
other hand the Earls of Rutland and Stamford were material in assembling 
and training the militia in the counties under their Lieutenancies. 
During April and May, after the shock of parliament's initiative 
had died down and both the King and parliament attempted reconciliation, 
the latter tried to persuade the holders of the King's lieutenancy 
commissions to return them for cancellation. Charles meanwhile considered 
allowing parliament's appointees to remain in office for one year. But 
then the King's humiliation at the hands of Sir John Hotham and the 
material disaster of the failure to secure the arsenal at Hull, convinced 
him of the need to prevent the execution of the Militia Ordinance. On 
May 28th he expressly forbade compliance with the Ordinance. 7 But 
already, in the centre of England, men were complying with it. Lord 
Willoughby of Parnham was raising Lincolnshire's militia-by early June. 8 
In Leicestershire, the Earl of Stamford was doing likewise by June 4th. 9 
Clearly, Charles had to take more positive action. On the 8th June the 
Leicestershire. Trained Bands had even mustered in parliament's name. 10 
The situation had become dangerous for the King. The execution of the 
Militia Ordinance in the very heart of his kingdom was not only a threat 
to his prestige but also to his safety. 
In response, Charles issued the first of the Commissions of Array 
on June 12th and directed it to Leicestershire. There was an important 
difference between the Commission and the Ordinance, despite both being 
designed to gain control of the counties' militia. The Militia Ordinance 
was permissive; it did not alter the structure of the militia system but 
only replaced the personnel whilst reaffirming the power of the lords 
lieutenant. The Commissions, on the other hand, were mandatory. They had 
the express purpose of calling out the Trained Bands in the near future 
with the intention of suppressing rebellion. Commissioners were to 
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'array and train our people, and to apportion and assess such 
persons who have estates and who are not able to bear arms 
to find arms for other men. 
The arrayed people were to be organised into companies and regiments 'as 
convenient'. 11 
The commissioners of array were to have a quorum of three before 
orders for musters could be issued. The commissioners were personally 
responsible for organising such muster and for inspecting the soldiers at 
such events. It was not envisaged, even as late as August 15th, by which 
time all of the north midland counties had received commissions, that the 
militia would be on permanent muster. Instead they were to be left at 
home until such time as they were called. This and the further 
instruction that there be no increase in the number of soldiers in the 
Trained Bands, was. -in order to keep costs down. 
12 
The North Midlands 
It is necessary to indicate which commissions of array fall within 
the boundaries of this study. Henry Hastings, second son to the Earl of 
Huntingdon, displaced from his Lieutenancy by the Militia Ordinance, was 
in the summer of 1642 appointed to the commissions for both Leicestershire 
and Derbyshire; as he was heavily involved in both counties during the 
following four years their inclusion needs no other explanation. His 
authority over Staffordshire, questioned by both Colonels Bagot and 
Leveson, was reaffirmed several times by the King right through until the 
end of 1645, and so therefore this county is included. The Rutland 
commission is included even though from early 1643 the county was 
supposedly under the command of the Earl of Kingston and the Lord 
Widdrington. The Rutland commissioners met first at Ashby de la Zouch and 
then at Belvoir, both within Leicestershire, and the collections of taxes 
within Rutland was done by Belvoir-based regiments. under Hastings' 
command. Thus as the income from the county was used by the North 
Midlands Army the county and its commission are a part of this study. The 
Nottinghamshire commission is also included as Hastings was placed in 
command of the county after the Earl of Newcastle had established the 
royalist garrison at Newark. Although a certain air of independence does 
seem to mark the county, even before Sir Charles Lucas took command of a 
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large part of the county's Horse in 1644, Nottinghamshire forces generally 
acted in concert with those of the other north midland counties throughout 
the war. In addition, several units directly under Hastings' command were 
stationed at Newark during the war and collected taxation from the area as 
well as receiving their pay from such revenue. Lincolnshire is a 
different case. Originally it too was put under Hastings' control but was 
hived off to the Earl of Kingston's command in early 1643. Although 
Hastings' troops were often involved in actions in the county it appears 
that, unlike Rutland, he was never involved in the administration side of 
affairs and so this county is excluded. 
The response of the men appointed to the commissions in the region 
was not one of unanimous action. In Leicestershire, neither the Earl of 
Huntingdon nor the Earl of Devonshire were involved in raising troops. As 
a result it was left to Huntingdon's second son, Henry Hastings, to 
undertake the work in the absence-of the two men whose names had headed 
the commission. Four days after Hastings had received the commission, he 
instructed Leicestershire's Under Sheriff to issue the warrants necessary 
to summon the Trained Bands. At the same time three other commissioners 
attempted, but failed, to seize the county magazine. 13 During the ensuing 
few days plans were made to assemble the bandsmen on the-22nd June, but 
though the High Sheriff had initially concurred, he sought Stamford's 
advice and the latter contacted parliament. The result of the discussion 
in parliament on 18th June was the declaration of the commission's 
illegality and the issue of orders for the arrest of Hastings and the 
other commissioners. 14 High Sheriff Palmer reversed his earlier decision 
and whilst the town of Leicester attempted to remain neutral by accepting 
whichever of the two warrants, those of crown or parliament, arrived 
first, Palmer arrested his under sheriff to prevent the issue of the 
warrants ordered by the commissioners. 15 The upshot was that the 
attempted muster of the 22nd had to be postponed until the next day. On 
the 23rd the Earl of Stamford fortified his house at Bradgate and Hastings 
gathered a force of his father's miners and the Trained Bandsmen from the 
north of the county at Loughborough. With these he marched to the 
appointed site of the muster at Leicester. The rendezvous at the Horse 
Fair Leas was a fiasco. Palmer and two representatives from parliament 
declared the commission illegal and attempted to arrest Hastings. The 
latter was rescued during a scuffle but the King's attempt to secure the 
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county had failed. Despite Charles' hope that Stamford would be arrested, 
it was clear that the Earl held the upper hand. 16 
The King did not abandon the idea of a military coup in the 
midlands. Staffordshire had received a Commission on June 16th, 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire on the 18th and Rutland on July 2nd. 17 On 
July 1st, Hastings, having earlier returned to York, re-entered 
Leicestershire with the High Sheriff of Nottinghamshire, John Digby. They 
had both ammunition and cannon. 18 In addition Charles instructed the 
Derbyshire commissioners to raise their Trained Bands to aid Hastings. 19 
Already, the north midland counties were expected to work together. This 
co-operation, which appears to have lasted about seven days, did not 
result in the securing of the Leicestershire magazine which was now 
largely in the hands of the Earl of Stamford. In Nottingham too, Lord 
Newark failed to secure that county's magazine. 20 
Force was accompanied by coercion. In the face of these failures 
Charles abandoned his hopes of capturing Hull and entered the midlands. 
He was at Nottingham on the 21st July and at Leicester on the following 
day. There he expressed his desire for peace and accommodation, but was 
met with demands for Hasting's arrest. 21 There were other problems: 
Dr Bastwick, the puritan who had suffered at the hands of the High 
Commission in the 1630s, was arrested in Leicester after trying to avoid 
the King's notice. Charles wanted him tried for treason but Justice Reeve 
convinced the King that no jury in Leicester would convict him. Instead 
Bastwick was carried away to York and thence to Knaresborough. In 
addition, twenty-five men had barricaded themselves in the county magazine 
with the portion of ammunition left there by Stamford. Either to appear 
pacific, or to cover for his lack of armed forces to attempt a forcible 
entry to the store, the King agreed to disperse the contents to the county 
hundreds. 22 He left the city having gained nothing. 
Attempts by commissioners of other counties in the region also met 
with limited successes. In Derbyshire only one commissioner, Christopher 
Fullwood, appears to have made strenuous efforts to raise the militia. 
The nominal head of the commission, Devonshire, was as inactive in this 
county as he was in Leicestershire. At first the lead miners of the north 
of the shire were strongly supportive of parliament's men, Sir John Gell 
and the Earl of Rutland. However, the King made concessions to them 
regarding dropping the lead tithe and this enabled the energetic Fullwood 
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to raise up to one thousand men and escort them to the King at Shrewsbury, 
in September. 23 
In Nottinghamshire, the bandsmen were mustered in the King's name 
by Lord Newark in July; however his subsequent failure to capture the 
county ammunition dented his authority. When the King was in the town 
during August, prior to raising the standard, only thirty bandsmen obeyed 
the initial summons to arms. Joyce Malcolm, in Caesar's Due..., cites 
this as a prime example of the lack of popular support for the King's 
cause. However, in the ensuing few days this was mediated by the 
appearance of at least three hundred bandsmen and other volunteers. 24 
In Staffordshire, although some attempts were made by the 
commissioners of array to raise the militia, they met with little positive 
success. It devolved upon men like Lord Paget or Sir John Beaumont to use 
their personal commissions to raise troops within the county. On the 
whole the county was extremely reluctant to appear in arms for either 
side. This led to bi-party negotiations, as late as November, aimed at 
creating a third force to expel any protagonists who entered the county. 
In the case of Rutland, there is no evidence to suggest what attempts were 
made to raise the county's forces. 25 
By August, it was clear that the commissions of array had failed in 
their immediate aim - to raise an army for the King. Control of the 
Trained Bands had been impossible to attain and, in response, Charles 
began to issue commissions to individuals in order that they raise 
regiments of their own to support him. At the beginning of August, 
Hastings was empowered to form a regiment of four hundred horse and by the 
middle of the month he had raised at least two troops. 26 It was, as 
Ronald Hutton argues, by these commissions that the King's army was 
raised. Though some, at least, of the men so empowered, like Hastings, 
Sir John Harpur and Sir John Fitzherbert, both of Derbyshire, as well as 
others, were commissioners of array, it was their work as individuals, not 
as a part of the commissions, which created the royalist army within the 
midland shires. 27 
Though they had failed in their primary task, which resulted in the 
creation of the regiments studied in Chapter Four, the commissions of 
array did not disappear. Though they appear to have met only rarely, if 
at all, during the rest of the year and in some cases became involved in 
local negotiations with parliamentarians, they were still in existence the 
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following Spring. In February 1643, the region's commissions were 
instructed to work with their neighbouring counties and on February 23rd 
the counties of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland and 
Lincolnshire were associated under the command of Henry Hastings. Within 
weeks Lincolnshire and perhaps Rutland were taken from his territory but 
Staffordshire was added to it. 28 
The role of the commissioners was now altered: there was less 
emphasis on their role as a military body and more on their part as a 
financial one whose function was to supply and maintain the forces raised 
in the region by the colonels, by means of taxation. Their methods of 
doing so are examined in the third section of this chapter. The next part 
is concerned with an examination of the individuals who remained active 
commissioners during late 1642 and became the figures responsible for the 
financial administration with which they were entrusted during 1643. 
The Commissioners of Array 
In order to assess the extent to which war time local government 
was in the hands of the pre-war social elite and to deduce from which 
social groups the King was able to draw active support, it is necessary to 
analyse the commissioners of array. These are, of course, only one of the 
two groups of activists at the regional level and a study of the royalist 
officers, and how they reflect the social structure, will be made in a 
following chapter. The commissioners, and the officers in their turn, 
will be examined with reference to their social rank, their familial 
status and with regard to their experience of higher and/or legal 
education as well as their experience of central or local government. 
Only commissioners deemed active, by light of available evidence, will be 
examined in the text, though all appointees will be covered in Appendix 
One. Within the text mention will be made of any differences to the 
proportions revealed in the tables, by the inclusion of statistics derived 
from examination of men deemed inactive because of their incapacitation, 
or simply through lack of evidence. This is because of the possibility of 
error brought about by the dearth of information regarding the activities 
of the commissions. At the close of the war commissioners, faced with the 
enquiry by the Compounding Committees as to their war record, were careful 
to destroy as much incriminating evidence as possible. This left the 
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Compounding Committees a difficult task and has left the historian an even 
more problematic one. 
The commissioners will be considered firstly county by county and 
then as an entire group. Comparison between them and the royalist 
officers will be made in Chapter Four, which deals with the officers 
themselves. 29 
The Derbyshire Commissioners of Array 
A total of twenty-three men were appointed to the two commissions 
issued for Derbyshire, that of July 1642 and of December 1643. The only 
significant difference between the two commissions is that the Earl of 
Rutland, by that time overtly a parliamentarian, is excluded from the list 
of names. Similarly, Lord Deincourt is also left off the commission and 
the Marquis of Newcastle is added in their place. However it is pertinent 
to note that none of the nobles appointed to either of the commissions 
took an active part in their work. Newcastle was busy elsewhere, 
Devonshire avoided any connection with the commission and the Earl of 
Chesterfield had been captured before the commission really began to 
assert itself as a financial body. 
Eleven of the nominees appear to have been activists. Along with 
Rutland, Sir Edward Leech and Sir John Coke were parliamentarians. Sir 
John Fitzherbert of Tissington died before the end of 1642 and four 
others, including Sir John Harpur of Caulke, High Sheriff in 1642, seem to 
have avoided working on the commission. John Agard's case is a problem: 
. although he appears to have been at Tutbury Castle in 1643 and was 
captured from there by the parliamentarians early in the year, he does not 
appear to have served as a commissioner and is not included in the 
following statistics. 
The social composition is affected by this lack of active nobility; 
the one person included in the noble classification is Sir John 
Fitzherbert of Norbury, heir to Lord Norbury. 
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Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
123S0000 
Thus we can see that war time county government was in the hands of the 
second rank of county society. No less than six of these commissioners 
were also colonels of regiments. Of the lower social ranks, Hastings and 
Fullwood were out of the commission by the time the second one was issued. 
This leaves the remaining nine even more heavily concentrated at the upper 
end of the gentry... 
A similar concentration is in evidence in the familial status 
table. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
81100 
With eight actual and one potential heads of families we can see that in 
Derbyshire at least, the level of commitment in activists' families was 
very high. Committing the family head to a cause in such a way would 
entail grave financial consequences if that cause failed. Given the 
structure of the seventeenth century 'family' such a commitment of the 
head would entail the financial involvement not only of the nuclear but 
also the extended family. In addition active involvement may well have 
deprived the family of its spiritual, as well as its economic, leader for 
protracted periods. 30 
The Derbyshire group were possessed of a great deal of 
administrative experience gained in the years before the war which would 
serve them whilst on the commission. Only Sir Andrew Kniverton appears to 
have been without such experience. 
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Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
(M. P. = member of parliament; L. L. = Lord Lieutenant; D. L. = Deputy 
Lieutenant; H. S. = High Sheriff; J. P. = Justice of the Peace; Inn = 
attendance at one of the Inns of Court) 
M. P. L. L. 
20 
D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
44563 
As neither of the M. P. s had sat in the 'long' parliament, they did not get 
summoned to the Oxford parliament and thus were not removed from the 
commission for this purpose in 1644. Of the high sheriffs, two, John 
Milward of Snitterton and Sir John Harpur of Swarkstone, would have been 
involved in the collection of Ship Money: this was of value in respect to 
the gathering of taxation. All four of the deputy lieutenants had been 
involved in the raising of Trained Bands during the Scottish Wars. Of 
four of the six commissioners who had attended university, little is known 
of their actual educational experience. The other two gained M. A. s. 
Coupled with even the barest legal knowledge gained by the four who had 
attended one or other of the Inns of Court this makes the combined 
educational experience of the Derbyshire commission quite impressive. 
More of the educational aspect of the commission will be said below. The 
presence of the five J. P. s is important. Appeals against aspects of 
royalist financial exactions would be made to this group, which gave the 
royalists' administration some impression of legality. This formed a 
major part in Charles' pretensions to be acting in respect of the English 
'constitution'. This collective ability, coupled with the local knowledge 
and the social connections that such a group would have, indicate that the 
Derbyshire commissioners had formidable potential. With such a large 
proportion of colonels on the commission there would be little likelihood 
of factional rivalry between military and administration as happened in 
other counties. 
There were no catholics amongst either the active or non active 
Derbyshire commissioners. Their exclusion from pre-war county government 
was reflected in the war-time equivalent; however there were catholic 
officers from the county in the North Midlands Army. 
The consequences of high familial commitment were eventually 
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visited upon the county's activist families. Only in the case of Sir 
Edward Vernon of Sudbury is there no evidence of post war fines. 
Fullwood's death did not deter the parliamentarians from confiscating the 
greater part of his estate, leaving one of his three daughters dependent 
upon charity. This emphasises the dire consequences, not only for the 
family but also for their posterity, of being an activist. Harpur was 
also heavily prosecuted; the first assessment of a fine was over four and 
a half thousand pounds and was only eventually reduced to four thousand. 
There is a large gap between Harpur's fine and the next largest figure - 
due, no doubt, to the fact that he was reputed to be the richest man in 
the county. John Milward and John Bullock of Darley suffered exactions of 
over one thousand pounds. The rest paid sums less than this. Hastings 
and Kniverton were able to avoid crippling fines by judicious demands when 
surrendering their garrisons to the enemy. This does not of course take 
into account the costs paid out during the war from personal income. 
Hastings estimated that fighting the war cost him ten thousand pounds, a 
small amount compared to the nine hundred thousand said to have been paid 
out by the Marquis of Newcastle, but great to a man with an estate said to 
be 'little or nothing of worth'. Just as the potential ability of the 
Derbyshire Commissioners was great, so was the price of their heavy 
commitment great. 
The Leicestershire Commissioners of Array 
Of the. thirty-one nominees to both the commission of array of 
June 1642 and the commission'of peace intended to assume some war-time 
duties as well as add legal weight to the administration, issued in 1644, 
only thirteen appear to have been active. Three, two Earls of Huntingdon, 
father and son, and Edward Farnham of Quorn, may have at some time been 
involved in the operation of the war effort, but there is not enough 
evidence to fully include them as activists. The elder Earl appears to 
have left everything to his second son, his heir having dabbled with 
parliament's cause to the extent of having been (briefly) at the battle of 
Edgehill. He may never have become involved in the administrative affairs 
conducted at Ashby de la Zouch, to where he claimed to have fled to avoid 
parliamentarian harassment. Farnham left Ashby during the plague in 1645 
and thus may conceivably have been embroiled in the war effort. Of the 
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others deemed inactive, three were parliamentarians, one died without 
having been involved and two were royalist activists elsewhere. 
As in the case of Derbyshire the social concentration is in the 
upper gentry bracket, titled gentry and the squirarchy. The sole noble is 
Sapcoat, Viscount Beaumont, added to the commission in 1644 although he 
may have been involved earlier unofficially. By that time Hastings was a 
baron in his own right, but as we are here only concerned with pre war 
rank, he only figures as an esquire. 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
12451000 
The commissioner of lowest social rank was Richard Turpin of Knaptoft, 
whose commitment was to cost him dear in the aftermath of the war. Two of 
the commissioners were colonels (including Hastings) and six others had 
sons in the forces. 
Again, following the pattern of the Derbyshire commission, familial 
commitment was high. This is not very surprising. As the commissioners 
were initially chosen perhaps with regard to their county standing, most 
would have been the leading figure within their own family to have 
achieved that standing in the first place. 
Familial Status 
Head Ist son 2nd son other son unknown 
11 0200 
Again it can be perceived that the financial commitment was high. Nuclear 
and extended family fortunes as well as the activists' 'posterity', were 
risked in the heavy commitment which these men made to defending the 
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position of the monarchy. Hastings and Turpin were the two second sons. 
Only two activists, Beaumont and Sir Eusebius Pelsant appear not to 
have had any pre-war administrative experience to bring to bear on the 
work as commissioners. In neither case is this apparantly due to age, 
i. e. they were too young to have held office previous to the war, nor due 
to religion: they were not ineligible due to being catholics. This may 
be some indication of either the preparedness or necessity of going below 
the caucus of county families which normally provided county officials. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
2047362 
Of the M. P. s neither had served in the 'long' parliament so were not 
called upon to sit at Oxford. Had the Earls of Huntingdon been active 
they would have both figured in the lord lieutenant category. All four of 
the deputy lieutenants had been involved in the raising of the Trained 
Bands for the Scottish wars and had been engaged in the ättempts to bring 
them on to the side of the King in the summer of 1642. Of the high 
sheriffs, only Sir Richard Roberts of Sutton Cheney and Sir Henry Skipwith 
of Cotes had actually been connected with the raising of ship money, but 
the collective experience of the seven sheriffs would be invaluable. In 
contrast to the members of the Derbyshire commission who had attended 
university, none of the Leicestershire men had gained degrees, though two 
did progress to the inns. These latter would join with the J. P. s to bring 
legal knowledge and an appeals body to the commission. Only one of the 
commissioners was specifically accused, though not guilty, of being a 
catholic, despite it being widely asserted that Hastings was working hand 
in hand with papists from the outset of the war. 
All the commissioners faced financial penalties at the end of the 
first civil war, although in the majority of cases there are no numerical 
details. Sir John Pate of Sysonby was the greatest sufferer. In 1646 he 
was fined one sixth of the value of his estate, a sum of over eight 
hundred pounds. Later, perhaps due to some unrecorded involvement in the 
second civil war this was increased to over four thousand pounds. Sir 
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Richard Halford paid over two thousand pounds and Sir Erasmus de la 
Fontaine of Kirby Bellars, whose estate was used as a parliamentarian 
garrison, over one thousand. Turpin's burden was both financially and 
personally heavy. In addition to having to sell off his Knaptoft estate 
to pay his nine hundred pound fine, all of his sons were killed in the 
King's service. 
This commission was in one way different to Derbyshire's. It was 
not dominated by the military, unless Hastings could hold it in his sway. 
It came into conflict with Colonel Gervaise Lucas, governor of Belvoir 
Castle when he objected to their allotment of territory to his forces. 
But, on the other hand, both commissions could call upon a wide variety of 
administrative experience held by their members and both entailed a great 
deal of financial forfeit for the activists. 
The Nottinghamshire Commissioners of Array 
Out of the thirty-five nominees to the 1642 Nottinghamshire 
commission of array and to the county's representatives an the bi-county 
commission established with Lincolnshire in 1645, only nine are deemed 
active by this survey. This commission has left slightly more 
documentation regarding its structure than the others in the region, but 
even so it is still possible to have three cases of insufficient evidence 
to include them amongst the activists. Sir Matthew Palmer served in the 
north instead of-working on the commission. Colonel William Stanton, 
despite being in the Newark garrison, does not appear to have sat in his 
capacity as commissioner of array and Robert Mellish also in Newark does 
not appear to have been active. Because of the presence of doubt in all 
of these cases they are referred to in the relevant appendix. Two 
would-be commissioners were captured early in 1643 and thereby kept out of 
the way and no less than eight nominees were actively to espouse the 
parliamentarian cause. Eight others were to serve the royalist cause 
outside the county, one of these being the Marquis of Newcastle whose 
absence from the Derbyshire commission has already been referred to. A 
further eight have left no evidence to suggest what they did during the 
war years. They were probably either passive royalists or determined 
neutrals. One, however, Robert Grieves, Nottingham town clerk, was 
deprived of his office by the resident parliamentarian committee who 
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regarded his presence at Newark as indicative of royalist sympathy if not 
activity. There is evidence that Grieves was under arrest for at least 
part of his time in Newark. 
There was one holder of a noble title on the commission, John Lord 
Chaworth of Armagh. 
Social Status 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
11240001 
For the first time there appears an individual whose social rank cannot be 
determined. However, unlike the large numbers of such cases in the 
statistics pertaining to the officer corp, Holder was not entirely 
obscure. He would appear to be from the gentry or at least to have 
pretensions of belonging to it - he signed the county's petition calling 
on its M. P. s to adhere to the King's side in Spring 1642. Holder's 
origins do not affect the position too much. The concentration at the 
upper end of the gentry, though not higher, is still apparent. 
This is likewise true of the familial position of the 
commissioners. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
70011 
It is Holder again who remains a mystery. Richard Byron of Strelley was a 
third son; both his elder brothers were active royalists. His eldest 
brother John had also been appointed to the commission but served out of 
the area for the whole of the war, at one stage being Field Marshal of 
Horse and Foot in Cheshire. Richard became the governor of Newark from 
early 1644 until his defeat at the battle of Denton undermined his 
40 
authority and he was removed at the end of that year or early the next. 
The Nottinghamshire commission did not have a high degree of 
collective experience. Four commissioners, Holder, Byron, Thomas 
Williamson of East Markham and John Digby of Mansfield, had no experience 
of county government before 1642. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that Byron was from a family that had such experience behind it and Digby 
had been the High Sheriff during summer 1642 and thus heavily involved in 
the early stages of the King's attempt to gain the midlands' support. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
3010141 
Two M. P. s, Robert Sutton of Aversham and Sir Gervaise Clifton of Clifton, 
had sat in the 'long' parliament. Both appear to have attended the Oxford 
sessions at some time but were chiefly involved in the work of the 
commission. Sutton was also the sole deputy lieutenant; he had 
experience of mobilising the Trained Bands. The lack of any high 
sheriffs, parlicularly ones with experience of collecting ship money 
levies, may have caused initial difficulties with the financial system 
which cannot actually be discerned from the available evidence. There was 
also remarkably little legal experience on the commission and the presence 
of only one J. P. would present problems vis-a-vis the attempt to maintain 
an appearance of legality. However, the county's parliamentarians could 
only muster two J. P. s. Of the four who had attended university, only 
Clifton seems to have taken his degree. 
The price of their commitment to the cause was, in some cases at 
least, high. Clifton was fined over seven thousand pounds, Williamson 
over three and Roger Cooper of Thurgarton, two. Byron, perhaps as a third 
son, may have possessed only a small estate as his fine appears to have 
only been one hundred and twenty pounds. 
The two chief points brought up in the two previous counties, is 
reflected again here. Firstly the commissioners are, in the main, drawn 
from the upper ranks of the gentry although not from the highest ranks of 
society, this due in part to two of the county's nobles serving elsewhere. 
41 
Secondly the activists are from the apex of their families' structure and 
are thereby committing them financially to the King's war effort. 
The Rutland Commissioners of Array 
Only twelve persons were nominated to the commission for the 
smallest county in England. Six appear to have been active on the 
commission and three were royalist activists elsewhere. Edward Heath of 
Cottesmore and Sir Christopher Hatton R. B. of Kirby, Northamptonshire, 
were both at Oxford. Robert Tredway of Ketton sat on the joint 
Nottinghamshire-Lincolnshire commission by right of his holding estates in 
the latter. Two of the three other non-activists died in early 1643. 
Lord Camden died at Oxford in March, having earlier helped Gervaise Lucas 
capture Belvoir Castle. His younger son Henry Noel died in imprisonment 
after Lord Grey captured him in February 1643. The third man, Thomas 
Levett, has left no clues to his part in the civil war. 
The representative of the nobility is Camden's eldest son Babtiste 
Noel, who succeeded to the title in March 1643, but is included here by 
virtue of his being an heir to the title on the outbreak of war. 
Social Status 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
10230000 
The commission is very much from the upper end of county society. This is 
reflected in the fact that all six were heads or potential heads of 
families. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
24000 
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Only one of the activists had no experience of administration; the five 
who had were well versed in such affairs between them. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
3002151 
Two of the M. P. s were entitled to sit at Oxford and did so for some of the 
period of that parliament's sitting. Neither of the high sheriffs had 
held office in the.. period when the ship money levies were made and no one 
had been involved in the mustering of Trained Bands. Two of those who had 
been students actually took degrees. The one J. P. was Sir Francis 
Bodenham of Wingfield who had attended Grey's Inn. 
Financial consequences of the involvement in the war effort were 
high. Noel was fined over eleven thousand pounds for his part, the 
original assessment had been more than twenty thousand. Guy Palmes of 
Ashwell had to pay over three thousand pounds. Bullingham's fine was much 
lower than these that was eventually reduced to three hundred pounds. All 
of the commissioners had to pay some form of fine for their commitment to 
the royalist cause. Their posterity was again burdened with the 
consequences of their defeat. 
The Staffordshire Commissioners of Array 
Of thirty nominees to the commissions for Staffordshire, fourteen 
seem to have been active. Walter Chetwynd of Rugeley who produced iron 
for the royalists and Thomas Crompton of Stone are both shrouded in 
uncertainty. Though in this instance Charles and his advisors picked no 
future parliamentarians, several of the commissioners were involved in the 
attempts to establish the third force in the county during late 1642. 
Three of the nominees served outside the county: Lord Paget and Sir 
Richard Shelton, the King's Solicitor General, were at Oxford and Sir 
Henry Griffith of Whichnor served in the north. Six appointees played no 
role in the civil war beyond passive royalism or trying to remain aloof 
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from the conflict. 
None of the nobility originally appointed to the commission was 
active upon it; this again included the Marquis of Newcastle. Thomas, 
Lord Cromwell, was appointed to the commission established in 1645 and was 
to crop up on minor ones concerned with the county during the final year 
of the war. As this thesis is chiefly concerned with those figures 
actively involved from the outset of the war, he does not figure in the 
statistics, nor do Sir Jacob Astley or Henry Hastings also appointed to 
Staffordshire commissions in 1645. 
Social Status 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
07250000 
With the high number of titled gentry, there is no doubt that this 
commission was composed of men who were, if not at the apex of county 
society, at the top of the gentry bracket within that county. Sir Simon 
Avery of Eggington, Derbyshire, was one of the county's commissioners as 
well as serving on that of his native county. It is highly probable that 
he was able to partake in work on both commissions and thus he is counted 
as being active for both, although in the final analysis of all the 
commissioners he will naturally be counted only once as will Hastings who 
also served on two bodies. 
Only Sir Robert Wolesley was xot a first son by birth; at the 
commencement of the civil war his exact position in his family is unknown 
so he is counted here as a second son as he was at birth. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
13 0100 
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The concentration is again, convincingly, at the top of the table. Again 
it must be recalled that in some way this is to be expected as to have 
reached a position of responsibility within the county the commissioners 
were more likely to have been the representatives of families of 
administrative experience. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
7024695 
Only one commissioner, Thomas Lane of Bentley, appears to have no pre-war 
experience in any of the above fields. Four of the M. P. s were entitled to 
sit at the Oxford parliament and only one, Ralph Sneade of Keele, did not 
attend at some time. Sneade was heavily involved in attempts to raise 
troops in the north of the county during 1644 and this would have 
prevented him from going to Oxford. Both deputy lieutenants had raised 
the militia during the wars with the Scots and two of the high sheriffs 
had been involved with ship money. Of the nine men who had received 
higher education none appears to have taken their degree though five did 
progress to the inns. The presence of six J. P. s would be an important 
factor in maintaining a facade of legality as well as providing an inbuilt 
appeals body. Only two of the commissioners held a contemporaneous 
military rank: Sir Richard Leveson was operating in neighbouring 
Shropshire for much of the time and Sneade was, it appears, largely 
unsuccessful at raising a regiment in the north of the county. Thus it 
does not appear strange that this commission had problematic relations 
with the county military personnel, Thomas Leveson in particular. Leveson 
continuously found fault with the commissioners' allocation of territory 
between the county garrisons especially with respect to, what he saw, as 
the excessive area allowed to Colonel Bagot, commander of the Lichfield 
garrison, son of one of the commissioners. 
Their defeat cost the commissioners dear. Sir Richard Leveson was 
fined over ten thousand pounds after the war on top of which his estate 
had been under sequestration during the conflict. Others who paid high 
fines include Sir Thomas Littleton who lost over six thousand pounds, Sir 
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Edward Seabright over three thousand and Sneade over two. 
The pattern established with the Derbyshire commissioners is 
carried through to their Staffordshire counterparts. War-time county 
government was in the hands of a social elite, if not at the top of the 
social ladder then very near it. They were drawn chiefly from the upper 
gentry bracket; either from the squirarchy or the ranks of the titled 
gentry. They were not, for the most part, magnates with vast multi-county 
land holdings but were powerful within their home county and very often 
had played leading roles in their society by holding administrative office 
within it. This combined to give them not only practical knowledge to 
help them in their war-time task, but would also give them a desire to 
temper the rigours of war when dealing with what was essentially their or 
their associates' property, their source of both income and status. 
Before moving on to the overall analysis of the commissioners it is 
necessary to look at two areas referred to in the preceding examination in 
more depth. These areas are education and religion. 
Education 
a) The Universities 
As has been suggested throughout the relevant sections of the 
county by county analysis, very few of the commissioners who attended 
university left with degrees. University attendance in the seventeenth 
century was considered important not solely as a means of obtaining an 
education. The English universities were a place for the young members of 
the gentry to meet others of their ilk and thus make potentially 
advantageous social connections. It is the purpose of this section to 
explore the possibility that the commissioners of array made social 
connections during their respective times at university which stretch 
until the outbreak of war. Such connections, if made, may be an indicator 
of a shared basic ideology, although, of course, there is practically no 
hope of proving such a hypothesis. 
Of the twenty-eight commissioners who had received some amount of 
university education, only eight appear to have taken degrees. Given that 
Lawrence Stone has argued that the pre-war period was a time of an 
educational revolution as the numbers of entrants to the universities 
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increased, the number of commissioners who went may seem low, being 
slightly over half the total number of activists. Stone also suggests 
that, due to deficiencies in the records kept of matriculants, up to a 
third more people may have attended Oxford or Cambridge than it is 
possible to prove. This rough estimate cannot, of course, be turned into 
meaningful figures for the group we are concerned with, and so we are left 
with only the twenty-eight known cases. The point does remain however 
that twenty-three commissioners did not gain either the benefits of social 
alliances nor the recognisably necessary smattering of legal knowledge to 
survive in what were notoriously litigious times. As attendance at 
university was a mark of social standing we are, perhaps, reminded by 
these figures that the commissioners, though of high standing in their 
counties, were not all representatives of the apex of the social ladder. 
There are no significant groupings of commissioners, during the 
time they spent at university, which suggest social or economic ties. The 
thirteen who attended Cambridge went to eight different colleges, the 
highest number at any one college being three, at St John's. These men 
did not share a common time period and nor are there any significant time 
period groupings amongst any of the other commissioners regardless of 
college. Four of these Cambridge men attended what were considered 
'puritan' colleges, though as we cannot say what their actual educational 
experiences were, no real conclusions can be drawn from this. 
At Oxford, the fifteen commissioners were again spread amongst 
eight colleges. There are no significant groupings either on a time or 
college basis. No Oxford commissioner attended a 'puritan' college. 
Turning to the status'of the undergraduate commissioners: only ten 
can be so judged, these all being Cambridge men. Seven were fellow 
commoners which meant that their families afforded the cost of their 
education. Two were pensioners also present at their families' expence, 
and one was a scholar who was there at the expence of the college, having 
proved himself to be of academic ability. There were no sizars or 
plebeans, the lower class of student, amongst the commissioners as there 
were amongst the royalist officers. 
Whilst on the theme of comparing the two groups of activists there 
are practically no groupings of officers and commissioners at either 
university. At Oxford there were however three future commissioners and 
six future north midlands royalist officers present in the year 1616-1617. 
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At Cambridge only one commissioner was in attendance at the same time as 
any of the officers. The difference in age between the two groups can be 
noted at this point. The average age of the commissioners was fifteen 
years older than the average age of the field officers (the only officers 
for whom any meaningful age statistics could be obtained). This is 
reflected in the university attendance. Whereas only three of the 
commissioners matriculated after 1625, only nine of the thirty-six 
officers who went to university matriculated before the same date. 
There seems to be little or no ground for asserting that the 
commissioners made lasting connections with each other at university. The 
instances of any being at either establishment within the same time period 
are so few that connections could well have been re-enforcements of social 
links forged as a result of being a part of the same community. Therefore 
there are no grounds for suggesting that potential for common ideologies 
was formed at the universities. 
b) The Inns of Court 
As with the universities, there appear to be no links forged 
between the future commissioners who attended the Inns. - On the question 
of time groupings, only four of the eleven commissioners were there within 
any acceptable number of years, in this instance 1611-1615. Three of 
these were at. Greys and one at the Inner Temple. Though five in all 
attended Greys, -only these three were there in anything like a significant 
time span. The Inns provided a useful legal training which, to gentry who 
were likely to spend some of there life in legal wrangles over land 
rights, would have been extremely useful. They were also used in much the 
same way as the universities, that is they were at once an expression of 
status, a place for making useful social contacts and also a base in the 
capital city from which to make forays into the court. 
Prest in his work on the Stuart Inns came to the conclusion that 
there were strong regional ties revealed in the patterns of attendance at 
the inns. However the statistics revealed in the study of the north 
midland commissioners of array do not easily fit into the picture which 
Prest gave. Greys, he stated, drew most of its men from the north, East 
Anglia and Kent. According to the findings regarding the commissioners it 
also drew on the north midlands. This is also true of the Middle Temple 
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whose bias was supposedly towards the south west and Northamptonshire and 
of the Inner Temple; the latter but not the former would accord with 
Prest's theory. Also in accordance with Prest is the fact that none of 
the commissioners went to Lincoln's Inn. The numbers in this instance are 
too small for any valid critique of Prest's finding to be made, but the 
regional question will be referred to again as the sample gets larger when 
firstly the parliamentarian committeemen are added and finally the 
royalist officers are examined. 31 
Religion 
Though four of the commissioners were, at some time during the war, 
accused of being papists it is not likely that any of them were, unless 
they were successfully covert crypto-catholics. Appointing catholics to 
administrative posts at such an early stage of the war when the first 
commissions were drawn up was potentially dangerous. The dislike, if not 
fear, of papacy would ensure a high rate of disregard for the commissions 
of array in the provinces had they actually contained catholic members. 
The problems of appointing catholics to the administration even at a late 
stage in the war were revealed when the placing of the Earl of Shrewsbury 
to head the Marcher Association provoked the Worcestershire 'clubmen' to 
issue the Woodbury Declaration. Thus, though allowing catholics into the 
army was a successful method. of tapping their financial wealth, the 
inclusion of them in commissions of array would have been counter 
productive. This may explain the exclusion of the catholic Thomas Leveson 
from the Staffordshire commission, an exclusion which certainly wrankled 
with him. 
Certainly in one case out of the four, that of Sir Richard Dyott of 
Lichfield, there were very spurious grounds for labelling him a catholic. 
Whilst a barrister at the Inner Temple, he had been a furious opponent of 
the puritans at the Inn, an antipathy he may well have kept up whilst 
Chancellor of the Palatinate of Durham. Incidentally, the only other 
commissioner to have apparently strong religious views was Christopher 
Fullwood, who had opposed the puritan element at Grey's Inn. 32 As it 
appears that there were no catholics on any of the commissions, we are 
dealing with an area closed to them, just as pre-war administration was, 
in general, closed to them. Thus the only positive outlet for royalist 
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catholic activists was the army. Their presence in the North Midlands 
Army will be examined in Chapter Four. 
The Commissioners: An Overview 
To commence the study of the commissioners as a single body a table 
of the total number is presented. Once those people who held dual or even 
triple membership are taken into account, there were one hundred and 
twenty-eight men nominated to commissions in the five counties with which 
we are concerned. The breakdown is as follows: 
Activists 51 39.8% 
Cases for which it is not possible 
to ascertain their behaviour 9 7.0% 
Non Activists 
a) Dead or captured before April 1643 7 5.5% 
b) Activists outside the county 16 12.5% 
c) Parliamentarians 15 11.8% 
d) Passive royalists or neutrals 30 23.4% 
TOTAL 128 
It is at once obvious-that, at York, grave errors of judgment were 
made regarding the expected support for the King in the counties. Only 
58% of those seen as potential activists actually became so, and this 
includes those who became active outside their own counties. No less than 
fifteen men were active supporters of parliament. There are also thirty 
individuals whose part in the war was so small as to be untraceable. They 
were, it would seem, either passive supporters of the royalists or 
neutrals. Neutralism was not recognised by either side and fourteen were 
fined or at any rate assessed for fines by the victorious parliament. 
Thus we are left with fifty-one active commissioners and the possibility 
that a further nine may have been involved in the work with them. It is 
to the fifty-one men that we now turn; if any significant difference to 
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the findings is made by the inclusion of the nine others, mention will be 
made in the text. 
The pattern which emerged in the examination of individual counties 
is made clear when the group is considered as a whole. 
Q--; mal Pant, 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman 
4 11 13 22 10 
of 7.7% 21.2% 25.0% 42.3% 1.92% 
whole 
% of 7.8% 21.6% 25.5% 43.1% 1.6% 
known 
Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
01 
1.92% 
The overwhelming majority of commissioners who were active royalists 
derive from the ranks of the titled gentry and the squirarchy rather than 
the nobility. It is evident that the local communities under royalist 
control were in the hands of the gentry just as much as the Northern Army, 
according to Peter Newman. If the nobility who died before April 1643 and 
those included in the nine uncertain cases are taken into account, the 
numbers of the aristocracy are increased to eight thus achieving a 
proportion of 15.8%. This does not materially alter the fact that the 
nobility were not the dominant group in the counties. Equally, despite 
the large proportion of esquires active on the commissions, the actual 
numbers were not high. 
The lack of information regarding the thoughts of these men 
regarding their choice, either between sides or between activity or 
passivity, means that no sound judgments can be made regarding their 
motivation. In the cases of some, particularly amongst the nobility, it 
may be that exclusion from the court played some role in this. But 
Huntingdon was a court appointed Lieutenant and did nothing, perhaps due 
to age or as part of his long term policy of the avoidance of central 
politics. 33 Yet Newark from a similar family, and likewise a Lieutenant, 
did become active. Devonshire, another Lieutenant, was a passive royalist 
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whilst Chaworth, with seemingly no court connections, became an activist. 
With others it may have been opposition to the King's policies during the 
1630s which guided their view of the civil war, but Erasmus de la 
Fontaine, fined for depopulation in the 1630s, was an active royalist; 
additionally some commissioners had been fined for distraint of 
Knighthood. There are no easy-to-apply rules regarding fealty to Charles 
in the war years, and it is beyond this thesis to try to establish these: 
it is concerned with a mere identification of the groups from which 
loyalty did come, not with a psycho-historical analysis of why. 
On the other hand those who did commit themselves to the cause were 
risking not only themselves in doing so, they committed their families 
too. 
Familial Status 
Head 
40 
of 76.9% 
whole 
7 of 78.4% 
whole 
1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
5411 
11.5% 7.7% 1.92% 1.92% 
11.8% 7.8% 1.96% 
The proportion of heads of families remains high, even when the nine cases 
of uncertainty are taken into consideration. It is clear that the King 
aimed to have his war effort run by men of certain status. If he failed 
to galvanise the majority of them, those left were still from essentially 
the same groups as is shown by the fact that they were at the head of 
their families. The willingness of these activists to get involved did 
cost them and their thus embroiled families dear. The twenty-five 
activists whose precise fines are known paid out over £160,000 between 
them for their 'delinquency'. 
The committed group were also to some extent an experienced group 
of administrators. Over half of the commissioners had received higher 
education and over a quarter had served as high sheriffs and a quarter as 
M. P. s, and this is important. The range of experience stretched from the 
collection of Ship Money to the representation of grievances in the House 
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of Commons. In addition, although the numbers may appear small, there 
were representatives of peace time law in the commissions. Therefore they 
had the entire range of abilities necessary for the running of a system 
geared to the collection of finance, the arbitration of disputes over tax 
assessments and, if necessary, the representation of the region's 
grievances in the Oxford parliament. 
Political, Administrative and Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inns 
15 0 10 18 14 28 11 
29.0% 19.6% 35.3% 27.4% 51.9% 21.6% 
On the whole many of these men had been at the forefront of their county's 
government at both local and national level. There are thus several 
possible conclusions to be drawn. One is that Charles was simply lucky in 
that the activists just happened to be the most experienced men amongst 
those he had chosen to conduct the royalist war effort. Another, more 
probable, conclusion is that the upper and governing ranks of county 
society were more conservative in their view of the constitution and saw 
the King's cause as the one most akin to their own beliefs. Thirdly, and 
this may well'tie in with the last point, the existing county governors 
saw that holding on to control of the counties themselves was the best 
method of preserving the communities intact and alleviating the burdens of 
war. Certainly by being in charge of regional finance during the war, 
they would be in a position to do just that. It is with this idea in mind 
that we now turn to the examination of the ways in which the commissioners 
did run the finances of the royalist war effort in the north midland 
shires. 
The Work of the Commissions of Array 
Evidence of the running of the war effort is not abundant. Many 
royalists were careful to destroy incriminating documents which would give 
dumb testimony to their activity on behalf of the King. Hutton, in his 
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book on the war effort, says that there are few general sources. 34 There 
are the Chancery records of the commissions issued by the King to 
individuals or groups of individuals during the war and Dugdale's record 
of the commissions created in 1642 and 1643.35 More specific documents 
are the papers of the Worcestershire Commission of Array and the minute 
book of the Glamorgan Commission. No equivalent of the latter two sources 
exists for any of the commissions in the north midlands. 
In the absence of such material the royalist war effort in the area 
has to be built up from a diverse variety of material and where possible 
related to information regarding other war efforts, such as those 
mentioned above. There are letters of the commissioners of Staffordshire 
to and from the King and Prince Rupert as well as to Hastings, in the Salt 
collection at the William Salt Library. These are useful for their 
references to the relationship between the commissioners and the 
military. 36 The sets of accounts kept by the Lichfield garrison in the 
two years 1643 and 1645 are of immense importance, as are the letters in 
the H. M. C. report on the Hastings manuscripts. 37 However the chief source 
for the collection of contribution, possibly the most viable means of 
income for the war effort, does not emanate from the authors of the 
system. Nor does it come from the propagandist newsbooks produced by 
either side. Dr Stephen Porter has depended heavily upon the latter for 
his interpretation of the financial systems of both sides during the war. 
Using such material, Porter saw the collection of taxes as a form of 
extortion racket. similar to the German Brandtschatzung, burning money, 
whereby villages were forced into payments to troops by the threat of 
destruction of property. 38 Instead, this present thesis has made 
extensive use of the accounts kept by constables, headboroughs and 
thirdboroughs. As a source these accounts have several strengths. They 
are not propaganda, aimed at encouraging or discouraging the reader, nor 
are they the plans of central or regional government which would be 
subject to mutation during their application to the communities. These 
are records of what was, and in some cases, what was not, paid by these 
communities into the royalist (or parliamentarian) coffers. By relating 
the evidence that they offer to that provided by private correspondence, 
official letters and other sources cited above, a reasonably comprehensive 
picture of this aspect of royalist administration can be obtained. 
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The five commissions were, to some extent, peripatetic in the same 
way as Kent's county committee. 
39 Leicestershire's commission sat 
variously at Ashby de la Zouch - its main base - Belvoir Castle, 
Melton 
Mowbray and Loughborough. 
40 The Rutland commission, as mentioned above, 
was sitting at Ashby de la Zouch in May 1643, though it appears chiefly to 
have met at Belvoir Castle. Members of it ended up at Newark at the end 
of the war. 41 Derbyshire's commissioners also may have met at some time 
at Ashby during early 1643, whilst Gell was dominant in their county; 
certainly two members, Hastings and Harpur, were there at the time. The 
commission later sat variously at Ashbourne, and Chesterfield. It spent 
the last years of the war ensconced in Tutbury Castle. 
42 Both 
Nottinghamshire's and Staffordshire's commissions were more static. The 
latter was based at Lichfield as early as the end of 1642 and apart from 
the time up until May 1643 when it met at Stafford, and its occasional 
meeting at Uttoxeter, Lichfield was where it remained. 
43 The former was 
established at Newark at the beginning of 1643 and remained there for the 
duration. 44 
Each commission had to deal with the difficult problems of finance: 
how to balance the needs of war with a desire to preserve the local 
economy. The chief ways in which the royalists gained money were: 
contribution -a regularly collected property tax; sequestration - the 
exploitation of enemy estates and excise -a tax on home produced goods. 
Oxford also imposed an additional levy to be raised on gentry estates and 
collected by the high sheriffs independent of the commissions of which 
they were a part; Sir John Pate had this task in Leicestershire. 
45 By 
1644 the Oxford parliament had become sufficiently perturbed by the 
potential, if not actual, abuse of the taxation systems in the counties to 
establish committees of accounts in each of those under its control * 
46 
Parliament, too, ran a system very similar to this. Sequestration and 
excise were important sources of income to their treasuries. The 
parliamentarian version of the contribution - known as the weekly 
assessment - was collected on a property basis in the manner of 
Ship 
Money. An examination of parliament's financial exactions is undertaken 
in the following chapter. 
The three main sources of income - excise, sequestration and 
contribution - will be examined in turn. For the first two, there 
is 
little evidence either direct or otherwise, and thus their prominence may 
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suffer unduly due to the relative wealth of information regarding 
contribution. 
rm. V. 14 .,., 
John Pym had first proposed the imposition of an excise to aid 
parliament's finances as early as May 1643, but it was not until the 
following July that the first ordinance establishing an excise was passed 
at Westminster. By then it was necessary for the payment of the armed 
forces and to cover debts already incurred in the first eleven months of 
the war. The excise was to prove parliament's second largest source of 
income after the weekly assessment. However it did not cover the amounts 
borrowed from the city of London on the strength of its expected bounty. 47 
The royalists followed suit when the Oxford parliament passed a 
similar excise aimed at bringing income to the central treasury. London 
had established a group of eight commissioners responsible to the 
Committee for the Advance of Money and created sub-offices in the major 
towns under parliament's control. The royalists appointed three man 
commissions in each of its counties along with separate commissions for 
Worcester and Bristol. There were regional variations, with some areas 
having commissioners of array serving on the excise commissions, but as 
Hutton says, there is no evidence to suggest why these variations 
existed. 48 
For the north midlands, there is only evidence of the creation of 
one excise commission, that of Staffordshire. James Povey, Elias Ashmole 
and John Hill, none of whom had been on any other commission, were 
appointed in May 1644. The commission was renewed one year later, when 
Povey was replaced by Elias Pydall. 49 On each occasion, the commission 
was established to be in operation for one year, or until the London 
excise was stopped, which ever was the shorter period. This is part and 
parcel of the King's attempt to make parliament look the innovator and 
portray himself as being forced to take unconstitutional measures purely 
as a makeshift response. The appearance of Povey, Ashmole, Hill and 
Pydall is in itself interesting. They were not of the same social calibre 
as the commissioners of array; thus in some way they may be an example of 
the form of social dilution which was, by this time, supposedly occurring 
in parliament's minor committees. If they are, they may be an indication 
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that there was an element of 'new men' amongst the royalist administrators 
as well as amongst their enemy's. However the lack of substantial 
evidence means that no hard case can be made for this assertion, but the 
suggestion does remain. 
The excise rates, established at Oxford for 1645, do not include 
levies on beef or pork to which parliament extended its tax that year. 
This extension was the direct cause of civil unrest in Derby. 50 Sir John 
Gell was powerless, or unwilling, to prevent attacks on the excise 
commissioners or the accompanying riots. 51 The royalist excise did cause 
problems in Cheshire, but there is no evidence of it causing problems in 
the north midlands, although this may be just a reflection of the general 
lack of evidence. Rioting such as that experienced at Derby was 
noteworthy and certainly of excellent value to the propaganda orientated 
press; given this, if any problems did occur it is surprising that they 
were not seized upon. It is therefore reasonable to conclude either that 
there were none or that they were of a minor nature. 
However, because of the lack of evidence regarding the royalist 
excise, little can be deduced about the application or success of the 
system. This is regrettable given that, for parliament, the excise was 
such a valuable source of income. It may be that in the-north midlands 
the returns from the levy were small. The commissions were not issued 
until May 1644, by which time the north midlands royalists were within two 
months of losing their mastery of the region. The potential of the excise 
as a source of income would decline from July of that year even if it had 
begun well in. May. In addition, the chief market towns of the region were 
always in the hands of parliament. Though the royalists were able to 
curtail severely the trading at these places for much of the war, it is 
unlikely that they were able to establish successfully alternative venues 
in the towns they controlled. This would be a serious hindrance to the 
collection of an excise tax, dependent as it was on the market place. 
Sequestration 
The royalists moved slowly into the adoption of a system of taking 
over and exploiting the income of enemies' estates. There were incidents 
of pragmatic raids upon the homes of 'delinquents' within the midlands. 
On August 28th Hastings and Prince Rupert led such an attack on the home 
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of the Earl of Stamford at Bradgate Park. 52 In March 1643 the Oxford 
Council of War issued instructions to the Oxfordshire commissioners of 
array regarding estates of 'delinquents'. These instructions contained a 
comprehensive definition of who was to be regarded as a delinquent. The 
list gave not only obvious categories such as those actually in arms or 
acting as administrators for parliament but also tenants whose rents had 
been seized by parliament. This was a rather harsh definition not 
mirrored by parliament's equivalent legislation. Royalist sequestration 
procedure, as outlined in these instructions, required high sheriffs to 
seize the property of suspected delinquents and hold them until the case 
was proved or otherwise. If the person was judged delinquent, then the 
estate could be sold to prosecute the war. It would appear that this was 
an unsatisfactory system as land sales would hardly be easy to effect in a 
situation as uncertain as a civil war. Potential purchasers would have 
had to be convinced of the likelihood of royalist victory, as this would 
be the only guarantee of the permanence of the sale. Even in such a case, 
any spirit of, or political necessity for, reconciliation may well have 
negated the sale once the war was over. 
Instead, it seems more likely that in many cases the income from 
the estate was used as a form of constant revenue. This, was more in the 
manner of parliament's sequestration method, and, although admittedly from 
limited evidence, seems to be the case in the north midlands. 
Parliament's legislation came into being in April 1643 and was similarly 
designed to exploit estates to increase funds. 53 The same month, 
royalists to, the north and west of Hastings' command, a command which now 
included Staffordshire but not Lincolnshire, were sequestering the estates 
of parliamentarians. Likewise, Leicestershire was quick off the mark when 
its commissioners began sequestering the estates of the county's leading 
parliamentarian, Lord Grey, at Groby. Derbyshire's commissioners were to 
sequester Sir George Gresley's estates in the south of the county 
throughout 1644, having begun to do so in late 1643. The Rutland 
commissioners were sequestering the Earl of Rutland's county estates by 
January 1644 at the latest from their base at Belvoir Castle. 54 
No evidence of the official structure of the royalist sequestration 
process in the region for the early part of the war has come to light. 
Sir Edward Seabright, a commissioner for Staffordshire, was appointed to a 
committee to investigate enemy estates in Worcestershire during late 1643, 
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and may have held a similar post in Staffordshire. In December 1645 
Hastings, along with Lords Aston and Astley, was ordered to investigate 
the collection of sequestration money in Staffordshire and the Marcher 
counties. 55 By this time, except for one Staffordshire hundred, the 
royalists' hold on the area was minimal. 56 The commission directed to 
Hastings stated that the income from sequestration was to be used in, and 
for, the county of origin. It is likely that this was no new departure. 
Though such income had originally been intended to benefit central 
coffers, the Marcher Association had, in 1644, been granted the right to 
use this money. The income at Oxford from sequestrations amounted to only 
£1,225 in 1644, while there appears to have been none in any other year. 
It would seem that the concession to the Marcher counties was a 
recognition of fact, rather than a new departure. Royalist counties, as 
well as their parliamentarian counterparts, were using the income from 
sequestration for themselves rather than sending it to Oxford. 57 
It is perhaps the case that in the north midlands sequestration 
revenue was not very high despite the presence of large 'delinquent' 
estates. What revenue there was would decline after the battle of Marston 
Moor. Thus Aston, Astley and Hastings would not have been daunted by 
their task in late 1645. On the other hand, one piece of evidence 
regarding royalist sequestration shows that Sir George Gresley's estates 
were being subjected to some form of sequestration at the end of 1644, and 
the Earl of Rutland's castle at Belvoir was a royalist garrison until 
February 1646. In addition, some parliamentarians would own property in 
their enemy's-garrison towns, which would be used to quarter commissioners, 
officers and soldiers, another form of sequestration. 
The Contribution 
The contribution can be examined in more detail than the other 
sources of income for the royalists in the north midlands. As with excise 
and sequestration, evidence regarding the superstructure of the system is 
limited beyond the names and instructions issued to some commissioners. 
However there are some sources which shed light on the actual allotment 
and collection of the tax. This relative wealth of source material may 
give contribution a higher profile in this thesis than it deserves; 
however, parliament's equivalent, the weekly assessment, was their largest 
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source of income, and so it may be that this prominence is somewhat 
justified. 58 
Contribution was collected for the use of the county soldiery by 
commissioners' warrants, after they and the garrison commanders had 
conferred as to the amounts desirable. It is probable that both Oxford, 
in the county by county allotment, and the commissioners, in their 
division of the amount between their county's communities, used Ship Money 
as a guide. 59 The amounts requested from individual communities are 
similar to those collected by parliament who did use the much hated tax of 
the 1630s as a basis for their war time levies. This makes the assumption 
credible. The presence of high sheriffs who had experience of collecting 
the ship tax on three of the commissions will also be recalled. A 
conflict of interest was apparent within the royalist war effort, between 
the largely civilian commissions of array and the military, for whom the 
contribution was generally destined. In the counties of Nottinghamshire, 
Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Rutland, this potential conflict would be 
reduced due to the inclusion of several prominent colonels of county 
regiments on the commissions. Even so in Leicestershire the exclusion of 
Gervaise Lucas, led to his dissenting from the commission's decisions. In 
Staffordshire, where Colonel Thomas Leveson was excluded, the problems 
were, if not more severe, then at least of longer duration than those of 
Leicestershire; the problem was exacerbated by his being created high 
sheriff. Instead of bringing him into the administration it allowed him 
to act independently under the authority of his own position. 
At the discussions between the administration and the colonels 
(whether formal or not cannot be divined) the counties were divided up 
between the various garrisons on, if possible, a hundredal basis. In 
Derbyshire, Scarsdale hundred was the province of Bolsover Castle during 
1643 and 1644, though after the castle fell the area was used by the 
garrison of Welbeck during the short period of its second occupation by 
royalists in 1645.60 Tutbury Castle, though itself in Staffordshire, 
appears to have been allocated Moreleston and Litchurch hundred in 
Derbyshire right until the end of the war. This would be in part based on 
the fact that the area was the Honour of Tutbury and thus traditionally 
bound up with the castle. Tutbury may also have had control over parts of 
Repton and Gresley hundred. 61 The other three of the county's hundreds 
cannot be so definitely allocated: Wingfield garrison may have been in 
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charge of levying taxes upon Wirksworth hundred, High Peak under the 
control of the smaller garrisons along the north west border of the 
county, and Appletree under the garrisons at Tissington and Ashbourne. 
Leicestershire was for most of the time split up between the two main and 
often only garrisons of Belvoir and Ashby; the latter being a very large 
garrison may have also shared Repton and Gresley in Derbyshire with 
Tutbury. In addition it would have the levies from Sparkenhoe, Gartre, 
Guthlaxton, West Goscote and perhaps until the quarrels between Lucas and 
Hastings, East Goscote as well. There is some evidence that Ashby also 
gained contribution from parts of Warwickwhire. Belvoir garrison gained 
contribution from Framland hundred, the whole of which it annexed in late 
1643 and later from East Goscote as well as parts of Lincolnshire and 
Rutland. 62 In Nottinghamshire, Newark and its satellite garrison at 
Shelford House were collecting contribution from Broxton wapentake and 
Newark alone, from Lide and Newark wapentakes; it would share Thurgarton 
wapentake with the satellite garrison at Thurgarton itself. 63 The two 
southern wapentakes, Rushcliffe and Bingham, may also have been under 
Newark's control. Bassetlaw and Oswardbeck would probably be under the 
Welbeck garrison. In addition Newark could at favourable times collect 
contribution from large areas of Lincolnshire. Together, in the summer of 
1645, Welbeck and Newark were gaining contribution from no less than four 
counties, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire. 64 
Rutland would be the province of the Belvoir forces after the royalist 
garrison at Burleigh House had been forced out in late 1643; however, 
earlier in the year, it appears that it may have been at least partially 
responsible to Ashby. 65 Lichfield garrison in Staffordshire was assigned 
Offloe hundred for its income as soon as the town was recaptured by the 
royalists in April 1643. It is probable that the financial problems 
experienced by the governor, Richard Bagot, in the last weeks of that year 
necessitated the extension of its territory to Totmansloe hundred and 
Pirehill. The former it would have to share with Tutbury and the latter 
had until August been under Eccleshall, now held for parliament. 
Lichfield could still gain income from parts of these hundreds in December 
1645.66 Bagot had lost parts of Offloe to Tutbury Castle and Rushall 
House in 1643, and as compensation had received areas of Warwickshire. 
This in a way contributed to his problems as Leveson of the Dudley 
garrison was to dispute the Warwickshire allotment in April 1644.67 As 
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well as parts of Warwickshire and Worcestershire, the Dudley garrison was 
assigned Staffordshire's Siesdon hundred during 1643 and 1644.68 
Cuttlestone hundred may also have been responsible to Dudley as there was 
a satellite garrison established at Lapley House in the hundred. 69 
Tutbury shared Pirehill, Offloe and Totmansloe with Lichfield, in addition 
to the areas of Derbyshire from where it could collect contribution. 70 
At this level, the county boundary was not allowed to inhibit the 
royalist organisation. The garrisons of Tutbury, Belvoir, Dudley, 
Lichfield, Newark and Ashby de la Zouch, collected income from counties 
other than those in which they were situated. This would have been a 
response to their geographical positions since all were near to county 
borders. The sub county boundaries appear to have been adhered to; the 
division of counties on an hundredal basis shows this. 
Up to this point the county administration has been shown to be in 
the hands of bodies alien to peace time local government. From this level 
downwards strenuous efforts were made to utilize officials and methods 
more common to provincial administration. Once the allotment of financial 
and geographical divisions had been made between the garrisons, the 
commissioners sought to conduct operations through the normal offices of 
county life. Many of the country's commissions of array incorporated the 
relevant county's high sheriff; others had been deprived of one by the 
incumbant's parliamentarianism. Leicestershire's had Hastings, picked 
after the commission was made, Nottinghamshire had the energetic John 
Digby, Staffordshire's Sir Harvey Bagot, Derbyshire's had the non active 
royalist, Sir. John Harpur of Caulke, and later John Pate, but Rutland did 
not have the current high sheriff amongst its commissioners. 71 Therefore, 
within the midlands, most of the warrants for tax levies could be sent out 
in the name of the current high sheriff - an appearance of legality or at 
least normality as this was the usual way of authorising financial 
collections. More often than not the levies would be ordered in the name 
of the sheriff and members of the commission but sometimes they may just 
have been sent out in the name of the requisite three members of the 
commission's quorum. By utilizing the sheriffs it was hoped to give the 
warrants some form of recognisable legality, an objective that the 
parliamentarian war effort sought by similar means to achieve - this 
resulted in cases of counties having a dual shreivalty. 
Warrants for contribution, as the levy was known at a central 
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level, were passed on to the constables, headboroughs or thirdboroughs by 
whichever name the communities' officials were known. It is from the 
records of these village officials that we are able to learn more about a 
fundamental part of the royalist administration of the north midland 
counties. The office of constable was an elective post - he was chosen 
from amongst the freeholders of the community by his peers. Once elected 
for his year of office, he became responsible for the licencing of ale 
houses, the removing of 'strangers', the supervision of the village's 
contribution to the Trained Bands, looking after the village weaponry and 
keeping the parish bull. He may also, in the absence of overseers of the 
poor, have administered the poor rate and undertaken the apprenticing of 
orphans. More pertinent to the present work, he was responsible for 
collecting and even allocating the fiscal levies which were passed on to 
him by county government. In the 1630s this had meant Ship Money; in the 
1640s it was on his shoulders that the onus of collecting war taxes fell. 
During the early part of the century constables were not obliged to 
keep records of their financial dealing. Most did not. Some used, and 
then lost, loose papers of records; others kept scant or cryptic 
accounts. The constable of Rugeley in Staffordshire, for the year 
1643-1644, watched his house burn down, taking with it his accounts for 
his term of office. 72 Other constables may have used the war as an excuse 
for not keeping accounts. The note: 
'The mighty accounts in the years 1642,1643 and 1644, 
between this town of Edwinstowe and Miles Oldham constable 
that because of the war could not be then or now counted. 
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fills an otherwise blank page in the Edwinstowe accounts -a one sentence 
substitute for three years of financial administration. For. Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire, there are only 
twenty-one sets of constables' accounts surviving out of a potential 
number of about eight hundred. Of these only eleven offer reasonably 
continuous records of financial transactions; three of them alone give 
week by week accounts for periods longer than a year. There is one other 
important shortfall: there are no relevant detailed accounts for 
Derbyshire which exhibit any continuity in their compilation. Despite 
this paucity, there are enough links and similarities amongst the 
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C 
surviving twenty-eight sets of accounts to enable a substantial picture of 
this aspect of royalist administration in the region to be built up. 
The constables of Offloe hundred seem to have been involved in the 
royalist financial system as early as November 1642, when the 
commissioners at Lichfield summoned them to a meeting. 74 This was before 
there was a coherent royalist party in the county of Staffordshire and, 
indeed, was at the time when there was a distinct possibility of the 
county adopting armed neutrality. 75 Also at this time, local taxes were 
only adopted as temporary expedients. The system of loans at 8% interest 
on the public faith would not, and voluntary donations from the landed 
magnates could not, finance the war effort once it became clear, on the 
field of Edgehill, that the war was to be more than a short term problem. 
By February, Nottinghamshire's commissioners had established monthly 
meetings for the constables at Newark in order to allocate and co-ordinate 
levies. During the same period, the royalist commissioners now at 
Stafford, were calling in Staffordshire's constables in the sheriff's 
name. 76 The constables of the region's other three counties would 
probably be likewise summoned to meetings for the same purpose. By May 
the Staffordshire commission had assessed the county for a primary levy of 
two thousand pounds and appointed collectors for each of the county's 
hundreds. 77 Derbyshire's commission was conducting its financial system 
on a regular basis by June 1643 at the latest. 78 By this time the 
pragmatic approach had clearly been shed with governors prevented from 
issuing warrants and commissioners ordered to supply accounts to Oxford. 79 
Contribution collection began to take on an aspect of regularity. 
However, it is clear from the constables' records that not all of 
these officials were attending the meetings held by the commissioners. 
There would be many reasons for this. Firstly, the geographical location 
of many of the commissions' meetings made it difficult for some men to 
attend. For example, Ashby de la Zouch is on the border between north 
west Leicestershire and south Derbyshire. Both of the relevant county 
towns were held by the enemy and were between Ashby and large sections of 
the two counties' communities. This, coupled with the sheer distance from 
the headquarters of these commissions, would have been prohibitive to the 
attendance of a large proportion of constables. Secondly, there was the 
distinct possibility of retribution by parliament's committees in. the 
counties. Constables who were guilty of co-operation with the royalists 
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could be regarded as enemies and therefore be liable to arrest and 
displacement from office - though few instances of this appear to have 
occurred. 80 Thirdly, during the early months of the war, some desire for 
neutralism or at least avoidance of responsibility may have pervaded some 
constables. Fourthly, there was also the probability that some of the 
constables would have political motives for ignoring the royalists' 
summonses to county meetings. As a result some of the constables who did 
attend the meetings had to carry warrants to their absentee neighbours' 
constablewicks, whilst others had to administer several constablewicks for 
some periods of the war. 81 Also once the organisations had established 
themselves, -, unstables would only have to travel as far as their nearest 
garrison and as royalist collectors often coursd the villages minimal 
movement was required. 
However a constable received the warrants, he probably had to pay 
for his own copy - usually 4d or 2d a time. 
82 It was then up to him to 
allot the individual amounts that went to make up the levy amongst his 
fellow property owners in the village. This was probably done at a 
meeting of what were often termed 'his Neighbours', either at his house or 
at a local inn of convenient size. 83 The allotments were made in the form 
of a property tax, suggesting that they, like the parliamentarian 
equivalent, were following the pattern established by Ship Money. When 
the villages were incorporated into parliamentarian territory, either 
permanently or temporarily, there was little alteration in the size of the 
levy made on it - again an indication of the validity of the assumption 
about Ship Money being used as a guideline. 84 
At Stathern in Leicestershire, the allotment of the levy was made 
on the following terms: - 8d per acre of land, 8d per score of sheep, and 
4d per pasture beast. This was in 1643. At Waltham on the Wolds in the 
same county, the levy appears to have been, one shilling per yardland and 
3d per cow in the same year. 85 At Coddington in Nottinghamshire, the 1643 
rates for the levy were: - 2d per acre, 2d per score of sheep, ld per 
beast and a penny for a dwelling or perhaps an outbuilding. Here, by the 
following year, these amounts had all doubled except for the levy on 
beasts when the amount went up to one shilling. Similar increases are 
evident elsewhere indicating that the burden was increasing. 86 
The regularity with which the constable collected, or at least 
allotted the portions of the levy, appears to vary slightly. The best 
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recorded levies are those given for Waltham on the Wolds between October 
1644 and the following August: - 
29th October (1644) £7- Os - Od 
30th December 14 - 0- 0 
21st February (1645) 27 - 4- 0 
5th June 27 - 4- 0 
16th August 27 - 2- 0 
Total 102 - 10 -0 
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There are two possibilities regarding the sudden fluctuation in the 
amounts; either the incoming constable reduced the number of individual 
collections made in the year, thus increasing the amount of money 
collected each time, or the constablewick simply had to face demands for 
more money from Belvoir in the way that the village of Coddington had to 
provide Newark with more money at about the same time. If the latter is 
the case then the increase was in the region of twenty-five per cent. At 
Branston in Leicestershire, the constable collected four levies during the 
same time period as the Waltham constable made five. 88 At Stathern there 
was no regular series of collections; varying amounts were collected 
sporadically. At Coddington, only three such levies were made in 1643. 
Elsewhere there are no complete series of levies recorded. It appears 
then that there was considerable variation in the ways that the constables 
operated within the region. 
In some cases these levies of the individual amounts represented 
the end of the constables' duty regarding contribution. The garrisons to 
which it was payable often collected the village levies from them. This 
was done usually at weekly or fortnightly intervals, wherever possible by 
a quartermaster of a regiment of Horse stationed in the garrison 
concerned. Thus at Waltham on the Wolds, Quartermaster Power of Captain 
Mason's troop collected the contribution from the constable. Mason was 
one of the captains in Gervaise Lucas' Regiment of Horse and was described 
as the 'commander of the fen robbers', indicating that his regiment may 
have been involved in collecting contribution from Lincolnshire as well. 
Power called at fortnightly intervals from December 1643 until at least 
October 1644, when the new constable kept less detailed accounts. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Mason's troop was responsible for this area 
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around Belvoir until November 1645. Branston too, was visited by Mason's 
troop on a weekly basis during 1644.89 In the Staffordshire community of 
Mavesyn Ridware the three constables in office between 1642 and 1645 made 
fortnightly trips to pay money to Captain Jeffry Glasier, the Lichfield 
treasurer and captain in Richard Bagot's Regiment of Foot. 90 Constables 
in Siesdon Hundred in Staffordshire also appear to have travelled to their 
nearest garrison, in this case Dudley Castle, to pay their levies. The 
garrison treasurer, Captain Lieutenant John Birch of Thomas Leveson's 
Regiment of Horse, may have on occasion arranged to have the money 
collected from the cömunities. 91 In Nottinghamshire, Upton's constables 
were paying money to Newark at weekly intervals. It is not, however, 
clear if they had to make the journey to the garrison themselves. As 
there are no complete accounts for Derbyshire or Rutland we cannot be 
certain of the pattern of events in either county. It is most likely that 
the former fell into the same pattern established in Staffordshire, at 
least in the sections administered from Tutbury. As for the latter, we 
can assume that the system there operated in the same way as the rest of 
the territory administered by the Belvoir garrison. 
Not all the contribution was collected in the form of cash. It was 
much easier for the royalists to take some of it in the form of 
provisions, as this prevented the necessity of returning to the various 
communities in order to purchase goods. Villages provided the garrison 
with their own specialities. Stathern sent peas and barley to Belvoir 
Castle; Branston sent oats, beer, veal and cheese. 92 Mavesyn Ridware 
provided Lichfield with coal, hay and all embracing provisions as part of 
its contribution. 93 The same pattern is followed in Nottinghamshire where 
towns responsible to Newark sent hay and provisions to the garrison. 94 It 
is probable that this shipment of goods followed pre-war trade patterns. 
In return for these provisions, a receipt was issued to the constable (for 
which he had, naturally, to pay) in order to prevent confusion when the 
value of the goods came to be deducted from the contribution total. These 
receipts would be copies of the ones kept by the garrison treasurers. 
The cost to the communities of the constant collection of 
contribution would be high. At Mavesyn Ridware, where the accounts are 
most complete, the yearly totals for 1643,1644 and 1645 are given: these 
amounts are broken down into details, with respect to cash and provisions. 
Individual fortnightly payments in this period vary from £9-6s-8d in 
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November 1643 to £1-18s-6d in cash and £O-18s-6d in goods paid over in 
June 1644. The more usual total sums are in the region of four pounds, 
ten shillings. The annual sums are thus: 
1642-1643 (October to October) 
1643-1644 (In addition to 
£47 - 5s - Od to 
parliament) 
1644-1645 (In addition to 
£87 - 7s - 9d to 
parliament) 
Total 
£ 30 - 13s - 7d 
£144 - As - 4d 
£128 - 13s - 3d 
£304 - 2s - 2d 
95 
In other parts of Staffordshire, amounts paid to the royalists (or indeed 
the parliamentarians) are not so easy to find. Uttoxeter probably made 
over a total of two hundred pounds to the Tutbury garrison in 1645. In 
Leicestershire, Branston paid Belvoir fifty pounds in 1645 whilst paying 
ninety to the parliamentarians. Had it only had to pay one side the 
amount would appear to have been around one hundred to one hundred and 
twenty pounds per annum. Waltham on the Wolds paid E99-16s-4d in 
1643-1644 and E103-8s-3d in the following year to Belvoir. 96 In 
Nottinghamshire, Thorpe sent approximately seventy-five pounds to Newark 
in 1644, whilst Upton paid out over one hundred and seventy pounds in the 
following year. Some of the latter money went in sporadic payments to the 
parliamentarians whilst the majority went to Newark. 97 As for individual 
amounts paid by constablewicks in Derbyshire we can say nothing. 
Scarsdale Hundred owed around one hundred pounds at the garrison's second 
surrender, in November 1645; it seems likely that this represented four 
weeks' contribution. 98 For purposes of comparison, Lichfield received 
approximately forty-eight pounds a month from Offloe hundred in 1643 and 
over three hundred pounds from the same area, along with an additional 
twelve constablewicks, in October to December 1645.99 As it would seem 
from these figures the sums expected from Derbyshire at the end of the war 
were reasonably similar to those expected elsewhere, it is probable that 
this was true throughout the periods when the royalists were able to tax 
the county. 
There is little possibility of assessing how much of an additional 
I 
expence the war entailed for villages, however, especially when concurrent 
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payments to parliament are taken into consideration, the burden on the 
communities appears to have been very high. There are few accounts which 
cover both pre and post-war periods in any detail. Belton in 
Leicestershire does provide a useful exception: 
1638 £9- lls - 8d (Ship Money period) 
1639 £14 - 15s - 9d (First Scots War) 
1640 £14 - 9s - 10d (Second Scots War) 
1641 £8- 18s - lld 
1644 £34 - 4s - 5d 
1646 £17 - 6s - 3d 
100 
From these figures we can see that in 1638 and 1641, when there were no 
'foreign' wars to drain the village's finances, the annual outlay was in 
the region of eight to ten pounds, whilst at the height of the war the sum 
was over three and a half times higher. The majority, if not all, of the 
1644 sum would go to Ashby de la Zouch. At Biddulph in Staffordshire, the 
proportional difference is quite similar, with a rise from £8-9s-7d in 
1640 to £26-12s-6d in 1645, a three fold increase. 101 Edwinstowe in 
Nottinghamshire in 1641-1642 had an expenditure of £8-4s-4d which 
increased to £23-Os-7d in 1646, a year when Belton amongst other places 
paid less than in other war years. Again, this is almost three times the 
normal sum. 102 The amount collected there in 1648 was only £2-2s-2d, 
indicating that the war was already a burden by 1642 or the village had 
become impoverished by 1648. At Rugeley in Staffordshire, accounts not 
destroyed in the fire at Robert Burton's house show that peace time 
disbursements totalled around seventeen pounds, whilst in 1644-1645 they 
reached £43-13s-9d (perhaps paid to both sides). This is once more a 
threefold increase. 103 From these few figures we can say that for those 
villages which did pay contribution on a regular basis the war was an 
expensive business, involving a proportional increase of around three 
times the normal village outlay. The fact that these figures come from 
three separate counties adds weight to this assumption. 
Due to the lack of information no real estimate can be made of the 
total income that the royalists gained from each of these counties; we 
can only use regional sums as a guide line. Two, the one hundred pounds 
owed to Welbeck by Scarsdale in 1645, and the one hundred pounds per month 
paid in the same year to Lichfield, have been mentioned. To these must be 
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added the claim, made by Henry Hastings, that Belvoir Castle was claiming 
two hundred pounds a week from its allotted areas in 1644.104 In 1645, 
Richard Symonds claimed that the Leicestershire royalists were claiming 
'four score and seventeen thousand pounds' per annum from the county. 105 
If true this would entail an average annual sum collected from the 
communities of three hundred and forty pounds. The highest sum we have 
come across in the region was the one hundred and seventy-four pounds paid 
by Upton to Newark. In Leicestershire, the highest figure is Branston's 
one hundret. _and 
forty pounds split between both sides. As we have also 
seen, many villages paid considerably less. If the Branston sum were 
taken as the average figure for the county and simply multiplied by the 
number of parishes, the annual outlay would only be £34,580. If the 
highest county sum paid to the royalists alone is so multiplied (Waltham's 
£103) the annual sum would thus be £25,441. The highest figure which can 
be derived from the Leicestershire statistics is gained by assuming that 
the two hundred pounds that the Belvoir garrison was claiming came from 
only one hundred in the county. This gives us an annual total of £71,800. 
As this entails the unlikely possibility that the royalists were able to 
collect money from the whole county when their power was on the wane, it 
seems that Symonds was wildly overestimating. These rough estimates made 
for Leicestershire, if extended to the other counties, suggest that around 
thirty thousand pounds per annum could be gained from each of the larger 
counties, Rutland being the exception. 106 
Though it. is probable that many of the constablewicks fell at some 
time or other. into arrears, there is amongst the constables' papers little 
evidence for this. Only at Mavesyn Ridware does the constable mention 
arrears and then only twice: he cites no figures. Both instances 
occurred in 1645.107 To check the performance of the constables it is 
possible that the garrison commanders and their treasurers called them in 
from time to time. Many visits to the garrisons are referred to in the 
account books and in at least one such instance recorded at Mavesyn the 
purpose was to go over the accounts. Arrears must have occurred more 
frequently than there is evidence for. The decline in the size of the 
North Midlands Army after the middle of 1644 cannot be solely due to the 
results of military action. The increasing hold over the region 
established by the parliamentarians will have reduced the income of the 
royalist war effort. This would have had undoubted effects on the 
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commanders' ability to pay their men, thus possibly leading to desertions. 
From the evidence presented by the constables' accounts it is clear 
that the royalist war effort was run, not on an ad hoc basis, but as a 
systematic yet flexible organisation. There is strong evidence from 
villages such as Mavesyn Ridware, Branston and Upton that they were paying 
a regularly collected property tax rather than a seventeenth century 
version of protection money. Yet it has recently been suggested by 
Stephen Porter that the legitimate method of collecting contribution was 
ry 
the method of collection by threat. Porter saw contribution as a form of 
brandtschatzung - burning money - the form of protection racket operated by 
commanders in the current continental wars. This would involve explicit 
or implicit violence being a part of the collection of contribution. The 
majority of Porter's evidence for such a theory is derived from 
parliamentarian sources when dealing with contribution, and royalist ones 
when referring to parliament's assessment. Thus the picture he gives, 
especially in the light of the more objective sources used in this thesis, 
would appear to be of suspect value. Indeed to infer that contribution 
was an English equivalent of brandtschatzung is erroneous. 108 Problems 
over non payment were sorted out by discussion and possible readjustment. 
In extreme cases constables could be arrested and deprived of office but 
this was a resort to law not to the sword. In any case a war effort 
required a constant income not sporadic bouts of plunder. A system 
consisting of violent extortion would have caused a public reaction and 
the war effort been less successful. Not only would large numbers of 
troops been necessary to enforce payments but villages could have withheld 
supplies. There is no reference to contribution in the terms of a fine or 
by any other names than tax levy or assessment. There were payments made 
to troops specifically to prevent plundering, but these come under an 
entirely different category and involved small payments such as a shilling 
or two. These would appear to be payments to a few deserters or 
stragglers, not to representatives of the royalist or parliamentarian war 
efforts. 109 
It remains difficult to assess how much of the region was 
incorporated into the royalist war effort. It is probable that at the end 
of 1643 Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire were, with the 
exception of the county towns, firmly in the grip of the commissioners' 
system. The Leicester committee and the London press asserted that 
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assessment in the county could not be collected; nor could 
parliamentarians collect their own rents; the county was blocked up, cut 
off from trade and communication with London. 110 Derbyshire was likewise 
cut off from the south and had the Marquis of Newcastle's army in 
residence as well as the indigenous royalists under Hastings. Nottingham 
parliamentarians were on the defensive and attempts were made to capture 
the town in November and the following January. The fall of Eccleshall 
must have dented royalist control of Staffordshire in late summer 1643, 
but the county was described, by the parliamentarian press, as being in 
great distress after Lapley House fell to the Dudley garrison in the 
following December. Lichfield's hold on large parts of the county 
continued throughout the war and still were able to dominate one hundred 
at the end of 1645.111 In the period following the battle of Marston 
Moor, the local parliamentarians were, with outside help, able to assert 
control over large parts of the north midlands; however, we are left with 
the conclusion that until such a time the royalists were able for some 
months to extend their control and gain contribution from the vast 
majority of the region's communities. The obvious exceptions were, of 
course, the county towns. Due to the lack of evidence regarding the 
income from any of the chief royalist sources of income, "excise, 
sequestration or contribution, no assessment of their relative input to 
the royalist war effort can be made. Thus no fiscal value can be placed 
on the cost of the loss of these major towns to the royalist financial 
system. 
Additional Levies 
Unfortunately for the various communities, contribution was not the 
only levy imposed by the local garrisons. Whilst food for men and horses 
were covered by this property tax other goods, it would seem, were not. 
In October 1644 three pounds worth of beds and bedding were sent from 
Waltham on the Wolds to Belvoir Castle. Likewise Upton sent such items to 
Newark, Mavesyn Ridware to Lichfield during the same and following 
years. 112 Also, labourers were often supplied upon warranted demand to 
work on the defensive structures at the garrisons, either to build or 
repair earthworks. Such labourers were required of Stathern by Belvoir, 
76 
of Upton by Newark and of Mavesyn Ridware by Lichfield in 1644 and 
1645.113 These men were paid their wages by their home community. The 
additional cost was not docked from the contribution but the constable may 
have included such a possibility when he assessed the individual 
contributions within his village. 
What was probably more burdensome to the villages was the presence 
of another royalist army in their area on top of the local forces. 
Henrietta Maria's Army was. tn additional drain on Upton's resouces in June 
1643 for example. The most difficult period was the time in May 1644 when 
the Northern Horse under Goring was based in the north of the region prior 
to joining Rupert's army for the march to York. The effects of this were 
felt right through the north midlands and the dire effects of Goring's 
presence are discussed in Chapter Six. The march of the King's own field 
army through the area in May 1645 was also financially a burden to the 
villages on the route. The unification of the elements of the North 
Midlands Army when it was engaged on a particular project also caused an 
increase in the financial burden. Thus Upton and other places in the area 
were faced with the cost of regiments not normally based there, during 
March 1644 after the relief of Newark. 114 
Military Expenditure 
Having deduced how the money necessary to the war effort in the 
north midlands was collected, it is now intended to give a brief 
indication of the way in which that money was spent by the royalists. 
Evidence for the expenditure side of the accounts book is even harder to 
find than for the income section. 
Food and fodder have already been dealt with as they generally were 
part and parcel of the contribution. There would also be cash payments to 
the troops, though their food and quarter was deducted from their pay. 
This would form the most constant drain on the royalists' resources. The 
wages laid down at Oxford, were four shillings a week for a foot soldier 
and twelve shillings a week for a horse soldier (this includes the food 
and quarter allowance as well as that for the stabling charges incurred by 
the trooper). A rough estimate based on the size of the North Midlands 
Army indicates a wage bill of over £1,200 a week, or £64,480 per annum 
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inclusive of allowances. 115 It is probable that in many cases wages were 
often paid irregularly. However at Lichfield, where the accounts are the 
most detailed, the soldiers were paid regularly until the end of 1643 when 
the decrease in the garrison's allotted area due to Leveson's encroachment 
and the establishment of the garrison at Rushall, prevented this and 
mutiny threatened. 116 Yet by the end of 1645 the garrison, which had in 
1644 gained concessions of territory, was still able to pay the soldiers 
regularly. At; the end of September 1644, Tutbury's governor, Sir Andrew 
Kniverton, wast/'very much distressed' for money to pay his soldiers at a 
time when parliament's power in the county was growing. In this case and 
in the case of Lichfield in 1643 temporary expedients were made by the 
provision of 'loans' by the county gentry. 117 
Weapons and gunpowder had to be bought either at Oxford or 
elsewhere from manufacturers. There could also be arrangements to 
exchange goods between regions. Captain Dupont of the Ashby garrison 
suggested that Richard Bagot send saltpetre he was producing at Lichfield 
to Oxford, where there was a shortage, and in return he would receive the 
equivalent weight of gunpowder, the finished product. 118 Iron and other 
necessities were obtained from local suppliers if possible. Colonel 
Leveson at Dudley was in the heart of what was, already, -a burgeoning 
proto industrial area and obtained his iron from nearby. 119 Lichfield was 
supplied with the same by Walter Chetwynd of Rugeley. 120 There was, of 
course, the cheaper expedient of seizing the enemies' stocks as they 
passed through the region. 
Bagot's accounts for 1643 give a useful insight into what else 
funds were used for. During the nine months following his installation as 
governor of Lichfield in April, he rebuilt the town defences and added to 
those already in existence. To enable the town to become self sufficient, 
he built a corn mill and a gunpowder mill. He had the facilities to 
produce brass cannon and had his own saltpetre furnace. These were on top 
of the numbers of skilled workmen constantly in his pay to produce the 
goods in each of these works and skilled arms manufacturers. 121 Though 
there is no evidence of any other garrison possessing such operations it 
is unlikely that the larger garrisons like Dudley and Tutbury and 
especially Ashby and Newark would be without the ability to produce their 
own weaponry to some extent. 
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The Royalist Administration: A Conclusion 
From what has been discussed above, it may be concluded that there 
were two factors which produced the system that the royalists used to 
finance their operations. Firstly the commissioners of array who ran it 
had an established stake in the region over which they presided. They 
were not grea ; magnates who had large estates in other counties: their 
primary holdings were within the county or regional boundaries of the 
north midlands, and these they sought to protect. Also they would not 
wish to aggravate the populace, which included their own tenantry upon 
whose work they depended, or the freeholders, whose votes they needed to 
keep their men or even themselves in parliament. In addition these men 
were familiar with the mechanics of the system which they were to use in 
the war. They had served in the various offices of county government and 
respected its traditions and values. Thus they sought to graft war time 
government of necessity onto the peace time government of stability. 
Secondly, it made military sense not to destroy the area in which 
they were living and hopefully going to be living and maintaining an armed 
force in for some time. To threaten and to carry out the threat of 
military retribution and violent extraction of funding from the town or 
village communities would not be conducive to long term military presence 
and strategy. 
For these. reasons the system here described was gradually 
developed. I. t was essentially dependent on the collection of a weekly 
collected property tax akin to that which had been utilized earlier in 
order to raise Ship Money. This system, with its pseudo legal appearance, 
would cause relatively little confusion as it resembled so closely that 
which had been applied recently and as it was conducted through the 
traditional channels of county governance and was also often carried out 
by the same individuals. Only the amounts of money, which have been shown 
in some cases to have been treble the normal annual outlay of a village, 
broke greatly with tradition. This is an important point. The long term 
imposition of these sums which were collected by armed men would ensure 
that everyone realised a war was in progress. There could be no surprised 
ploughmen. in the midlands. If the term 'Total War' implies the 
utilization of all a country's resources, then the English Civil War was 
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no simple collection of disconnected localised incidents: this war in 
the bowels of England was a seventeenth century version of Total War. 
To assess the effectiveness of the royalist war effort we must turn 
to its performance; this will be illustrated in later chapters in detail 
but a brief outline of which is given here. Throughout 1643 the system 
supported a growing army: the conquest of Derbyshire by the Marquis of 
Newcastle created a well defined area of royalist control in which the 
small pockets of parliamentarians grouped in the county towns could only 
enact a kind of guerilla warfare. Very little else was needed. The 
counties were secure enough for outside royalist forces to pass through 
and draw support from the indigenous garrisons. As an area between two 
great regions of royalist domination - the south and west, and the north - 
the midlands had only to be kept stable. In this the system was a success 
having, in effect, provided the royalist cause with a self-sufficient 
regional base. 
Failure only came with the full onslaught of parliamentarian 
incursion after the battle of Marston Moor in July 1644. Had the 
financial system been run differently the result would have been the same: 
the commissioners of array were not to blame for the military defeat in 
the north. As it was their system ensured that there was not defeat from 
within. A harsher operation may have evoked popular reaction, as was in 
evidence in other areas, which would have damaged the effectiveness of the 
system and made it unworkable, had civil control been weak and the 
military 'swordsmen' been correspondingly stronger. That this does not 
occur indicates two things. Firstly that the commissioners of array were 
able to some extent to run successfully a potentially oppressive system 
through normal channels and secondly that the royalists were not defeated 
because their financial organisation was at fault. 
80, 
Footnotes 
1. Firth and Rait, pp. 1-6 
2. North R0, Finch Hatton Mss 133 
3. CSPD 1627 p. 193; HMC Hastings, 4, p. 209 
4. HMC, op. cit., 4, p. 67; Gruenfelder J. N., 'The Electoral Influence of 
the Earlgýof Huntingdon', Transactions of the Leicestershire 
Archaeological and Historical Society, L 1974-5 
5. Hutchinson L., 'Memoirs of the Life of Colonel John Hutchinson', OUP, 
1973 ed., Hutchinson Life..., pp. 56,64 
6. SRO D948/4/6/2-6 Letter from George Thorley to Walter Wrottesley; 
Wrottesley G, 'History of the Wrottesley Family', Collections for a 
History of Staffordshire (CHS) new series VI part 2, pp. 312-319 
7. Gardiner S. R., Documents of the Puritan Revolution OUP, 1979 ed., 
p. 259 
8. Rushworth, 3,2, p. 676 
9. Rushworth, 3,2, p. 669; Nichols J., The History and Antiquities of 
the County of Leicestershire, III, 2, Appendix 4, pp. 19-22 
10. Nichols, op. cit., III, 2, App. 4, p. 19 
11. Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 245-7 
12. BL Add Mss 34217, f70, Instructions to the Northamptonshire 
Commissioners 
13. Nichols, op. cit., III, 2, App. 4, pp. 20-21 
14. Rushworth, 3,1, p. 618 
15. LRO Borough Records, BR 18/22/155; Rushworth, 3,1, p. 669; Nichols, 
op. cit., III, 2, App. 4, pp. 22-4 
16. HMC Hastings, 2, p. 84; Rushworth, 3,1, p. 670; Nichols, op. cit., 
III, 2, App. 4, p. 24 
17. North R0, Finch Hatton Mss 133 
18. JHC, II, p. 645 
19. HMC Hastings, 2, p. 85, Charles I to the Earl of Devonshire 27/6/1642 
20. Hutchinson, Life..., p. 54 
21. Nichols, op. cit., III, 2, App. 4, pp. 28-9 
81 
22. Clarendon Earl of, History of the Great Rebellion, OUP, 1969 ed., 
p. 242 
23. Brighton J. T., 'Sir John Gell and the Civil War in Derbyshire', 
Journal of the Bakewell and District Historical Society, VIII, 1981, 
p. 8; Dias J., 'Lead, Society and Politics in Derbyshire before the 
Civil War', Midland History, VI, 1981, p. 53 
24. Malcolm J., Caesar's Due: Loyalty and King Charles I, RHS, 1983, 
p. 43 
25. Hutton R., The Royalist War Effort, Longman, 1982, p. 24; Morrill J., 
The Revolt of the Provinces, Longman, 1980, p. 37 
26. HMC Hastings, 2, pp. 85-6 
27. Hutton (1982), op. cit., p. 22 
28. Bod Lib, Dugdale Ms 19, f6, Black, Doquets of Letters Patent and 
Other Instruments of Government, unpublished volume in the PRO, p. 9; 
HMC Hastings, 2, pp. 94-5 
29. Individual Commissioners of Array's personal details may be studied 
in Appendix One 
30. For a discussion of the seventeenth century family structure see, 
Slater M. Family Life in the Seventeenth Century, Routledge and Regan 
Paul, 1984; Slater M., 'The Weightiest Business: Marriage in an 
Upper Gentry Family', Past and Present, 72,1976; Mendelson S. H., 
'Debate: The Weightiest Business... ', Past and Present, 85,1979; 
Larminie V., 'Marriage and the Family: The Example of the 
Seventeenth Century Newdigates', Midland History, IX, 1984 
31. Prest W.,. The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts 
1590-1640, Longman, 1972, p. 37 
32. ibid., p. 215 
33. See for instance, CSPD Charles I 1626, p. 370, and various letters in 
HMC Hastings, IV, pp. 204-212 
34. Hutton (1982), op. cit., p. 36 
35. Bod Lib, Dugdale Ms 19, Black, op. cit.; North R0, Finch Hatton 
Mss 133 
36. WSL, SMS 479-564 
37. LCL Ms 24; LJRO, D30 LIIIB 
38. Porter S., 'The Fire Raid in the English Civil War', War and Society, 
2,2,1984 
39. Everitt E., The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, Leicester 
University Press, 1973, p. 130 
82 
40. BL TT E69/12, Certain Informations 37, Sept 26 - Oct 2,1643 
41. BL Add Mss 5752, ff398-9 Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, 
Newark upon Trent: the Civil War Siegeworks, HMSO, 1964, pp. 93-4 
42. Glover S., The History, Gazetteer and Directory of the County of 
Derbyshire, 1829,1, App., p. 66, 'A True Relation of What Service has 
been done by Colonel John Gell... '; BL TT E105/27, Certain 
Informatiqns 21, June 5-11,1643 
43. SRO D3712/4/1 Mavesyn Ridware Parish Book (Mavesyn PB); LJRO D30 
LIIIB, Lichfield Accounts 
44. See Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, op. cit. 
45. The Ottley Papers, Shropshire Archaeological Transactions (SAT) 8, 
p. 245 
46. Bod Lib, Dugdale Ms 19 f86 
47. Wheeler J., unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 'English Army Finance and 
Logistics', Berkeley, 1980, chapter 4 
48. Hutton (1982), op. cit., p. 93 
49. Bod Lib, Dugdale Ms 19 ff83,105. Black, op. cit., pp. 210,262 
50. BL TT E308/1 An Order Concerning the Excise 
51. Beats L., unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 'Politics and Government in 
Derbyshire 1640-1660', Sheffield, 1978 
52. An easily accessible account can be found in, Nichols, op. cit., III, 
2, App. 4; p. 30 
53. BL TT E94/24, A Declaration and Ordinance for the Seizing and 
Sequestering Estates 
54. BL TT E97/3, Certain Informations, April 17,1643; DRO D803 M29, 
Copybook of Sir George Gresley f109; LRO DE730, Barker 
Correspondence, IV, p. 15 
55. Bod Lib, Dugdale Ms 19 ff30,115 
56. LJRO D30 LIIIB 
57. Dietz F. C., 'The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer... ', Smith 
College Studies, 3,4, pp. 152-3 
58. Wheeler (1980), op. cit., p. 65 
59. Hutton (1982), op'. cit., p. 36 
60. HMC Hastings, 2, p. 116; DRO Gell Mss Box 30/5/n 
83 
61. DRO Gell Mss Box 60/16; BL Harl Mss 6802, f224 
62. BL Add Mss 18982, f42 
63. NRO D35/5 Toton Rentals p. 95; PRMW 13/2 Accounts of William Dand of 
Mansfield; PR 1710 Upton Constables' Accounts (Upton CA); PR 5767 
Constables' Accounts of Thorpe (Thorpe CA); PR 1531 Coddington 
Constables' Accounts (Coddington CA) 
64. BL TT E303/16, Mercurius Verdicus Sept 20-27 1645 
65. BL Add Mss 5752, ff398-9 
66. LCL, Ms Lich 24; LJRO, D30 LIIIB 
67. Shaw S., The History and Antiquities of the County of Staffordshire, 
EP Publishing, 1976 ed., p. 48 
68. SRO D3451/2/2-Pattingham Parish Book (Pattingham PB) p. 108; Shaw, 
op. cit., I, pp. 60-2; HMC Hastings, 2, pp. 105,126-7 
69. BL TT E78/33, Mercurius Aulicus, 47th Week, 1643 
70. SRO 1039, Extract of Uttoxeter Churchwardens' Accounts; Shaw, 
op. cit., I, p. 48 
71. See analysis above and Appendix One 
72. SRO D1454/2 Rugeley Constables' Accounts (Rugeley CA), np 
73. NRO PR2130, Edwinstowe Constables' Accounts (Edwinstowe CA), p. 16 
74. Mavesyn PB, np 
75. Morrill (1980), op. cit., p. 37 
76. Upton CA, p. 15; Mavesyn PB, np 
77. Pickles J. T., unpublished MA Thesis, 'Studies in Royalism in the 
English Civil War, 1642-1646, with Special Reference to 
Staffordshire', Manchester 1968, p. 94 
78. BL TT E59/1 Certain Informations no. 24, June 26 - July 3,1643 
79. BL Harl Mss 6851, f130, Instructions to the Commissioners of 
Worcestershire, f133-4, Orders of a Council of War, March 14,1643 
80. WSL, SMS, 48-9, p. 8 
81. See Upton CA for the best example of this practice 
82. Warrants, like receipts, were paid for: At Coddington they were 2d 
but at Upton they were 4d, and at Mavesyn they were 6d 
84 
83. Mavesyn PB, np 
84. ibid. and LRO, DE 720/30 Branston Constables' Accounts (Branston CA), 
pp. 60-2 
85. LRO D 1605/56, Stathern Constables' Accounts (Stathern CA), p. 72 
86. ibid.; Coddington CA passim. 
87.. LRO DE 625/60 Waltham on the Wolds Constables' Accounts 1608-1706 
(Waltham CA), p. 68 
88. Branston CA, p. 55; Nichols, op. cit., II, 1, p. 55 
89. Waltham CA, pp. 68-70; Branston CA, pp. 60-62 
90. Mavesyn PB, np; LCL, Ms Lich 24, LJRO, D30 LIIB 
91. Shaw, op. cit., I, p. 60 
92. Guilford E. ed., 'The Accounts of the Constables of the Village of 
Stathern, Leicestershire', Archaeological Journal, 69, p. 149; 
Branston CA, pp. 58-62 
93. Mavesyn PB, passim. 
94. Upton CA, passim. for examples 
95. Mavesyn PB, various pages 
96. Branston CA, p. 62; Waltham CA, pp. 68,70 
97. Thorpe CA, np; Upton CA, pp. 35-45 
98. Welbeck was 'staitened' from October 22 to November 22,1645, HMC 
Portland, I, p. 290; NRO D71/1 Agreement for disgarrisoning Welbeck; 
DRO Gell, Mss Box 30/5/n 
99. LCL, Ms Lich 24; LJRO, D30 LIIIB 
100. LRO, DE 1965/41, Belton Constables, Churchwardens and Overseers 
Accounts 1602-1739 (Belton CA), np 
101. SRO D3539/21, Biddulph Parish Book 1630 onwards (Biddulph PB), np 
102. Edwinstowe CA, p. 12 
103. Rugeley CA, np 
104. BL Add Mss 18982, fill 
105. Long C. E. ed., -Symonds R., Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army, 
Camden Society 1859, p. 168 
85 
106. Based on the Lichfield Accounts, Staffordshire's royalists could 
expect around £20,000 per annum and the Scarsdale sum would if 
consistent throughout the county only render £6,754 per annum: thus 
£30,000 does not seem an underestimate 
107. Mavesyn CA, np 
108. Porter S., unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 'The Destruction of Urban 
Property in the English Civil War 1642-1651', London 1983, 
_pp. 148-157; Porter 
(1984), op. cit., p. 37 
109. LAO, Addlethorpe and Ingolmells Constables' Accounts, 12,1637-1684, 
passim.; Biddulph PB, passim.; Branston CA, passim. 
110. HMC Portland, I, p. 158, Staveley and Hacker to William Lenthal, 
24/11 43 
111. BL TT E77/6, Certain Informations, no. 49, November 20-27 1644; LJRO, 
D30 LIIIB; Beats L. (Thesis), p. 140 
112. Waltham CA, p. 70; Upton CA, pp. 39,41; Mavesyn PB, np 
113. Upton CA, p. 36; Guilford op. cit., p. 141; Mavesyn PB, np 
114. Guildord op. cit., p. 149; , lavesyn PB, np; Upton CA, pp. 16,23 
115. This does not take into account the officers' wages, nor does it 
include the numbers of men still in the garrisons during the field 
campaign; the figure will thus be an underestimate. NRO DD 49 
55/49, Billeting costs in Devon on Lady Button's estates show the 
cost of one night's billet for horse and man as being 4d each 
116. LCL, Ms Lich 24; HMC Hastings, 2, pp. 115-6; LJRO, D39 LIIIB 
117. HMC Hastings, 2, p. 132 
118. ibid., 2, p. 119 
119. BL Add Mss, 5752, f402 
120. CCAM, p. 1184 
121. LCL, Ms Lich 24 
86 
Chanter Three 
The Parliamentarian War Effort in the North Midlands: A Comparative 
Analysis 
This chapter is intended only as a brief survey of the topic; for 
detailed work on the parliamentarian war effort the reader is referred to 
the works by Pennington and Roots and by Everitt, which are mentioned in 
this text and in the bibliography at the end of this thesis. This 
chapter's purpose is twofold. Firstly it is to present a more balanced 
picture of the region in order that the royalist war effort does not 
appear in isolation. Secondly, throughout this analysis of the rival 
administration, points of comparison with the royalists will be presented 
thereby placing the findings of the bulk of this thesis within context. 
Unlike the royalist war effort, the parliamentarian equivalent is 
well documented at the central level. Ordinances for the creation of 
county committees and for the establishment of excise, sequestration and 
assessment levies, along with their respective attendant committees, are 
contained within works by John Rushworth and that by Firth and Rait. 1 
Secondary sources include works by Alan Everitt and Clive Holmes which 
have presented us with detailed examinations of several individual county 
committees, and-James Wheeler, who has illuminated the methods employed 
by, and the success of, the parliamentarian war machine. 2 At the local 
level there is less evidence to work on, but the sources used will become 
apparent in the later section dealing with the regional operations. 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Firstly the 
establishment of the committees and their history up until the middle of 
1643 will be examined. Secondly the membership will be studied in a 
manner similar to that employed in the previous chapter when examining the 
commissioners of array. Following this the three main sources of revenue 
will be taken into consideration. Finally the way in which the committees 
within the region worked in unison will be explored. 
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The Establishment of the County Committees 
From December 1642 parliament began to establish committees in 
counties over which it had some control. By the following February it 
instituted such committees for counties over which it was, for the time 
being, powerless. Devon and Yorkshire were amongst those counties which 
received a committee-in-waiting. In the north midlands, Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Rutland all received committees before 
the end of 1642; Staffordshire appears not to have received one until the 
new year. The first one recorded seems to have been issued in February by 
which time the county had been placed under the command of Lord Brooke who 
was marching north to seize military control from the growing royalist 
party within the county. 3 In Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, the 
committees were formed around the leading parliamentarians who had been 
instrumental in securing the county towns in the absence of royalist 
activists. When the King moved west to Shrewsbury and then south towards 
London, he drained the north midlands of prominent royalist figures such 
as Hastings, giving active parliamentarians a free hand. 4 Accordingly Sir 
John Gell, a noted lessee of lead mines and ex-high sheriff, aided by % 
troops supplied by Sir John Hotham at Hull, took Derby. John Hutchinson, 
eldest son of the respected owner of Owthorpe in Nottinghamshire, who had 
become prominent earlier in the year when he prevented Lord Newark from 
seizing the county magazine for the King, likewise took control of 
Nottingham. 5 It was, given their obvious zeal, a practical idea to centre 
the committees around men such as these. In Leicestershire, since the 
Earl of Stamford, the parliamentarian lord lieutenant, had become 
embroiled in the war in the south west, the committee was formed around 
Stamford's son Lord Grey of Groby. 6 Within the same month as these 
committees were formed, they and their counties were grouped into an 
association along with Rutland, Northamptonshire, Huntingdonshire, 
Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire; Lord Grey was placed in military 
command over them. 7 
Within the first half of 1643 the committee system in the north 
midland counties was developed. By February all of the five counties 
covered by this thesis had committees responsible for the raising and 
training of military forces. The means of raising income had progressed 
from the dependence on loans at eight per cent interest, to measures more 
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suited to a long term prosecution of the war. The chief source of income 
was the collection of a weekly tax, the Assessment, established by an 
ordinance in late February. 8 By the end of the following month the 
sequestration of enemy estates was provided for. 9 For both of these 
measures a committee was established, the membership of each being drawn 
from the personnel of the militia committees established earlier. The 
same was true of the contemporaneous committees for 'punishing scandalous 
ministers'. By utilizing the same corps of men parliament aimed at 
preventing the possibility of conflict between rival organs of government. 
It is to an examination of the composition of these committees that we now 
turn. As with the study of the commissioners of array, these men will be 
examined in the light of their social standing, their familial status and 
their experiences of education, local or national government. 
The County Committees 
The counties dealt with here are the same as those with which the 
previous chapter was concerned, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Staffordshire. In each county we will be 
taking into account the nominees to all the committees created in the 
county, but only those deemed to have been active on the committees will 
be included in the statistical analyses. Any significant, difference to 
the findings of the tables produced by the addition of statistics from a 
group excluded from the main analysis, will, as in the previous chapter, 
be dealt with in the text. The statistics only take note of titles or 
offices held before the issue of the Militia Ordinance in March 1642. As 
with the previous chapter, each county will be examined in turn and then 
the committeemen will be considered as a whole. Throughout this analysis 
reference will be made to comparable statistics from the last chapter. 
Derbyshire's Committeemen 10 
It would appear that a total of thirty men were appointed to 
committees within Derbyshire between December 1642 and the end of 1645. 
Of these, only four did not play an active role in the county 
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administration. One of these was captured at the beginning of the war, 
two were possible neutrals and one falls into that category where there is 
not enough evidence to indicate clearly whether or not he was an activist. 
This leaves twenty-six known activists whose social breakdown is as 
follows: 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
0425 10 104 
Though there are six men from the titled gentry, it is immediately 
obvious that right from the outset parliament, whether from necessity or 
not, was willing to appoint men of lesser social standing than were the 
royalists. Though in the nominees to the commissions of array there are 
men termed simply as 'gentlemen' there are very few of them and they 
certainly never come near to forming the largest single group. The one 
yeoman was appointed after 1644, when it was evident in many counties that 
there was an element of social dilution occurring in the parliamentarian 
county administration. The appointment of even just one yeoman is 
significant especially when notice is taken of the four men in the unknown 
category. These too would come from either the low obscure tail of the 
gentry or even like the yeoman, from below the identifiable rank of 
gentleman altogether, indicating that the parliamentarian war 
administration was an agent of social mobility. These figures also show 
that parliamentarian administration was chiefly composed of men from the 
lower end of the gentry spectrum or below. It has been argued that social 
dilution occurred during the war, that committees became, as the war 
progressed, increasingly reliant upon men of low status. Here, it is 
suggested that an element of such men was apparent from the outset. 
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Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
11 8133 
With regard to familial status, it can be seen that a large number 
of activists came from the upper end of the family scale. The commitment 
is similar to that shown by the royalist commissioners. Involvement of 
the heads of families was in effect the commital of the families' wealth 
and future to the cause. The risk was no less great than that undertaken 
by royalist families. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that we 
know which side won the first civil war and were thus not faced with 
financial penalties. 
Despite the apparent lack of social standing amongst the 
committeemen there was quite a high degree of experience on the committee, 
but compared with the county's commissioners there is a much higher 
proportion who had no political or administrative experience at all (ten 
out of the twenty-six as opposed to one out of eleven). However a larger 
proportion of committeemen did attend places of legal and higher 
education. There was also one man with town government experience - an 
element missing from the commissions. This-can be partly explained by the 
location of the committees in the county towns. Gell was not enamoured 
with Derby's council as a whole; when Hastings captured the mayor and 
offered to return him, Gell suggested sending Hastings the rest of the 
council as he found them an obstruction. 11 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. 
202 
H. S. J. P. University Inn Town Govt 
54 13 10 1 
Derbyshire's committee was drawn from a broader social base than 
the county's commission of array. On a familial level there is the same 
pattern shown: a concentration at the upper end of the family scale with 
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the same consequent embroiling of the families' wealth. Though a large 
number of the committeemen received some form of education, administrative 
experience is confined, as might be expected, to those at the upper end of 
the gentry spectrum. 
Leicestershire's Committeemen 
Forty-nine men were appointed to the committees handling 
parliament's affairs in Leicestershire. Of these the high number of 
thirty-four seem to have played at least some part in the working of the 
committees. Four men left insufficient evidence for their part to be 
accurately assessed, one man was a passive supporter or neutral, three 
were activists elsewhere and seven were royalists. 
The social breakdown is as follows: 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq 
103 16 
Gent. Yeoman Trade/ 
. 
profession/ 
clergy 
5 
Unknown 
9 
A slightly higher proportion of these committeemen came from the 
upper gentry (esquires and above) than did their Derbyshire counterparts. 
However the large number of 'unknowns' indicates that there was still a 
significant proportion of lower gentry or even elements from below the 
gentry. Of the ten appointed after 1644, only two were esquires; the 
others were of low or implied low gentry status. The petition, presented 
to parliament by Leicestershire's 'well affected' in late 1644, indicated 
that the county committee were already perceived as being created of 
lesser men with no estates in the county. 12 This fear of social dilution 
would not be stilled by the post 1644 additions to the committees. The 
claim that some of the committee had no Leicestershire estates, is not 
true: all had estates in the county, but some were not very substantial. 
Despite the large number whose exact familial status cannot be 
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discerned, we still have a group dominated by those from the upper end of 
the family scale. However there is a noticeable proportion of men who are 
not. There is no reason why the 'unknown' group should not follow the 
pattern established by the others. 
Familial Status 
Head Ist son 2nd son other son unknown 
12 632 11 
There is still evidence of the apparent willingness to commit the family 
to the cause shownby the great number of the heads and potential heads of 
families present in the statistics. 
Only fifteen of the committeemen appear to have had pre-war 
experience of education or administration. This is quite different to the 
situation in Derbyshire and compares poorly with the county's 
commissioners. The number who had had some experience of higher 
education, is also low, being only a third of the total.. We are left to 
conclude that the petitioners of 1644 may have had grounds upon which to 
base their fears of the committee's suitability to administer the county. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. 
000 
H. S. J. P. University Inn Town Govt 
01 12 63 
We do again see an element of men with experience of town government 
present on the committee. 
On the whole Leicestershire's committeemen appear to be, and were 
perceived to be at the time, of low social standing and experience. 
Though there is a slightly higher proportion of upper gentry than is 
present in Derbyshire the general lack of social standing is not, as in 
Derbyshire, compensated for by an impressive amount of political, 
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administrative and educational experience. We see again parliament's 
willingness to call upon lower social groups to control its local affairs. 
Nottinghamshire's Committeemen 
Of the twenty-nine men appointed to the Nottinghamshire committees 
before 1646, only four appear not to have played a part in their 
activities. Three were either passive parliamentarians or neutrals and 
one, William Drury, was thrown off the committee for suspected royalist 
sympathies and compliance in royalist attempts to capture the town. 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
012 11 6023 
The two men in the 'Trade... ' category were both of professional 
status with, perhaps, claims to urban gentility; one was a physician and 
the other a lawyer. Two of the 'unknowns' were probably involved in trade 
and were both involved in town government, therefore they may well have 
been in the same group as the afore mentioned urban gentry. Despite the 
firm anchor in the upper ranks of the gentry where over half of the 
committee men had their origins, it is clearly shown that parliament's 
cause utilized men of lower social standing in the administration than the 
royalists were willing to do. Dr Huntingdon Plumtree, the committeeman, 
was not considered for the royalist commission probably due to his low 
social standing: his parliamentarianism owed a lot to force of 
circumstance, living as he did in Nottingham. 
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Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
5532 10 
Though the large number of 'unknowns' is disconcerting it would appear 
again that the Nottinghamshire committeemen are from the upper end of the 
family spectrum and could be expected to hold or to succeed to the 
family's financial reins. Though their social obscurity clouds the issue 
in ten cases it may be possible that these prospective lower gentry had 
something to make them eligible for consideration as candidates for 
committee post. That may well have been their familial position, thus it 
is possible that they were heads of their (obscure) families. 
This may be born out by the fact that it was obviously not their 
proven skills as administrators which won them their place. Only eleven 
of the committeemen had had such experience and they were from the upper 
end of the social ladder. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. 
001 
H. S. J. P. University Inn Town Govt 
w12852 
It will be remembered that the county's commissioners were not 
particularly well versed in the relevant experiences tabulated here 
either. The committee's Sir Francis Thornhaugh did have experience of 
Ship Money collection in the 1630s. This would be of no small value given 
that parliament's assessment was based on this much hated tax. 
Nottinghamshire's committees were, it has been shown, composed of 
men drawn from a broad gentry spectrum but were not made up of men of 
proven adminstrative worth. Yet the social elite and the experienced 
administrators of seventeenth century life were represented on the 
committee, where their presence would add weight to both its appearance 
and its performance. 
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Rutland's Committeemen 
The fourteen active members of the Rutland committees came from a 
total of fifteen nominees: the one absentee was in London for the 
duration. The social pattern is similar to those of the committees seen 
above. The two gentlemen were appointed after 1644 when social dilution 
was becoming evident. However this is offset by the fact that the one 
noble, Lord Grey, was also a post 1644 appointee. The two 'unknowns' were 
however nominated before 1644, and were probably mere gentlemen. 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
11082002 
On a familial basis the pattern set by the other committees is 
mirrored in Rutland. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
53015 
The issue is again clouded by the large number of 'unknowns' in the table, 
yet social obscurity does not automatically imply that these men were from 
lower ranks of the family tree. 
Only seven of the committeemen had any of the forms of experience 
relevant to this study. 
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Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn Town Govt. 
00041520 
In this respect they compare badly with the commissioners of array 
as, despite the committee being twice the size of the commission, there 
are only two more men of experience on it. The strength of the committee 
would lie in its possession of four ex high sheriffs, three with 
experience of Ship Money collection. 
Rutland's committee had, like the others seen so far, a firm anchor 
in the upper gentry but not the highest elements of society. It also drew 
men from much lower down the social spectrum. ' This is reflected in the 
fact that only half of them had had either higher education or a hand in 
pre-war county government. 
Staffordshire's Committeemen 
The Staffordshire committeemen are exceptional cases for several 
reasons. Firstly there were considerably more nominees to the committees 
-a total of fifty-two. Secondly, unlike any other of the north midland 
county committees, they left behind a series of minutes of their 
activities. -Thirdly, and leading on from the last point, it is easier to 
assess which members were active. The numbers given here are similar to 
those in the analysis by Pennington and Roots, though they are not 
entirely the same. 13 The number deemed active is judged to be nineteen. 
Two appointees were to be royalists, five to be active elsewhere for 
parliament, and no less than twenty-six appear to have remained aloof in 
one way or another. This could indicate one of two things. It may be 
that the relative wealth of information regarding these committees has 
enabled a more accurate picture of the level of activism to be made, 
thereby indicating that the numbers of activists given for the other 
counties is an overestimate. Or-secondly, that the powerful tendency 
towards neutralism, shown by the county's attempt to raise a 'third force' 
as late as December 1642, led to widescale avoidance of involvement with 
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the war effort. However it must be remembered that with regard to the 
Staffordshire commissioners of array the proportion of activists was not 
wildly different from other commissions in the way that the Staffordshire 
committee figures are different from other counties' committees. It is 
probable that a combination of the two above propositions is the 
explanation and a work dedicated to the full examination of the 
parliamentarian war effort, unlike this present thesis, would be more able 
to pursue this point. It does remain true that the county relied heavily 
upon outsiders for a lot of its initiative. Hastings was the driving 
force behind the royalists, at least in the early stages of the war. Sir 
William Brereton was the impetus behind the parliamentarian counter 
measures once the other ousider's - Brooke's - initiative petered out. By 
late 1643 it was to be the Earl of Denbigh who was to influence the 
parliamentarians of the county, often in opposition of Cheshire's 
Brereton. Denbigh was an informal presence on the committee with two 
others who formed part of his faction: none of these three is covered by 
this analysis. 
The nineteen activists were not of the highest social standing and 
in many ways form a contrast to the other committees studied. Over half 
of them were below the rank of esquire without including-the 'unknowns'. 
The commissioners it will be recalled were of quite high social standing. 
Given this and the assertion above regarding neutralism this may be an 
example of what Morrill meant by his argument that fear made some men 
royalists and others neutrals. We may be witnessing proof here that this 
was the casein Staffordshire. Fear amongst the ruling county groups of 
the shire over the potential-for social revolution drove some into active 
royalism, which they saw as a means of preserving their county, but, at 
the same time it drove more of the same group into neutralism. This left 
parliament with the necessity of drawing active support from lower social 
groups. 
P1, 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
01046026 
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If we assume that the six 'unknowns' are unidentifiable because of their 
social obscurity then it is clear that the Staffordshire committee is 
drawn heavily from the lower gentry ranks. The two men in the 'Trade... ' 
bracket were both described as ironmongers but one had served as mayor for 
Stafford and thus one or both of them may have claim to 'urban gentility'. 
The obvious lack of social status on the committee does not entail a 
parallel shift down the familial scale. 
Familial Status 
Head Ist son 2nd son other son unknown 
38107 
Again this may reflect the point that there must be some identifying 
factor which made these men out to be potential nominees. At the time the 
majority were chosen the war was still in its infancy and it is therefore 
unlikely that it was evidence of their talents in prosecuting the cause 
that made them candidates for committees. Probably the only mark of 
standing they gould possess would have been their position at the top of a 
family heirarchy. 
It was not, in all but eight cases, evidence of pre-war 
administrative experience which made them candidates for the committees. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. 
100 
H. S. J. P. University Inn Town Govt 
00641 
Not one of the committeemen had experience of governing Staffordshire or 
representing it in parliament; the one M. P. was Brereton and he had 
represented Cheshire. This may well have had serious repercussions on the 
committee's ability to manage the county and will go some way towards 
explaining the dependence upon outsiders. It may also explain why the 
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royalists were able to maintain control of large portions of the county 
right up until the end of the war. 
The Staffordshire committee had the least number of members with 
administrative experience of the five county committees and was certainly 
the one composed of the lowest number of men from the higher gentry ranks 
and the largest proportion from the tail of the gentry and below. It 
shows that there may well be validity in Morrill's assertion about the 
fear of social disruption and revolution; the large scale avoidance of 
involvement in either cause as shown in this county is reflected in the 
others but not to the same degree. 
Before progressing to the study of the committeemen as a whole it 
is proposed to take the educational aspect separately. As in the case of 
the commissioners this will enable us to detect social connections made 
between the future-parliamentarians and reveal any grounds for the 
formation of any common ideology within the group. 
Education 
a) The Universities 
' Forty-three of the committeemen deemed active went to university; 
36.75%. This is a smaller proportion than is true of the commissioners. 
There may be several reasons for this. Stone mentions the possibility 
that there were decreasing opportunities for men of lower status to enter 
the universities, though this is in dispute and may not account for the 
lack of committeemen who had been to university. However we are concerned 
with a large group of lower and non gentry and these may be a group which 
could not afford to attend university unless they achieved a scholarship 
or undertook work whilst in attendance or a group to whom university 
attendance was still alien and not yet accepted as part of the normal 
pattern of life. Whatever the cause we are faced with the fact that in 
what has been termed a time of 'educational revolution' a large portion of 
parliament's county governors had not attended university. 14 
In the cases of those committeemen who attended Oxford, there are 
no significant groupings by either college or time period. Only in the 
years 1610-1611 were there any more than three students who were later to 
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become committeemen. present; nonet, rere at the same college. Only Magdalen 
had more than three student committeemen - none contemporaneously. 
At Cambridge, in both 1621 and 1624, there were four men destined 
to become north midland committeemen. Two of those present in 1621 were 
in the same college and both served on Leicestershire's committee. In 
1624 three of the four-contemporaries were to serve on the Nottinghamshire 
committee, though none was at the same college. Too much must not be read 
into these seeming connections. Though it is true that university was 
regarded as a place to establish social and economic links to be of 
service in later life, Cambridge may not have been. the catalyst. These 
men were from the same counties and broadly speaking, from the same social 
circles, thus the university may only have been responsible for the 
furtherance of connections already made. 
There is again little evidence to suggest the status of the student 
committeemen. There are only sixteen cases where such a definition is 
possible, only one of them from Oxford. The majority, fifteen, were 
pensioners and commoners and thus financially supported by their families 
indicating that the majority of those who attended university were derived 
from committeemen at the upper end of the social scale. One was a sizar 
supplementing his subsistence by doing work later to be. performed by the 
college servants. Only one, William Bendy, was registered as being of 
plebian status. As in the case of the commissioners there are no 
scholars, men who as a result of their proven ability, were supported at 
the expense 6f the university. It was argued at the time and later by 
Lawrence Stone that many scholarships were being given to members of the 
upper gentry for favours rather than for merit. Thus it was, and is 
argued, that less of them were available for the lower, impecunious 
gentry. 
It is impossible to suggest that common ideologies were formed at 
university, ideologies which would bind the committeemen, in later life, 
to the cause for which they risked themselves and their families for in 
the 1640s. 
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b) Inns of Court 
Some degree of legal knowledge was considered very useful to the 
landowners of the seventeenth century, given that part of their life would 
be spent in legal wrangles over land holdings. To one involved in county. 
government such knowledge would be of enhanced value, preventing the 
likelihood of falling into the pitfalls of office holding. The 
committeemen of the north midland counties were not on the whole well 
versed in legal knowledge. Though three of them were barristers before 
their appointment to the committees, only twenty-seven (23%) appear to 
have attended the Inns of Court. 
As with the study of the university experience there is little 
evidence to suggest that social, political or economic ties were forged at 
the Inns. Only in '1619 was there a group of more than three committeemen 
present - two each in Grays and the Inner Temple. These may be 
suggestions of links being made but this is only conjecture. As with the 
other examinations of educational aspects of the north midland activists, 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace extra-regional connections 
between future royalists or parliamentarians. 
Turning again to Prest's regional argument, we once more find 
Grays, which he claims had a heavy northern bias, taking the largest 
single proportion of committeemen (ten) which was also true in the case of 
the commissioners. Lincoln's which according to Prest would be less 
likely to have any members from this region -a point confirmed with 
regard to the, commissioners - took six men who were later to become 
committeemen. Middle Temple with its supposed southern bias took four and 
Inner Temple with its midland bias had seven. 15 
r 
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The Committeemen of the'North Midland Counties: An Overview 
Activists 117* 67.2% 
Cases for which it is not possible 
to ascertain their behaviour 5 2.8% 
Non Activists 
a) Dead or captured before April 1643 2+ 1.1% 
b) Activists outside the area 11 6.2% 
c) Royalists 10 5.7% 
d) Passive parliamentarians or neutrals 29 16.6% 
TOTAL 174 
* This allows for Lord Grey with a position on two committees. 
+ This figure includes the one member thrown off a committee. 
In the previous chapter it was indicated that the king made serious 
errors of judgement when selecting prospective commissioners of array. 
Parliament should have had more success; by the time the first committees 
were named the war had been in progress for three. months and the lines of 
division had been drawn. Therefore, it might be expected that parliament 
would be able to draw upon men who had already shown their. commitment to 
the cause. This was, in a way, envinced when parliament formed its 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire committees around the activists Sir John 
Gell and John Hutchinson. It is, at first sight, borne out by the above 
figures which show that 67% of the nominees did become activists in the 
area. With the addition of the activists outside the area the total is 
73.4% as compared with only 58% in the case of the commissioners. The 
number of passive supporters or neutrals remains high at 16.6% but is 
lower than the/23.4% in the case of the King's nominees. Given what was 
said in the Staffordshire section about the possibility that the activist 
numbers for the other four counties may be overestimates, the number of 
neutrals given here may correspondingly be an underestimate. On second 
glance the figures do not suggest that the parliament was as successful as 
it could have been in selecting its supporters; no less than ten did 
103 
become royalists. But. it does remain true that parliament's war effort 
was run by a larger number of people than the royalist equivalent and thus 
it may have, in its execution, represented a wider spectrum of views, both 
social and economic. 
Q.... ß., 1 D--I, 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
177 44 29 1 
% of 0.8% :. 
6% 6% 38% 
whole 
% of 1% 7.5% 7.5% 47% 
known 
24.8% 0.8% 
31% 1% 
4' 24 
3.4% 20.5% 
4.3% 
Only just over a half of the committeemen (50.8%) were from the ranks of 
the upper gentry (esquires and above) and nobility. This contrasts with 
the 96.2% of the commissioners in the same groups. In both cases the 
esquire category accounts for the single largest group and also in both it 
is in the region of 40%. But with the commissioners this was, with one 
known exceptiön and one 'unknown' exception, the bottom group, whereas 
with the committeemen there are at least 29% and a possible 49.5% below 
the rank of esquire. The war was something that inspired the English 
squirarchy into action even if it did not galvanise a like proportion of 
their social betters. 
Returning to the committeemen, we do see that the parliamentarian 
war effort was staffed by men drawn from a wider social spectrum than was 
the royalists': either it was more attractive to, or more dependant upon, 
such a wider group. The royalists sought to promote the impression that 
they were composed of the country's natural governors - yet the statistics 
given in the last chapter place serious limitations of the validity of 
this assumption. It still remains clear that the royalists had a higher 
proportion of the upper strata of county society but smaller 
administrative bodies, perhaps as a result of the reluctance to go below 
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the squirarchy. The membership of the committees is as far as social rank 
is concerned more akin to the royalist officer cadre than to the royalist 
administrators.. This will be demonstrated in the following chapter. With 
respect to age, the committeemen were, on average, nine years younger than 
the royalist commissioners, a reversal of the position in the House of 
Commons and six years older than the royalist officers. 
The connections between the royalist officer corps and the 
committeemen does not extend to familial status. There is a far greater 
tendency for the committeemen to be heads of families than there was for 
the royalist officers. 
Familial Status 
Head ist son 2nd son other son unknown 
36 29 78 37 
% of 30.8% 24.8% 5.9% 6.8% 31.6% 
whole 
of 45% 36.25% 8.7% 10% 
whole 
If the pattern established by the identified committeemen is carried on 
through to the ', Unknown' bracket then the propensity to be head or 
potential head of a family is the same in both the commissioners' and the 
committeemen's cases. This indicates, again, the level of commitment 
shown by both sides' active administrators to their respective causes. We 
must not let hindsight, and the knowledge that the parliamentarians won in 
1646, cloud our judgement of their risk that these families were involved 
in when their head or first son became a committeeman. 
Fifty-seven of the committeemen (48.7%) had some form of political, 
administrative or educational experience behind them when they took up 
their positions. 
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Political, Administrative and Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inns Town Govt 
50297 43 27 4 
of 4.3% 
whole 
1.7% 7.7% 6% 36.7% 23% 3.4% 
This compares poorly with the 86.5% of commissioners who had 
similar experience. This is not surprising given that, as has clearly 
been shown, the parliamentarians were drawn from a broader social spectrum 
thus embracing social groups which were normally barred from participation 
in county government. In terms of numbers, the north midland royalists 
had more M. P. s, deputy lieutenants, high sheriffs and J. P. s working on 
their smaller commissions and proportionately more people who had attended 
the universities or Inns of Court. Thus we see reflected here the point 
that status, education and trust go hand in hand. This lack of status and 
experience may well have led to shortfalls in the running of the 
parliamentarian financial system other than those consequent upon military 
failures. However elements of all the forms of experience covered in this 
study were available to the committees, though admittedly in fewer numbers 
than in the case of the royalists. 
The larger size of the committees would allow for a greater 
participation in-county affairs bringing perhaps new light on the matter 
of local government. These two points combined suggest that the social 
and other deficiencies evident on the committees would not. automatically 
make them incapable of performing their allotted task; after all, once 
the royalist military domination of the region was broken these very 
committees were able to extend their financial system to areas once the 
domain of the royalists. 
It is to a study of their financial system that we now turn. 
The Work of the Committees, 1643-1646 
Like the commissions of array, the county committees of the north 
midlands were generally static. That of Nottinghamshire remained firmly 
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ensconsed in Nottingham Castle once the town proved to be vulnerable to 
royalist attacks. Derbyshire's committee stayed usually within the county 
town though it did sit at Chesterfield at some time. Leicestershire's 
likewise remained at Leicester and Staffordshire's in Stafford after the 
town fell to parliament in late Spring 1643. The Rutland committee 
probably sat at Leicester, perhaps as an adjunct of the Leicestershire 
committee, until Burleigh House in Rutland was captured by Colonel Waite. 
In the four cases where the committees met in the county towns this grew 
mainly from necessity. The towns were all, to some extent, fortified and 
for a substantial period represented the parliamentarian's only hold on 
the region. It was also dangerous to venture out. Part of the 
Leicestershire committee was captured whilst engaged on a peripatetic 
session at Melton Mowbray and the same happened to part of the Derbyshire 
committee whilst it was at Wingerworth. 16 
The committees, like the commissions, had to deal with three main 
forms of revenue - excise, sequestration and assessment. There were, in 
addition, other financial collections of a minor nature to be dealt with. 
These were the levy aimed at financing the war against the catholic rebels 
in Ireland and the levy towards the pay of the Scots army once it had 
entered the war in January 1644. Only the major three levies will be 
considered here. 
The Excise 
For parliament this was the second largest source of income. The 
first ordinance establishing the excise passed through the Lords on 
July 22 1643 and came into force three days later. A central committee 
was established in London to which the accounts of the excise committees 
established in the counties were sent quarterly. 17 
The,, major towns where the excise was to be collected and over which 
parliament had military power, were each given an excise office, open each 
weekday for the registration of excise goods. A register of all buyers, 
sellers and manufacturers of goods upon which excise was due would be held 
at these offices. Registration was supposed to be undertaken voluntarily 
by the manufacturers etc., but by September 1643 it was clear that there 
was, if not hostility, then certainly antipathy to doing so. A second 
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excise ordinance was therefore passed empowering sheriffs and constables 
to take the registrations and collect the sums due. 18 
As was found with the royalist excise, there is little local 
evidence to suggest how the system operated in the north midlands. The 
. royalists did their best to upset markets and 
fairs where excise could be 
collected, even in the period marked by their military decline. 19 Thus 
receipts from the area may not have been high. However the 
parliamentarians did possess the four major county towns and would be able 
to divert several county markets to these places as the Marquis of 
Newcastle did at York. Certainly in Stafford, provision was made for the 
traders in the town's military regulations, indicating that markets were 
still held with some frequency. 20 It is not known how successful the 
parliamentarians were at holding these markets, though in Derbyshire, at 
least, the markets were reported to be recovering from 1644, but no trade 
figures are available. 21 
On a national level, though excise brought in at least £697,000 
between September 1643 and February 1645, it did not cover the amounts 
that parliament had borrowed, from the London merchants, on the strength 
of its expected income. As a result the list of goods on which excise was 
liable was increased to include beef, mutton, pork and veal. 22 It was 
these changes which provoked the anti excise riots in Derby in April 1645. 
During the riots, led by women, an excise commissioner was chained to the 
Bull Ring. Gell was unwilling or unable to prevent the rioting. Instead, 
seeing potential. advantages, he supported the townspeople. As a result 
the excise wap suspended for several months. 23 Gell's motive was that he 
required the tax for use in the county to supplement assessment revenue. 
By July he had therefore secured a major victory when parliament in an 
attempt to quell the disturbances allowed the county to retain half of the 
excise income for its own use. 24 This did not, as might be expected, 
appease the town where antagonism to the tax remained': high. The Derby 
incident, is important; it is, apparently, the only occasion in the north 
midlands that popular revulsion towards wartime financial systems ran to 
the extent of public demonstration. The aims of the protesters were far 
more specific and limited than the demands of the clubmen of the south 
midlands. Their only quarrel was with the excise tax and then chiefly to 
its extension to meats. Regular taxation of rural property provoked no 
such problems in the region during the first civil war. So it may be 
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assumed that propertied groups within society and rural elements which 
possessed a limited amount of livestock on common land and thus a hedge 
against such extensions of excise, were content to pay their lot. On the 
other hand, urban groups with little or no means of supplying a part of 
their own foodstocks were harder hit by the extension of the excise to 
meat and were, correspondingly, more liable to respond in the manner such 
as occured in Derby. If a detailed study could be made of the Derby 
rioters, we would be able to say more about the link between rural 
passivity and urban activity. If the Derby rioters were not property 
owners or those who only had a limited property stake, then it would 
identify them as the social group most hostile to war time taxation. 
Those manufacturers whose produce had been assessed for the excise and had 
only registered passive opposition to the tax, by their reluctance to 
register voluntarily, had, by their subsequent aquiescence, revealed that 
they were capable of bearing the expense. The rioters were, it appears, 
therefore, a different group and a different case. 
Unfortunately, as indicated, we cannot discern the financial 
success or otherwise of the excise system. Clearly it cannot have been as 
provident as it was in the counties of East Anglia or Kent which were 
dominated by parliament throughout the first civil war. However, income 
from the tax would have increased and gone on increasing from mid 1644, 
despite royalist attempts to hinder the markets. Even though nationally 
it proved to be an important source of income for parliament, excise 
proved in the north midlands that it was a potential cause of discontent 
far and above either contribution or assessment, or even both. 
Sequestration 
Towards the end of March 1643 Parliament formalised the seizure of 
estates and incomes of those whom it regarded as delinquent. 25 First on 
their list came the bishops and they were followed by anyone in arms 
against parliament or who had, or were to, contribute money to the King's 
forces. Also included were those involved in royalist tax collection. 
This was a less comprehensive statement of requisites of delinquency than 
the royalist sequestration order discussed in the previous chapter. It 
did not, for example, consider as delinquent tenants who had handed their 
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rents to royalist sequestrators, unlike the royalists who would have done 
so had the tenants handed money to parliamentarian sequestrators. 
26 Money 
from the sequestration of estates - which involved the confiscation of 
lands, property and rents, minus a subsistence allowance to delinquents' 
families - was to go straight to the London coffers 
for the finance of the 
army. The ordinance named a committee of sequestrators, with a quorum of 
only two, for each county. The membership was, in general, derived from 
the membership of the committees already established within those 
counties. Nationally the committees for sequestration only appear to have 
been of limited success. The regulations regarding their operations were 
tightened up in May 1644, particularly with respect to the percentage of 
the income which committees were allowed to rake off, to cover expenses. 
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Wheeler estimates that the national income from sequestrations was around 
, 000 per annum. 
Unfortunately there are no specific figures £200 28 
relating to the north midlands. 
Not all the sequestration money reached London - counties used some 
of the money to finance their own needs. In many counties this was 
eventually recognised as legitimate by London. Composition, the fine paid 
by delinquents who agreed to abide by the rules of parliament to have 
their estates freed from sequestration, was also intended to be paid to 
London. Initially, compounders were expected to travel to London to 
settle the composition fee. Nevertheless, in some cases, composition was 
settled in the. counties and fines collected and used in the county. 
Staffordshire was a case in point - the composition book still survives. 
29 
In it details are given of the sums paid by prominent north midlands 
royalists such as (Colonel) Rowland Eyre, Walter Wrottesley and the Bagot 
family. 
Within the north midland counties, the ability of the 
parliamentarians to collect sequestration would follow a pattern inverse 
to that of the royalists. That is to say their ability to sequestrate 
would have been at its lowest ebb in late 1643 and early 1644. Then as 
royalist power declined the parliamentarians would be able to begin a more 
comprehensive sequestration of royalist estates. By the conclusion of the 
war the estates of at least one hundred and thirty royalist activists 
within the north midlands were under sequestration. In addition there 
were far greater numbers of neutrals or passive royalists whose estates 
were also under sequestration. Some of the royalist activists managed to 
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free their estates from devastating sequestration in return for 
surrendering garrisons; Hastings himself was one example. 30 
Despite the general lack of information regarding the day to day 
running of the parliamentarian sequestration procedure, some details can 
be ascertained. Derbyshire's sequestrators were operating in April 1644 
and were hoping to collect money from the estates of Francis Revell 
despite the fact that one of his estates was close to the royalist 
garrison at Wingfield Manor. 31 With the estate of Robert Waring at 
Clapton Hill in Nottinghamshire, the sequestrators were in receipt of the 
rents as they were being paid to Gervaise Clifton, one of the 
sequestrations committee, in 1644.32 Lists of those who compounded are 
contained in the Calendars of the Committee for Compounding as referred to 
in a previous footnote. Administration of sequestration in Staffordshire 
formed, in the words of Pennington and Roots, 'one of the most arduous 
duties of the Committee and its officials'. 33 The order book in the 
William Salt Library, clearly indicates that a committee had to accept, in 
some cases, that rents could not be collected from sequestered estates 
even by August 1644.34 Occasionally they were able, as were the Derby 
committee, to gain the rents from the majority of a royalist's tenants as 
was the case with Sir Charles Cavendish's estates at Barleston. 35 It is 
probable that in the other counties of the region it would be as true as 
it was in the case of Staffordshire, that the establishment of the 
Committee of Compounding at Goldsmiths' Hall in London would deprive the 
counties of income they had come to expect and depend upon, from their 
indigenous delinquent population. This would not, in the estimation of 
Pennington and Roots, be fully ameliorated by the agreements made with 
Goldsmiths' for the retention of a portion of the composition fine. As 
Staffordshire was only allowed to retain three thousand pounds of such 
money and the twenty-five commissioners of array for the region whose 
precise composition fines are known paid around £16,000 between them, the 
loss to the local parliamentarians can be gauged as substantial. 36 
Weekly Assessment 
Originally conceived and passed by parliament as a temporary 
expedient subject to renewal, the weekly assessment became the largest 
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source of income which parliament had. Over £1,100,000 was collected as 
weekly pay between February 1643 and October 1646. For the last twenty 
months the tax was known as the Monthly Tax and had yielded the largest 
part of the total sum. The Monthly Tax was aimed at covering the costs of 
the new Model Army, and its collection indicates parliament's growing 
control over the counties. 37 
In February 1643 the weekly assessment for the five north midland 
counties was listed as follows: Derbyshire, £175; Nottinghamshire, 
£187-1Os; Leicestershire, £187-1Os; Rutland, £62-10s; and Staffordshire, 
£212-1Os. None of these sums was particularly high; Devon, for example, 
was charged with £1,800 a week, Shropshire with £375 and Warwickshire with 
£562-1Os. 38 These values were based on an earlier general assessment 
aimed at raising £400,000 nationally. In the case of Derbyshire the sum 
represented three rimes the annual sum collected for Ship Money in the 
1630s. 39 The setting of an overall rate for the counties left the 
responsibility for dividing the counties into districts and appointing 
collectors for the levy up to the sequestrations committees created in the 
ordinance. 
As with the royalist case, the exact methods involved in the 
process of assessment collection at county level are hard to define. 
Again the constables' accounts are of great value especially when used 
alongside the Staffordshire order book - the most detailed document 
regarding administration in the north midlands. Central government had 
indicated the items upon which the assessment levy was to be based: these 
included property such as plate, cattle and land and income such as rents 
annuities and tithes. It was therefore a combination of an income tax and 
a property tax similar to that which the royalists were collecting. 
Basically, the system of collection operated by parliament was the 
same as that used by the royalists. Constables, called to meetings with 
the committees, or in receipt of warrants from them, were to assess the 
individual contributions of the inhabitants of their communities. Again, 
as described in the previous chapter, this would be done at meetings of 
'neighbours'. It is probable that in cases where the village was already 
paying to the royalists the parliamentarians would charge approximately 
the same amount. This is evident in many of the sets of constables' 
accounts still in existence and may be true elsewhere. 
Parliament enabled committees to divide counties into sections to 
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facilitate collections. In practice this seems to have followed the same 
pattern as the royalists used: that is, making indigenous garrisons 
responsible for assessment collections within their own area. The small 
garrison at Lapley House, whilst it was in parliamentarian hands, was to 
collect the £8-13s-7d from the four villages and parishes surrounding it. 
However the garrison was to deduct its own requirements from this and send 
the residue with receipts to Stafford. Similarly, the forty strong 
garrison at Carswell House was collecting the local assessment and, in the 
case of non payment, was empowered to distrain cattle. 40 Organisation in 
Staffordshire reached, in theory, an advanced stage with Totmansloe being 
assigned to Colonel Bowyer, Cuttlestone and Pirehill hundreds' assessments 
to be used solely for the pay of the county's Foot and Siesdon and Offloe 
hundreds' for the Horse. 41 The degree to which the royalists were 
prepared to ignore county boundaries in ascribing contribution allocations 
was only, it would appear, achieved temporarily by their enemies in 
Staffordshire. In 1644, parts of Offloe hundred had been given to 
Warwickshire commanders, but the Earl of Denbigh and the Staffordshire 
committee revoked the agreement in the October of the same year. 42 
Pennington and Roots have correctly detected that the system in the county 
was not as sound in practise as it appeared. Denbigh interfered with the 
allocations of territory made before his arrival in the county just as 
Charles tinkered with the royalists' allocations. Thus some garrisons 
were left unpaid or in arrears like the forces at Leeke: this 
necessitated the collection of supplementary assessments. 43 Royalist 
domination of large parts of the county, outlined in the last chapter, 
would make the above ascriptions of hundredal allotments mere wishful 
thinking for a significant part of the war. 
By mid 1644 the parliamentarians were, in many places, beginning to 
make incursions into royalist areas. At Waltham on the Wolds in 
Leicestershire, 'Lord Grey's tax' was first paid in mid 1644: £4-6s-Od 
was collected towards an annual total of £68. It was paid sporadically 
from then until the following year when payments became more regular. The 
same is true of Branston also in Leicestershire, where in mid 1644 the 
constable was summoned to Melton Mowbray to meet members of the committee 
and learn of the assessment charges. After this occasion, the tax became 
steadily more regular until by the end of 1645 the majority, though not 
all, of the village's tax payments were made to the parliamentarians. In 
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both these cases, the communities were contributing to both war efforts 
until the close of 1645.45 From mid 1644 to the end of the following 
year, the village's constable had to collect payments for both sides from 
his neighbours. In Staffordshire the classic example of assessment 
collection is Mavesyn Ridware. Here Henry Lowe, the constable, was faced 
with collections of taxes for both sides for a period of six months 
beginning in February 1644. In this case the assessment is clearly shown 
as being collected both as cash and as receipted goods. The amounts of 
both were slightly lower than the royalist contribution payments Lowe was 
making. The period's totals are, £46-lls-Od for the contribution and 
£41-3s-10d for the assessment. This small disparity reveals that the 
figures given by Joyce Malcolm suggesting that the sums levied on counties 
by royalists were up to 74% higher than those charged by parliament, 
conceal a large number of disparities and thus obscure the true state of 
affairs. 46 Parliament was not able to control fully the region until the 
last of the royalist garrisons had surrendered. Places like Uttoxeter 
were still paying money to the royalists on a sporadic basis until the 
very last weeks of the war. 47 
Though there is less evidence of parliamentary taxation contained 
in the constables' accounts for the region and therefore no chance of 
judging the county totals for figures contained therein, other clues do 
exist - at least for Staffordshire. Pennington and Roots show that the 
county's treasurer, Robert Wilmot, only recorded the receipt of 
£1,321-6s-5d from county assessment. The vast majority was being spent in 
situ by the garrison commanders without the money ever passing through the 
hands of the county committee. Captain Foxal, whose company was based at 
Stafford, himself collected £2,840-12s-10d in assessments from villages 
allotted to him. His disbursements and short fall in his company's pay 
exceeded this sum by £404-10s-10d. 
48 From this example alone it is easy 
to see why Wilmot only received what he did and why Staffordshire and 
Nottinghamshire were excluded from the original New Model ordinance which 
established the Monthly Pay. Income from such counties excluded because 
of the impossibility of guaranteeing an income from them, was to be used 
to pay debts already incurred by parliament. This policy was an attempt 
to base the New Model's pay on a firm and dependable source in order to 
secure regular payment of the soldiers. 
49 
Weekly Assessment or the Monthly Pay which succeeded it was, in 
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concept and practice, similar to the royalists' contribution. Both were 
essentially property taxes and both were collected by constables - 
traditional elements of county government. In addition both taxes were 
collected initially by local garrisons for their own use, within an 
overall framework based upon hundredal or wapentakal boundries. As 
contribution collection declined it was superseded by the expansion of the 
assessment collection. It may be as true for assessment as it was for the 
contribution that though it was a major source of income, it failed to 
cover fully the cost of the war. 
The Association of Counties 
Paliament associated four of the north midland counties - 
Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Rutland - with 
Northamptonshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Huntingdonshire, on 
December 15th, 1642. Staffordshire was associated with Warwickshire on 
December 31st. The former association was under Lord Grey, the latter 
under Lord Brooke. 50 As to the military operations in the counties, these 
are covered in Chapters Five and Six and there is little need to go into 
detail here; only a brief outline is necessary. 
Brooke's attempt to gain military control over the counties he 
commanded came to an end with his death at the siege of Lichfield in March 
1643 after he had conquered Warwickshire. Even his success in that county 
was to be short lived. The Earl of Northampton's march through the 
county, on his way to help Hastings recoup his losses in Staffordshire, 
. saw the abandonment of many of the garrisons established by Brooke. As a 
result of work by Hastings with help from Northampton and then Rupert, 
Staffordshire was generally under royalist control from this period until 
the decline of royalist power throughout the region after the middle of 
1644. The gains made by the parliamentarians within the county, the 
capture of Stafford, Eccleshall and other minor garrisons, were due to the 
intervention of Sir William Brereton and his Cheshire/Lancashire forces, 
not through the county's association with Warwickshire. 
The association was given new life with the appointment of Lord 
Denbigh in mid 1643; but due to his being investigated for suspected 
royalism, he was not able to take the field until March 1644. His command 
also included Shropshire and Worcestershire. 51 Denbigh's military 
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intervention did not see a wholesale conquest of Staffordshire and indeed 
it led to division within the county committee. 52 The struggle for 
control of Stafford between Brereton and Denbigh continued even after 
Denbigh left the county's military affairs in July 1644. It is covered in 
detail by Pennington and Roots and by R. N. Dore in his edition of 
Brereton's letters. For the purpose of this thesis suffice to say that 
though Denbigh continued to interfere in county affairs it was Brereton 
who became the dominant figure. 53 It was to Brereton that the major 
garrisons of Tutbury, Lichfield and Dudley fell in 1646. Thus 
Staffordshire's history in the first civil war is dominated not by its 
ties with counties in the south midlands, with which it was formally 
associated, but by the military prominence of Brereton and his forces from 
Cheshire and the west midlands. 
The first test for Lord Grey's association was the abortive siege 
of Ashby in January 1643. Grey's abandonment of the siege prompted the 
Derbyshire faction to accuse him of being a faintheart. This was simply a 
reflection of their dissatisfaction with the result of the campaign, as 
Hastings based at Ashby was a very potent threat to south Derbyshire over 
which he had already, temporarily, been able to assert some control and 
was likely to be capable of doing so again. 54 In the following months the 
two failures to capture Newark and the Association's inability to prevent 
the march of the Queen's army through the region on its way southward, led 
to the decline of Grey's authority. Sir John Meldrum, the Scots 
professional soldier, became the effective leader of the Association's 
soldiers until his and their defeat at Newark in March 1644. Grey's 
nominal command was finally at an end and the Association broke up, when 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire were added to the Northern Association 
after Marston Moor and the Leicestershire area became subject to 
Rossiter's command in Lincolnshire. Even so, it was both Leicestershire 
and Derbyshire forces which together attacked and captured Wilne Ferry in 
July 1644 and the committees of the two counties who jointly established 
the garrison at Coleorton to watch Ashby de la Zouch in November 1644.55 
Co-operation between Derby's and Nottingham's committees was 
evident from the very commencement of the war. It was with Gell's help 
that John Hutchinson was able to establish Nottingham as a parliamentarian 
garrison. Gell's troops were also responsible for saving Nottingham from 
the pressure of Newark's attempt to establish a permanent garrison on the 
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Trent, only a mile from the town. 56 However relations were not always 
cordial. As early as January 1644, the Nottinghamshire committee accused 
their Derbyshire colleagues of collecting horses from the Stapleford area. 
Derby replied, being in 'wonder of men making title to wisdom' as to why 
such an accusation could be made in the knowledge that Nottingham troops 
were quartered in Derbyshire and collecting horses from there. Gell, 
Gresley and the rest of the committee quite rightly suggested that 
Hutchinson confine himself to fighting the Newark royalists. The dispute 
re-surfaced in the late summer when the Nottinghamshire committee again 
accused the Derbyshire men of levying horses in the Mansfield area. 57 It 
can be said, that between the parliamentarian administrators there was as 
much rivalry and conflict as there was amongst their royalist counterparts 
- largely due to Grey's ineffective leadership and the resultant lack of 
positive direction to the Association. 
Strange Bedfellows: The Two Administrations 
For the entire period of the first civil war the rival 
administrations worked side by side. The general pattern of royalist 
supremacy and subsequent decline and the parliamentarians' struggle to 
achieve their own supremacy and victory will be explored in detail later. 
As the royalists lost the ability to gain regular taxes from the 
communities the parliamentarians were able to take them over. For a time 
in many cases both sides obtained income from the same place. There must 
have been some element of 'turning a blind eye'. It cannot be true that 
either side remained ignorant of the constables' duplicity in the double 
taxed communities. Constables were arrested or displaced. Hastings 
arrested one at Lutterworth and the committee at Stafford arrested several 
during the war. However it may be that in these instances the constables 
were politically motivated, guilty of not only handling enemy warrants and 
tax, but also of neglecting to. put into effect those that Hastings or the 
committee wanted them to. For the others their ability to handle both 
levies meant survival - of sorts. The office of constable was made 
onerous by the civil. war and, like that of sheriff, one to be avoided if 
possible. It is no surprise that the constable of Branston for 1645, John 
Worsdale, wrote at the end of the accounts for his year of office: 
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'Mount not up to the place of honour for prosperity is more 
dangerous than adversity and more perish at the right hand 
of prosperity than on the right hand of low and poor degree. ' 
58 
However, there are excellent examples of a live and let live 
approach to the matter of coexistence. In 1644, the inhabitants of the 
Nottinghamshire portion of the Vale of Belvoir petitioned the Newark 
royalists and the Nottingham parliamentarians regarding the number of 
horses that each side was taking from the area. In reply, both parties 
made some attempt to agree on a joint policy on horse collection. 
Nottingham suggested that no more than one horse in four or five be taken 
from its owner. The bilateral agreement was never finalised due to mutual 
distrust when planning the necessary joint meeting - however, the very 
fact that it was considered is important in itself. 59 
When the royalist garrison at Welbeck surrendered in November 1645, 
after Colonel Freshville had held it for some months, the garrison was in 
arrears. In recognition of this the Derbyshire committee agreed, as part 
of the surrender terms, that the contribution due to the garrison from 
Scarsdale hundered, be collected and paid over by Lieutenant Colonel 
Thomas Gell. 60 
What the incidents illustrate is part and parcel of the attitude 
which the commissioners of array, and to some extent the committeemen, had 
towards their communities. The two bodies appear to have been reluctant 
to overburden'the counties in which they after all had some stake. Thus 
it may be seen that the leisurely approach to prosecuting the war, 
evidenced in ignoring the fact that constables were playing a double game, 
attempting to make bilateral agreements and paying enemy arrears even when 
their own soldiers were underpaid and when victory was certain, is just an 
extension of this. It is a recognition perhaps of the fact that the war 
was not being fought in some foreign country which could be left, after 
the war, to sort out its own problems as the combatants returned home. In 
the midlands, at least, the conduct of the war seems to have been tempered 
by the desire to protect the homelands. In this region and perhaps in 
other parts of England, it was not a war fought as Ian Roy and others may 
suggest, in the manner of the war on the continent. It was not a case of 
England turned Germany. 61 
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The Parlimentarian War Effort: A Conclusion 
The system was very similar to that employed by the region's 
royalists. However, it was run by men of a markedly lower social status 
and of lower administrative experience. These factors partially explain 
the committees' inability to exercise their system in late 1643 and early 
1644. It is the royalists' overwhelming military supremacy during this 
period which is the overiding factor in this. By the end of the war 
parliament's system was being run as efficiently, if not more so, as the 
royalists had run theirs. The parliamentarian war effort in this area was 
dependant upon outside military intervention. Though Gell, Hutchinson, 
Waite and to some extent Lord Grey and his successors at Leicester, were 
indefatigable in their attempts to maintain pockets of resistance, their 
eventual victory was due to outside help. Gell lost Derbyshire during 
1643; it was returned to him by the Earl of Manchester in the summer of 
1644. When the King entered the county in the summer of the following 
year, Gell was unable to prevent the royalists resurrecting part of their 
financial administration. Hutchinson never conquered Nottinghamshire: 
this was left to first Manchester and then to the Scots. " Royalist 
Staffordshire fell to Brereton, not to the forces of the county committee. 
Leicestershire was plagued by royalists right up until the end of the war 
despite the committee being able to take advantage in their enemy's 
internal strife. The failure of the royalists, shown in Chapters Five and 
Six, to capture any of the county towns before 1645, left the hardy 
parliamentarians with bases from which to run their war effort once the 
tide had turned. Therefore we must conclude that the parliamentarian war 
effort could only be established and run, with any measure of success, 
when military supremacy was achieved. It does not appear that, in the 
north midlands, parliament was capable of making such an achievement 
possible in the way that the royalist war effort had done. 
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Chapter Four 
The North Midlands Army 
In the last thirty years there has been growing interest in the 
composition of the royalist armies of the first civil war. The Oxford 
Field Army has been examined by Ian Roy, the army in the west by Malcolm 
Wanklyn and the Northern Army by Peter Newman. 1 The armies involved in 
various campaigns have been noted and studied in many published 
monographs. 2 The personnel of the officer corps of several armies have 
been listed in some of the above; biographies of major characters have 
been produced and the biographical dictionary of over sixteen hundred 
royalist field officers has been a welcome addition to the subject area. 3 
The officer corps have also been subjected to statistical analyses by 
Peter Newman and others, notably Dr D. G. Blackwood who incorporated his 
study in his work on Lancashire. 4 Until now none of this treatment has 
been accorded to the North Midlands Army, though most of its field 
officers were covered in the biographical dictionary and other work by 
Newman. 5 Indeed, apart from some brief acknowledgements, its existence as 
an army is largely ignored. Ian Roy referred to it as a 'Flying Army' in 
his work on the royalist ordnance papers and Peter Young has occasionally 
referred to Hastings' army in passing. In general, however, works dealing 
with specific geographical areas have skirted around this region. 6 Ronald 
Hutton deals with Staffordshire, considering it as an appendage of the 
Marcher Counties, and Peter Newman establishes that 'they are north 
midland shires and few of their regiments played any part in the civil war 
in the six northern counties', thus they play no part in his thesis. 7 On 
the other hand officers of the Derbyshire regiments have been identified 
by J. T. Brighton, but this is a work concerned with that county alone and 
mentions this 'ephemeral' army only in passing. 8 It is a major contention 
of this thesis that such an army did exist and that it played an important 
role in the war. References to it and some of its officers, do appear in 
general works when it, and they, played a part in what are considered 
'central events'. But doing so was only part of its role, a role which is 
fully dealt with in Chapters Five and Six. In order that it be allowed to 
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take its place amongst the other royalist armies which have been studied, 
it is necessary to re-create it with a regiment by regiment study; these 
regiments will be analysed if possible with respect to their size, their 
military record and their eligibility for inclusion in this army. 
Following the regimental breakdown, the officer corps will be analysed 
along the lines adopted for the commissioners and committeemen. This will 
not be a list of officers - such is left to Appendix Three. 
It is hoped that by the conclusion of this chapter the character of 
the North Midlands Army will be established. It will be seen that for a 
major part of the war it was not simply a collection of isolated guerrilla 
bands as it appears to be in several of the works referred to in Chapter 
One. Instead it will be shown that from Spring 1643, but particularly 
from the following Autumn, until October 1644, it was more a sort of field 
army, which embodied Napoleon's maxim of a century and a half later that 
an army should divide up to survive, yet unite to fight. Its division 
into various garrisons enabled it to live off local resources gathered in 
the manner described in Chapter Two, but occasionally some or all of it 
could and would unite to participate in several major field operations. 
The Regiments of the North Midlands Army - 
In order that the structure of the regiments described below can be 
seen in relation to general military establishments common in seventeenth 
century England,. it is necessary to look briefly at the sizes of various 
forms of regiments. 
Foot Regiments 
Ideally these would be composed of thirteen hundred men. Each 
regiment would be divided into ten companies not of equal strength. The 
three field officers in a regiment each had companies which, in their 
absence, were commanded by captains lieutenant. The colonel's company was 
two hundred strong, the lieutenant colonel's one hundred and fifty, and 
the (sergeant) major's one hundred and forty. The seven captains each had 
companies of one hundred men. Regiments would, in addition, have a 
surgeon, a chaplain, a quartermaster and other individuals. Foot 
regiments in the North Midlands Army did not, as will be seen below, reach 
full strength. 
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Horse Regiments 
Regiments would, in theory, consist of around five hundred men, in 
six troops, each troop having around sixty troopers and several officers. 
The field officers again each commanded troops, looked after in their 
absence by captains lieutenant; these troops were the same size as those 
of the captains'. Though regiments in the North Midlands Army consisted 
of six, seven or even eight troops these were often under size, in some 
cases with as few as twenty men. 
Dragoon Regiments 
These tended to vary in size but were organised along the same 
lines as the foot, being in companies. Dragoons suffered from the 
stringencies of the times. In good times they had mounts - though not 
usually of the highest calibre. In bad, they marched and fought as foot; 
they were in any case simply mounted foot soldiers and thus accorded less 
pay than horse soldiers. It is probable that in the North Midlands Army 
as in Hopton's forces in the south west, dragoon regiments were in effect 
the size of a single troop and attached to regiments of Horse. 
Artillery 
Unfortunately no substantial information regarding the artillery 
used by the North Midlands Army has come to light. Certainly nothing is 
known of its organisation or numbers. As a result it cannot be dealt with 
in this chapter. When the numbers of guns for a specific period are 
known, they are dealt with in the relevant parts of Chapters Five and Six. 
The regiments belonging to this army are here listed by county of 
origin; they will be examined in turn in this order. 
Colonels Type(s) of Regiments he Commanded 
Leicestershire 
Henry Hastings (Lord Loughborough's) Horse Foot Dragoons 
William Nevill Horse Foot 
John Pate Horse 
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Derbyshire 
Rowland Eyre Horse Foot Dragoons 
Sir John Fitzherbert Horse Foot 
John Freshville Horse Foot 
Sir John Harpur Horse Foot Dragoons 
John Milward/John Shalcross Horse Foot 
Sir Andrew Kniverton Horse Foot 
Roger Molyneux (also raised 
in Notts and Lincs) Horse Foot 
Ferdinando Stanhope/John Barnard 
(also raised in Notts) Horse Foot 
Nottinghamshire 
Isham Parkins Horse Foot 
Staffordshire 
Richard/Harvey Bagot Horse Foot Dragoons 
John Lane Horse 
Thomas Leveson Horse Foot 
Devereaux Wolseley Horse Foot 
Lincolnshire 
Gervaise Lucas (also raised in Leics) Horse Foot 
Regiments which are associated with the north midlands and which may have 
been a part of the army 
Sir John Corbet Foot 
Francis Whortley/Dud Dudley Dragoons 
Christopher Roper 
(may only be part of Hastings') Foot 
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Though some of these regiments were raised by commissioners of 
array, Hastings', Fitzherbert's and Harpur's being examples, they were not 
generally, with perhaps the exception of both Eyre and Stanhope's foot, 
men raised as a result of the work of the commissions. Instead, they were 
raised as outlined in Chapter Two, by virtue of commissions issued to the 
colonels as individuals once it became clear that the commissions of array 
were largely unsuccessful at what had been their primary task. Any 
soldiers raised by these bodies after the beginning of 1643 were 
incorporated into the regiments already in existence. 
Henry Hastings' (Lord Loughborough's) Regiments of Horse, Foot and 
Dragoons 
The Horse was originally raised in August 1642 by virtue of a 
warrant to raise four hundred men. 9 They were reputed to have fought at 
Powick Bridge and Edgehill; parliamentarian observers suggest that there 
were eight troops including that of the colonel. This estimate may in 
part be fanciful as only two of the officers named in the estimation 
appear subsequently as officers in the regiment. 1° Hastings led the 
regiment north from Oxford with the power to raise a further five hundred 
dragoons. 11 During December 1642, he was recruiting in Worcestershire and 
Shropshire; these recruits and those he had raised earlier may have given 
him around three hundred horse by the end of the month. 12 However, during 
the siege of Ashby in January 1643, Hastings was reported to have five 
hundred horse and foot in the castle and may have sent some out of the way 
before the siege began. By February he could muster seven hundred horse, 
in fifteen troops. Some of these troops could have been the embryo 
regiments of Pate, Harpur or Wolseley. 13 There may also have been 
dragoons counted amongst these numbers for in Cheshire later that month 
Hastings certainly had some dragoons. 14 Therefore Hastings'own regiment 
was potentially a full size unit during 1643 and part of 1644. Certainly 
no less than thirty-one troop captains can be traced as having served, or 
claimed to have served, in the regiment at some time during the war. 
After the middle of 1644 the size of the regiment appears to have 
declined. Only one hundred men from it were attached to the King's field 
army in May 1645, although as Symonds indicated that this represented only 
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three troops it is possible that this was only a portion of the 
regiment. '5 At the surrender of Ashby in February 1646, there were three 
of the troop commanders present whilst the lieutenant colonel was absent 
with one hundred men and there were also sections of the regiment still 
stationed at Newark. 16 As there is only one captain's name which can be 
traced for the dragoons, it is possible that this unit was of troop size 
and generally attached to the horse. 
The Foot regiment was also, perhaps, recruited in Worcestershire 
and Shropshire as well as in Leicestershire. Hastings was provided with 
munitions for musketeers before he left Oxford in December 1642.17 Gell 
heard that there were three hundred foot in the castle at Ashby by the end 
of the year. 18 The names of twelve captains can be traced for the 
regiment. It is possible that there were as many as seven of them serving 
at any one time. There appear to have been two majors, Robert Bonney who 
was transferred and promoted to lieutenant colonel of Milward's Foot and 
Christopher Roper who replaced him in late 1643. Roper appears to have 
been promoted to a colonelcy by the end of the war; this may have 
involved his assuming command over part of Hastings' regiment. The 
estimate of four hundred men which Hastings was said to have at his 
attempted relief of Eccleshall Castle, along with soldiers he may have had 
to leave at Ashby, would seem to suggest that the regiment was around five 
hundred strong, about the usual size of a large royalist regiment. 19 
It is certain that Hastings' regiments were amongst the largest in 
this army. It would appear that these regiments acted as a kind of 
training school for officers as a number of men like Major Barnabas 
Scudamore, who became a colonel and later governor of Hereford, and 
Captain Sigismund Beeton, who also reached the rank of colonel and 
governed Wellbeck, were to progress to high command. Many sections of the 
regiments served in other garrisons or became small garrisons away from 
Ashby. Major Hacker and Captains Gregory and Archer-took their troops to 
Newark in 1644. These probably formed the garrison on the river Trent set 
up a mile from Nottingham on two occasions, with Hacker as governor. At 
least one and probably two of the Captains Robinson were, with their 
companies, stationed at one of the small forts established on the river 
Trent; there were three companies in all at the Wilne Ferry garrison -a 
total of seventy men. 20 
It was an experienced trio of regiments. Parts of them had fought 
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at Powick Bridge, Edgehill, Hopton Heath, the capture of Lichfield, the 
relief of Eccleshall, the battle of Cotes, the relief of Newark and the 
capture of Leicester in addition to the numerous small skirmishes around 
the region. 
William Nevill's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
On December 28th 1642, Henry Nevill of Holt began to raise soldiers 
to defend the south Leicestershire/Northamptonshire area from the local 
parliamentarians. 21 Within three weeks he had fortified his house at Holt 
and established his regiments as a garrison. On or about January 21st it 
was attacked by Lord Grey; Nevill was captured and sent as prisoner to 
London. 22 Evidently parts of the regiments had escaped and were taken 
over by Nevill's eldest son William with the second son Thomas as 
Lieutenant Colonel. One of the brothers had served as a captain in 
Hastings' Horse in the summer of 1642. The regiments were with Hastings' 
forces when they were seen by Richard Symonds, yet it may be that they 
served at Belvoir and/or Newark at some time during the war. At the 
surrender of Ashby Castle the regiment of horse was present. 23 The 
officers of the regiments came from the three counties of 
Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire and may thereby reflect 
the area in which the soldiers were recruited. There are no known figures 
regarding the size of the regiments. However, there appears to have been 
one major, one captain and two captains lieutenant, which incorporating 
the brothers Nevill gives a total of four troops. If these were small 
units as were other troops of horse in the army, there may have been only 
around one hundred to one hundred and twenty troopers. There may have 
been as many as five companies of foot, perhaps a maximum of two hundred 
men. 
John Pate's Regiment of Horse 
Pate's regiment was probably raised in 1642, though as Hastings' 
lieutenant colonel William Bale was transferred to Pate's it may have been 
younger than Hastings' horse. However the transfer of Bale cannot be 
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dated; it thus may have been in 1643 when Pate's regiment served at 
Belvoir. Hastings apparently used Bale as a form of spy to watch over 
Lucas at Belvoir whom he did not trust. When Symonds made his list of the 
regiment there were seven troops, but only one of the four captains 
appears on the list of indigent officers. 24 As with the previous 
regiments no numerical evidence is given. With seven troops it was 
probably between one hundred and forty and two hundred strong if its troop 
sizes were similar to other North Midland Army regiments. The men like 
their officers were possibly raised in Leicestershire and Lincolnshire. 
This regiment may have formed part of the large number of horse with which 
Hastings is accredited in early 1643. One of the captains was at the 
surrender of Ashby but as it would appear the regiment had been at the 
surrender of Belvoir, four weeks earlier) the regiment was not usually 
stationed there. Pate himself seems to have gone straight on to Lichfield 
from Belvoir. 25 
Rowland Eyre's Regiments of Horse, Foot and Dragoons 
Eyre was one of the six colonels commanding the Derbyshire forces 
in the Autumn of 1643, and the regiments were raised then and during the 
early part of the following year. 26 The regiments formed the garrisons of 
Chatsworth House and Hassop. Milward's regiments were also at Chatsworth. 
It is possible that the foot of both colonels was raised by the county's 
commission of array; Hastings described them as array men and believed 
that, as such, they were unreliable. Eyre's foot may have had as many as 
five companies but each only numbering around twenty men. When he and 
Milward led their men north in 1644 they only had 220 men between them; 
Milward appears to have had six companies. 27 It is possible that Eyre's 
foot were severely mauled at Marston Moor and the regiment may not have 
been reformed afterwards. 
The horse seems to have had five troops and were perhaps about the 
same strength. On the field at Marston Moor they were teamed up with 
Milward's horse. Unlike the foot they would have had some measure of 
success at the battle and may have escaped reasonably intact. But on 
their return most of the regiment was captured at Boyleston in August 
1644. Eyre and those that remained made their home at Newark and were 
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part of the Newark Horse at Naseby. Nevertheless the regiments were 
included by Symonds in his list of Hastings' army in 1644. The dragoons 
appear to have been in one troop under Captain Tunstead. 
Sir John Fitzherbert's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
When Symonds listed these regiments there appeared to be little of 
them in existence, but by which time they had spawned Kniverton's 
regiments. 28 Formed as early as 1642 the regiments made up part of the 
royalist presence in Stafford during February 1643.29 Later they formed 
the garrison at Tissington and part of that of Wingfield Manor where 
soldiers from them threatened mutiny. When Wingfield fell and Derbyshire 
was dominated by the parliamentarians, the regiments moved on to Tutbury 
where they may have stayed up until Kniverton's replacement as governor in 
1646. The regiment of horse may have been fairly large: there were ten 
captains at some time or another, but again no numbers are known. The 
regiment was always a scattered force; parts served at Ashby, and 
Lichfield as well as Tutbury. There may have been seven troops each of 
twenty men. 
The foot appears to have had about half a dozen companies and was 
perhaps about one hundred and fifty strong. 
John Freshville's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
The horse were formed in 1642 and served in the Edgehill campaign. 
From then until the following year the regiment was part of the Oxford 
forces and fought at the battle of Newbury in September 1642. Freshville 
then returned to Derbyshire to become one of the Marquis of Newcastle's 
six colonels. In the Marston Moor campaign Freshville had eight troops 
each of approximately twenty men. It is possible to trace six captain's 
names. By the Marston Moor campaign, either John Eyre had transferred to 
Fitzherbert's or Gervaise Pole had been killed thus leaving the eight 
troop commanders (including the three field officers) present at the 
battle. 30 The horse which survived the battle went on to serve at Newark 
and may have fought at Naseby. In July 1645 Freshville captured and 
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garrisoned Welbeck, holding it for four months before returning to 
Newark. 31 
In March 1644 the foot numbered as many as three hundred men, 
though only a hundred or so appear at Marston Moor. 32 Thereafter there is 
no specific mention of them, and their Major Jammot may have transferred 
to the horse. They were a pair of experienced regiments having between 
them fought at Edgehill, Marston Moor, Newbury, Cotes, the relief of 
Newark and possibly Naseby. 33 
Sir John Harnur's Reniments of Horse. Foot and Dragoons 
These regiments were raised in early 1643 after Hastings had been 
invited to intervene in south Derbyshire. After being driven from 
Swarkestone in January of that year they were based at Ashby until the 
Queen's Army captured Burton on Trent in July and they were then installed 
as the garrison. On January 6th 1644, the regiments were attacked at 
Burton. Harpur and Lieutenant Colonel Bullock were in the north of the 
county attending the councils of war at Chesterfield. In the fight which 
led to the capture of the town by the parliamentarians, as many as six 
captains and a major were captured. 34 
Whilst forming the garrison the two regiments had totalled five 
hundred men, but it is unlikely that Bullock and Harpur did not have some 
part of the horse with them at Chesterfield. If we assume that there was 
only one troop of dragoons under Captain Corbet, and assume that it was 
about twenty to thirty strong, we could have a strength of around two 
hundred and twenty for the other two units. Symonds lists five troops of 
horse and five companies of foot. 35 If the regiments were of equal size 
then each troop and each company would be about forty men strong. At 
least one troop, that of Captain Sykes, was present at the siege of 
Leicester. Many of the officers, including Bullock and Harpur, had laid 
down their arms by the end of 1645.36 
John Milward's/John Shalcross' Regiments of Horse and Foot 
Milward formed the regiments in late 1643, possibly as part of his 
role as a commissioner of array. Shalcross was his lieutenant colonel. 
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The regiments were based at Chatsworth with Eyre's. Both the regiments 
went north with Eyre in the campaign which culminated with Marston Moor. 
The foot with Eyre's and perhaps Freshville's are suspected to be the unit 
which de Gomme left untitled on his map of the battle. 37 
The horse seems to have been a small regiment, with, as its 
nucleus, the troop of Captain Vernon, transferred from Hastings' regiment. 
The regiment as a whole was perhaps only one hundred strong, with the foot 
being about the same size. 
Milward submitted to parliament in the panic which followed Marston 
Moor when Freshville was thinking along the same lines. Shalcross took 
over the regiment of horse, but it may be that the foot, damaged or 
destroyed at Marston Moor, had, as a regiment, ceased to exist. Shalcross 
and the horse were absorbed into the Northern Horse, and he signed the 
petition of the Northern Horse desiring to return northwards from Oxford 
in 1645. As a result the regiments were sent on the dazzling mission 
which led to the relief of Pontefract in March 1645. However it is 
probable that Shalcross was captured in this campaign. 38 
Sir Andrew Kniverton's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
Little information regarding the foot can be found.. Symonds 
appears not to. have seen them when he drew up his list of the army, though 
he does indicate that the field officers of the horse held, as was common, 
dual commands. in both regiments. If Symonds is referring specifically to 
units involved in the relief'of Newark then we can assume that the foot 
were on garrison duty at Tutbury at the time. Even so no regimental 
officers come to light later. 
The horse had five troops when Symonds listed'_them. At the time 
one of the captains had just been killed. He was replaced by either 
Captain Merry or Brough who seem to appear after Symonds drew up his 
list. 39 No evidence remains regarding the size of the regiment, though 
going by the size of others it was about one hundred to one hundred and 
twenty strong. Kniverton had first been Fitzherbert's lieutenant colonel 
and it is likely that the regiment was formed around his troop in 
Fitzherbert's. Though Sir Andrew was present at the surrender of Ashby, 
after his replacement by Blakiston at Tutbury, the regiments were still at 
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Tutbury when it surrendered in April. Sir Andrew's brother and lieutenant 
colonel, Peter Kniverton, was involved in the negotiations. 
There may have been a dragoon regiment. A letter from Kniverton to 
Hastings in September 1644 mentions the capture of a Lieutenant Smith 
'that belonged to the dragoons'. There is no corroborative evidence, 
though it is probable that any dragoon unit would be the size of one small 
troop. 40 
Roger Molyneux's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
Molyneux's two regiments appear to have been raised in 
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire as well as in Derbyshire. The first 
seem to have come tinder Hastings' command when they are established as the 
garrison of Wingfield Manor in December 1643. It is likely that there 
were five companies of foot and a small number of horse. Nevertheless in 
August 1644 the only horse units present in the garrison were those of Sir 
John Fitzherbert. 41 Molyneux's Major Fiennes and Captain Wilkinson of the 
horse were present in the garrison at the time they do not appear to have 
been accompanied by their troops. It is possible that as the garrison was 
under siege, most of the horse had been evacuated. 42 After the garrison 
surrendered, Major Fiennes disappears from the scene and Thomas Eyre, who 
hitherto may have been major of the foot, only assumed the post of major 
of horse. The foot regiment may have disintegrated after the siege, but 
the horse moved on to Newark. At Naseby the regiment was part of the 
Newark Horse and Eyre was mortally wounded. No figures are available for 
the size of either regiment. Molyneux seems to have commanded five troops 
when he captured part of the Derbyshire committee in February 1645; this 
may indicate that both units were of similar size, perhaps a hundred men 
each. 
Isham Parkins' (Parkyns') Regiments of Horse and Foot 
Symonds does not mention Parkynst Horse but a Captain Geoffery 
Treece (Trees) of Nottinghamshire claimed, in 1663, to have been a part of 
such a body. Symonds only names two captains of foot, which suggests that 
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the regiment was very small. 44 It appears to have been raised in 1644 in 
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire. Their position in the North Midlands 
Army is confirmed by their role as part of the garrison at Ashby de la 
Zouch where Parkyns was governor. 45 Both regiments may have been between 
twenty and fifty strong. 
Ferdinando Stanhope/John Barnard's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
These regiments would have their origins in the garrison which the 
Earl of Chesterfield established at Bretby in late 1642, and then led to 
Lichfield. Having gone into a form of voluntary captivity at the 
surrender of Lichfield to Gell in March 1643, Chesterfield left the 
regiments to his fourth son Ferdinando who had brought a troop of horse 
with him from Oxford at the end of 1642.46 The horse were present at 
Hopton Heath in March 1643; Stanhope was wounded and a cornet was captured 
during the battle. 47 By the end of that year there were at least one 
hundred and twenty men, divided into four companies, in the foot. In 
November 1644, Stanhope was killed at a skirmish near Nottingham. The man 
who Symonds noted as being the major, John Barnard, appears then to have 
assumed command of the regiment, yet he had already been called colonel a 
year earlier - this may indicate that he was either the lieutenant colonel 
by this date, 
-or 
that he had his own forces. 48 Whatever the situation 
Barnard's regiment or part of the regiment, which had officers from 
Stanhope's regiments, went south before Stanhope's death, thus effectively 
leaving the North Midlands Army. Barnard served as temporary governor of 
Hereford before Scudamore, Hastings' old major of horse, was given the 
position. Barnard's forces then became the garrison of Abbey Cwm Hyr 
which they surrendered in January 1645. In the following July he and the 
regiment were massacred at Cannon Frome when the Scots stormed the 
garrison. 49 
Richard/Harvey Bagot's Regiments of Horse, Foot and Dragoons 
Both the Bagots were company commanders in Lord Paget's, later Sir 
Richard Bolles' Regiment of Foot, raised in Staffordshire. 50 They had, as 
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early as March 1643, returned to their native county, perhaps as part of 
the King's initiative aimed at securing the north midlands. They served 
under Hastings in the campaign of Hopton Heath. 51 When Lichfield was 
recaptured by Hastings and Rupert, Richard was made governor and a colonel 
with Harvey as his lieutenant colonel. He not only developed the foot 
companies that he and his brother had, but began to raise a regiment of 
horse. By the end of the year there may have been as few as three troops 
of horse. The 1644 recruitment drive, which led to quarrels with Leveson, 
resulted in the creation of a regiment of seven or eight troops by the 
time that Symonds listed the officers. 53 By 1645 the regiment of Horse 
was probably three to four hundred strong. At Naseby there were two 
hundred present in Sir Thomas Howard's brigade; Richard Bagot was 
mortally wounded in the battle. 54 When at the end of 1645 Sir William 
Vaughan's royalist -force was destroyed, the horse, now with Harvey as 
colonel, were probably involved. This would account for their not being 
included in the Lichfield accounts for the months of October, November and 
December 1645.55 It would appear that there was only one troop of 
dragoons, attached, perhaps to the regiment of horse. 
The regiment of foot had seven companies and three hundred men by 
the end of 1643.56 A year later there were four hundred, 57 At the end of 
1645, there were a total of 489 men in seven companies and a part time 
citizen company raised in the town of Lichfield had been established. 
Thus it can be seen that even as royalist power in the region was 
declining, the regiment was growing in size. The regularity with which 
the regiment was being paid was undoubtedly a factor in this, since at 
this time even the new model-was falling into arrears. No doubt Bagot's 
regiments were attracting soldiers from disbanded or destroyed 
regiments. 58 Its initial size and its continued growth made the foot 
regiment, like the horse, one of the largest regiments in the North 
Midland Army. 
During its existence the regiments would have fought at Hopton 
Heath, Cotes, the relief of Newark, Marston Moor and Naseby as well as 
numerous actions in the Marcher Counties and Lancashire, making it very 
much a field regiment. 
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John Lane's Regiment of Horse 
Lane's regiment was probably formed from the troop Lane commanded 
in Lord Digby's regiment at Edgehill. 59 It either returned to 
Staffordshire as part of the King's attempts to secure the county or as 
part of Rupert's forces sent to help Hastings recapture Lichfield in April 
1643. At the end of the month it formed the garrison of Stafford 
Castle. 60 After the fall of Stafford it became the garrison of Rushall 
House. The total garrison was two hundred strong. Lane's Horse were 
fifty strong at the time. The foot at the House may possibly have been 
Lane's, but were more likely to be part of Bagot's Foot or Hastings' Foot. 
When Rushall fell to Denbigh in 1645, the horses were lost as part of the 
terms. 61 These must have been replaced as there is evidence to suggest 
that the regiment served in later parts of the war at both Lichfield and 
Ashby. Lane and two of his captains surrendered at Ashby de la Zouch. 62 
Thomas Leveson's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
Leveson was empowered to raise fifteen hundred foot in May 1643.63 
His regiment would not have been anything like this size. There were two 
hundred present at the relief of Newark; with those left in the garrison 
the total would be near to three hundred men. By 1646 actions during the 
war had reduced its size to about a hundred and fifty; Naseby would have 
caused a great decline in numbers. The horse was probably about the same 
size. At Newark there were one hundred troopers present; at Marston 
Moor, two hundred. At the battle of Naseby the three troops totalled one 
hundred and fifty men. 64 There appear to have been five troops, thus 
indicating that the forces left at Dudley, under Lieutenant Colonel 
Beaumont, numbered on this occasion two troops. 65 
The majority of the officers in these regiments were, like the 
colonel, Roman Catholics, generally coming from the south of Staffordshire 
which had a high concentration of Roman Catholics. 66 Leveson was adept at 
ignoring Hastings and arguing with Bagot. This led to his attempting, 
where possible, to withold his units from the North Midlands Army. 67 In 
the Newark campaign he strategically appended his forces to those of 
Prince Rupert rather than join them to the gathering forces at Ashby in 
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the preceding days. Symonds includes his regiments under Hastings' forces 
when he drew up the list, and indeed the King pointedly indicated to 
Leveson that he was under Hastings' command. 68 A full discussion of this 
problem will be given in the following two chapters. 
Devereaux Wolseley's Regiments of Horse and Foot 
These regiments formed the garrison of Bagworth Park, from early 
1643 until the following October. From that time onwards, they were 
probably attached to the forces at Ashby de la Zouch. 69 The regiment of 
foot may have had six companies when Symonds drew up his list though he 
did not note its size. The horse may only have had three troops, that of 
the colonel, Lieutenant Colonel Knapper's and that of the only person 
claiming to have belonged to that body in the list of indigent officers, 
Captain Walter Hastings. The latter was a transfer from Hastings' Horse; 
he may have brought his troop with him to form the embryo of Wolseley's 
regiment. 7° The strengths for the regiments would be in the region of one 
hundred and fifty foot and about fifty horse. The remains of the 
regiments were at Ashby de la Zouch when the castle surrendered. 71 
Gervaise Lucas' Regiments of Horse and Foot 
When Lucas, Lord Camden and his eldest son Babtiste Noel captured 
Belvoir Castle at the end of January 1643, they established a base for the 
Rutland Commission of Array and for Lucas' soldiers. 72 The regiment of 
horse which Symonds later listed had seven troops, yet may have been 
numerically small. When Hastings drew up his complaints against Lucas in 
1645, he asserted that Lucas had only thirty horse and a hundred foot, and 
claimed that Lucas was collecting contribution on the basis that he had 
twice as many soldiers as that. 73 Lucas' regiments were often involved in 
working with the forces from Newark, especially in Lincolnshire. After 
Newcastle went into voluntary exile, Lucas did his best not to cooperate 
with Hastings, and though Symonds indicates that William Bale was the 
lieutenant colonel, it is more probable that Bale was still in Pate's 
regiment and was in Belvoir to keep an eye on Lucas. 74 This is borne out 
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by the fact that at the end of 1643, when Lucas was attending the councils 
of war at Chesterfield and Bolsover, he left Captain Lucas in charge, not 
Bale. These latter two men were then involved in a dispute in Gervaise 
Lucas' absence. Lucas' claim that Bale was disruptive suggests that he 
was rightly suspicious of Bale's role in the castle. 75 
Lucas' Horse were involved in Major General Porter's disastrous 
intervention into south Yorkshire in March 1644. The regiments were, 
between them, involved in the relief of Newark and the catastrophic defeat 
at Denton in October 1644. 
The above are the regiments which positively appear to be a part of 
the North Midlands Army. There are several others which were associated 
either with the army or with the area: Sir John Corbet's Foot (and 
Horse? ), Francis Whortley's Dragoons and Christopher Roper's Foot. Roper 
had one man claiming to have served in his foot regiment in 1663. 
However, as pointed out earlier, the three hundred foot he led to Chester 
may have been a part of Hastings' regiment over which he was possibly 
given a colonelcy. Corbet had been a captain in Hastings' Horse; perhaps 
his troop formed the embryo of his regiment. In 1663, one man claimed to 
have served in Corbet's Foot. Corbet's forces seem to have been detached 
from the North Midlands Army and sent. to serve in the Marcher Counties. 76 
Whortley, son of Sir Francis whose dragoons had been the only royalist 
presence in the north midlands during the Edgehill campaign, may have been 
the colonel of the regiment which included Major Dud Dudley. It is not 
certain whether this regiment was a formal part of the North Midlands 
Army, though Whortley surrendered at Ashby in 1646. There may have been 
some form of regiment under Ralph Sneyd. If he did succeed in his 
attempts in raising troops in 1644 he may only have served in Cheshire and 
the Marcher Counties. 77 
It is unfortunate that there exist only scanty references to the 
use of impressment in the north midlands. In Staffordshire the 
responsibility for levying impressment befell Thomas Leveson in his role 
of High Sheriff, but also to the commissioners of array. A quorum of 
three was necessary to enact any levy, thus the power to raise troops did 
not go to Leveson alone. At the end of 1643 Leveson had tried to use his 
power to collect posse comitatus - in effect conscripts - in defiance of 
Hastings. By involving both him and the commissioners in impressment, the 
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King sought to prevent any repeat of the problems caused by this matter. 
In March 1644, Leveson and the commissioners were empowered to raise 
sixty-seven men in Staffordshire. Due to this lack of information it is 
impossible to estimate the number of conscripts that were in the North 
Midlands Army or how many men were sent out of the region for service 
elsewhere. 78 It may be that the men in Eyre's and Milward's foot 
regiments whom Hastings referred to as 'array men' were impressed men. It 
is clear that the commissioners were still allowed some power over the 
raising of troops though it was no longer their main function. There are 
very few references to impressment in the constables' accounts indicating 
that conscription was never a permanent feature of the war in. the region. 
This point bears on the relationship between clubmen risings and the 
administration of the counties. In some regions impressment formed a 
major grievance of the clubmen petitions. 
The possible total numbers, based on the above discussion, is given 
in tabular form below. The regiments dealt with in the last paragraph are 
not included. 
Arm Number of Possible maximum 
regiments strength 
Horse 17 2,575 
Foot 15 2,520 
Dragoons 4 (troop size only) 90 
Totals 36 5,130 
This would accord with the estimate Symonds gives at the end of 
lists of Hastings' regiments. 79 It would appear that Symonds suggests 
that there were five thousand men of Hastings' forces present at the 
relief of Newark in March 1644. However, there were only three thousand 
of Hastings' army in the field during the campaign. The total of five 
thousand is perhaps nearer the mark if the numbers of men left in the 
garrisons during the campaign is included. Given that the regiments at 
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Dudley and Lichfield left between a third and a half of their strengths in 
the garrison, whilst the rest were in the field, this proposition has some 
value. There is the probability that some of the smaller garrisons like 
Tissington, Ashbourne, Hassop and Stavely, were temporarily abandoned 
during the campaign. 80 This and the possibility that some of the 
regiments listed above may have been derived from sections of other 
regiments and therefore has resulted in some double counting, would 
suggest that the possible maximum strength is a slight overestimate. Even 
so, we are dealing here with an army adjudged to be between four and five 
thousand strong. 
Hastings himself estimated that in the summer of 1643 he had two 
thousand men under arms and could, if given the weapons, arm a further 
thousand. 81 During the ensuing months the conquest of Derbyshire resulted 
in the creation and addition of the regiments of Eyre, Freshville, Milward 
and possibly Molyneaux -a potential increase of nearly a thousand men. 
Other regiments, following Bagot's example, would be recruiting at what 
was a very favourable time for the royalists. Thus we see that the period 
when the campaign of Newark was being fought saw the North Midlands Army 
at its strongest. There were, at this time, a number of units from this 
army serving under Sir Charles Lucas in the north. 
Decline was rapid. As indicated above, Marston Moor probably saw 
the destruction of Freshville's, Eyre's and Milward's foot regiments. 
Though their horse would, given their greater mobility, have suffered 
markedly less, the combined losses could have been as high as five 
hundred. The. disastrous summer, which saw Derbyshire change hands and 
resulted in the collapse of several garrisons, would also have witnessed 
the gradual drift of men from the royalist armed forces in addition to 
losses incurred through death and casualties. On top of this there were 
the defeats at Burton in August and at Denton which would have further 
contributed to the decline. By May 1645, Symonds reckoned on there being 
fifteen hundred royalist soldiers in the region. 82 Following this there 
were instances of plague at both Tutbury and Ashby - the natural 
consequence'of large unhygienic collections of soldiers, as well as the 
casualties of Naseby, to contend with. 83 
Decrease in size was accompanied by the increasing fragmentation of 
the army. The regiments of four of the Derbyshire colonels drifted into, 
and became part of, the Newark garrison, serving with it at Naseby. As 
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early as the end of 1644, local parliamentarians began to establish small 
garrisons between the royalists' major ones. The intention was to 
interrupt as much as possible the day to day running of the royalists' 
system and to disrupt communications between the various garrisons. 
The success of these attempts is questionable, given the good state 
of affairs with Lichfield's exercising of the contribution collection in 
late 1645, and Ashby's ability to operate once the plague cleared up in 
November 1645. Further damage was done by the royalist high command when 
they continued their policy of hiving off parts of the North Midlands Army 
for service elsewhere. In mid to late 1645 the Staffordshire units served 
first with Sir William Vaughan and later, with Ashby units, under Lord 
Astley. 
Another point about the numerical composition of the North Midlands 
Army, apart from its size removing from it the label of 'guerrilla band', 
is the way in which it epitomised the problems concerning the strengths of 
the royalist regiments, perceived by the Oxford Parliament. 84 There were 
too many small regiments which, given the disproportionate balance between 
officers and men, would entail unnecessary expence. Had all the regiments 
in this army been full strength the total numbers of soldiers would have 
been 8,500 horse and no less than 19,500 foot. 85 As it is there was, in 
numbers, the equivalent of only five regiments of horse and less than two 
of foot. Such a force should only require seven colonels, at the most - 
with duality of commands there need only have been five - yet there were 
twenty-three. A. rough estimate of the number of all officers required by 
these seven regiments would suggest somewhat less than one hundred and 
fifty; there were, throughout the first civil war, a total of 356 
officers in the army; not all, of course serving at the same time: some 
were killed, others moved into regiments from other areas, or simply gave 
up the fight. Such an over proportion of officers created a drain on 
resources which the Oxford parliament sought and failed to rectify. 
Reasons for this failure sprang from the same root as the problem. The 
failure of the commissioners of array to raise men in the summer of 1642, 
had resulted in the proliferation of commissions given to individuals, 
each with the power to appoint their own officers. The inability of these 
officers to recruit fully their commands, be they troops or companies, 
resulted in the existence of this large collection of small units. The 
independency which the individual commissions had given, not only to the 
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persons to whom they were originally directed, but also to their 
appointees, meant that any attempt to reduce their numbers would involve 
the destruction of a whole collection of almost autonomous units. This, 
given the status inherent in the position, and the following discussion of 
how the army provided a social ladder to various groups in Stuart society, 
would be opposed vigorously by those in danger of being thus 'paid off'. 
The Officer Corps 
Having in the above section 'created' this army it remains to 
examine the social status of the officer corps along the same lines as the 
commissioners were examined in order to round out our picture of the 
committed royalist activists and to help us further identify the social 
groups from which the King was able to draw support. There are many and 
varied sources for this study; several of them have been discussed in 
Chapter One. The main ones for providing the names of the officers are 
the 'List of Officers Claiming to the Sixty Thousand Pounds etc Granted by 
His Sacred Majesty for the Relief of his Truly Loyal and Indigent Party' 
which contains lists of regiments and their officers and the Notebook kept 
by Richard Symonds. The former has many limitations as a source which 
were thoroughly rehearsed in the first chapter. Obviously it does not 
contain lists of officers killed during the war unless they are named by 
one of the claiments. Though attempts were made during its compilation no 
distinction is made between the regiment(s) raised by Sir Francis Whortley 
and that (or. those) raised by his son. Just as that problem is pertinent 
to this study so is the problem over regional origin which the 'List... ' 
throws up. Many of those who gave their address as London and Westminster 
were only living there whilst making their claim to the money. There is 
also the point that those officers who are mentioned by those who served 
under them, but did not register their own names, are only accorded the 
scantiest of details, usually just their rank and surname. Despite these 
important deficiencies the 'List... ' provides a valuable source for those 
wishing to recreate royalist regiments. 86 
Symonds saw the North Midlands Army some time in 1645, or so it 
would seem as he refers as if in retrospect to its size in March 1644. It 
therefore is probable that the list drawn up was either done as he saw 
units in May 1645 whilst the King's Army was in Leicestershire, or he 
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compiled his list from information provided to him at the time and thus 
included units which were by this time elsewhere. Alternatively, the list 
was actually compiled in March 1644, and comments were added later 
regarding its decrease in size. In any event Symonds did not include all 
the units of the army. Nor does he name any officer below the rank of 
captain lieutenant. But this notebook is very important, providing as it 
does the only list drawn up of the army still in existence and giving 
clues as to the size and composition of some of the regiments. 87 
Other main sources include the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 
series as well as many of the papers themselves held in the Public Records 
Office, the Calendar of the Committee for Compounding and that of the 
Committee of Advance of Money. The first gives occasional references to 
the names of some officers in the army. The compounding papers do, on the 
other hand, give the war records of several of those attempting to sue for 
composition. These and the Committee for Advance of Money's papers also 
provide useful information about the estates of the officers. This has to 
be treated with caution, as the royalists were, naturally, unwilling to 
provide the committees with a full account of their property, as this 
would lead to higher fines than they wished to pay. Nor did other 
witnesses always provide accurate information, particularly if they had a 
grudge against the compoundee. 
The Docquets of the Clerks of the Chancery, referred to in Chapter 
Two, with reference to the commissioners of array, can also provide 
details of the commissions, and their scope, issued to several of the 
North Midlands Army colonels. Black's printed, but unpublished, version 
of these docquets also provides such, and other, information. 88 
Names given in the various newsbooks and papers can be very 
misleading. In some cases they were even invented, and many times the 
reported name is a misspelling of a name gained by hearsay. In these 
cases and that of the 'Catalogue of... ... the King's -Marching Army' it is 
best to accept the names as a positive identification only if they can be 
verified by another source. 89 Modern examinations of the royalist 
officers which were referred to in Chapter One have also been consulted 
and mention of their findings is given in the text and the footnotes. 90 
When Dr Blackwood identified the status of the officers of 
Lancashire, he included a category named 'gentry? '. With this study the 
number of men who simply cannot be identified, by use of the heraldic 
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visitation or even calendars of probate inventories, is very large. Thus 
in this case the 'gentry? ' status has had to be abandoned. Where plebeian 
status can be positively identified, it has been done but the category 
'unknown' contains not only doubtful gentry, but also men below the rank 
of gentry who have left little or no evidence of their status behind them. 
In other cases, status is taken as that accorded before March 1642. 
Evidence for this comes from a variety of sources including the visits of 
heralds, both before and after the war. Official sources which refer 
status are invaluable and give perhaps a more 'up to date' (in seventeenth 
century eyes) outlook upon how men were perceived and how they perceived 
themselves than do the heraldic visitations which used dated terms of 
reference. It must be remembered that this is not a gentry study in 
itself, but an attempt to identify the status of a given number of 
royalist officers and, in Chapter Two, other royalist activists. In this 
case, the fact that many of the men are unidentifiable as far as status is 
concerned is very important as it indicates that active royalist support 
came from social groups with which the royalist high command did not 
identify. Modern works which give means of judging social rank are used 
in this part of the chapter and reference is made to other studies of 
royalist armies. 91 
The officers will be studied rank by rank after the colonels. 
Officers of Horse were generally of a higher status than their colleagues 
in the Foot and therefore these two groups are taken separately. At 
various stages the officers will be considered in larger groups; for 
instance the field officers and the regimental officers will be taken 
together as a whole. After the rank by rank study the format reverts to 
that used in the previous two chapters, with education being looked at as 
well as religion. One general difference between this and the previous 
two chapters is the attention paid to regional origins. In the cases of 
the commissioners and the committeemen regional origin was easy to 
ascribe, as to qualify for selection for these bodies, in the first place, 
residence in the county, or at least major estate holdings within it, was 
essential. In the case of the officers, there was no such formal tie, 
although it was more likely that a colonel would pick people he knew from 
the same area as himself to be his officers. But as will be shown below 
there were a number of officers from other regions in the North Midlands 
Army. 
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The ranks which are covered by this analysis are, in descending 
order, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, captain- 
lieutenants, lieutenants, cornets and ensigns. Quartermasters, of which 
there was one per foot regiment and one per troop of horse, are not 
included; unfortunately, the information regarding these men is so 
limited that making any valid assumptions about them is impossible. This 
is regretted as a study of these men, who would be below gentry status for 
the most part, and who would have a difficult task during the war, could 
be of very great value. 
The numbers of men in each of the ranks under consideration is 
given here. 
Field Officers 
Colonels Lieutenant Majors All 
Colonels 
Horse - 13 22 35 
Foot/Dragoons *- 7 "8 15 
Totals 23 20 30 73 
These are those field officers that do not seem to have held dual 
commands and only held rank in the foot regiments 
Regimental Officers 
Captains Captain Lieutenants Cornets Ensigns All 
Lieutenants 
Horse 92 12 35 39 - 178 
Foot/Dragoons 52 4 24 - 25 105 
Totals 144 16 59 39 25 283 
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This gives a total of 356 officers. In the analyses which follow 
it will be noted that when descending through the ranks, the number of 
officers who can be identified becomes fewer. For instance it is 
impossible to create a pattern of mortality rates amongst the officers as 
the deaths of officers below the rank of major were rarely recorded. As 
lower ranking officers in the foot regiments were more vulnerable, having 
no horses upon which to escape danger, their mortality rate would be 
higher. However, due to the dearth of relevant information, the only 
evidence for this in the North Midlands Army is the relative lack of foot 
captains. Exceptions to this pit of obscurity occur when individual 
officers gained notoriety for themselves by some actual, or imagined, act 
in either the royalist or parliamentarian press. 
Colonels (Horse, Foot and Dragoons) 92 
As most of these officers were the commanders of regiments of two 
or three arms of the army they are considered as a single group. The 
pattern followed in this section is that established in the studies in the 
previous chapter with the noted exception of the regional question, and 
will be followed in the studies of other ranks. There were twenty-three 
men who served as colonels in the North Midlands Army. Their social rank 
is broken down as follows. 
Q-, -4o1 P 1, 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
120 17 10.02 
It can be seen that although the group undoubtedly are strongly 
based in the gentry, there are very few titled gentry and only Sir John 
Fitzherbert represents the. nobility by being heir to a title. Hastings of 
course, though counted as an esquire in the above table, was the younger 
son of an earl, as was Stanhope. It is clear that the main social group 
are the esquires. Both the 'unknowns', Roper and Barnard, are at least 
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gentry and may well be esquires. The one identified gentleman is Gervaise 
Lucas who won his colonelcy and then a baronetcy through his capture and 
retention of Belvoir Castle. Of the six who definitely possessed 
colonels' ranks before April 1643, Fitzherbert is one, Hastings and 
Stanhope were a further two, one other was a baronet, leaving two 
esquires. This may indicate that the influx of gentry into the colonelcy 
followed an initial period during which the King appointed men of more 
established status to command his regiments. Men like Leveson, Bagot, 
Lucas and Lane, became colonels later, having already proved their worth 
to the royalist cause. Three of the colonels were the owners of lead mine 
leases in Derbyshire and represented, along with Hastings who had coal 
mines in north west Leicestershire, the only industrial interests amongst 
the colonels. 
Familial Status 
Head Ist son 2nd son other son unknown 
78512 
Though a large number of the colonels were heads or potential heads 
of families, a significant proportion were not. Three of the colonels 
appointed early in the war were amongst this latter group. As shown in 
the previous two chapters the commitment of the head of a family to a 
cause was a major step. Such action not only deprived a family of its 
nucleus and its spiritual, moral and economic patriarch, but effectively 
gambled, not only the nuclear, but also the extended family's fortunes and 
future. Any retribution exacted by the victor of the conflict could be 
expected to involve some financial penalty -a probability of which none 
of the activists could have been unaware. 93 The presence of six men who 
were not in, or likely to be in, the position of head of the family, does 
indicate that even in the early stages there were difficulties in finding 
men of the highest status to fight for the cause. Hastings was 
undoubtedly a substitute, not only for his elderly and inactive father, 
but also for his parliamentarian elder brother; either of these would 
have brought more status to the cause than could Henry. 
By examining the political, administrative and educational 
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experiences of the colonels, and later other officers, one can determine 
their importance within their social class by seeing how much trust their 
peers and betters reposed in them previous to the war. Also, as many such 
roles would involve them in working with, guiding and commanding other 
men, lessers and equals, we can judge how much experience of leadership 
they brought with them into military command. 
Political, Administrative or Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inns 
2045373 
Ten of the colonels do not appear to have been involved in any of 
the areas covered by this analysis. Only one of these, Wolseley, was one 
of the original colonels. It may be possible that Christopher Roper was 
the man elected as M. P. for Dingle in Munster for the 1640 Irish 
Parliament. This then would give us three M. P. s and only nine with no 
experience of office or higher education. 94 Even so, the proportion we 
are left with of men who had some form of experience or at least 
education, is not very high. In addition only seven men had pre war 
military experience. However, eight did rise in rank to a colonelcy 
during the war; three of these latter are not included in the latter 
table, and therefore had had practice in handling groups of men before 
assuming regimental command. We do see that a large number of colonels 
had not been recipients of society's trust previous to the war, and yet 
during it, north midlands society was subject to their military commands. 
As indicated above, defeat was potentially a financial disaster. 
However only sixteen of the colonels have left evidence of their financial 
plight brought on by their losing the war. 95 Only one of them had died 
before the war ended so that has left six who did not seem to have been 
fined. Some like Kniverton and Lucas may have ameliorated their plight by 
negotiating judicious terms when surrendering their garrisons; Hastings 
himself was the outstanding example of this tendency. But this does not 
account for many of the colonels. The highest fine paid was £4,583, 
reduced to four thousand pounds later, paid by Sir John Harpur. 96 This 
was a small amount when compared with some of the commissioners; Babtiste 
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Noel, second Lord Camden, was fined over nineteen thousand pounds for his 
role on the commission and raising troops for the King. 97 Harpur did no 
less and in a way his small fine is surprisingly low given that he was 
reputed to be the richest man in Derbyshire. This high incidence of low 
or non payments indicates that we are dealing with a group of men many of 
whom had, like Hastings, estates describable as being 'little or nothing 
of worth'. 98 Some of those who did not pay fines based on their estates 
would therefore have little property on which to base such a fine. 
Only four of the colonels did not live, or have major estates, in 
the five counties under study in this thesis. Gervaise Lucas was a 
Lincolnshire man. His county was temporarily under Hastings' control, and 
the castle in which he established himself was on that county's border 
with Leicestershire. Of the others, two served in regiments emanating in 
the five counties before rising to the command of a regiment. This leaves 
only Francis Whortley esquire of Yorkshire, who may have entered the army 
with the rank of colonel. 
Lieutenant Colonels of Horse 
This category also includes men who held the same rank in regiments 
of foot. Out of the twelve, three cannot be ascribed social rank. It is 
unlikely that they were of below gentry status. 
Cnr- 1 RýnU 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
000 10 00.03 
As all the identified officers were esquires, this confirms that 
the untitled ranks of the gentry were those from which the North Midlands 
Army field officers were, in general, drawn. 
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Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
06413 
There is an indication that the lieutenant colonels were more 
likely to come from lower down the social scale than full colonels. Two 
of them were men serving as their brothers' second in command. 
The lieutenant colonels had no experience of office holding though 
several had attended universities and or inns of court. 
Political, Administrative and Educational Experience 
M. P. L. L. D. L. H. S. J. P. University Inn 
0000054 
This does indicate that previous to the war these men had very 
limited, if any, experience of man management, although some may have 
served in minor office such as constable, thirdborough or headborough. 
None of them had any pre civil war military experience. This poses the 
question as to why the colonels chose them as their seconds in command in 
the first place? 
_ 
It is probable that the answer is related to social 
position, family and/or economic ties and possibly even simply friendship 
rather than in proven ability. 
Only seven of the lieutenant colonels paid estate based fines for 
their part in the war. The highest amount recorded is only £1,458.99 
Thus it would seem that these officers came from the same social group as 
their colonels. Not only did they come from the same social group but 
also from the same region. All of the eleven whose origins can be traced 
served in a regiment raised in their own home county or one adjacent to 
it. This would support the notion that there were social, familial or 
reason of friendship behind their appointments, although it is difficult 
to prove as there are so few personal papers existent for any of the 
groups of royalist activists. 
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Lieutenant Colonels of Foot 
Of this small group little can be said. Of the seven, four cannot 
be ascribed a precise social rank. The others fit into the broad general 
category of gentry, one being a knight and the other two gentlemen. 
Though little can be assumed from such a small group it is interesting to 
note that despite their high rank and potential responsibility, they could 
serve as temporary governors in their commander's absence and take on 
other charges; no less than four have left so little evidence behind them 
as to remain largely anonymous. Equally only one can be given a familial 
role and he was a first son. As for experience, only one had any form of 
those noted in this survey. Sir Arthur Gorges, Hastings' lieutenant 
colonel, had attended Oxford University. Further confirmation of their 
lack of status is the point that only two left evidence of paying 
composition. Gorges' fine was the highest at £806-5s-Od, later reduced to 
£512.100 
Regionally, three are untraceable. Two, Gorges and Tamworth 
Reresby came from outside the region, hailing from London and Yorkshire 
respectively. As for the other two, one served in a regiment raised in 
his home county and the other in one raised in a county adjacent to his 
own. 
Majors of Hor. se 
This group although larger, also contains a high proportion of 
officers about whom we can only find the scantiest of information. 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
0007202 11 
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Most of those, if not all, in the 'unknown' category will be from 
the gentry. Those who can be identified are all from the broad untitled 
gentry with the exception of William Warner who was a clerk and Cecil 
Cooper who was an apprentice and may have been a younger son of a 
gentleman. The presence of Cooper and Warner and the large number of 
unidentified officers suggests that the majors are from lower down the 
social scale than their commanders. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
0232 15 
Not only are these men of a lower social status but they may also 
be of lower familial status. This cannot be said for certain, the large 
numbers of 'unknowns' present tending to obscure the picture. 
Though Hugh Calverley had been a high sheriff, he was the only major 
of horse to have such experience of office. He and two others did attend 
universities and one man, Major John Bannington, went to. Grays Inn. Of 
the twenty-two, only six have left evidence of having paid composition 
fines; the highest sum paid was £1,855.101 On a regional basis these 
majors follow,. for the most part, the pattern established earlier. Of the 
fourteen men who. came from midland counties all but one served in a 
regiment raised in his own or an adjacent county. Two of the men from 
other areas may have been recruited in Hastings' drives in the Autumn of 
1642. Calverly and Scudamore, both of midland counties but not from the 
north midlands, would certainly have come into the 'army' in this early 
period, the former perhaps as late as February 1643 when Hastings entered 
Calverley's home county of Cheshire. 
With the majors it appears that we are witnessing a downward shift 
in social status despite the importance of the rank. Majors would be 
responsible for the regimental administration and were often in charge of 
military operations and involved in minor actions. The potential 
importance and attendant ability of the majors was high - it was 
Christopher Heveningham who captured Lapley House in 1643, and it was 
Rowland Hacker who commanded the Trent Bridge Fort in 1644.102 The men 
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who held these posts in the North Midlands Army were not of very high 
social standing, nor were they men in whom society had placed much trust 
previous to 1642. 
Majors of Foot 
The small group of majors who only held the rank in foot regiments 
confirm the above. Only two can be ascribed social rank. One was a 
yeoman and one a gentleman, the other six remain 'unknown'. With the one 
yeoman who may not even be a member of this social bracket - he was 
described as a cow gelder at the time - we have proof that the field ranks 
of the royalist army were open to those of below gentry status. Thus the 
six 'Unknowns' may well be from the 'shady' area below gentry status and 
may contain other yeomen or men from below this rank. Only two can be 
traced as to their familial rank. One was a second son, the other 
illegitimate. Likewise, only two appear to have been fined. One was Dud 
Dudley, the illegitimate son of Lord Dudley and iron master who produced 
weapons for the royalist forces as well as serving as a major of dragoons. 
His estate was confiscated after he had been sentenced to death for his 
activities in and after the second civil war. 103 None of them had any 
administrative, political or educational experience. Of the eight, one of 
them remains of unknown regional origin. One, John Jammot of Freshville's 
Foot, was a Walloon and one was from Scotland. The four who came from the 
midlands all served in regiments raised in their own or an adjacent 
county. 
It would appear that what has been said about the majors of horse 
was equally if not more true of these majors. It is suggested that they 
were of genuine rather than accidental obscurity. That is, their 
obscurity is not solely due to evidence being lost in the years since the 
civil war but is due to the fact that they were socially obscure at the 
time. 
Field Officers 
As there has appeared to be little discernable difference between 
the officers of Horse and Foot in the terms of this examination, the field 
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officers will be considered together in this brief overall analysis. 
The colonels are demonstrably derived from the upper echelons of 
the gentry. With but one exception they came from the esquire class and 
above. However, it is noticeable that they are not, in general, from the 
upper strata of national or even county society. There are only three men 
from noble families and only one who was actually heir to a title. In 
Peter Newman's study of the Northern Army the proportion of baronets and 
knights balance the number of esquires -a phenomenon not apparent in this 
present case where the esquires dominate the field ranks. The familial 
status of the North Midlands Army colonels is similar to those of the 
Northern Army but a smaller number of them had political, administrative 
or educational experiences. 104 Amongst Blackwood's Lancashire royalist 
officers, the proportion of esquires to titled gentry is similar to the 
field officers in this study; that is to say that in both cases the 
squirarchy is the dominant group. 105 This is not true of the Northern 
Army even when all the field officers are taken as a whole. Thus the 
North Midlands royalist officers are, with regard to the field officers, 
more akin to those in Lancashire than to those in Yorkshire and the north. 
However all three studies have established that the royalist armies were 
led by the gentry as opposed to the aristocracy and that-the field ranks 
were open not only to the untitled gentry and lower gentry but also to 
those below gentry status. 
In the case of familial status we can see a decline in the tendency 
for North Midlands field officers to be heads, or potential heads, of 
families as we descend through the ranks. This is only partly explained 
by the fact that some of these officers were serving in elder brothers' 
regiments. It must be assumed that service as an officer in the royalist 
army was seen as a potentially rewarding career move by younger sons. 
Thus active royalism must not simply be seen as an expression of loyalty 
to the King, although this would play some role in the choosing of sides. 
This assertion is supported by the obscurity from which so many of the 
field officers emerged when becoming officers and into which they returned 
having failed to consolidate their new social position by winning the war. 
The statement about their. obscurity is made plainer by the fact 
that even the colonels were not particularly well versed in either higher 
education or administration previous to their appointment to the commands 
of regiments. This dearth is more evident as one descends through the 
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military ranks. Overall the majority of field officers had no such pre 
war experiences. 
Even so, the 43.5% of the field officers who compounded for their 
estates is above the 34% of all the country's royalist field officers that 
Peter Newman has traced as having compounded. 106 Given this, the fact 
that 56% of the field officers did not compound for estates is still 
significant. Taking into account that some papers will have been lost, 
some men may have escaped paying fines through having made use of social 
or familial connections and there will be others who have slipped either 
through the nets of the compounding committees or the modern historian. 
We are dealing with a field officer corps composed for the most part of 
men with little estate. Their lack of property and wealth may be due 
either to their low familial status or to their social obscurity. Of 
those who did compound, over half of the eighteen who left record of the 
final sum paid less than five hundred pounds. 
The regional examination has revealed that there is little evidence 
of geographical mobility amongst the field officers. Military service 
seems to have been largely determined by regional ties; the majority of 
these men served in regiments raised in their own county or in a county 
adjacent to that of their home. This is not really surprising as even if 
these men were socially obscure to the twentieth century historian, their 
faces would be better known then - an aid to recruitment in their home 
area, but not elsewhere. So, despite the distinct possibility that the 
army was seen as. a social ladder, it appears that for these men it was not 
so great an inducement as to entice them far. This is compounded by the 
point that these regiments were, for the most part and for the largest 
part of the time, acting in the regional sphere of the north midlands. 
Regimental Officers 
Captains of Horse 
With the lower field ranks the lack of available evidence for 
identifying the individuals became noticeable; with the ninety-two 
captains, it becomes dramatic. 
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Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
0016 21 15 58 (61.5%) 
Over half of the men of this rank are unidentifiable beyond their 
military rank and regional origins. For those that are identifiable the 
concentration is from the gentry. The 'unknowns' may well be from the 
lowest ranks of those of gentle birth and from the 'shady' area beneath. 
Only one man is identified as being a yeoman by his contemporaries, 
suggesting that the majority of the 'unknowns' may well be of some form of 
(lower) gentry status. Two of those in the 'trade... ' category were 
'preacher', one an attorney and another sold gloves. 107 We are left to 
assume that though the rank of captain was open to men involved in working 
for a living, the majority of the posts, like the ranks, were held by men 
whose income was largely derived from the ownership of land, although the 
captains were not either the richest or the the leading members. 
Within their own families, these men were of more' importance. 
Familial Status 
Head 1st son 2nd son other son unknown 
1 23 52 61 
The vast majority of those whose familial status can be traced were 
potential or actual heads of families. Remembering that this involved 
potential risk of the nuclear and extended family economy we can see that 
a great number of families, or at least their heads, saw the risk as worth 
taking. This may be a further indication that the career of royalist 
officer was seen as a social ladder. 
None of the captains of horse had been involved in politics or 
county administration previous to 1642. Eight men had been to university 
and five went to Inns of Court. Unlike other statistics in this section, 
these are more likely to be the final figures as they are taken from the 
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registers of the organisations concerned and are not dependent upon 
attempts to find information from each individual. This, of course, has 
its own limitations which have been dealt with in the education sections 
of the previous two chapters and will be referred to below. As education 
was an expensive luxury, it may be this cost-factor which prevented the 
vast majority of these officers being part of the 'educational 
revolution'. Only one of the captains appears to have had any sort of 
military career previous to the war. The fact that for only 34% does any 
composition evidence exist does not in any way denegrate the point that 
these men seem to have been of low status. For most of the compounders no 
figures are available, possibly because not all of them were capable of 
paying a property and income based fine. Of those who did pay, only one 
was fined over a thousand pounds whilst others paid as little as forty. 108 
The regional examination has revealed that the captains follow the 
pattern established by the field officers. All but nineteen of the 
ninety-two can be traced regionally. Twelve only were from outside the 
midlands as a whole and of the remaining sixty-one, only five were not 
from the north midlands. Out of the sixty-one midlanders, only three men 
did not serve in regiments raised in a county neither their own nor 
adjacent to their own. There were a few exceptional cases. Captains 
George and Edward Fitzrandolph and Robert Moore were all from Surrey and 
all served in Fitzherbert's Horse. Why and how they came to do so cannot 
be satisfactorily explained. They may simply have been reformadoes or may 
have held untraced Derbyshire estates. The regional ties which appear to 
have influenced the majority of officers' military service limits any 
notion that these men, who may well have had an eye to the social 
potential of service in the King's armies, might have been simply 
mercenaries. 
Captains of Foot 
In the period when the number of foot officers per regiment was 
higher than the number of officers in a regiment of horse, the relative 
dearth of North Midlands foot captains indicates two things. Firstly we 
are dealing with an army of undersized regiments. Secondly even if foot 
regiments had full complements of officers, if not men, the post of 
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captain was infinitely more vulnerable than his counterpart in the horse. 
Encumbered by back and breast plates and perhaps by the awkward leg guards 
- tassetts - and armed or hindered by a partisan, the captain was not, in 
defeat, an agile creature. Unless a captain achieved notoriety - and tax 
gathering, a sure way of coming to the attention of hostile press, was the 
province of horse captains - the death of a captain, his body thrown into 
the common pit, often went un-noted. Only fifty-two names of foot 
captains have come to light. 
Social Rank 
Noble Bart Knight Esq Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
0001505 41 
The vast majority remain unidentified; the remainder suggest that the 
captains of foot were not of high social status. Of the five in the 
'Trade... ' category, two were shoemakers, one an apothecary, one a tailor 
and the other a barrister. The first four were from groups more associated 
with the parliamentarian armed forces than those of the royalists by 
historians and by the royalists themselves. 109 Even so, the majority of 
the remaining. men, the 'unknowns', may well be of the landed, if not 
armigerous, classes. 
Little can be deduced from the familial status as only eight 
individuals can be so ascribed. Of these, six were first sons, one a 
second son and another a third. Only five of these men attended 
university and two inns of court. None of them had any other relevant 
form of experience, though two had seen military service before the war. 
Nine alone have left evidence of having paid composition fines. Not all 
the others will have been without estates upon which to base fines. Apart 
from lost papers some captains would have escaped through pulling familial 
or social strings. There is, however, the strong possibility that a large 
number of these captains would, at the cessation of hostilities, have 
owned little or no property of their own. Of those who did, and were 
fined accordingly, only one paid over five hundred pounds and this was a 
sum reduced from only £1,395.110 
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The captains' regional origins trace the same pattern followed by 
captains of horse and established by the field officers. Of the 
thirty-two from midland counties, only one captain served in a regiment 
that was not raised in his own county or one adjacent to it. Six alone 
came from outside the midlands; fifteen cannot be regionally placed. 
This group of officers come from fairly low on the social scale 
though the majority were still probably from the landed classes. The 
greater number preferred only to practise their royalism within the region 
in which they were born - though they were not content to let this simply 
be their home county. 
Captain Lieutenants of Horse 
Eight of the twelve men for whom this was the highest rank achieved 
during the first civil war cannot be identified. The four who can were 
all gentlemen. Three of them were first sons and went to university, one 
attended the Inner Temple. Only one appears to have compounded. Beyond 
this, little can be said with so small a base number and. tables are 
unnecessary. The four identified men fit into the pattern established 
earlier; they are lower gentry with some education but no experience of 
administration. The regional origins of these officers also follow the 
pattern set by other groups, that is they tended to serve in regiments 
from their own or adjacent counties. 
Captain Lieutenants of Foot 
All four of these men remain unidentified. It is possible that 
Ralph Smith of Bagot's Foot attended Oxford but it is by no means 
conclusive. Only one appears to have been fined -a sum of £171-10s-Od 
was paid by Timothy Startin - his estate was later confiscated in the 
third Confiscation Act of 1652.111 
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Lieutenants of Horse 
Twenty-nine of the thirty-five lieutenants cannot be ascribed 
social rank. Of the six who can be so identified, five were gentlemen and 
one was a vintner. With regard to familial status, five were first sons 
and three were younger sons. Only one attended university and only two 
compounded. On a regional basis ten came from non midland counties, two 
from midland counties other than the five under study in this thesis; the 
rest were all from the north midlands. Of these twenty-three, all served 
in regiments raised in their own or adjacent counties. Thus it would 
appear that right down to the junior ranks, men derived from the tail end 
of the gentry and below, military service was, to a large extent, 
determined by regional origins. 
Lieutenants of Foot 
Only two of the twenty-four lieutenants of foot can be ascribed 
social rank. One was described as a composer and may have had some claim 
to gentility, the other was a yeoman. The others, notable neither for 
their talent nor their status, must have come from the tail of the gentry 
or the ranks of society with pretensions to gentility. Two were first 
sons (the yeoman was one) and as might be expected none had any political, 
administrative or educational experience. Only one has left evidence of 
having compounded. Again, these men, at least those whose regional 
origins can be traced, were for the most part restricted in their military 
service by their place of residence. 
Cornets 
Of the thirty-nine cornets, thirty-three cannot be identified to 
any significant degree. Of the six who can, five were gentlemen and one 
described as a leadminer - he may have been a gentleman with commercial 
interests in mining. Four of these six were first sons and two were 
younger sons. Only one of the gentlemen had attended university and none 
of them had any political or administrative experience. One man 
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compounded and the leadminer's property was seized during the war. 112 
Some of the cornets were serving in their elders regiments or troops. 
Their regional origins follow the established pattern. 
Ensigns of Foot and Cornets of Dragoons 
The final group are all unidentified. One, Jeffery Dudley, was 
however related to Dud Dudley, his major, and had married Dud's sister, 
but his exact social status is unknown. Another man is definitely known 
to have been a younger son and one may have gone to university. It may be 
that the Phillip Draycott who compounded for his estates was Leveson's 
Lieutenant Colonel's ensign, but this possible identification is not 
assured. 112 The regional pattern as far as it can be traced follows the 
established pattern of the majority serving in regiments raised in their 
home or adjacent counties. 
Regimental Officers 
As a whole this group of officers are remarkable for the lack of 
evidence regarding them as individual officers. Undeniably these men came 
from, in general, a lower social group than their superior officers. 
Where they were drawn from the same backgrounds then they were from lower 
down the social scale. There are a few exceptions, such as Sir Richard 
Astley, but these men were appointed earlier in the war when there were 
less posts available. Yet, on the other hand, the large number of the 
officers who came from the lesser ranks of the gentry or below and yet 
were from high up the familial scale, indicates that there was a great 
deal of commitment shown to the cause, both by these individuals and by 
their broad social group. This along with the smallness of the fines, 
when indeed any were paid, indicates what a risk these minor families were 
taking with their small stake in the counties they were defending. Those 
who could afford a modest fine would have little to fall back on after the 
war, and those who could not may well have exhausted their meagre finances 
during the war. The high numbers of men who do not appear to have 
compounded, indicates a number of things. Some officers, through social, 
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familial or economic ties, may have been able to elude compounding. 
Papers relating to some cases may have been wilfully or negligently lost. 
In some instances absence of papers for an officer who does not appear to 
have subscribed to the list of indigent officers or does not crop up in 
any post war documentation, may indicate an unrecorded war-time death, or 
that the officer died in the period between the war and the restoration 
and is not discernable from any source. But it must be true that these 
will only account for the minority of the 78% of regimental officers who 
have left no trace of composition or any other property based fine. The 
majority would appear to have no estates, real or personal, upon which to 
base such a fine. This is borne out by the fact that those who did pay 
fines were only, for the most part, charged comparatively small amounts. 
Thus it must be asserted that the vast majority of regimental 
officers came from'either the tail end of the gentry or from various 
social groups below the gentry. The financially enforced obscurity, which 
had excluded these men and their families from previous political or 
administrative office and higher education, did not, it would seem, 
prevent them from believing that they had a role to play in their region's 
affairs during the war. The involvement at a high familial level, with 
all the attendant risks referred to in this and the previous two chapters, 
would seem to indicate that some individuals, if not families, may have 
seen active involvement being a gamble, the possible returns being an 
increased peace time role in their region's affairs. 
Few served in a regiment raised far from their home county but many 
were not restricted to serving in regiments raised in their immediate 
locality. The adherence to area is a regional phenomenon rather than a 
county one. 
As in the previous chapters educational aspects of the officer's 
backgrounds will be taken into consideration separately. The purposes of 
this are to assess the possibility that the future officers made social 
contacts at the universities and the Inns which may have served them in 
some way, such as the selection of junior officers in their later life 
during the civil war period. 
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Education 
a) The Universities 
The highest proportion of the officers who attended university were 
from the ranks of field officer. Sixteen of the seventy-three field 
officers attended one of the universities whilst only twenty of the 283 
regimental officers did so. As indicated earlier the gaining of a degree 
was not the sole, or even the chief, aim of attending such an institution. 
Only ten of the officers did take a first degree: seven of these 
progressed to a Master's degree, two became fellows. 114 As the 
universities could be a vehicle for the forging or enhancing of social 
contacts it is worth studying the periods and college locations of the 
thirty-six north midlands officers in such a light. It must be remembered 
that in both the previous cases, the royalist commissioners and the 
parliamentarian committeemen, there were few, if any, grounds for 
asserting that there were any social connections founded or political 
ideologies developed and shared between those from each group who attended 
either of the universities. 
At Cambridge there were three major groupings of students on the 
basis of time, 1627-8,1635 and 1638-9. In the first of these, there were 
three future officers at the university, Hastings and one of his captains 
being two; both of them were at Queen's. In 1635 there were four 
officers at the university, two of Harpur's field officers and two of 
Bagot's officers. In the final period the two men from Harpur's were 
still at the university as were three other men, two of whom were later to 
serve as captains in Hastings' Horse. On a college basis there is only 
the instance cited above of Hastings and one of his officers at Queen's 
and another instance where two otherwise unconnected officers were in St 
John's at the same time. 
At Oxford there are again three time period groupings of officers, 
1616-7,1631-2 and 1635-6. In the first there were five officers present; 
Rowland Eyre and his future lieutenant colonel were amongst them. As the 
latter was Rowland's brother this is obviously no indication of a social 
connection either forged or compounded! Two of Hastings' future officers 
were also amongst these five. In the grouping of 1631-2 none of the 
officers was to serve in the same regiment, and of the final group only 
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two were later to serve in the same unit. On a college basis, two future 
officers were contemporaneous at each of the three colleges of Trinity, 
Brasenose and Lincoln. Of these only the latter two served in the same 
regiment. With reference to the commissioners, at Oxford in the first 
time grouping as the officers, there were also three commissioners 
present, whilst at Cambridge there was only one occasion when a future 
commissioner was present at the same time as a future officer. 
Such are the significant groupings of future royalist activists. 
Any assumptions about potential influence on later military service are 
purely conjectural as none of the people involved left diaries of any form 
from which such possibilities could be ascertained. There is, with the 
officers, more potential for these groupings to have witnessed the forming 
or advancement of social connections than there was in the cases of either 
the commissioners or the committeemen. The incidences of contemporaneous 
students who then served as officers of the same regiment would suggest 
this. But as the number of cases is small it only goes a little way to 
explaining the command structures of north midlands royalist regiments. 
The status of only thirteen of the officers, whilst at university, 
can be traced. None of them was admitted as a scholar, which would have 
offered evidence of ability not wealth. Scholars were funded by the 
universities and could potentially come from social groups normally 
excluded from admission by the cost element. Instead most of these men 
were pensioners or commoners, who would be financed by their families. 
There was one sitar who like other sizars would probably supplement his 
income by performing the menial tasks later ascribed to college servants. 
Three men were, however, admitted as plebeians. This rank normally 
included yeoman stock or those from a trading background. In this present 
case two of the plebeians remain unidentified as to their status, other 
than the ascription of 'plebeian' at admission. The-other however is Sir 
Robert Harding, described as having an impoverished estate at the end of 
hostilities. It was considered at the time that the opportunities for 
those of lower status to get into university were on the decline due to 
the tendency for scholarships to be offered to sons of men well able to 
afford the cost in order that dons might secure patronage. 115 Whether or 
not this was so, and there is some doubt, the small number of officers who 
had attended university, even allowing that as many as a third again of 
the numbers here may be added to compensate for the inaccuracies of the 
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registers as suggested by Professor Stone, would indicate that 
opportunities for those of low gentry or common status, as many of these 
officers undoubtedly were, were very limited. 
116 
b) Inns of Court 
Training in the basic precepts of law was, in the seventeenth 
century, essential to the landowner, who would spend some part of his 
landholding life involved in legal battles. The inns did not however 
offer concessions on fees - there were no scholarships and no sizars. As 
the fees and associated costs were high, entrance was prohibited to the 
impecunious gentry. 117 Thus it is not surprising, given the assertions 
made earlier regarding the social standing of many of the officers, that 
only fifteen had attended the inns. The inns were as much a social venue 
as the universities, with the added attraction of the proximity of the 
royal Court with its ability to make and break careers and fortunes. 
Therefore attendance at the inns is examined in the same way as the 
universities. However, there was only one significant time grouping, 
1636-7, when four officers were present - two at Grays'.. There were no 
other groupings by individual inn and none of the contemporaries served in 
the same regiments. 
On the regional question raised by Prest and referred to 
extensively in the previous chapters little light can be shed, except to 
say that Grays with its supposed bias towards men from the north, Kent 
and East Anglia, again drew the most significant proportion of north 
midlands activists to itself. 
With so few connections between the officers as individuals and as 
a group in relation to the commissioners, no assertions of value can be 
drawn about the exploitation of the inns as a place for forging useful 
social connections. 
Religion 
Whereas the commissioners of array did not have catholics amongst 
them, perhaps for political reasons, the army had several catholic 
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officers in it; in many ways it represented the only outlet for catholic 
activism. The proportion of catholic officers in the North Midlands Army 
was not as high as it was in the Northern Army. As may be expected the 
most accurate figures available are for the field officers and, as a 
result, the most accurate estimates regarding proportions of catholics can 
be made for them only. Even so, of the seventy-three field officers 
thirty-two cannot be definitely categorised on the lines of protestant or 
catholic. Of the forty-one who can, eleven were catholics. This is a 
proportion of 26.8%. Given that catholic officers were singled out by the 
parliamentarian media and the sequestration and other committees, the vast 
majority if not all of the thirty-two 'unidentified' men were protestant. 
At the extreme this would reduce the proportion of catholics to 15.1%. We 
are, therefore, dealing with a proportion between 15.1% and 26.8%. In 
either extreme this is not near the proportion of 36% of catholic field 
officers in the Northern Army. 118 As the familial status of four of the 
eleven catholic officers in the North Midlands Army cannot be traced, 
little can be said about the commitment of north midland catholic 
families. Certainly for the five of the remaining seven who were heads of 
families or first sons, the familial commitment was very high. 
Of the regimental officers much less can be said. - Only fifty-nine 
can be identified in sufficient detail to ascertain their religious 
convictions; of these twenty were catholics, a proportion of 34%. At 
first sight this matches Newman's figures for Northern Army field officers 
quite well. But. for the reasons in the above paragraph it is safe to 
assume that the vast majority of the 'unidentified' officers were 
protestants. It is therefore likely that the actual proportion was 
similar to that witnessed in the case of the North Midlands Army field 
officers, that is less than 26.8%. 
The highest concentration of catholic officers is in Thomas 
Leveson's regiments raised in south Staffordshire. Almost all the 
officers serving in his Horse were catholics as was Leveson himself, and 
most of the officers in his Foot were catholic also. 119 This gravitation 
towards a catholic commander is understandable. Suspicion of the value of 
the employment of catholics would make many protestant commanders shy away 
from offering them commissions. Nor is it surprising that this large 
group under Leveson came from south Staffordshire as the area was known 
for its catholic population. Derbyshire also provided a large number of 
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catholic officers, many serving in the regiments of Rowland Eyre or Sir 
John Fitzherbert. Despite these two counties having higher proportions of 
catholics than other areas of the north midlands, the proportion of 
catholic activists in the North Midlands Army is greater than that of 
catholics indigenous in the counties. This supports the findings of Peter 
Newman which indicate that the same is true in Yorkshire, though perhaps 
to an even higher degree than is shown here. However, this proportion is 
not sufficiently high to explain the lack of administrative or political 
experience shown by the officer group as a whole as Newman asserts may be 
the case in the Northern Army. The explanation must, in the North 
Midlands Army at least, lie in the general low social status and seeming 
low financial position of the officer corps as a whole. 120 
The Officer Corps of the North Midlands Army: Conclusion 
As has been shown, for both the field officers and the regimental 
officers, the social status was not particularly high. No title holding 
noble held any commission in it and only four titled gentry held rank 
within it. The majority of officers whose status can be-traced were 
esquires or gentlemen, though a significant number were demonstrably below 
this class. 
c,.,.;., 1 v.,.. i. 
Noble Bart Knight Esq 
122 40 
of 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 11% 
all 
Gent. Yeoman Trade/ Unknown 
profession/ 
clergy 
45 3 15 247 
12.7% 0.08%: 4.2% 69.6% 
% of 0.9% 1.8% 1.8% 36.7% 41.2% 2.7% 13.8% 
known 
The vast numbers of unidentified men, the majority of whom were from the 
regimental officer group, can only indicate that these men came from 
socially obscure families, though they were perhaps derived from 
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landowning groups with pretensions to, if not possession of, gentry 
status, at least in the eyes of the College of Heralds. This leads to 
several conclusions. Firstly, the King's attempts to galvanise the upper 
strata of society failed in the north midlands. Whether this was due to 
dissatisfaction with his government or not we cannot tell, but the fact 
remains that the North Midlands Army was led by the gentry under the 
overall command of the second son of a declining aristocratic family. 
Secondly, the army was commanded by men who, because of their low status 
during the pre-war years, had been excluded by wealth and standing from 
the conducting of county government. Only four deputy lieutenants, six 
high sheriffs, three J. P. s and two M. P. s served in the army. Thus 
Hastings had under him a large collection of men with no experience of 
administering anything beyond their parish and their (possibly meagre) 
estates. Thirdly, 'these two last factors indicate that these men who had 
so little grip on seventeenth century affairs may well have seen the war 
as a means of social advancement on a scale normally closed to them. Thus 
they were exploiting the multiple dysfunction of society to further their 
own ends, whether or not they had a deep political commitment to the 
royalist cause. Their defeat meant that the door to social progress 
remained closed; the financial hardship caused by their espousal of the 
losing side, whether the result of fines or by the outlay of money during 
the fighting, resulted in the door being locked and bolted. This 
hypothesis supports the work done by other historians, particularly Peter 
Newman, with regard to royalist officers in other areas. 121 
Very few of the ex North Midland Officers did gain by their part in 
the war after the restoration. Gervaise Lucas became the governor of 
Bombay but he was one of the few exceptions. Hastings, Lord Loughborough 
since 1643, merely took over the lieutenancy of Leicestershire which was 
his family's prerogative anyway. It is unlikely that his pension or his 
income from concessions on the cattle trade ever compensated his financial 
outlay of £10,000 during the war. 122 
Field Officers and Commissioners: A Comparative Analysis 
Both groups emerge from a similar social spectrum, that is the 
nobility to the lower gentry. In both cases esquires are the largest 
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single group, consisting of about 40% of the whole. However the field 
officers differ in one crucial respect: their membership extends much 
further down the social ladder. In the group of commissioners, with one 
exception, the esquires form the baseline; among the field officers, with 
only four exceptions, the esquires are the highest social group from which 
they were recruited. The fact that such a large proportion of the field 
officers are unidentified is further indication of their social 
inferiority, although some gained advancement as a result of military 
service. It is a similar case with familial status; there is a far 
greater tendency for the officers to be younger sons than for the 
commissioners to be so. 
Officers, it is evident from the administrative tables, had not the 
same administrative experience as the commissioners of array. This would, 
no doubt, affect the way in which each group saw their communities in war 
time. Officers may not have had the same desire to manage the war effort 
using the traditional methods, of which they had little experience. They 
also had less of a material hold on the communities in which they were 
waging war. Only aroung 42% of the field officers appear to have paid 
property based fines or assessments, compared with almost all the 
commissioners having done so. With less ties and less experience of 
government in the counties their attitudes to them may not have resembled 
the careful handling of the commissioners who often had major estates in 
the same shires. But with the commissioners-acting as a brake on them, 
the officers were not able to act in a way which would have invoked a 
popular reactj. on. This would be a major contribution to the maintenance 
of a system which provoked no clubmen reactions in the north midlands. On 
the other hand, when colonels did act out of concert with the 
commissioners, the opposite was the case. When Gervaise Lucas disobeyed 
Hastings and the Leicestershire commissioners and, on the instigation of 
the King, annexed Framland hundred, petitions were collected in protest. 
When Hastings' ex major Barnabus Scudamore pressed for more taxation in 
Herefordshire, he in no small way contributed to the provocation of the 
populace which led to the massive Herefordshire clubmen risings. 
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Chapter Five 
The Establishment of Royalist Control of the North Midland Counties 
In Chapters Two and Four the machinery of both aspects of the 
royalist war effort, financial and military, have been examined. It 
remains the province of this and the following chapter, to analyse the 
military control of the counties upon which the financial system depended 
and, indeed, paid for. In this present chapter, the period dating from 
Charles' raising of the standard until the relief of Newark in March 1644 
will be studied. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that during 
this period the royalist war effort in this region became so effective 
that by the end of 1643 the royalists had established sufficient control 
of the area for the map of territorial depositions for that period to be 
redrawn in their favour. The course of this rise was not smooth and, more 
importantly, the achievement was not flawless. Hastings faced two 
problems, which will be considered in this chapter. Firstly, because he 
had to constantly provide military aid to neighbouring royalists, he could 
never concentrate his full efforts on his own region. Secondly, and 
partly as a result of the latter, he could not muster enough strength on 
his own, or inveigle any outside help, to enable him to destroy the 
pockets of parliamentarian resistance established in the region's county 
towns. Two further themes, the constant unhelpful interference of the 
King and others and the internal wrangles between commissioners and 
commanders, are left until the following chapter. The difficulties thrown 
up by these two problems were to have a greater impact on the latter part 
of the story of the north midlands. Throughout this chapter, an analysis 
of the composition of Hastings' forces on particular occasions is given, 
if at all possible, to support the assertions made in the previous chapter 
concerning Hastings' army being more than a collection of guerrilla bands. 
In Chapter Two, the discussion of the consequences of the Militia 
Ordinance, and the issue of commissions of array, involved a description 
of events leading up to the King's raising of the standard at Nottingham 
in August 1642. This chapter will therefore commence with the events in 
the North Midlands which occurred that month. 
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August 1642 to the Battle of Edgehill 
The early period of the conflict, both prior and subsequent to the 
raising of the standard, saw a definite approach to the imminent struggle 
by the royalists, which could be described as a 'field army mentality'. 
It appears that both sides expected a brief clash of arms to decide the 
issue. As a result of this the forces which Charles empowered his 
nominated colonels to raise were intended for a marching army and not for 
the establishment of local power bases. This was to have serious 
consequences as it deprived the north midlands of royalist activists who 
could seize strongpoints from which to establish regional control. 
Hastings' Horse, which he had been empowered to raise on August 
4th, within eleven days consisted of at least two troops, though no 
indication of its numerical strength can be found. This might indicate, 
given the small amount of time between the two troops appearing and their 
commission, that in this case at least, Hastings' appointment as colonel 
may have recognised his already established position as a commander of 
armed forces. Hastings and his troops were ordered into Warwickshire to 
join local royalists in an attempt to wrest the county from the grip of 
Lord Brooke's successful recruitment campaign. ' The extension of this 
attempt was the unification of the forces under Hastings, Sir Nicholas 
Byron and the Earl of Northampton under the King himself, in an attempt to 
seize Coventry from an hostile populace and a small parliamentarian 
garrison. The failure to coerce the town into submission and thus to 
obtain the county munitions contained therein, saw some of the first 
hostile shots of the war being fired. Because of this, the raising of the 
standard several days later was a recognition of, rather than the 
declaration of, a state of war. 
In the three weeks following the King's acknowledgement of the war, 
the royalist horse was stationed in Leicestershire. On August 26th 
Hastings and Prince Rupert, commander of the horse, attacked Bradgate Park 
in an effort to seize the ammunition which the Earl of Stamford had taken 
there from Leicester. 2 On'September 6th, Rupert, in the King's name but 
without his approval, issued a demand for two thousand pounds from 
Leicester and threatened to bring forces to the town if it was not 
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cooperative. The King, realising that such an act was unlikely to warm 
the region to his cause, wrote to Leicester to 'utterley disavow' the 
demand. It was a signal both to the commanders and the towns themselves 
that communities were not to be treated to peremptory demands for money. 
The King did, however, keep the five hundred pounds the town had already 
sent to him, indicating that he himself was pressed for money. 
3 
On the 12th, Charles began his march west from Nottingham, to join 
the regiments raised by Sir John Beaumont and Lord Paget and to enable him 
to link up with the Welsh recruitment programme. 4 The horse followed a 
parallel course to the south of the King's foot forces which marched 
through Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. On its progress the horse 
encamped on the property of two future North Midlands Army colonels, Isham 
Parkyns at Bunny and Sir John Harpur at Swarkstone. Whilst the King was 
at Stafford, the horse were at Field, the property of the Bagot family 
which provided three activists for the royalist cause: Richard and Harvey 
were already in Paget's Foot. 5 When the King established himself at 
Shrewsbury, 6 Rupert took the horse south towards Worcester to meet a 
convoy of plate, on its way north from Oxford University. 7 
The fight at Powick Bridge, which ensued when Rupert drove off a 
would-be ambush on the convoy, blooded at least two of the units which 
would later be a part of the North Midlands Army. Freshville's Horse and 
Hastings' Horse were both involved. 8 As the King moved south from 
Shrewsbury on. October 10th, he left the Marcher counties secured by 
garrisons at Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury and Wrexham. He had not secured the 
north midlands in the same way, nor had he left any local activists of the 
calibre of Hastings behind him. 9 
As a result, Sir John Gell, the parliamentarian leadmine owner from 
Derbyshire, was able to enter his county with the foot troops he had been 
given by Sir John Hotham at Hull. With these he drove the only remaining 
royalist unit, the Yorkshireman Sir Francis Whortley's Dragoons, out of 
the county. By the-time Edgehill had been fought, and its uncertain 
conclusion had destroyed the myth of a short war, a large part of the 
north midlands had been lost by the royalists. 
10 The King now had to 
reverse his policy of denuding the region of its activists, which the 
creation of the field army had achieved, and reinject these men into the 
shires to forge a royalist powerbase. 
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Edgehill to Lichfield: Breaking Parliament's Grip 
In the period from October 1642 until April 1643, the royalists in 
the north midlands had an uphill struggle. They were faced with the task 
of regaining territorial losses and asserting themselves in the face of 
concerted opposition. This they did, both at the King's instigation and 
by local initiative. However, despite being able to build up their forces 
they were unable to assert themselves fully without recourse to outside 
intervention. Sir John Gell received his first horse unit in November 
from Nottinghamshire. On the 11th, Sir Francis Whortley attempted to 
re-enter Derbyshire but a sharp engagement at Dale saw him worsted. 11 
Staffordshire did not want Whortley's forces either and the county's 
gentry decided, at*a special Sessions of the Peace in mid November, to 
raise a force to repel any such incursion of troops from either side. 12 
It was to this potentially dangerous situation that the King turned to 
after the Battle of Brentford. 
To deal with the Staffordshire problem he ordered the high sheriff 
to garrison the county and, with Whortley, to secure the county town. 13 
At the same time Thomas Leveson was to garrison Wolverhampton. 14 Hastings 
was sent from Oxford with his regiment. of horse, a commission to raise a 
regiment of dragoons and ammunition for a regiment of foot. 15 Hastings 
was, moreover,. to establish a base from which to control Leicestershire. 
Also sent home from Oxford was Ferdinando Stanhope, the Earl of 
Chesterfield'. s fourth son. He was to join his father's small garrison at 
Bretby in Derbyshire, with his troop of horse. 16 Nottinghamshire was to 
be seized with help from the Earl of Newcastle, by the high sheriff John 
Digby, another man sent from Oxford. 17 
Such was Charles' response to the problem of parliamentarian 
control over the north midlands. It was not a complete success. By mid 
December, Sir John Henderson, a Scots professional soldier sent down by 
Newcastle, and Digby had established themselves at Newark, but Nottingham 
was already fortified by the parliamentarian John Hutchinson with help 
from Gell. In Derbyshire, the situation was worse for the royalists than 
in Nottinghamshire. Early that month, Gell had cleared his county of the 
puny forces at Bretby thus enabling him to help his Nottinghamshire 
colleagues. In the middle of the month, Hastings, who had decided to 
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recruit an army before entering the region, was beating the drum in 
Worcester and Shrewsbury. 18 Gell heard that Hastings had three hundred 
horse and four hundred foot by the end of December. When the latter did 
arrive in his native county, Henry Nevill of Holt began the establishment 
of a royalist garrison at Holt in the south of the county with the help of 
his two sons, one of whom appears to have led a troop of horse in 
Hastings' regiment. 19 Thus by the end of the year, the royalists had 
established garrisons at Ashby de la Zouch and Holt in Leicestershire, 
Wolverhampton, Stafford and Lichfield in Staffordshire and Newark in 
Nottinghamshire. 
Nevertheless, they were far behind their adversaries who not only 
had garrisons but had designed a structured local government to manage 
them. In mid December, parliament had created County Committees of local 
gentry to administer their war effort. 20 In addition the counties 
themselves were grouped into associations in order that they work together 
in an attempt to pursue the war more effectively. Nottinghamshire, 
Leicestershire, Derbyshire and Rutland were associated with 
Northamptonshire, Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire and placed under the 
command of the young Lord Grey, heir to the Earl of Stamford. 21 
Staffordshire was associated with Warwickshire under Lord Brooke. 22 
Though the royalists in the midlands had been asked to work together as 
early as June 1642, the relationship was not formalised until the 
following February. In that month the counties were associated under 
Hastings. This was in many ways to be a recognition of the work which he 
and other local royalists had already achieved rather than a central 
initiative. 
In December 1642, the royalists and parliamentarians in 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire attempted to hold bilateral talks, perhaps 
to emulate the events in Staffordshire. It may be possible that in both 
cases the initiative came from the royalists as a ruse to gain time. In 
view of the poor standing of the royalists in these two counties during 
the period, such attempts could only be advantageous. In both instances 
the talks came to nothing. In Nottinghamshire, John Hutchinson and his 
colleagues were suspicious of the royalist motives and refused to attend 
the meeting. In response to Digby's recruitment of forces at Newark, 
Hutchinson and his brother George put Nottingham in a state of defence. 23 
In Derbyshire, the meeting took place between the royalists and Gell's 
181 
brother Thomas along with other Derby parliamentarians. The royalists 
present demanded that Gell disgarrison Derby. It was a hollow demand as, 
since the fall of Bretby, the royalists had no armed forces in the county 
with which to coerce Gell into agreement. 24 Whether either side could 
have achieved a neutrality pact, even if the attempts were geniune, is 
debatable. Both King and parliament had declared against neutrality, 
parliament as early as October. 25 Even the Staffordshire attempt had 
failed to produce the promised third force. The establishment of royalist 
garrisons at Wolverhampton and the other places had met with no armed 
opposition despite these being a direct affront to the proclaimed 
neutralism of the county. 
The impetus for concerted royalist action now came from within the 
counties. The Derbyshire royalists, realising the futility of their 
threats, appealed to Hastings for aid. Sir John Harpur of Swarkstone, 
with help from Hastings, began to garrison his house. 26 The ground for 
Hastings' intervention was well prepared. Harpur had primed the local 
community into drawing up a formal protest concerning Gell, and directed 
to the Mayor of Derby. Fourteen south Derbyshire communities subscribed 
to the protest which denounced the expulsion of the Earl of Chesterfield 
from Bretby and thanked the King for sending Hastings to-their aid. 27 It 
was a threat that Gell could not ignore. The villages concerned were all 
within eight miles of Derby itself, and Swarkstone, where Harpur was 
establishing his garrison, was only six miles away. There were further 
considerations. The bridge over the Trent at Swarkstone was the main 
route from the south of the county to the markets at Derby. Hastings 
himself declared publicly that his aim was to prevent the unwarranted 
taxation which the county petition had complained of and to protect those 
who wished to use the markets of Leicestershire as an alternative to 
Derby, due to the disruption caused by Gell. 28 
The threat was answered two ways. The Derbyshire committee issued 
a counter declaration accusing Hastings of destroying the bridge at 
Swarkstone and blocking trade routes to Derby. They also suggested that 
Hastings was exacting just the sort of illegal taxation that he had 
accused them of levying. 29 On January 3rd, the second reply took the form 
of an attack on Swarkstone Bridge. Though the royalists survived the 
first day, a renewed attack on the 6th drove Hastings and Harpur out of 
the village and back across the Trent. 30 It would appear that Hastings 
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had not committed his full strength to the struggle as Mercurius Aulicus, 
the royalist newspaper, suggested that he only had a hundred horse at the 
bridge though Gell's accounts infer that there were three hundred horse 
and four hundred foot. Even allowing that Mercurius probably deliberately 
underestimated Hastings number, Hastings would not wish to commit much 
more than half his forces at such a difficult stage. 
The flight of Harpur and Hastings to Ashby de la Zouch was seen by 
all local parliamentarians as the opportunity to crush local royalism in 
the bud. Lord Grey exercised his command and ordered a general assault on 
Ashby. With aid from Sir William Brereton, whom parliament had dispatched 
to his native Cheshire with a regiment of horse, the north midland 
parliamentarians could concentrate around two thousand men. Their 
preliminary attack was a success. The five hundred men Hastings had at 
Ashby were forced, from their outer defences in the town, to the castle 
itself, the fortified church and the school. Though the allied 
parliamentarians possessed cannon, it was of too small a calibre to breach 
the walls of the fifteenth century manor house and they hoped to starve 
Hastings into submission instead. Yet Hastings had informed Prince Rupert 
of his predicament on January 17th. Already Hastings was recognised, at 
Oxford, as the mainspring of royalism in the north midlands and five days 
later the Prince was at Brackley in Northamptonshire, heading for 
Leicester with five regiments of horse and foot. However, Lord Grey had 
already been informed of Rupert's coming to Hastings' aid after the Prince 
had reached Banbury, and had abandoned the siege. 31 
Perhaps in an effort to fend off expected criticism for such a 
hasty withdrawal, Grey turned on the smaller garrison at Holt and captured 
it on January 23rd. Henry Nevill was taken prisoner, and sent 
(eventually) to London; his two sons, William and Thomas, assumed command 
of their father's regiments in order to continue the fight. 32 Grey's move 
south would also have placed him on the Prince's line of march and was, 
perhaps, designed as a deliberate attempt to fight the Prince's forces. 
However, Grey had not been as successful in dealing with his critics as he 
had been with Nevill's garrison. The Derbyshire contingent of his command 
were considerably rankled by the undue conclusion of the siege; possibly 
they felt Hastings more of a threat than Grey did. Both of the accounts 
of Gell's military career accuse Grey of being prey to rumours, suggesting 
that there never was a threat from Rupert. 33 This is without foundation, 
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as the letter from Rupert to Hastings on the 22nd announcing his imminent 
arrival proves 
34 
After Grey withdrew from Ashby, the Prince, confident of 
Hastings' ability to fend for himself, turned from his northward march at 
Daventry and moved west into Warwickshire. 35 
For Sir William Brereton the end of the siege was not such a 
problem. Freed from Grey's command he was able to turn to Cheshire where 
he had been heading when Grey embroiled him in the attempt on Ashby. He 
was, however, by this time too late to prevent Orlando Bridgeman 
garrisoning Chester with one thousand men. Before the end of January 
Brereton did manage to defeat Sir Thomas Aston's forces and establish a 
garrison at Nantwich. 36 
Elsewhere in the north midlands, royalist forces began to establish 
themselves. At Bolsover in the north of Derbyshire and Welbeck in 
Nottinghamshire, the royalist garrisons had begun to effect a local tax. 
At the end of January, Gervaise Lucas established a second major 
Leicestershire garrison when he captured Belvoir Castle. This base was to 
be an intrinsic part of the royalists' attempts to exercise control over 
Lincolnshire. 37 
As early as November 1642, the moorlanders, inhabitants of the 
scarcely populated areas north east of Stafford, had been offended by the 
presence of royalist forces, namely those of Sir Francis Whortley. 
Parliamentarian successes had given the moorlanders impetus and Gell and 
Brereton both encouraged them in their opposition to the royalists. With 
the provision of arms and ammunition the moorlanders transformed their 
antipathy into action and went on the offensive, aiming at the capture of 
Stafford. The high sheriff, William Comberford, sent an urgent request 
for help to Hastings from the county town on February 2nd. 38 The 
moorlander's attack the following day seems to have been fended off by 
Comberford, largely by means of negotiation. This respite was only 
temporary and Hastings was asked 'For God's sake [to] send what forces you 
can spare with what speed you can'. 39 Hastings was still short of men and 
had asked the King for reinforcements; it was clear he could not be 
everwhere at once. Comberford's request travelled via Rugeley and the 
Earl of Chesterfield at Lichfield before finding Hastings and his forces 
in the Vale of Belvoir, where he was preventing a parliamentarian attack 
on the new garrison in the caslte. 
40 It is apparent that by the 9th he 
still had not been able to send aid to Stafford and the town had faced 
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attacks on two consecutive days by that date. Though on each occasion the 
moorlanders had been repulsed, it had been a close run thing. Sir John 
Fitzherbert's regiments had been involved, with Sir John himself narrowly 
escaping capture during one of the assaults. Some of Hastings' forces had 
by the 8th been in the Yoxall area, and this had, to the eyes of the 
Lichfield garrison, weakened the moorlanders' resolve. 41 At the same time 
the forces at Newark heard a rumour that Skippon's parliamentarian forces 
were heading northward and desired that Hastings join them in case Skippon 
attacked. Hastings had delayed long enough and ignoring Newark's request, 
turned west to help Comberford. 
By February 15th, Stafford was secured and Comberford was able to 
take his forces into south Cheshire to recruit. On the 18th Hastings was 
at Stafford himself, with as many as seven hundred horse in fifteen 
troops. 42 On the 21st these forces captured Rushall House, south of 
Lichfield, and established a garrison. 43 Secretary Nicholas confirmed, on 
that same day, that Skippon had no intention of marching north, leaving 
Hastings free to establish garrisons at Tamworth in the south east of 
Staffordshire, Eccleshall in the west and Tutbury, on the edge of the 
moorlanders' territory. 44 The threat from the latter was now checked; 
with a new cache of arms from Oxford, Hastings was able to press on into 
Cheshire confident that Staffordshire was secure and north Leicestershire, 
south Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire were stable. 45 But with 
parliamentarian garrisons established by Brereton at Northwich and 
Nantwich, it was unlikely that Hastings could make much progress in 
Cheshire, despite the presence of the energetic Sir Nicholas Byron who was 
in command of the county's forces. Trouble was about to makea twofold 
appearance. A two pronged parliamentarian initiative, one of local origin 
and one of external invention, diverted Hastings from his Cheshire 
offensive. 
The local venture was the gathering of combined parliamentarian 
forces from Derbyshire, Nottinghshire and Lincolnshire to undertake an 
assault on Newark. With aid from the Earl of Newcastle, Henderson's 
garrison had grown considerably, so much so that Hutchinson at Nottingham 
realised that an attempt to capture the town had to be launched soon. In 
order to do this Hutchinson and others assembled an army from troops from 
Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire at Nottingham and arranged 
to join forces with Lincolnshire regiments under Major General Ballard to 
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attack Newark. On February 27th and 28th these combined forces attempted 
to storm the town. However, due probably to Ballard's incompetence and 
possible reluctance, they failed in their task. As a result the prestige 
and security of the tenuous, but increasing, royalist hold on the region 
received another boost. 46 
At about the same time, Lord Grey again used his forces to try and 
limit royalist encroachment in south Leicestershire and stormed another 
small garrison. This time it was the turn of Lord Camden's second son, 
Henry Noel, to suffer at Langham. Henry was captured and sent to London 
where, within a few months, he died. Camden and his heir, Babtiste Noel, 
were at Newark at the time of the attack. 47 
The more important externally inspired attack on the growing 
royalist presence in the region was directed at Staffordshire whilst local 
parliamentarians busied themselves at Newark. Lord Brooke, commander of 
parliament's associated counties of Staffordshire and Warwickshire, had 
established partial control of the latter by the 27th February when he 
reached Coventry and had established garrisons at Stratford on Avon and 
Maxtowe Castle. 48 On the 29th, he was at Coleshill and ready to move into 
Staffordshire. Passing between the small garrisons of Rushall and 
Tamworth, he invested Lichfield at the end of the month. - On March 2nd, 
Brooke was killed by a shot fired from the cathedral, the close of which 
constituted Chesterfield's garrison. 49 The siege was taken over by Sir 
John Cell, who.. had hitherto been engaged in preventing Hastings getting 
help to the Earl of Chesterfield's forces. Within two days of Brooke's 
death, Lichfield fell to Gell. 50 
Despite his possession of a small army, Hastings was not capable of 
conducting a siege operation unaided. Instead he and his forces circled 
the parliamentarians at Lichfield whilst waiting for aid from the Earl of 
Northampton whose forces were moving almost unopposed through 
Warwickshire. Hastings himself had around one thousand foot as well as 
the seven hundred horse with which he had entered Cheshire. Stationing 
these at Stafford, Rushall, Tamworth and Ashby, he proposed to prevent any 
relief force reaching the increasingly beleagued forces in Lichfield. 51 
The effectiveness of the embryo North Midlands Army is in question as only 
half of the foot in Staffordshire appear to have been fully armed. The 
horse would consist of Hastings' own Horse and Dragoons, Fitzherbert's, 
Stanhope's, Leveson's, John Lane's, Devereaux Wolseley's, Harpur's and 
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perhaps, Sir Francis Whortley's. Amongst the foot would be a section of 
his own regiment and perhaps the companies of Richard and Harvey Bagot. 
Inside Lichfield, Cell's force consisted of between seven hundred and one 
thousand regular foot and three hundred moorlanders of whom only half were 
armed. There were also six small troops of horse. 52 By the 8th, four 
days after the surrender of Lichfield, Northampton was moving north from 
Henley in Arden. Hastings suggested a rendezvous at Tamworth, the 
garrison held by Hastings' Major Scudamore. After the two forces joined, 
the royalists pressed on to Coleshill on the 16th or 17th of March. 53 
Gell, in order to secure the hold on Staffordshire and complete 
Brooke's task, intended to capture the county town. In order to do this 
he planned to link up with forces under Sir William Brereton. In the 
meantime Hastings and Northampton quartered in and around Stafford itself. 
On the 19th March, "upon hearing that Gell was mustering his forces on 
Hopton Heath, the two royalist commanders gathered their regiments to face 
the threat. 54 
The battle has been extensively covered elsewhere and details of it 
are not necessary here. The account by J. T. Brighton deserves particular 
mention, and should be consulted for tactical information. 55 In the case 
of the present thesis, it is only relevant to indicate which units 
comprise Hastings' forces at the battle in order to substantiate the claim 
that there was an embryonic form of the North Midlands Army in existence 
at this stage of the civil war. 
Upon their arrival on Hopton Heath, the royalist forces numbered 
between one thousand -a royalist eyewitness' estimate - and the one 
thousand two hundred that Mercurius Aulicus reported. 56 Most of these men 
were horse troops; only one hundred foot appear to have actually made it 
to the battle. It is possible that these latter were the companies of 
Paget's Foot which the Bagot brothers had brought from Oxford earlier in 
the year. The horse comprised of twenty-five troops of which nine were 
from Northampton's army: six of the Prince of Wales' Horse and three of 
Northampton's own regiment. The other sixteen were from the army which 
Hastings had formally commanded since the end of February, with some 
possible additions from Shropshire. Hastings' regiments were probably 
Fitzherbert's, which had served in Staffordshire for some weeks, 
Stanhope's as he was wounded in battle, Nevill's (seemingly based at 
Ashby) and elements of Leveson's forces from Wolverhampton. The dragoons, 
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of which there were three hundred at the battle, would probably have been 
an amalgam of Hastings', Harpur's and Whortley's. Though the latter had 
been offered the chance to return north to his native Yorkshire, at the 
end of February, his dragoons were still in Staffordshire after the fall 
of Lichfield to Gell. 57 According to Brereton, some of the horse and 
dragoons were from Shropshire. For some reason, Peter Young in his 
article on the battle claimed that the Shropshire horse were Bagot's. 
This is unlikely, as Bagot's Horse were firstly a Staffordshire regiment 
and secondly was at most sixty men strong at the time, whereas Brereton 
asserted that the Shropshire forces were a 'greate addition' to the 
royalist army. 58 Despite the fact that there was a Shropshire element of 
indeterminate size, it is clear that the majority of forces present at the 
battle were derived from Hasting's army. This army he commanded by virtue 
of his appointment as Colonel General of the forces raised and to be 
raised in the north midland counties, on February 25th, 1643.59 Several 
other regiments under Hastings' direct command would still have been in 
the Stafford environs on the day of the battle due to their being too 
widely scattered into quarters on the previous night. Thus the North 
Midlands Army was already capable of acting as a field force by March 
1643, as its contribution to the royalist victory at Hopton Heath proves. 
The royalist forces faced around fourteen hundred parliamentarians 
brought together by Gell and Brereton in strong positions on the Heath. 
The battle consisted of a dragoon skirmish which resulted in some of the 
parliamentarians giving ground, and then a series of furious charges by 
the royalist. horse. In the second of these, the Earl of Northampton was 
killed. The third charge did not meet with any great success, unlike the 
previous two, and Hastings could not gather sufficient of the now 
scattered forces for a fourth. It was clear however that the 
parliamentarians were beaten and they began to retreat. The royalist 
pursuit floundered in the dark when they ran into ground holed by coal 
pits but they captured no less than eight cannon. 
Though the battle had taken the immediate pressure off Stafford, 
Hastings was still in no position to make an attempt on Lichfield unaided. 
He was able, however, to isolate further the garrison in the town and 
during the ensuing fortnight circled Lichfield with his forces in order 
both to do so and to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the town. 60 
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On March 29th Prince Rupert was sent north by the King to give 
Hastings the support he needed to retake Lichfield. By April 5th Rupert 
was at Cannock, where he had expected to find Hastings. However, the 
midland general was at Belvoir Castle, working with the Newark and Belvoir 
forces who were establishing their hold on Lincolnshire. 
61 On their 
return to Staffordshire, Hastings' forces numbered one thousand horse, 
eight hundred musketeers and two hundred pikemen, three heavy guns and 
eight drakes - presumably those taken at Hopton Heath. The regiments 
involved in the renewed Staffordshire campaign were perhaps the same ones 
present at Hopton Heath, including both Northampton's regiment and that of 
the Prince of Wales. Rupert brought with him an additional twelve hundred 
horse and seven hundred foot. On April 10th, their combined forces 
invested Lichfield. Two days later a body of miners from the Hastings' 
coalfields arrived and began to dig a mine under the town walls. 62 On the 
15th, an attempt to bridge the surrounding ditch was made using faggots, 
and on the following day, royalists tried to scale the town walls. These 
latter two attempts failed. 63 On the same day, the King, worried by the 
success of the parliamentarian general William Waller in the west midlands 
and Wales, ordered Rupert to return to Oxford as soon as he could. 
64 This 
meant that the second part of Hastings' and Rupert's plans, the 
destruction of all the forces of Gell. and Brereton, was postponed. It was 
an expensive mistake. 
On April 20th, the mine at Lichfield was exploded and the town 
walls thereby breached. 
65 Fierce fighting on that day resulted in the 
town's surrender on that following, once the royalists had forced their 
way into the cathedral close. Hastings conducted the negotiations. 
66 
Richard Bagot was appointed governor and elevated to the rank of colonel; 
his elder brother, Harvey, became his lieutenant colonel. 
67 This was an 
appointment made on the basis of experience not on familial status. 
Staffordshire was thought secure with the reestablishment of a royalist 
garrison at Lichfield. 
68 Rupert, in accordance with his uncle's wishes, 
returned south where he was sorely needed. On the 25th Waller had 
captured Hereford. 
69 
Hastings' presence at Belvoir, in early April, may not have been 
wholly welcome. On the 19th, he was asked by Secretary Nicholas to leave 
Lincolnshire to its own devices and concentrate his efforts elsewhere. 70 
Now that royalist garrisons were established in all five counties under 
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Hastings' command, the King felt confident that Hastings could handle the 
north midlands without assistance, despite it being obvious that the 
midland general had not sufficient forces of his own to mount a siege. 
This was an important shortcoming, given that Gell and Hutchinson were 
ensconced in the county towns of two of the shires in Hastings' charge. 
Although Lord Grey had served with Essex's army in the south whilst 
Hastings had been in Staffordshire, thus leaving Hastings' rear well 
secured, Leicester had thrown itself firmly into the parliamentarian 
camp. 71 Though Hastings estimated that each of the three local 
parliamentarian leaders only had four hundred men apiece, all were locked 
into county towns with some form of defensive works. Even if these works 
were dated and of little strength, Hastings had not the manpower nor the 
money to conduct and finance a siege alone. 72 
Summer and Autumn 1643: Consolidation 
Nevertheless, the recapture of Lichfield marked a watershed in the 
region's royalists' fortunes. They now had a collection of major 
garrisons from which to extend their control of the counties. This 
enabled them to put into effect the financial system outlined in Chapter 
Two. Within these garrisons Hastings had two thousand men and he believed 
he could, with ; the necessary weaponry, recruit another thousand. 
In the 
counties under his command he had garrisons at Ashby, Belvoir, Newark, 
Stafford, Tutbury, Lichfield, Dudley and Wolverhampton, as well as the 
garrisons at Bolsover and Welbeck, properties of the Earl of Newcastle, 
who administered them directly. There were, in addition, smaller outposts 
at Wiverton Hall, Bagworth Park, Tamworth, Rushall and Eccleshall Castle. 
Hastings also had fortified crossing points on the river Trent and Perhaps 
Derwent in Derbyshire (see map on page 218). To the west of his 
territory, Lord Capel was engaged in establishing royalist control of 
Shropshire and the Marcher Counties. On his eastern flank, Sir Charles 
Cavendish was making inroads into Lincolnshire. To the north was the Earl 
of Newcastle and to the south was the King. His financial system, as 
shown above, was beginning to operate well. On the other hand, there were 
still the indigenous garrisons of parliamentarians and Rupert's march 
south had left Brereton's forces free to intrude upon north Staffordshire. 
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Two thousand forces could not, like their commander, be everywhere at 
once. 
At the beginning of May, ammunition purchased by the Queen in the 
Low Countries, was sent from York to Oxford. From its entry into the 
north midlands until it reached Banbury, the ammunition was escorted by 
Colonel General Hastings and Sir Charles Cavendish. 73 Hastings had 
expected to receive some of this much needed consignment himself so that 
he could increase the size of the north midland forces, but he was to be 
disappointed. The King, as he was often disposed to do, listened to the 
advice of those nearest to him, regardless of merit, and the Oxford 
commanders received the weaponry. 74 In Hastings' absence Lord Grey 
attacked some of his men at Loughborough, on May 4th, preparatory to his 
proposed joining of forces with Hutchinson, Gell and Sir John Hotham - 
recently appointed parliament's commander of Lincolnshire forces, and 
Colonel Cromwell, sent into Lincolnshire as part of the effort to curb 
Cavendish's success. The point of this projected alliance had been to 
prevent the munitions convoy that Hastings was guarding going south. 
However, despite his success at Loughborough, Grey did not leave 
Leicestershire and when Cromwell and Hotham joined forces at Sleaford on 
May 9th, the convoy had reached Banbury! Cromwell and Hotham marched to 
Newark and faced the town on the 13th, but were attacked at Grantham as 
they attempted to withdraw to Lincoln. This fight at Grantham was 
heralded by S. R. Gardiner as being a foretaste of what was to come - for 
the first time Cromwell's horse displayed their tactical superiority. 
Whatever Cromwell's personal success, the parliamentarians continued their 
retreat to Lincoln. 75 
In the west, Brereton had entered Staffordshire and attacked the 
county town. The governor, Colonel Lane, had expressed his need of 
supplies as early as April 20th, and complained that the castle was too 
small for his garrison. 76 By May 16th the town had fallen and was in 
Brereton's hands and Lane, with his three hundred men, was forced to take 
refuge in the small castle. Brereton's men then bypassed Lichfield and 
drove the small royalist garrison out of Wolverhampton. 
Hastings had been powerless to prevent these occurrences whilst 
doing the escort duty imposed upon him by the Queen, and in addition, 
Bagworth Park, Ashby's satellite garrison under Colonel Wolseley, was also 
attacked by Grey. 77 Even more pressing was the serious threat to Newark. 
191 
Cromwell and Hotham had, by the 24th, joined forces with Hutchinson, Gell 
and Grey at Nottingham. To combat this, the royalists mustered no less 
than thirty-eight troops of horse at Newark. This would be a composite 
force of the Newark regiments, Cavendish's units from Lincolnshire and the 
North Midlands Army Horse. 
The size of the royalist opposition, the behaviour of Hotham, 
who was playing a double game, and the commander's inability to decide 
whether or not to march into Yorkshire to help the Fairfaxes, seem to have 
prevented the parliamentarians from launching their attack on Newark. 
Lord Grey did lead an attack on the satellite garrison at Wiverton, with 
five thousand men, but was repulsed. Nor did the allied commanders seem 
disposed towards marching north to aid the Lord Fairfax's forces in 
Yorkshire. Lord Grey in particular was edgy about venturing far from 
Leicestershire. 78 The Earl of Essex was already angry over the lack of 
cooperation displayed by the midlands parliamentarians over the convoy 
incident, and to him their activities at the end of May must have 
displayed no improvement. 79 
On June 4th Queen Henrietta Maria, with her own army of four and a 
half thousand, left York having already requested that Colonel General 
Hastings join his forces to hers during her march once south of Newark. 80 
Two weeks later, she arrived at the town and the combined royalist forces 
went on the offensive. On either the 21st or 23rd of the month, this 
force attacked. Nottingham. Though they did not take the town, the fact 
that they did attack it whilst it contained Grey's large army, indicates 
that the parliamentarians, far from thinking in terms of capturing Newark 
to prevent the Queen's progress, were firmly on the defensive. 81 Within a 
few days the parliamentarians responded to the royalist pressure and 
divided their forces, each to return to their own area. All they had 
achieved by their concentration at Nottingham was the unmasking of Hotham, 
who Essex ordered be arrested, and the revelation that Grey was not 
capable of exercising high command. The Nottinghamshire parliamentarians 
in particular were very much on the defensive and a similar pressure by 
the royalists could have created the same effect in Derbyshire. 
On July 3rd, the Queen left Newark and she and her army progressed 
to Ashby de la Zouch. On the 7th, her army, along with Hastings', 
attacked and defeated the parliamentarian garrison at Burton on Trent 
established when Gell held Lichfield. Now Hastings and his army could be 
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masters of Derbyshire's southern section and its stretch of the Trent. 
Sir John Harpur was appointed governor and his regiments installed as its 
garrison. 82 Brereton's forces left the Stafford area leaving only a small 
garrison behind, and Sir William called off his siege of Eccleshall 
Castle. 83 Grey abandoned his home county and was heading south to join 
forces with the Earl of Essex. 84 But the royalists again failed to pursue 
a complete strategy and the Queen left the area and went south to join 
Rupert's forces which had been hovering on Leicestershire's southern 
borders. On the 13th the armies of Rupert, the Queen and the King joined 
on the field of Edgehill, and went on to Oxford. 85 Hastings was left 
alone with only a slightly improved position. 
The Nottinghamshire parliamentarian forces were, by July 1643, 
reduced to only three hundred men when Sir John Meldrum, recently 
appointed to command the county's forces by Essex, led men into 
Lincolnshire to retake Gainsborough. 86 Those in Leicestershire and 
Derbyshire each numbered about the same. In the latter county, the 
royalists had controlled the two large hundreds in the north since June 
and with the seizure of Burton on Trent, Hastings' ability to gather 
taxation in the southern hundreds was increasing. 87 To combat this, Gell 
mounted a concerted attack designed to capture Tutbury Castle at the end 
of July. 88 Hastings' forces managed to protect the castle but at the 
expense of not being able to assist Henderson and Cavendish in 
Lincolnshire where Meldrum and Cromwell were on the offensive. On the 
20th the parliamentarian commander of the county, Lord Willoughby, had 
defeated. the Earl of Kingston, his nominal counterpart, when he captured 
Gainsborough. 89 Four days later, Cromwell captured Stamford and then 
sought to supply Willoughby at Gainsborough. On the 28th he and Meldrum 
defeated Cavendish's forces outside the town; Cavendish was killed. But 
when the parliamentarians sought to fend off a renewed royalist attack, by 
what they thought was a small force, they found themselves confronted by 
all of the Earl of Newcastle's army, which had marched south after its 
victory over Lord Fairfax at Aldwarton Moor in Yorkshire. Gainsborough 
fell after three days, Cromwell withdrew south, and Willoughby abandoned 
Lincoln after his retreat from Gainsborough. Lincolnshire, and thereby 
Hastings' east flank, was secure. Sir William Widdrington replaced 
Kingston and Cavendish as commander of the county. 
90 
In the west Stafford Castle was finally abandoned by Lane despite 
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aid from Hastings having reached him. 91 Throughout August, the North 
Midlands Army was free to deal with Leicestershire and Staffordshire. In 
the middle of the month, Hastings attempted and failed to persuade 
Leicester to capitulate, just as Newcastle failed to persuade Nottingham 
to do so. 92 Capel's forces failed to capture Nantwich in Cheshire despite 
Brereton's absence. The latter had joined forces with Sir Thomas 
Myddleton, who had been sent with a small force to aid in the destruction 
of Capel's command. The two parliamentarians opened a second siege of 
Eccleshall without immediate success. Then on August 27th, Hastings 
himself marched to relieve the garrison. The regiments he took with him 
included his own horse and foot, the latter numbering around four hundred, 
the former possibly as many as eight hundred. It may be that the eight 
hundred horse Hastings had with him included some of Bagot's and William 
Nevill's. On top of the eight hundred there were also the regiments of 
Sir John Harpur and Sir John Fitzherbert. The North Midlands Army appear 
to have managed to force their way through the besieging army and to have 
reached the castle where Hastings may have installed a new governor, an 
unidentified Dane. In the process the royalists were forced finally to 
withdraw towards Tutbury. Two days later the garrison, supposedly 
unwilling to serve under the foreigner, surrendered. The captain 
responsible, be he the Dane or not, was to be brought to trial at the 
insistence of the King. 93 As Brereton had earlier captured Chillington 
House near Wolverhampton; one of Dudley Castle's satellites, the west of 
Staffordshire was free of royalists. Brereton had also taken Tamworth in 
the east of the county. 94 It is probable that the loss of this territory 
prompted the King to assign parts of Warwickshire to Dudley for the 
purpose of taxation. This was to have repercussions later on. 
During September, with Brereton and Myddleton in Shropshire, 
Hastings' control of Leicestershire became more pronounced. The garrison 
at Leicester did manage to effect a cattle raid on Ashby whilst Hastings 
was at Tutbury, but this was its only success. 
95 By the end of the month, 
the royalist commissioners of array had completed a circuit of the county, 
sitting at Loughborough in the north on the 25th, Hinckley in the south on 
the 26th, Market Harborough and the eastern town of Melton Mowbray on the 
27th. Only at the latter were they challenged by parliamentarian forces. 
One thousand men of the North Midlands Army successfully drove the 
Leicester forces off. By the end of the month, Mercurius Aulicus reported 
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that in the county, parliament's assessments had dried up. In this 
instance it does not appear that the paper was exaggerating. 96 
The Earl of Newcastle from his position at the siege of Hull 
desired that Henderson with the Newark forces and Hastings with the North 
Midlands Army enter Lincolnshire to aid Widdrington who was being 
threatened by Willoughby and Cromwell in mid September. 97 It seems that 
both Hastings and Henderson saw Nottingham as a more rewarding prospect. 
On the 18th, they attacked the town and drove the garrison into the 
castle. They stayed for five days and before they left set up a fort on 
the River Trent, commanded by Hastings' Major Hacker. 98 
They had been wrong not to aid Widdrington earlier. On the 11th of 
October he was defeated at Winceby and the royalists abandoned 
Gainsborough. Even as Widdrington wrote to Hastings for help, the latter 
and Henderson were. at Horncastle. 99 But Secretary Nicholas ordered 
Hastings to help Capel, who it appears was already using some of the North 
Midlands Army - namely sections from Dudley and Lichfield. Hastings 
wanted these forces back to protect his rear whilst he was operating in 
Lincolnshire, baling out forces he had earlier been instructed to leave 
'to themselves'. 100 As a result of this necessity for the North Midlands 
Army forces to divide in two, and fight in areas outside its own 
territory, local parliamentarians could act unhindered. The Leicester 
garrison captured Bagworth Park which had bothered them all year, and the 
Nottingham garrison, with help from Gell, drove Hacker from the Trent 
Bridge fort in the week preceding the 23rd October. 101 
The Lincolnshire campaign was not a success. Hastings' forces, 
reduced by their division, and Henderson failed to relieve Lincoln as 
Newcastle intended them to do. He had wanted the town to hold out until 
he could break away from the siege at Hull and enter Lincolnshire himself. 
Before he could do so Hastings was defeated at Horncastle by Cromwell and 
Lincoln fell on the 20th. 102 
Newcastle's biographer, GeoffreyTrease, considers it ironic that he 
became a Marquis in recognition of the summer victories he had achieved at 
a time when his siege of Hull was coming to its disastrous conclusion. 103 
It is no less ironic that just as Hastings was defeated in Lincolnshire, 
he was created a Baron for his earlier efforts. 104 Not only was the new 
Baron Loughborough. of Loughborough's eastern flank unprotected, but 
Capel's defeat at Nantwich and his subsequent hounding by Brereton and 
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Myddleton threatened to destabilise his western flank. 105 
With the siege of Hull over, the parliamentarian presses believed 
that the Marquis of Newcastle had withdrawn north, but a week later they 
had actually traced him to Pontefract. 106 Like a deus ex machina he was 
about to appear in the north midlands. Hastings' position within his own 
territory was still very strong. Leicester's parliamentarians were cut 
off in the county town once Hastings returned from Lincolnshire. They 
could not collect enough assessment to pay the soldiers and some if not 
all the leaders' estates were under royalist sequestration. 107 An attempt 
to re-establish themselves as masters in at least part of the county - 
that nearest the now parliamentarian Lincolnshire and Rutland with its own 
resurgent parliamentarians - failed abysmally. When part of the committee 
met at Melton Mowbray on November 27th, Lucas sallied out from Belvoir and 
captured several of its members and three hundred soldiers. The captured 
committeemen included Arthur Staveley, Thomas Hesilrige (Sir Arthur's 
brother) and Francis Hacker (the brother of Hastings' major of horse). 108 
The following week Lord Grey asked parliament to send four hundred arms 
and five hundred pounds to compensate for the defeat and the loss of 
access to assessment. 109 
Whilst Gell and some moorlanders were conducting raids in the 
Tutbury area, parliament optimistically recorded that royalist cruelty was 
persuading people to enlist in Gell's forces. 110 Sir Thomas Fairfax and 
his units, which had moved west from Lincolnshire after their audacious 
escape from Hull by boat, appeared to Gell as the means by which Tutbury 
could be captured. But on the approach of Newcastle, Fairfax moved into 
Cheshire to aid Brereton. 111' The Marquis entered Derbyshire in late 
November, and established himself at Chesterfield whilst part of his army 
captured Chatsworth and drove the enemy out of Leek in Staffordshire. 112 
By early December the commanders of the North Midlands Army were attending 
the councils of war at Chesterfield. 113 Further control of Derbyshire was 
established with the capture of Wingfield Manor. Into it and Chatsworth 
were placed North Midlands Army garrison. 114 Newcastle added four new 
colonels to the army under Hastings, all of them from Derbyshire. John 
Freshville, who had served in the Oxford Field Army, was sent north with 
his troops when Newcastle moved south. John Milward and Sir Simon Avery, 
both commissioners of array, were given colonelcies and Rowland Eyre was 
appointed to raise horse and foot. Freshville's force was to be based at 
196 
his home, Staveley near Chesterfield. 115 Eyre and Milward were based at 
Chatsworth and Hassop. 116 Two existing colonels in the county, Kniverton 
and Fitzherbert, were already established at Tissington and Tutbury, and 
the latter also saw part of his regiment installed in Wingfield Manor. 
Fitzherbert's men were accompanied at Wingfield by Roger Molyneux, the 
Nottinghamshire colonel. 117 Avery, as Gell asserts, did not appear 
actually to raise regiments despite his appointment. Instead he took his 
seat in the Oxford parliament in January 1644.118 One other regiment may 
have been raised for the army by Ralph Sneade in north Staffordshire, one 
of that county's commissioners. However it would seem that it actually 
served under Lord Byron in Cheshire during his winter offensive. 119 
In Staffordshire the parliamentarians were neutralised. Despite 
the presence of an enemy garrison at Tamworth the royalists were able to 
collect cattle from its environs in November. 120 In the same month Dudley 
based regiments recaptured Chillington and then proceeded to capture and 
garrison Lapley House thus re-establishing control over much of the west 
of the county. 121 
As a result, the base counties of Hastings' command had never been 
more secure. The indigenous parliamentarian forces were divided and for 
the most part on the defensive. Royalist financial control was so 
pronounced that it deprived their enemies of resources. Grey at Leicester 
was, as we have seen, isolated and without arms or funds. The 
Staffordshire parliamentarians were hemmed into Stafford and Eccleshall. 
The county's northern border was secure whilst Byron's offensive occupied 
Brereton's full attention. On the eastern flank the Marquis of 
Newcastle's arrival meant that the Newark forces were able to renew 
financial exactions in Lincolnshire. Likewise Newcastle's presence caused 
Gell to withdraw into Derby with an 'inconsiderable party' whilst new 
royalist garrisons provided the bases from which the financial system 
could be extended over the whole of Derbyshire. 122 Therefore it is 
possible to assert that the north midlands, despite the four chief 
parliamentarian garrison towns, was royalist territory. This means that 
the map of royalist controlled areas in England, at the end of 1643, can 
be redrawn. The isthmus of parliamentarian territory, which has hitherto 
been seen as stretching from East Anglia to Lancashire, must be largely 
eradicated. The centre of England at the end of that year was royalist 
controlled. Though the final stage of the period of consolidation had 
ENGLAND AND WALES; DECEMBER 1643 
Hu 
Dx 
  
 ýo 
  
Oxford 
Lond 
Royalist Garrison 
M Parliamentarian Garrison 
Royalist Territory 
Disputed Territory 
Parliamentririnn Territory 
North Midlands Boundary MUMM 
198 
been dependent upon the intervention of the Marquis of Newcastle, it is 
clear that much of the work had been done by the regiments of the North 
Midlands Army and their commanders. It was in recognition of his 
achievement that Hastings was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General 
by the Marquis. 123 The final stage covered by this chapter, from January 
1644 until the relief of Newark, did not see further gains by the 
royalists but was a period in which they held on to what they had 
achieved. 
January, 1644 until the Relief of Newark: Holding on 
Their success had not been a flawless one. There was the 
ever-present problem of the parliamentarian garrison. The Marchioness of 
Newcastle may well have asserted that the Derby garrison were an 
inconsiderate party... not worth the labour to reduce... but she was 
mistaken. 124 Gell was not cowed or quiescent despite his being 
surrounded. Parliamentarians in Leicester, Stafford and Nottingham may 
have varied in their rate of activity but they were still present. In 
Rutland parliamentarian forces under Colonel Waite had established 
themselves at Burleigh House and were actively challenging the attempts of 
the Belvoir garrison to collect contribution and sequestration money. 125 
Had Newcastle and Hastings stormed Derby and/or Nottingham, the position 
would have been very different - the royalists' hold would have been much 
stronger. As. a result, they left parliamentarians with not only bases, 
but also with centres of local government from which to run an 
administration system should circumstances alter. 126 
The north midlands royalists' position was not only responsive to 
local events. On January 18th, the Scots army, which the Oxford 
politicians failed to keep out of the war, entered England. The Scots 
came in on the side of parliament to rescue the King from what were 
considered to be evil ministers. It caused the Marquis of Newcastle to 
abandon his sojurn at Welbeck. The enlarged North Midlands Army was on 
its own. 
Local parliamentarians were Hastings' major concern. On January 
6th, Derby's Major Mollanus had attacked and defeated the garrison of 
Burton on Trent - the regiments of Sir John Harpur. This did not result 
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in the town being garrisoned by parliament, an event which did not occur 
until the following November. Not all of Harpur's regimental strengths 
were present at the disaster, and the remains of them presumably 
reoccupied the town once Mollanus had left. Harpur himself was at 
Chesterfield at the time in his role as commissioner of array. Hastings, 
too, was working in his administrative role; at Lutterworth in south 
Leicestershire he had the constable arrested for handling parliamentarian 
warrants and not dealing effectively with the collection of contribution. 
Neither the Leicestershire nor the Staffordshire parliamentarians seem to 
have performed any service for their cause in January. The former were 
accused by the parliamentarian press of engaging in coursing and horse 
racing instead of fighting their enemies. 
In order to aid Newcastle's fight against the Scots, Sir Charles 
Lucas was sent from Oxford with a commission empowering him to lead 
sections of the North Midlands Army horse north. It was an order ill 
received by the Newark: garrison, now under Richard Byron whom Newcastle 
appointed to replace Henderson. This denudation of cavalry left the 
Newark garrison in danger. Newark forces, though in Hastings' territory, 
maintained an air of independence, engendered by their more direct 
relationship with the Marquis of Newcastle who appears to have commanded 
them himself and not through his Lieutenant General. Several units of 
horse stationed at Newark were sections of the actual North Midlands Army, 
Hacker's troops. for example, but in the main the chief garrison regiments 
were independent of Hastings despite often working in association with him 
and his army.. Early in January, Hastings and the Newark forces had 
attacked Nottingham, establishing themselves once more in the town. 
According to Lucy Hutchinson a thousand royalists were in the town and 
another thousand outside to prevent relief attempts. A further thousand 
under Hastings himself were south of the Trent. These latter were, it 
would appear, Leicestershire regiments, though Freshville's regiments were 
in the area at the time. The siege was abandoned aftet a few days, when 
it became obvious that the newly fortified castle was not likely to 
fall. 127 However at the end of the month, all was different. After Lucas 
had gone the Newark forces, far from going on a like offensive, were under 
threat and the garrison appealed to the King for succour. 128 The position 
on Hastings' western flank was also less secure by the end of January: 
Lord Byron's forces were defeated by Brereton and regiments from 
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Yorkshire. This was to result in Rupert being dispatched from Oxford to 
Shrewsbury to restore the royalists' hold on the west. 
Hastings' own army was again stretched. fie had been supplying men 
to Byron in Cheshire as well as to Charles Lucas. Within his own 
territory his fortified crossing points, King's Mills and Wilne Ferry on 
the Trent, were both under attack and on February 5th King's Mills fort 
was captured. 129 In west Derbyshire, parliamentarian horse attacked 
Ashbourne where part of the commission of array held daily sessions. To 
counter this activity on Gell's part Hastings had to keep most of his 
Derbyshire horse within the county moving between the garrisons occupied 
by his foot regiments. 130 Other regiments consisting of a thousand of the 
North Midlands Army's horse were concentrated around Lichfield to 
cooperate with Rupert's offensive. 131 Despite arguments between Colonels 
Leveson and Bagot and General Hastings over administrative matters, the 
full details of which will be examined in the following chapter, there 
seems to have been a great deal of military cooperation between the 
elements of the army at this stage. 132 Biddulph House in Staffordshire 
was captured by the parliamentarians on February 22nd, making 
communications with Chester very difficult, especially for the Derbyshire 
royalists. 133 Hastings and Leveson planned to recapture-the place 
together and jointly proposed to Rupert that they could achieve this 
within days. Within a week, however, Hastings heard from Freshville at 
Staveley and from Captain Archer at Newark, that a siege of the latter 
town was imminent. 134 Derbyshire parliamentarians were already at 
Nottingham with this aim in mind. 135 On February 29th, Meldrum moved on 
Newark with Lincolnshire forces and was joined there by units from 
Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire. By March 2nd, Newark was 
under close siege. 136 
The Relief of Newark: March 1644 
The purpose of this section is to detail the campaign which marked 
the culmination of the development of the North Midlands Army. By this 
time the region's royalists had a financial system capable of supporting 
this army and enabling it to undertake a major field action such as the 
relief of Newark. This was to be its only major campaign as a field army. 
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The campaign has already been covered by historians such as Peter Young 
and A. C. Wood but their attention has been directed at the contribution of 
Prince Rupert. 137 Thus it is felt that the affair can be looked at again 
in some detail, with emphasis on the role of the North Midlands Army. 
Henderson had been replaced as governor by Newcastle whilst the 
latter was quartered in Nottinghamshire, probably because of his failures 
in Lincolnshire. His replacement was Richard Byron, brother of John, Lord 
Byron, active in Cheshire. Byron had attended the councils of war with 
Newcastle and the North Midland Army officers during the winter. He lost 
no time in reminding Hastings of his promise, made at Bolsover, to help the 
garrison at Newark whenever the need arose. 138 Even though the garrison 
was, in-practice, out of Hastings' jurisdiction, defence of it was 
important. Integral to the geography of the north midlands, Hastings 
could not afford to be denuded of this important royalist stronghold. 
Important it was too, for the royalist cause as a whole. With Lord 
Byron's failure to defeat Brereton and secure Cheshire, communications 
with Newcastle's northern territory from Oxford via the west was all but 
closed. With the fall of King's Mills on the Trent communications via 
Derbyshire were liable to interruption. Thereby Newark, at the point 
where Fosse Way crossed the Trenttwas an essential town as far as royalist 
communications were concerned. 
The parliamentarian army surrounding the town consisted of between 
six and seven thousand men. In it were elements of Lord Willoughby of 
Parnham's Lincolnshire army, which were grouped chiefly to the south of 
the town while forces from the north midlands were grouped to the 
north. 139 Inside Byron had less than two thousand men; twelve hundred 
foot and six troops of horse. The rest of the Newark horse were initially 
on the island in the Trent to the north of the town under the command of 
Major General Porter. Having two thousand horse the parliamentarian army 
could keep an adequate guard on the surrounding districts to prevent small 
scale relief projects. Such an attempt made by the Belvoir garrison, with 
parts of the Newark horse quartered in the Vale of Belvoir, was driven off 
a week after the siege had begun. 
Prior to his surrounding the town Meldrum had attacked the island 
in the Trent across which the Fosse Way left the north side of the town. 
On the island were George Porter and the Newark Horse and Gervaise Holles' 
Regiment of Foot. Porter and the horse evacuated the island just before 
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the attack began, leaving the foot behind. The regiment was, as a result, 
severely mauled when the island was stormed and captured by anything up to 
three thousand men. 140 
Hastings' army was the nearest force of any size. Charles Lucas, 
who had until recently been as near as Doncaster, where he fortified the 
town in order that it be used as a communications route from north to 
south, had by this time gone further north. 141 Freshville at Staveley and 
Bolsover projected a relief project on March 3rd. Hastings was to bring 
elements of the forces he had recently had in Cheshire, with Prince 
Rupert, to Mansfield, from where the attack could be launched. For some 
reason the plan was never executed, probably due to the strength of the 
opposition. 142 Even with the help of Porter's horse and foot stationed at 
Tuxford, Meldrum's army would still be larger than the North Midlands 
Army. Hastings moved the forces he had had with him in Cheshire to Ashby 
and remained there as outlying units gravitated towards his 
headquarters. 143 The help of Prince Rupert was solicited by the Newark 
garrison before March 7th by J. Thorold, possibly a servant to Robert 
Sutton, one of the Nottinghamshire commissioners of array, based at 
Newark. Rupert replied that he would need a month to prepare such a 
project. 144 Thorold, witness to the opening stages of the siege, reckoned 
that the town could last no longer than twenty days. By the 9th, Rupert 
asked Hastings and/or Porter to provide him with seven hundred horses upon 
which to mount musketeers to facilitate the rapid march east. 145 Despite 
his desire to organise the western counties it appears that the idea of 
such a march was firmly in the Prince's mind. By the 12th, whilst he was 
at Chester, he was reported to be gathering forces with which to undertake 
the task. 146 This he did not make obvious. His movements to Shrewsbury 
on the 14th and Bridgnorth on the 15th, may have been an attempt to 
disguise the fact and indeed successfully did so. 147. By the 12th, whether 
the Prince had decided to relieve the town of his own volition or not, the 
King wrote to urge him to do so. 148 
At Ashby de la Zouch, Hastings had gathered his field force of 
1,500 horse and 1,200 musketeers. He also had alerted Leveson's regiments 
and they attached themselves directly to the Prince's army. 149 The 
regiments of horse present at Ashby were Hastings', Freshville's, Eyre's, 
Bagot's, Milward's and Nevill's. Fitzherbert's and Kniverton's were 
probably also present. 150 Units of the Newark Horse which had gone into 
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the Vale of Belvoir instead of north with Porter, were probably those 
units of the North Midlands Army, Hacker's troop and Archer's troop, both 
of Hastings' Horse, which were stationed at Newark, as they were 
incorporated into the force at Ashby without being apparent as separate 
units. The foot at Ashby would comprise the regiments belonging to the 
colonels who provided the horse. In all, including Leveson's regiments, 
the North Midlands Army fielded three thousand men. 
Before Hastings had informed Rupert of his preparedness, the Prince 
asked the midland general to demolish hedges and fences between Ashby and 
Newark to facilitate a cross country rapid march. 151 On the 15th, 
Hastings had probed the parliamentarian garrison at Leicester to 
investigate its readiness to assist the leaguer at Newark. After firing 
at the town walls the small royalist force retired along the line of the 
river Soar towards*Loughborough. They halted for the night at 
Mountsorrel. 
The parliamentarians at Newark were determined to prevent a 
combined army of royalists attacking them. However, it appears that they 
were primarily concerned to stop Porter joining Hastings rather than 
contemplating any attack made with the aid of Prince Rupert. Meldrum 
several days later still believed that the approach of Prince Rupert was 
only a rumour. Sir Edward Hartopp, the commander of the north midland 
contingent at Newark, with most or all of the parliamentarian horse, went 
into Leicestershire to prevent the junction of Porter and Hastings. On 
the 16th, he and. his force of two thousand clashed with the royalist 
forces at Mountsorrel. Colonel Thornhaugh's Nottinghamshire regiment 
forced their way across the Soar bridge and into the town before the 
royalists were aware of Hartopp's presence. For some reason Hartopp 
refused to back up Thornhaugh's attack and, despite the latter being able 
to fortify himself in the town, he was ordered to withdraw. This gave the 
royalists time to organise and counter attack. Thornhaugh's resultant 
extrication was difficult and costly in terms of casualties. Hartopp 
compounded this by withdrawing his entire force north towards the crossing 
point at Cotes just to the east of Loughborough. The royalists followed 
on the opposite bank. 152 
Hastings had fortified his own house, Burleigh Hall, to the west of 
Loughborough. From here, soldiers joined by the forces from Mountsorrel, 
moved on the bridge at Cotes where, on the 17th, they constructed 
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fortifications, watched but unhindered by Hartopp. The bridge at Cotes 
was the route by which Porter would reach Hastings and thus was important 
in this respect alone, but it was also the route by which Rupert and 
Hastings intended to approach Newark. During the day of the 17th, forces 
from Leicester, three companies of foot and two cannon led by Colonel 
Grey, arrived at the eastern end. of the bridge where Hartopp was 
stationed. 
Hastings' report concerning the state of affairs at Cotes to Prince 
Rupert said that he would have twelve hundred men at the bridge by the 
morning of the 18th. 153 A. C. Wood in his book on Nottinghamshire in the 
civil war, asserts that it was Porter's forces which were present at Cotes 
on the 17th and this may have been the case, but it is highly likely that 
Porter was still north of the Soar on that day. If Hartopp was trying to 
prevent Porter joining Hastings he would clearly have failed already if 
Porter were at Cotes. On the 18th, Hartopp attacked the royalists on the 
bridge. The two cannon were used to good effect and appear to have caused 
a great deal of damage to the royalist foot. It seems that the royalists 
had five regiments of foot present on the east bank along with an 
unspecified number of horse. If Porter had been present the royalist 
numbers would have been in excess of two thousand. Hartopp had two 
thousand horse and perhaps as many as five hundred foot. After the 
artillery had 'softened up' the royalists, a concerted attack was made on 
the bridge. After their foot had cleared the way, the parliamentarian 
horse rode across it and attacked their royalist counterparts, which 
certainly included Freshville's regiment. The royalists horse, after a 
fight of unknown duration, retreated through Loughborough to Burleigh 
Hall, whilst the parliamentarian horse pursued them as far as the town. 
Hartopp's forces were now in possession of the bridge as royalist foot 
retired from the Great Meadow, by the Soar, into the cultivated lands 
north of Loughborough. Thornhaugh's regiment of Horse had not been 
involved in the attack; they were stationed on Stanford Hill, to the 
north of the battle site. From this promentory they would have an 
excellent view of the battle, but more importantly, they would be able to 
observe the movement of any troops in Hartopp's rear. This tends to 
support the idea that Porter's force had not joined Hastings and was still 
in Nottinghamshire, north of Hartopp's position. 
It is possible that more of the North Midlands Army began to 
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approach the area as Hartopp withdrew his horse from the town by 
nightfall. Prince Rupert had, during the day, marched his forces from 
Lichfield to Ashby de la Zouch. 155 It is still unclear whether Hartopp 
was fully ignorant of the proximity of Rupert's forces; it is probable 
that he still discounted the possibility of his being present. At any 
rate the arrival of the entire North Midlands Army was not something he 
felt able to face - especially as Porter was probably still between him 
and Newark. As a result of these considerations, the entire 
parliamentarian army retreated from the bridge and Hartopp marched towards 
Nottingham. Colonel Grey and the Leicester forces returned to their 
garrison. The three royalist forces could now unite unhindered. 
Rupert brought with him three regiments of foot, numbering 1,120 
men, two regiments of horse and his own lifeguard, numbering seven hundred 
-a total of 1,820 men, which he added to Hastings' three thousand. On 
the 19th he crossed the Soar and, using the route Hastings had, as asked, 
cleared of hedges and enclosures and reached Rempstone on that night. 156 
On the following day the Prince's forces united with all of the North 
Midlands Army, some of which appears to have gone ahead after Hartopp, 
perhaps to complete the clearance of impediments to the route, and with 
Porter's 1,600 men at Bingham. At 2am on the 21st, the army marched to 
Newark and occupied Beacon Hill having made their approach via Balderton. 
Meldrum, now aware of the Prince's presence, concentrated his forces at 
the ruined hospice near Newark on the Spittal. 157 
As with Hopton Heath, this brief battle has been dealt with, in 
sufficient detail for our present purposes, by secondary sources - this 
was not the case with the incident at Cotes. 158 Rupert's horse swept down 
from the hill and clashed with two bodies of parliamentarians under 
Colonel Rossiter on the left, and Thornhaugh on the right. The first 
charge was inconclusive, but the second saw the parliamentarians begin a 
retreat which may have become a rout, on to the island in the Trent. 
Meldrum probably hoped to retreat across the island and make his retreat 
via the bridge at Muskham. However Richard Byron and the Newark garrison 
sallied out and surrounded the fort erected at the bridge, preventing 
Meldrum's passage. When the small force in the fort fled during the 
night, Meldrum's escape was ruled out entirely and Rupert planned to 
starve him into surrender. On the morning of the 22nd, Meldrum and his 
forces surrendered all their arms, ammunition and cannon to the royalists. 
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It was a masterpiece of strategy on Rupert's part but it was no 
less of a triumph for Hastings. The army which he had constructed in the 
previous sixteen months had, despite having lost men to other forces, 
fielded no less than three thousand men whilst at the same time 
maintaining men in several major garrisons. It had been achieved because 
of the financial system described in Chapter Two. It was indeed the 
zenith of its career. Rupert, like Newcastle in the winter, did not stay 
to complete the conquest of the counties. Though the jubilant 
commissioners of array did threaten Nottingham with Prince Rupert's army, 
the Prince did not-linger. Lincoln was abandoned by the parliamentarians 
on the 23rd, but six days later, the Prince was at Ashby, heading west. 159 
Parliamentarians in the north midlands were shaken and defeated but not 
destroyed. The Earl of Denbigh, appointed the previous year by parliament 
to take charge of several counties, including Staffordshire, had at last 
freed himself of the accusation of being a royalist sympathiser and had 
taken up his military task. By the time the Newark campaign reached its 
conclusion Denbigh had arrived at Leicester. At the same time, in 
response to Rupert's intervention and the fall of Lincoln, the Earl of 
Manchester, commander of Parliament's Eastern Association army, began to 
gather the forces in south Lincolnshire in order to march north. 160 
In the period covered by this chapter, the north midland counties 
had become, at least superficially, a unified area of royalist territory. 
It could provide the manpower and finances for a field army and maintain 
major and minor garrisons. Even if the parliamentarians were in 
possession of four major garrisons in the area the royalists could 
maintain a reasonable degree of stability in the face of what amounted to 
guerrilla warfare. Yet it was and is still obvious that the North 
Midlands Army could not mount a sustained campaign, even within its own 
territory, without recourse to outside aid. The failure of the army to 
capture any of the county towns and its inability to secure Newark alone, 
give evidence of that. However, when it is remembered that for much of 
the time Hastings' army was working in entire or in part, in other areas, 
aiding Lord Byron, Lord Capel or Sir Charles Lucas, this is perhaps 
understandable. Moreover the success of Hastings' forces is shown by the 
fact that of all the commanders north of Oxford, with the exception of 
Newcastle, he was the only one appointed in late 1642 who was still in 
actual command of his region. 
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Nevertheless within the north midlands, seeds of destruction were 
already sown, above and beyond the problems with the indigenous 
parliamentarians. The command system was not unified and its relations 
with the civil administration were strained. On top of this, Hastings' 
own success was to count against him for it opened the north midland 
forces and resources to use and abuse by the royalists at Oxford and 
elsewhere. It is to these problems and the subsequent history of the 
royalist war effort in the north midlands that this thesis now turns. 
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Chapter Six 
Nemesis: The Breakdown and Defeat of the North Midlands Royalist 
T. T., .. L'ýý.... ý- 
In the previous chapter the rise of the royalist war effort was 
examined. It was concluded that by the end of 1643 the royalists had 
established a firm grip upon the region and were able to operate the 
financial system outlined in Chapter Two. As indicated at the beginning 
of the previous chapter this present section will deal with the internal 
problems within the system and with the interference of the King which did 
not help Hastings to maintain his authority, but the bulk of this chapter 
will deal with the: -way in which the north midlands slipped from the 
royalist grasp. The problem, established in Chapter Five, that Hastings 
was frequently forced to supply troops to other royalist commanders, will 
be seen to recur in the months following March 1644. It will also be 
shown that this played no small part in its downfall. 
The royalists in the north midland counties had quite a strong 
military hold on their territory at the beginning of April 1644. They had 
nine major garrisons and at least fifteen minor ones, both from which to 
operate their financial system and in which to base their soldiers. In 
Derbyshire, the garrisons of major importance were Bolsover, which guarded 
the northern part of the county and provided a stopping place for 
northward movement of troops, and Wingfield Manor which, being within nine 
miles of Derby, was an important check on the town; in addition there 
were five minor garrisons in Derbyshire. In Leicestershire the major 
garrisons were Belvoir and Ashby de la Zouch. The former, under Gervaise 
Lucas, was Hastings' outpost on the Lincolnshire border and a place from 
where collections of contributions in that county could be administered 
and from where military initiatives were launched. Ashby de la Zouch was 
probably a large garrison second only in size to Newark, with a force, in 
its vicinity, of over a thousand men. In Nottinghamshire the chief 
garrison was, of course, Newark, the largest in the region with over two 
thousand men stationed in it. Newark had a chain of out-posts between it 
and Nottingham as well as having soldiers based, whenever the opportunity 
arose, at Grantham in Lincolnshire. In the north of Nottinghamshire was 
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Welbeck garrison, one of the Marquis of Newcastle's houses. In 
Staffordshire there were the three major garrisons of Dudley, Lichfield 
and Tutbury and several minor garrisons. Dudley was in actual fact part 
of Worcestershire in an island of that county inside Staffordshire. 
Ronald Hutton in his book states that Dudley was [technically] thus 
divorced from Hastings' command. 1 Technically this may be so but in 
practise Leveson, whether he liked it or not - and he did not - was part 
of the north midlands army under Hastings. The King reminded him of this 
in October 1643 and he reluctantly acknowledged it was so a few days 
later, 2 although he had to be reminded again in January. All the 
garrisons mentioned here were, with the exception of Newark and its 
satellites and perhaps Bolsover, under Hastings' command. It appears that 
Welbeck in Nottinghamshire may well have been under Hastings too as its 
governor was Sigismund Beeton the shoemaker ex-captain of Hastings' Foot. 3 
However, it is possible that this garrison like the other Nottinghamshire 
garrisons and Bolsover, were directly under the command of the Marquis of 
Newcastle. (Both Bolsover and Welbeck were the property of Newcastle. 4) 
Each garrison commander was, as Hutton asserts with reference to 
Lichfield, allowed autonomy in daily action subject to the work of the 
commissioners in financial matters and to Hastings' military needs. 5 It 
appears that Hastings' ability to assert his authority over a few of his 
colonels was limited and this helps to account for the internal strife 
which the north midlands association was to suffer in late 1643 and early 
1644. This was a problem which was not eradicated either then or 
subsequently, 
The first major difficulty arose when the King allocated parts of 
Staffordshire to the Dudley garrison. 6 This would initially seem sensible 
for, despite its presence in the Worcestershire island, Dudley was within 
Staffordshire and had been garrisoned by Leveson as an extension of his 
hold on the south county, whilst he was governor of Wolverhampton. 
However firstly, this was an example of Charles' interference with the 
local administrators who had already dealt with territorial allocation, 
and secondly, as a result, the allocation trespassed on territory 
previously assigned to Lichfield. These had already been reduced when 
Tutbury garrison began collecting contributions from Tolmansloe Hundred 
and parts of Offloe Hundred. This had cut down the area from which 
Lichfield was able to levy contributions. Rushall garrison also gained 
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contribution from Offloe. 7 As a result in Autumn 1643 Leveson and Bagot 
entered into a vicious argument with troops from each respective garrison 
fighting amongst themselves. Central government at Oxford appear to have 
realised their error and passed the buck on to Hastings. 8 He could not 
get the commanders to accept his decisions and the dispute dragged on 
throughout November 1643.9 By the 10th December Hastings had decided to 
let his immediate superior, the Marquis of Newcastle, decide the argument, 
presumably at one of the councils of war held at Bolsover and 
Chesterfield. 1° The result was not in Bagot's favour. Leveson was 
considered to be very important by the King and Hastings had been reminded 
of this by Nicholas earlier and thus was probably swayed in his judgment. 
Bagot in early January 1643 insinuated to Hastings that not only was he 
short of money as a result, but that his soldiers would mutiny. His 
income was only around one eighth of his expenditure at the time. 
Moreover a large part of this income came from the sale of plate and not 
from contribution collections. Bagot was able to exist, hand to mouth, on 
loans from the gentry in the surrounding area until Prince Rupert, whose 
command of the Marcher Counties had been expanded to cover Staffordshire, 
entered the region in February and dealt with the matter at one of his 
councils of war. Bagot and Leveson reputedly came to a mutual 
agreement. 11 
The problems were not over. Leveson was brought into the civil 
government of Staffordshire, when the King appointed him as high sheriff. 
This gave him, he assumed, the right of posse comitatus - the ability to, 
raise soldiers. This he could do, he told Hastings, 'without acquainting 
you'. Whilst the same letter of February 7th expressed Leveson's hope 
that he and Hastings could maintain a working relationship, he adopted a 
quite different tone with Prince Rupert the following day. Hastings, he 
claimed, had prevented the execution of the warrants for the posse 
comitatus and this coupled with the local parliamentarians preventative 
measures had cost the King a thousand recruits. 12 Hastings was right to 
be outraged: again the King had meddled directly in the affairs of the 
north midlands to the detriment of the royalist cause. Bagot, upon whose 
territory Leveson's posse comitatus was also being levied, was now being 
deprived of manpower as well as money. 
Powerless to prevent the King's actions in the first instance, 
Hastings turned to the Oxford parliament. Despite being under attack from 
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some elements in the Houses for allegedly demanding exhorbitant sums from 
Staffordshire, Hastings succeeded in having parliament remove Leveson's 
power of comitatus. 13 With Rupert's intervention in the financial matters 
and the parliamentary decision, Hastings had achieved a form of victory, 
but the victory, like the problem itself, was the result of outside 
intervention. Problems could have been eased if Leveson had been 
incorporated earlier into the civil and administration structure by the 
commissioners themselves.. At Dudley, he was geographically as well as 
actually, isolated from the administration based at Lichfield. In part 
this isolation would be due to his catholicism, which would seem to have 
excluded him from the commissions of array, as well as to his personal 
abrasiveness. His desire for military independence may well have grown 
out of this isolation. It certainly was not eased by the further 
fragmentation of the north midland command structure, which Rupert's 
authority over Staffordshire represented. In effect this divided 
Hastings' command in a way similar to the independent status held by the 
garrison at Newark. 
Although by the end of February Staffordshire was relatively 
stable, Hastings had two other problems within his command. Firstly, 
there was a practical military problem in Derbyshire. Sir John 
Fitzherbert, who had been a loyal colonel under Hastings since early in 
the war, seems to have felt that he had been unfairly treated in the later 
months of 1643. His lieutenant colonel, Sir Andrew KnivertQn, had been 
promoted and given the governorship of Tutbury, yet Sir John only had 
command of the minor garrison, Tissington Hall, his cousin's house near 
Ashbourne. Furthermore, when Wingfield Manor was captured by the Marquis 
of Newcastle, Colonel Roger Molyneux had been installed as governor. 
Molyneux, though put under the command of Hastings, appears to have been 
an outsider at the time of his appointment. Alongside this, parts of 
Fitzherbert's regiments were stationed at Wingfield under Molyneux's 
commands. Sir John petitioned Newcastle with a view to having the Marquis 
replace Molyneux with himself, but it would appear that Hastings and 
Newcastle agreed to leave things'as they were. 14 Fitzherbert's men at 
Wingfield mutinied in January in support of Sir John and Molyneux 
requested permission to return them to. Tissington. However, although the 
immediate outcome is unclear, some of Fitzherbert's Horse were in 
Wingfield during August 1644. We are left to assume that Sir John himself 
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and perhaps his regiment accepted the decision of the high command. This 
suggests that, left to its own devices, the north midlands royalists, with 
their overall commander, Newcastle, were capable of sorting out some of 
their problems, but not the problem of interference from Oxford. 15 
This last point, the interference from Oxford, is reinforced by the 
second problem which involved territory closer to Hastings' home base. 
Since the loss of large areas of Lincolnshire and Rutland during autumn 
1643, the Belvoir garrison had experienced financial difficulty. To 
compensate, the Leicestershire commissioners assigned to the garrison the 
whole of Framland Hun1red for a period of two months. By January 1644, 
the two months had elapsed and the situation in Lincolnshire had become 
easier, for the royalists and other units, probably those at Ashby, were 
being paid from the contribution income from Framland. However, in 
January, the King took it upon himself to assign Framland to Belvoir on a 
permanent basis, possibly as the result of a plea by Gervaise Lucas, the 
castle's governor. 16 Though Charles did acknowledge that such 
arrangements were up to Hastings and the commissioners, and that this 
decision was subject to their approval, he did so after giving Lucas the 
territory, thus making reversal difficult. The effect of this dispute was 
not serious in the short term, but resurfaced a year later, when Lucas 
refused to recognise Hastings as his superior officer, and absented 
himself from the general's council of war. 17 Lucas clearly regarded 
himself as independent of Hastings, perhaps in the same way that the 
garrison of Newark was. He had been in the Newark garrison before his 
seizure of Belvoir and had participated in many of the military actions 
into Lincolnshire. This has-led several historians to assume that Belvoir 
was a satellite garrison of Newark, in the same way that Wiverton was. 
/ý 
However it is clear that both Hastings and the King saw Belvoir very much 
as part of the North Midlands Association and, thereby, directly under 
Hastings' command. 19 
Despite the seeming stability of the north midlands command 
achieved by the Newark campaign, the internal problems were largely 
unresolved and they remained so during the subsequent part of the war. 
Yet it is not safe to assume that the internal wrangles were a major cause 
in'the ensuing collapse of the regional command. Though many of the 
settlements were to prove transient, the disputes in themselves were not 
sufficient to wreck the system. 
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The Crisis: April - July 1644 
During the two and a half months following the Scottish invasion of 
northern England, the military situation in the north had deteriorated and 
the effects of this were to have an adverse effect on the north midlands 
in the subsequent period. Newcastle, unable to bring the Scots' Army to 
battle, was forced into a steady retreat before them. In the south of his 
command he had left John Bellasyse in command at York with around five 
thousand men. Bellasyse had the onerous task of dealing with the 
Fairfaxes, father and son, who were ranging over the south of Yorkshire. 
Units of parliamentarians had raided deep into the East and North Ridings, 
capturing Bridlington and Whitby in the process. In the West Riding, 
during March, Bradford was occupied by parliamentarians, who fought off 
attempts to dislodge them. 20 
It appears that Newcastle first ordered Hastings to aid the 
Yorkshire royalists as early as March 1644, but no documentary evidence 
seems to exist. However the North Midlands Army's preoccupation with 
Newark precluded any such aid going north. Immediately after the relief 
of the town George Porter was sent into Yorkshire with the horse he 
commanded from Newark and some North Midlands Army horse, including 
Gervaise Lucas. ' regiment. Porter and his forces were involved in 
Bellasyse's second attempt to reoccupy Bradford, on March 25th, only four 
days after the relief of Newark. According to Peter Newman, Porter's 
horse failed Bellasyse in the same way that they failed Holles' Foot and 
had also failed Rupert at Newark on March 21st. 21 Porter immediately 
returned to Nottinghamshire with his forces, and sought Rupert's 
permission to stay and recruit. 22 
Despite urgent appeals from York seeking his help, Hastings was 
concerned over the practicality of venturing north. Fairfax was between 
him and York with three thousand men, a force equivalent to the North 
Midlands Army, and the army of the Eastern Association under Manchester 
was active on his eastern flank. 23 By April 8th, Hastings had ordered 
Porter to go north again, whilst he intended to follow as soon as he had 
amalgamated his army units. 24 But Porter had still not moved out of 
Nottinghamshire by the 11th, when Bellasyse's army was destroyed at the 
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Battle of Selby. It was a portentous defeat. Newcastle, realising that 
York was about to come under siege and that his rear was exposed to the 
victorious Fairfaxes, turned his anger both on Porter and, perhaps with 
less justification, on Hastings. 25 
Despite the King's assertion that all was secure in the north 
midlands, all was not. 26 Moorlanders, ever opportunists, had been 
attempting to push Ralph Sneade's headquarters out of Uttoxeter and 
Hastings had been forced to commit four hundred horse to preventing this 
from occuring. 27 Bagot's Horse were, according to their colonel, unable 
to go north because of high casualties suffered in the Newark campaign. 
Bagot had eighty troopers without horses, and collection of replacements 
was impossible without the section of the regiment that Hastings had at 
Ashby. In addition Leveson appears to have reneged on his promises and 
was encroaching on'Bagot's territory, an encroachment which involved the 
collection of horses. 28 
In addition to the renewed internal problems there was the more 
dangerous threat posed by the Earl of Manchester. Though Hastings 
suspected that the Earl intended to march to Yorkshire at some time, the 
presence of the Eastern Association Army at Stamford made it impossible 
for Hastings to leave his region unprotected. As the Earl remained within 
striking distance of the Leicestershire border for a further month, any 
possibility of going northward in strength was crippled. 29 
The Marquis of Newcastle, upon hearing of the defeat at Selby, 
marched his army rapidly to York. Shortly before his arrival at the city 
on the 16th April, he sent George Goring and the horse south to prevent 
them from being trapped in York. Hastings knew of this arrangement as 
early as the 13th. 30 The King expressly ordered Hastings to take his 
forces north with Goring once the latter had entered the midlands. 31 
Goring was in Nottinghamshire by the 21st and Hastings duly dispatched 
some forces to join him. However, few units from Staffordshire appear to 
have been with Hastings, who was now at Uttoxeter securing the town 
against attack; thus a significant element of the army could not be 
dispatched to join Goring. Though it appears that within a few days 
Bagot's soldiers themselves were ready to march, he was awaiting the 
arrival of some of Leveson's regiment, and there was no sign of them 
arriving. 32 Bagot then informed Hastings that Leveson claimed Rupert had 
ordered him to stay put and not to go into the north. The shortage of 
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horses in the area was still a major problem. The Staffordshire markets 
could only supply thin and wasted horses, thus again limiting the ability 
of the county's units being able to join Goring. Nevertheless, Hastings 
was able to dispatch Derbyshire regiments to Goring who was by this time 
based at Newark. 33 At least three of the Derbyshire colonels, Eyre, 
Milward and Freshville, joined the northern commander there. 34 Goring was 
not however satisfied; he chided Hastings for his lack of assistance and 
the Oxford royalists also condemned Hastings' seeming inactivity. 35 But 
despite the problem of manpower, the north midlands were managing to feed 
and supply the forces Goring had brought with him. Freshville told 
Hastings that it was becoming increasingly difficult to do so, and that 
the northern commander expected too much. 36 
The presence of Manchester still preyed on Hastings' mind and 
especially as Lincoln had fallen to the Earl on May 6th. On the western 
flank, as Rupert, who was raising forces in order that he could march 
north, reached Shrewsbury, Leveson's regiments from Dudley joined him, and 
as they did so, the Earl of Denbigh's army moved into south Staffordshire 
and lodged themselves around Tamworth. 38 It was clear that not all of the 
North Midlands Army could go north, either with the Prince or Goring. 
With Denbigh in the south and Manchester in the east, the north midlands 
were under as much of a threat as the-north itself. 
It was within these weeks that the north midlands were stretched to 
their limits: horse flesh was in short supply; Hastings' own forces were 
in a poor state and were divided between two outside armies; the 
counties' financial structure was supplying both Rupert's and Goring's 
forces as well as catering for their own needs. The parliamentarian 
paper, Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer, of May 21st-28th, was unlikely to 
be far wrong when it stated that the 'condition of Leicestershire is much 
lamented'. 39 Given this and Freshville's comments in his letter to 
Hastings on May 5th, it is apparent that the north midlands were in a 
sorry state. Though the newspaper, referred to above, suggested that 
Manchester dare not enter Leicestershire with his four thousand foot and 
twelve hundred horse (over three thousand horse had gone north under 
Cromwell to join with the Fairfaxes), the same was not true of Denbigh, 
who had marched through Staffordshire and was at Eccleshall by May 23rd. 
Rupert at this time was in Cheshire. 
40 On the 24th Denbigh's army, back 
in the east of Staffordshire, attacked and captured Rushall, the garrison 
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of Colonel Lane; Hastings had, a bare fortnight earlier, refused to 
disgarrison and level the Hall. As a result it was garrisoned by 
parliament and became a constant thorn in Lichfield's side. 41 
When Rupert and Goring joined forces on May 30th, they had armies 
fed and paid out of the north midlands' resources and at least a thousand 
men from the region's army. 42 This left Hastings' command potentially 
incapable of resisting incursions by external forces and disruptions 
caused by indigenous parliamentarians. In such circumstances a victory in 
the north was essential to the survival of the north midlands war effort. 
Though by June 3rd, Manchester's army was at York and thus out of 
Hastings' way, Denbigh was besieging Dudley Castle, denuded, like the 
region as a whole, of a large portion of its military forces. Dudley was 
left to suffer Denbigh's siege for over a week. Inside, Lieutenant 
Colonel Beaumont was in command of probably less than two hundred men. 
There are no surviving letters to, or from, Hastings during this month so 
his actions against the threats within the region cannot be ascertained. 
The local parliamentarians were determined to make the most of the absence 
of a large proportion of the royalist regiments by going onto the 
offensive. In Derbyshire where, like south Staffordshire, the absence of 
royalists was felt most keenly, Gell proposed the unification of 
Derbyshire and Leicestershire forces to attack Hastings' garrison at Wilne 
Ferry. 43 
South of Hastings' command, the King was in danger of being trapped 
at Oxford by the armies of Sir William Waller and the Earl of Essex. On 
June 3rd, the King left his war-time capital and on the 6th arrived at 
Worcester, with Essex and Wailer following from there. Lord Wilmot, with 
the Oxford Field Army, horse marched northward, and on the 10th, relieved 
Dudley Castle. Two days later Wilmot failed to defeat Denbigh at Tipton 
Green. 44 Denbigh moved south and linked up with Essex's army and remained 
in Worcestershire until the King made his dash from Worcester on the 16th. 
Then the Earl crossed Staffordshire and with Mytton stormed Oswestry 
before entering Cheshire, where he helped Myddleton take over the south of 
the county. Despite the predictions of Perfect Occurrences on June 17th 
that a second siege of Dudley Castle was imminent, Denbigh's military role 
in the north midlands was at an end and he shortly returned to London. 45 
In the north, the worst possible event, from the north midlands' 
royalists' point of view, occurred. On July Ist Rupert dazzled friend and 
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foe alike when he relieved York as his enemies drew away from the city in 
a vain attempt to prevent his approach. On the next day his army and the 
forces of the Marquis of Newcastle were attacked whilst at supper on the 
field of Marston Moor. In the royalist army that day, several regiments 
from the north midlands were startled by the sudden attack of the 
parliamentarian army. 46 
Prince Rupert's marching army contained Leveson's Horse, under 
their colonel himself. On the field of battle, Leveson's regiment was on 
Rupert's right wing, the cavalry force commanded by Lord Byron. According 
to de Gomme's map, the regiment was in the second line at the left hand 
end of the body next to Tyldesley's Horse. With Goring's marching army 
were the regiments of Eyre, Milward and Freshville. The first two and 
perhaps the latter, had taken both horse and foot. On de Gomme's plan, 
the Derbyshire foot may have been the unnamed unit marked 'S'. It is 
possible that all the foot were gathered here. Peter Young reckoned that 
the total number of Derbyshire foot was around two hundred and twenty, 
this being the number that Gell said that Milward and Eyre took out of the 
county. 47 If Freshville had taken his foot, there may have been a further 
hundred or so in the body, though Gell's report to the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms suggests that Freshville himself did not take many foot. The 
combined unit stood in the second line of foot regiments at the left hand 
end, between the regiments of Henry Cheater to the right and Edward 
Chisnell to their left. The three colonels' horse regiments were placed 
in the front line of Goring's wing on the royalist left. There were five 
hundred musketeers interspersed with this wing; some may have been 
Derbyshire forces. These North Midlands Army regiments would have 
numbered between eight hundred and a thousand men between them. However 
this was probably not the whole number of soldiers from the North Midlands 
Association. Behind Eyre's Horse stood Sir Charles Lucas' Brigade, a unit 
which, as we have seen, was composed in part of forces which he had taken 
from the North Midlands Army. 48 Thus it is possible that there were in 
excess of a thousand men from Hastings' own forces as well as Newark 
regiments (Anthoney Eyre's, for example) present on the field on July 2nd, 
1644. 
If, as Peter Newman asserts, Lord Byron plunged his front rank into 
disorder when he led them across the broken ground and the ditch which 
should have protected them, then it is equally true that Leveson's Horse 
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would be amongst those attempting to stem the tide of Cromwell's advance. 
It was a vain attempt: the wing collapsed and Leveson's men would have 
fled to within sight of York's walls. On the other flank, where Goring 
was successful in defeating the horse under Sir Thomas Fairfax, Eyre's and 
Freshville's Horse would have been in the charges which swept the 
opposition off the field and exposed the parliamentarian foot's right 
flank. However, when matched against Cromwell's horse which had circled 
the battle between the foot regiments of both sides, Goring's outnumbered 
forces could not, despite fighting hard, hold their ground. Under cover 
of nightfall, they were forced to leave the field. In the centre, where 
the foot had slogged it out for over three hours, the regiments of the 
three Derbyshire colonels would have been instrumental in pushing back the 
parliamentarian regiments pitted against them. But when Sir Charles 
Lucas' horse repeatedly failed to make any impression on the Scottish 
foot, the tide began to turn. When Lucas was captured, his brigade broke 
up and the parliamentarian foot began to gain ground from their opponents. 
Slingsby wrote, 'Our Foot.., although a great while they maintained the 
fight yet at last they were cut down and most part either taken or 
killed'. 49 Amongst them were the regiments of Eyre and Milward, composed 
of men raised by the commissioners of array in late 1643, of whom Hastings 
had said, 'I have no faith in them'. 50 He had been wrong. 
In the north midlands, there was brief optimism following the 
battle. Plans. were made for the advance of a second composite force to 
join Rupert who, it was asserted, had just fought 'an Edgehill battle' (it 
was earlier thought to have been a victory). Hastings, unfettered by 
Denbigh's army and with no threatening forces on his eastern flank, was 
preparing an army of eighteen hundred men taken from the North Midlands 
Army, Newark and Pontefract, to join with Rupert near Doncaster. 51 But by 
the 8th, doubt as to the nature of events in the north was beginning to 
set in. Rupert's silence was ominous. Furthermore, it was rumoured that 
Waller was to lead his army north to aid Manchester, Fairfax and the 
Scots. If this was the case, Byron, at Newark, argued that the midlands 
army should wait until Waller had passed, and then to follow him, to 
prevent being trapped between him and the other parliamentarian armies in 
the north. The resolve to go north had, it seems, by this time become 
less pronounced. Though Byron was actively planning to gain horses on 
which to mount musketeers, he was also pondering remaining in the midlands 
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where, he told Hastings, 'we shall be master of the field. '. 52 
By July 19th, not only had Hastings learned of the defeat at 
Marston Moor, but also of the fall of York. Closer to home the loss of 
the fort at Wilne Ferry had lost him his remaining crossing point on the 
Trent, which had been the point of rendezvous with Byron. 53 Wilne had 
been captured, by the forces of Gell and Leicester, from Captain Thomas 
Robinson and parts of Hastings' own regiments. Two days earlier 
Derbyshire forces, with help from Nottingham, had established a leaguer 
around Wingfield Manor, Molyneux's garrison in central Derbyshire. 54 
Clearly the defeat of Rupert at Marston Moor would give further impetus to 
the local parliamentary initiatives, begun when royalist forces by Rupert 
and Goring marched north. On the other hand, Dudley forces, free of any 
threat from Denbigh, were able to gain supplies from Birmingham. 55 
Hastings' plan for bringing together the North Midlands Army was 
preserved, but in order now to act within its own territory and rescue 
Molyneux. Bagot and the Lichfield forces were to meet Hastings at Burton 
on Trent and if possible, link up with Colonel Eyre's Horse, which had 
arrived in the area with Prince Rupert around the 25th July. Eyre, 
Freshville and Leveson had returned via Lancashire with the Prince, whilst 
Milward's Regiment of Horse was with the Northern Horse-and probably 
already led by the former lieutenant colonel, John Shallcross. (Henceforth 
the regiment will be referred to as Shallcross'. ) The Northern Horse were 
marching in the Yorkshire/Lancashire border region. 56 
The planned meeting failed miserably. Eyre's regiment, presumably 
tired and careless, was captured in its entirety as it slumbered in the 
church at Boyleston in Derbyshire, without a shot being fired. 57 When 
Bagot's men arrived at Burton on Trent they found parliamentarians waiting 
for them, and so they withdrew into Staffordshire. The following day they 
were attacked and although they drove the parliamentarians off, Bagot was 
forced to retreat to Lichfield. 58 A despR rate plea for help made by 
Molyneux to Hastings, caused the general to postulate another rescue 
attempt at the end of July, but it came to nothing. 59 
Since the end of March, when the North Midlands Army had been at 
the height of its power, and the counties where it had been raised had 
been relatively stable, the situation had declined dramatically. 
Staffordshire, part of Newcastle's territory during 1643, had, since April 
at the latest, been part of Rupert's command, thus giving Hastings two 
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masters and Leveson the opportunity to break away from Hastings' control 
even more. 60 The drastic situation in the north had presented many 
problems to the Lieutenant General. From his territory food, horses and 
men had been invested in what had turned out to be a defeat. Three of the 
active Derbyshire colonels had, with their regiments, been taken north, 
leaving their county open to the parliamentarian initiative which deprived 
Hastings of a small garrison and would soon deprive him of the whole 
county after it had received outside help. The whole region, as a result 
of supplying the northward march of Rupert and Goring, had been drained of 
resources. For this sacrifice of resources and men, Hastings received 
small thanks - he was still blamed for the defeat at Selby. Moreover, the 
strategic position of his territory had changed. Hitherto the region had 
been the link between the royalist north and the royalist south and west. 
Now at the end of July, it was the front line -a front line with large 
numbers of men and resources wasted in other regions. 
August, September and October, 1644: Decline 
On August 1st, Welbeck was summoned by the Earl of Manchester's 
army. On the following day it surrendered and Manchester moved across the 
county border into Derbyshire to Bolsover. 61 Freshville had by this time 
returned to his garrisoned house at Staveley. But the colonel was, it 
seems, seized with the same panic which made Milward leave off his command 
and he offered to hand Staveley to the enemy and lay down his arms. On 
the 12th August, the day that Molyneux sallied out of Wingfield and 
attacked the besiegers, Freshville surrendered Staveley. 62 That same day 
Bolsover fell to Manchester and Hastings' northern garrisons were gone. 63 
Elements of Manchester's army, under Major General Crawford, moved down to 
Wingfield with heavy artillery and began to destroy the walls of the 
manor. On the 17th, unable to hold out any longer, Molyneux 
surrendered. 64 In less than three weeks, northern and central Derbyshire 
had fallen to parliamentarians. Whilst enthusiastic London newspapers 
confidently predicted that Hastings would soon be under siege himself, 
Manchester's forces left the north midlands area. 65 They set up 
headquarters in Lincoln where, in the words of Clive Holmes, Manchester 
'dithered... until... early September'. Hastings was given a breathing 
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space to protect what territory and income he still had. 66 Whilst the 
Belvoir forces successfully tackled the Rutland parliamentarians, based at 
the once royalist garrison of Burleigh House, Hastings was still able to 
collect contribution from within sight of Leicester. 67 The 
parliamentarians in the county town were now reduced to a small garrison 
under Colonel Henry Grey. Lord Grey of Groby's role in the region was 
almost at an end. Though the East Midlands Association was not dismantled 
until October, his commission, as Mercurius Aulicus pointed out, had been 
a hollow title since the middle of the previous year when parts of the 
region's forces had been hived off to other commands. In the resurgence 
of local parliamentarianism, Lord Grey was to play no part. 68 
By mid September, Hastings' fortunes had ebbed so low that the 
Leicester committee was now able to claim that it had bottled Belvoir and 
Ashby up and that they were fighting each other. There was some truth in 
this. 69 Lucas was disputing not only the right to command over him. 
Lucas' argument was that as Hastings' commission had been granted by the 
Marquis of Newcastle, the Marquis' voluntary exile made the commission 
extinct. 70 It does not appear that Hastings was as bottled up as 
Leicester claimed, or would have liked, him to be. Regiments of horse from 
Ashby were able to operate just south of Nottingham in late September, 
when Colonel Stanhope was killed and his regiment passed to John Barnard, 
who led it south. 71 (For a full discussion of Barnard and the regiment 
see the previous chapter. ) 
At Tutbury, Sir Andrew Kniverton was deprived of much of his 
Derbyshire contribution. This appears to have been a result of the 
deprivations of May 1644 whilst Rupert and Goring were in the area as much 
as the result of the collapse of royalist control in the county. 
Kniverton, like Bagot before him, was forced to supplement his income with 
loans from sympathetic gentry. Normality, of a sort, was resumed within a 
few weeks as the castle appears to have been able to collect contribution 
from Repton and Gresley hundred. 72 In Leicestershire, a petition was 
organised by the 'well affected' and delivered to parliament. The 
petitioners claimed that the raids of the garrisons of Belvoir and Ashby 
were becoming more frequent. The blame for this was put firmly on the 
shoulders of the Leicestershire committee who were accused of embezzling 
county funds and of having 'little or no estates amongst us'. The 
solution, according to the petitioners, was the recall of Lord Grey and 
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the re-establishment of his command. Given the proven abilities of the 
noble lord this solution would have suited the royalists far more than the 
parliamentarians. It is possible that what worried the petitioners, was 
that the royalist forces were increasingly pragmatic in their tax 
collection. To suggest that the royalists were a more potent force in 
late 1644, when their power was definitely on the decline, than in late 
1643 when they controlled virtually the whole county, is certainly 
spurious. However, the evidence cited in Chapter Two suggests strongly 
that in certain parts of the county contribution was proceeding normally. 
Thus the actual fears expressed in this petition may well be less 
important, being of doubtful validity, than the desire that that committee 
do something to further the decline of royalist power. After all in 
Derbyshire, the major royalist garrisons had been eradicated but in 
Leicestershire they were both still present and potent. 73 
Following the departure of the Earl of Manchester with the major 
part of his army from Lincolnshire, the Belvoir and Newark forces went on 
the offensive. Units from Belvoir seized Crowland in early October. Such 
a nuisance did this small outpost prove to be, that Lincolnshire 
parliamentarians made immediate attempts to recapture the town. 
Manchester was forced to send aid to Edward Rossiter and-Thomas 
Rainsborough, the two colonels he had left in the county. By the end of 
the month Crowland was cut off and in need of aid. Hastings and Byron 
undertook the construction of a relief force from the North Midlands Army 
and the Newark garrison in order to rescue the garrison at Crowland. 
Accordingly a rendezvous at Belvoir was arranged. The Newark 
forces contained Roger Molyneux's regiment of Horse which had gravitated 
to the garrison after the fall of Wingfield. It is possible that other 
units of the North Midlands Army were also included in the Newark 
contingent. Also present were the Belvoir forces and elements of the 
Ashby garrison. In total the midlands relief force totalled fifteen 
hundred horse and five hundred foot. On the night of October 29th, 
regiments of Lincolnshire parliamentarians met at Denton, to the east of 
Belvoir. Another force of parliamentarians from Derbyshire, 
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire were approaching the area from 
Nottingham. The following morning, the Lincolnshire forces withdrew, 
enticing the royalists after them. This enabled the midlands 
parliamentarians to approach the royalists from their left flank and rear. 
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What followed appeared to be induced by panic rather than by defeat on the 
field. The royalists, perceiving the enemy to their rear, fell into 
disorder, and if the parliamentarian accounts have any honesty about them, 
to the amazement of their opponents, fled the field, not by the route to 
their left rear towards Belvoir, which was still open to them, but through 
the closes to their right rear. Many found themselves trapped in the 
enclosed fields and others attempted to swim the mill pond below the 
castle hill. This resulted in many men and horses being drowned. In the 
panic, parliament were able to capture between six and eight hundred 
men. 75 
It was a devastating defeat, the blame for which fell squarely on 
Byron's shoulders as he had led the royalist forces at the battle. Within 
Newark factions developed, one supporting Byron and desiring his retention 
as governor, and another which sought to replace him with John Digby, the 
man who as high sheriff in 1642 had done much to turn the town into a 
royalist stronghold. The argument dragged on for three months following 
the Battle of Denton until Byron was replaced by Richard Willis in 1645. 
The chief casualty was the North Midlands Army, which was never to fight 
again as a combined unit, as its fragmentation became increasingly 
pronounced. With the arrival at Newark, in mid September, of the Northern 
Horse, Shallcross' regiment temporarily joined other North Midlands Army 
regiments in the town. Eyre had reformed his regiment after the disaster 
at Boyleston and it was now at Newark as was Molyneux. Hacker was also in 
the town. Freshville was still absent, flirting with parliament's cause 
though he was soon to reappear in Newark with his horse. 76 Hastings 
himself, it appeared to parliament, was under a cloud. 
'General Hastings is like to be removed from his government 
of Ashby de la Zouch and another made Commander of his 
Counties in his Place whereby it appeareth that the 
Cavaliers begin to suspect their own party. ' 
wrote the Court Messenger, and Weekly Account heard that 'he hath many 
causes of distaste, then that he hath laid down his commission'. 77 
Whether further suppositions that he was at Oxford attempting to gain 
other employment had any substance or not, the Lieutenant General was not 
to be removed from his present charge. 78 
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November 1644 - April 1645: Isolation and Division 
During this winter several strands in the history of the North 
Midlands Army can be identified. Firstly, the fragmentation of the army 
which now spent much of its time within its composite garrisons. Secondly 
and concurrently, parliament sought to increase its hold on the counties. 
Thirdly, as a result of victories in the west, the royalists began a 
resurgence of activity in March and April. 
Parliamentarians at Derby and Leicester spent the early weeks of 
November, in the wake of the Battle of Denton, debating the establishment 
of a garrison close to Hastings' command centre at Ashby de la Zouch. 
Between them they agreed to garrison Sir John Beaumont's house at 
Coleorton, within three miles of Hastings' headquarters. Leicester 
provided two hundred horse and three hundred foot, Derby three hundred 
horse and dragoons. This force was in position by November 18th. 79 Such 
a large proportion of horse assigned to the garrison gives an indication 
of the nature of intent. The Coleorton forces were to disrupt, as much as 
possible, Hastings' collection of taxes and provisions from the hundreds 
appropriated to Ashby. It would be possible, given Coleorton's proximity 
to Repton and Gresley Hundred in Derbyshire, for the garrison to hinder 
Tutbury's taxation effort too. 
At this time the town and castle at Ashby had, in addition to the 
county's commissioners of array, a force of one thousand soldiers. These 
would be the core regiments of the North Midlands Army, Hastings', Pate's, 
Nevill's and Parkyns' being amongst them. Hastings himself was reportedly 
at Oxford, giving rise to the suggestions that he wished to hand over his 
command. 80 
There was, in addition to the increasing difficulty of maintaining 
any grip on the counties, the problem of the power vacuum created by 
Newcastle's departure from the country. It is not known, due to the lack 
of documentary evidence, who was considered to be Hastings' superior. In 
the case of Staffordshire it was still Prince Rupert who had assumed 
command there from Newcastle in or around March 1644. Thus it was to him 
that Leveson turned to for help when he accused Bagot of disrupting the 
collection of contribution by force of arms in November 1644.81 Rupert's 
command passed under his brother Maurice's generalship in December as did 
235 
the responsibility for sorting out the Staffordshire quarrels. 82 It is 
possible that the rest of Hastings' regional command came directly under 
the authority of the commander of the King's forces, in effect under 
Rupert, from December. As Maurice was responsible for sorting out the 
Leveson/Bagot quarrel, it is clear that no attempt was made to reunify 
Hastings' command by separating Staffordshire from the Marcher Counties. 
During December the royalists' position crumbled further. In the 
first half of the month the garrison at Crowland, established by Belvbir 
in September, surrendered, cut off as it was from its parent garrison. 83 
By the 20th, it was reported confidently in London that the Ashby garrison 
was safely cooped up. Derbyshire markets had now recovered and the sad 
state of the county economy, witnessed by parliamentarians in the previous 
winter, had been reversed. 84 By the turn of the year the situation had 
changed so completely from the halcyon days of the royalist war effort: 
from being masters of four counties, with the exception of the county 
towns, they were now holding on to much reduced areas of territory 
surrounding their garrisons. Even in these areas they were subject to 
parliamentarian interference. Newark, Tutbury and Ashby were permanently 
watched by small enemy forces. Those at Newark were under Rossiter's 
command and derived from Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire. It 
does not seem that this army was a permanent fixture, though London 
presses referred to it as a leaguer -a siege force. By the 3rd January, 
Rossiter moved further away from the town - he had hitherto been at 
Southwell six miles from Newark. As a result, the garrison was able to 
collect contribution despite the fears that the hovering menace had 
earlier produced. 85 
The Bagot/Leveson quarrel, begun anew at the end of 1644, dragged 
on through the following January. Leveson claimed that the Staffordshire 
commissioners of array refused to collect contribution to pay his 
regiments' back pay. 86 For their part, the commissioners were in the 
process of joining with the gentry of Shropshire, Worcestershire and 
Herefordshire, in demanding a greater say in the running of the war 
effort. They wished to raise an armed force themselves and appoint its 
officer. This was an extension of the idea Leveson had had the previous 
year when he attempted to use posse commitatus. In this case however 
regular officers, such as Leveson, were deliberately excluded from the 
proposed county orientated forces. By February 15th the King had agreed 
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to the association of the Marcher Counties. 87 In a way, *this royal 
recognition of an accomplished unity was reminiscent of his handling of 
the unity achieved under Hastings in February 1643. Charles limited the 
powers of the association's commissioners: Maurice was to choose and 
appoint the officers for the newly raised forces; but on the other hand, 
the commissioners had greater control over the use of excise and 
sequestration income. (It will be remembered that in Chapter Two, it was 
suggested that this latter may have been a recognition of fact rather than 
right. ) Again, by recognising this position, the King had reinforced the 
division of the north midlands counties, thereby ensuring that the 
breakdown of the unity of the north midlands royalist war effort was not 
due solely to the difficulty of holding on to the ever decreasing 
territorial hold, but also to the internal realignments made by the 
royalists themselves. Maurice managed to get Leveson and Bagot to reach 
an agreement without recourse to Rupert's suggestion of recalling them 
both to Oxford and thus achieved temporary stability in Staffordshire. 
With these commanders in agreement, Maurice was able to draw troops 
from both their garrisons in order to construct the army he needed to 
reconquer the west. Troops from Ashby and Tutbury were also incorporated 
in this army. 88 Leveson alone contributed three hundred men. It seems 
that little regard was paid to the safety of the royalist garrisons in the 
north midlands; as a result of Leveson's diminution of forces, Patshull 
House, one of his satellite garrisons, fell to the enemy. 89 Once again 
there was to be no immediate success derived from the drawing out of men 
from the north midlands to fight elsewhere. As Maurice's army entered 
Chester, enemy forces from Wem attacked and captured Shrewsbury. 
However the situation in the north midlands was confused, for not 
everything was working against the royalists. On Hastings' eastern flank, 
the relief force consisting of the Northern Horse sent from Oxford to 
Pontefract, defeated Rossiter's horse at Melton Mowbray and then drove the 
rest of his troops from the vicinity of Newark. Whilst in Derbyshire, 
Colonel Molyneux's Horse captured members of the Derbyshire committee at 
Wingerworth as they attempted to collect assessments. 90 
Nevertheless Hastings was disillusioned as he witnessed his 
territory being divided up and his Ashby and Staffordshire soldiers being 
again led off into the west. On his own doorstep, the inhabitants of 
Leicestershire petitioned him regarding the activities of Gervaise Lucas 
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at Belvoir. Their complaints he added to his own about Lucas not 
attending councils of war and his reappropriation of North Midlands Army 
weaponry, and sent them on to Prince Rupert. 91 Hastings went to Oxford in 
March, perhaps to make some personal representation on the matter. His 
general unhappiness with the situation was obvious. Digby urged Rupert to 
settle the problems to Hastings' satisfaction as he was still of 'great 
importance' and to ensure that he 'be not sent home discontented, as here 
he appears to be highly'. 92 It is not known what solution was made to the 
Lucas problem though it is likely that Rupert followed Digby's advice as 
no further complaints seem to have arisen from either side. Presumably 
the Prince simply reaffirmed Hastings' command over the region and over 
Lucas. 
Staffordshire was the only county where the Marcher Association was 
pursued concientioüsly. The county commissioners, with their few 
newcomers like the Earl of Ardglass, continued to plan their renewed 
administration. They had secured Bagot's and Kniverton's agreements to 
the system but Leveson, as ever, continued in his opposition to civilian 
government. This time it was Leveson who won. Rupert was dispatched from 
Oxford to help his re-establishment of royalist control in the Marcher 
Counties and relieve Chester from a siege. 93 Hastings linked his forces 
with those-of the two Princes during April and was a part of their 
successful rescues of both Beeston and Chester. The achievements of the 
Princes encouraged the appearance of small royalist garrisons in the 
Marches but also strengthened the position of the regular officers, the 
so-called swc&rdsmen, as opposed to the projected civilian armies of the 
Marcher Association. 94 By the end of April, Rupert ordered the 
Staffordshire commissioners, in the King's name, to cease their work. The 
county then seems to have returned to the system established by the 
original commissioners of array but now effectively run by the garrison 
commanders. 95 
A resurgence of royalist activity followed the removal of the 
threat of Rossiter's forces upon Newark and the victories of the Princes 
and Hastings in the west. Leicestershire's royalists attempted to take 
possession of the county town in March by means of a complicated plot 
which failed to mature. 96 Whilst Leveson and Bagot's forces still 
operated in the Marcher counties, the Staffordshire commissioners were 
able to meet in Uttoxeter. 97 Nottinghamshire royalists who had roamed 
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around Lincolnshire for a month after Rossiter's departure launched 
another attack on Nottingham and Major Hacker again became the governor of 
the Trent Bridge Fort. This time he held it for a week until Rossiter's 
forces returned to throw him out. Parliament was sufficiently worried by 
the turn of events to dispatch John Hutchinson home from the enquiry into 
his activities as governor, brought about as a result of conflicts between 
the civil administration of the town and his own military command. 
Parliament expressed its continued confidence in him by sending him back 
to Nottingham to handle affairs in what they saw as a time of crisis. 98 
Thus there was somewhat of a resurgence of activity on the part of 
the royalists after a period of extreme difficulties. True, they were 
still largely fragmented and had no real hold on Derbyshire but they 
proved that the local parliamentarians could not rest on their laurels. 
This resurgence was to receive added impetus within a few weeks, when the 
King's Field Army moved out of Oxford to relieve Chester which had fallen 
under siege again from Sir William Brereton, once the Princes had left the 
area. 
May - June 1645: Renaissance 
The intervention of the King's Field Army brought hope to the local 
royalists. It forced the local parliamentarians to abandon various small 
garrisons and at the same time provided the royalists with a major new one 
-a potential nerve centre from which to administer the newly regained 
territory. 
The King left Oxford on May 7th and had, by the 8th, joined the 
Princes at Stow on the Wold. By the time his army had reached 
Staffordshire on the 22nd, Brereton had again abandoned his blockade of 
Chester. 99 The King's army continued to march north through 
Staffordshire, prompting parliament to warn its chief garrisons from 
Leicester to York to prepare for a possible siege. From Uttoxeter, which 
he reached on the 24th, the King had a force of four thousand horse 
including Bagot's and Leveson's regiments which together contributed three 
hundred and fifty men, and five thousand foot also including units from 
Lichfield and Dudley. At the same time as the King heard that Brereton 
had withdrawn from Chester, he also heard that Sir Thomas Fairfax and his 
army, a composite force made up of the old armies of the Earls of Essex 
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and Manchester and Sir William Waller, topped up with conscripts, was 
establishing a siege of Oxford. 100 
The King's army turned east. It had been decided that Fairfax's 
army, the New Model, had to be drawn away from Oxford. To do this, it was 
proposed that a midland parliamentarian garrison should be stormed. There 
were, of course, four immediate choices: Derby, Stafford, Nottingham and 
Leicester. Derby was discounted, perhaps from being too far to the north 
and because there was a large contingent of parliamentarian horse 
concentrated there under Gell and Veymuden at the time. Nottingham's 
castle had resisted attempts to take it several times and was thus ruled 
out. Stafford was fairly insignificant and was outclassed by the nearby 
Lichfield. On the other hand, Leicester, where the committee had 
continually prevaricated over the building of strong defensive works 
because it would have meant the destruction of some members' houses, was 
ideal. The garrison was small, having a regular force of only 240 horse 
and 480 foot which were expected to man a defensive line over three miles 
in length. The excessive size of the outer defences was to enable it to 
encompass the committeemens' houses. 101 
Accordingly, Charles' army moved into Leicestershire. ' At Ashby, it 
picked up one hundred horse from Hastings' regiment and then moved on 
Leicester. Between the 27th and the 30th the army established itself 
around the county town and built gun batteries against the weakest area of 
the walls, the. part known as the Newarke. The garrison had been 
reinforced by a unit of dragoons under Major Innes, up to a hundred horse 
from the abandoned garrison of Kirby Bellars and armed civilians, giving a 
total strength of around two 'thousand. The committee refused Rupert's 
summons to surrender and the cannon opened fire. Within three hours there 
was a breach in the walls. 102 
At midnight the town was attacked, and after a brief hard fight, 
entered. By 2.30am, on the 31st, resistance ended and the royalists were 
masters of the town. The following day, Hastings became titular governor 
with Sir Matthew Appleyard as his deputy. Hastings' command of the north 
midlands appears to have been reaffirmed and Sir George Lisle was 
appointed Lieutenant General under him, with responsibility for 
Leicestershire. 103 Whether Hastings was at this time or earlier in the 
year, raised above his rank of Lieutenant General is unknown, but the fact 
that he now had a person of that rank under him would suggest that he was. 
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As the King's army rested south of Leicester, and then marched 
south to dispatch convoys of food to Oxford via Daventry, Hastings began a 
two fold task. Immediately he was faced with repairing and strengthening 
Leicester, the new capital of his command. To do this he undertook what 
the committee failed to do and began demolishing houses in order to 
contract the defensive line. Secondly and more importantly he began to 
raise new recruits. Before the King's forces had even left the town on 
the 2nd June, he had raised one thousand men. At one stroke the county 
had become wholly royalist as all the little parliamentarian garrisons 
melted away. 104 Gell with the forces of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire 
were still hovering in the Derby area but did not venture into 
Leicestershire. The Scots Army, summoned by parliament to move south to 
oppose the King and join with Brereton's forces, remained put in 
Yorkshire. 
It was the New Model Army which was to provide the only sufficient 
opposition to the royalist resurgence. Whilst the King's Army lingered at 
Daventry for five days, waiting for the return of an escort of horse sent 
with the convoy of provisions to Oxford, Fairfax, released from his 
dependence upon the Committee of Both Kingdoms, moved north towards it. 
By June 12th, apprised of Fairfax's approach, the King's-Army retired 
towards Market Harborough. This was in order that Goring and the three 
thousand horse dispatched to the south west on May 8th and recalled on the 
19th, with orders to go to Market Harborough, would be given time to do 
so. The royalist army was, without Goring, woefully small, numbering 
somewhat less than eight thousand men. 105 The following day, Fairfax was 
joined by his second in command Oliver Cromwell and the New Model reached 
a strength of around 14,600 
In the King's small army were several elements of the North 
Midlands Army. Bagot's and Leveson's units have already been referred to. 
Hastings' Horse appears to have remained at Leicester but elements of 
Molyneux's, Freshville's and perhaps Eyre's were with the Newark Horse, 
and Shallcross' were still with the Northern Horse, under Langdale. 
On the morning of the 14th, the two armies shifted position 
westwards after Fairfax and Cromwell decided that the New Model's position 
was too strong and would deter the royalists from attacking. After 
mirroring this movement, the royalists stood on Dust Hill, a mile or so 
north of the village of Naseby, facing south. Across the Broad Moor, a 
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heath land area with three strips of cultivated land running roughly north 
to south and planted with corn, stood the New Model, almost twice the size 
of the King's Army, on the reverse slopes of Red Hill. On the royalists' 
right flank, and to their front the New Model dragoons were ensconced in 
Sulby Hill Close, an enclosure projecting from the Naseby side of the 
boundary hedge of Sulby Parish. 106 The North Midland Army units were 
positioned as follows: Bagot's and Leveson's Horse were in Sir Thomas 
Howard's Brigade, which was a total of 880 men split into three bodies 
amongst the foot units of the royalist centre; Molyneux and Freshville, 
in the Newark Horse, stood in reserve to the rear of the horse on the left 
flank; Shallcross' Horse was in the front line of the left wing. 
The battle lasted less than three hours. Though no convincing 
account has yet been written of the fight, the action was fairly 
straightforward. The royalists advanced and as they did so found 
themselves outflanked to their left as they emerged from the strictures of 
the parish boundary hedge on that flank. At the same time their left 
flank would also enter the broken ground, pitted with rabbit warrens. As 
they negotiated these, they were hit by the first wave of Cromwell's 
attack. 
On the royalist right, the horse advanced towards-Commissary 
General Ireton's horse and as they did so a , small number of royalist horse 
became enmeshed in the hedges of Sulby Close which housed Okey's Dragoons. 
Most of the royalist regiments avoided this obstacle and charged home. 
After a stiff fight, they broke Ireton's wing and most of his horse 
scattered. 
In the centre the outnumbered, but far more experienced, royalist 
foot of the King's Army under Lord Astley, pushed back the opposition. 
However, Cromwell's horse consisting in the main of his excellent Eastern 
Association regiments, broke the royalist horse under Langdale and 
ploughed into Astley's flank. By the time Rupert, who had led the 
royalist right flank to victory, extricated his men from the 
parliamentarian baggage train and returned to the field, the battle was 
lost. An attempt by the King to lead a counter attack was prevented when 
the Earl of Carnwrath swore at him and pulled him aside by the bridle of 
his horse. On seeing this the reserve forces joined in the general 
retreat. The King's Army had been defeated chiefly due to their pitiful 
lack of numbers which prevented their being able to stem the advance of 
MAP OFT11E BATTLE OF NASEBY; JUNE 14th 1645 
Indicating the position of North Midlands Army Units. See the 
text for full details. 
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the numerically superior New Model, once the latter had begun to gain the 
upper hand. 
The royalist foot were, for the most part, captured, but the horse 
fled by various routes towards Leicester. Here, during the ensuing 
twenty-four hours, they deposited their wounded with Hastings, and 
followed the King, via Ashby, to Lichfield. 107 
The renaissance of the royalists in the north midlands was over, 
destroyed by the madcap enthusiasm of the King's Army. Again, outside 
interference, though initially offering hope, had damaged the north 
midlands royalist war effort. Four days after the Battle of Naseby, 
Hastings was forced to surrender Leicester. He managed, under cover of 
darkness on the 17th, to sneak five hundred horse out of the town, but 
with the newly repaired walls of the town battered down by the very guns, 
now under new ownership, which had damaged them before, he was faced with 
an impossible task. 108 In his letters of explanation he expressed his 
conviction, after a council of war involving him, Lisle and the rest of 
the officer corps in the town, that surrender was a better option than 
fighting it out. At least this way, he asserted, the garrison was neither 
slaughtered nor taken prisoner. But he lost all the arms he had in the 
town and five hundred horses as a result of the surrender conditions. 109 
Parts of the New Model along with Cell's forces contemplated the 
capture of Ashby de la Zouch but nothing was-done. 110 The parliamentarian 
garrisons were reoccupied and the royalists became yet further restricted 
in their movements and, as a result of Naseby and the surrender of 
Leicester, mach reduced in both weaponry and manpower. Gell was accused 
of not trying hard enough to-prevent the King leaving the area after the 
battle, for he certainly had the manpower to do so. Hastings too was to 
suffer the acrimony of his superiors. 
A War of Attrition: July 1645 - July 1646 
During this final stage of the war, the north midland counties 
finally succumbed to a reversal of the position at the end of 1643. Small 
pockets of resistance were now surrounded by a territory largely dominated 
by parliamentarian forces. However, the indigenous royalists continued a 
potent guerrilla war against their enemies. It is this image of the North 
Midlands Army which has survived and presented itself in all hitherto 
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histories. Whereas the army had been a cohesive force until October 1644, 
it had now become small, isolated but determined groups of warriors. 
Despite the disaster of Naseby, the royalist forces were not 
thoroughly dismayed. On July 16th Freshville's Horse, their colonel 
recently returned to the royalist fold and with his regiment based at 
Newark, recaptured Welbeck in Nottinghamshire. Bolsover, across the 
county border in Derbyshire, also fell to royalist forces. Thus while 
Cell had been concentrating his efforts on Tutbury, large parts of north 
Derbyshire were opened up for the collection of royalist contribution. 111 
Richard Bagot had received his death wound at Naseby and Rupert 
proposed to replace him with his own adjutant, John Scrimshore. Both 
Hastings and the King objected to the move, on the grounds that Scrimshore 
had, along with Bagot, argued with Hastings. Thus they asserted, if he 
were given the governorship, the disputes would continue. That Rupert 
conceded by the end of July, and allowed Hastings' candidate Harvey Bagot, 
Richard's brother, to have the post, shows that Hastings was still 
considered as an important figure by the Prince. 112 The King, it would 
appear, was not so sure; he had wanted the post to go to Lieutenant 
General George Lisle. Parliament's newspapers had reported that Hastings 
had been imprisoned by the King after the surrender of Leicester. But if 
he did fall into such disfavour, he was in some measure restored, probably 
by the Prince's intervention, by the end of July. If the Prince had 
intervened there is no doubt that the letters Hastings had written to him 
regarding the surrender would have been a factor in this. 113 
The southward march of the Scots Army through the area does not 
seem to have hampered the activities of some of the local royalists. 
Newark forces were raiding, on a pragmatic basis, deep into Lincolnshire 
throughout August and were threatening to remove the county's harvest 
produce. 114 In the second week of the month, Charles began a new march 
into the region having been forced to make concessions to localism in 
Wales. He took, as usual, soldiers from the garrisons en route. In 
Staffordshire he was forced to re-establish the Marcher Association. By 
the time he reached Welbeck on August 13th, he had added a hundred foot 
from Lichfield, and as many as two hundred and fifty foot from the 
Nottinghamshire forces to his small army of four thousand. 115 The King's 
sojourn in the area was, as ever, a mixed blessing. Despite the loss of 
men to the marching army the royalists could collect contribution from 
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throughout Derbyshire despite parliamentarians from Stafford, Derby and 
Nottingham, hovering in the area. 116 Leicestershire was still recovering 
from the effect of the past months. The committee requested the right to 
compound with royalists who were surrendering in increasing numbers, to 
supplement their income. The committee also refused to supply Fairfax 
with fifteen hundred men, who, they claimed, could not be raised by 
them. 117 
Throughout this period, from June to November, Ashby Castle was 
almost inoperative. Plague had broken out in May probably spurred on by 
the overcrowded conditions in the town and castle caused by the presence 
of the army. The garrison of the castle had been forced to live in the 
parklands to the south. By the end of September, it was estimated that 
there were only sixty men left in the garrison, the rest having moved to 
other nearby garrisons. "Hastings, when not with the King while the latter 
coursed the north midlands, seems to have resided at Lichfield. 118 
Charles' departure, after less than three weeks of planning a march 
to Scotland with his army to join Montrose, returned the north midland 
shires to the position held before his arrival. Gell's forces reassumed 
the task of containing the royalist garrisons within decreasing pockets of 
territory. Throughout September the situation remained unchanged; the 
King, having returned to Oxford, then marched out to rescue Hereford from 
the Scots' siege. At the end of the month, Freshville's garrison of 
Welbeck, with troops from Newark and Bolsover, recaptured Chatsworth 
House. Shallcross' Horse, based at Newark since Naseby, became the 
garrison there. When the regiment had been Milward's Chatsworth had been 
their base, shared with Eyre's. 119 
By the beginning of October, the King and his roving army returned 
to the region. He based himself around Newark for a month, and again 
brought the artificial control of increased areas of the country to the 
north midlands war effort. 120 Newark forces were able to exact 
contribution, albeit on a more pragmatic basis, from parts of Lincolnshire 
as far away as the Lindsey coast. 121 The Staffordshire commissioners, 
with Hastings actively involved, had again come into conflict with Leveson 
over the collection of contribution. Whilst in Leicestershire, as Princes 
Maurice and Rupert rode to Newark to plead the latter's case for his 
seeming precipitous surrender of Bristol, Ashby was reoccupied. The 
re-established forces soon began to conduct raids on nearby 
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parliamentarians. The King ordered Hastings not to allow the two princes 
to stay at Ashby Castle. Charles' given reasons were that they might use 
up precious provisions; in reality he probably feared that they would 
persuade Hastings that they had a just cause and that he would allow them 
to remain at the castle where they would be a challenge to the King's 
authority over the north midlands officers. Four days before the letter 
to Hastings, the princes had, with officers loyal to them, attempted to 
challenge the King's power to decide the governorship of Newark. The 
King, by replacing Willis, Rupert's friend, had been attempting to placate 
the commissioners who had grievances against Willis' command. Rupert's 
action in trying to get the King to retain Willis can be seen in the light 
of Rupert's attempts to favour army officers, the swordsmen against the 
civil authorities, as he had done in the case of Leveson. 
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However, in this instance the King's presence could not prevent the 
tightening grip of parliamentarian forces on the region for long. By the 
end of October, the Scots army which had entered the north midlands 
stormed Shelford House, one of Newark's outposts and the garrison was put 
to the sword. 123 Prompted by this, the king left Newark on the 3rd 
November, having effected Willis' replacement with John Bellasyse. 124 
Following the King's departure, the minor royalist garrisons collapsed. 
Rowland Hacker surrendered Wiverton House, Welbeck was abandoned by 
Freshville and Chatsworth and Bolsover followed suit. In Staffordshire 
Wrottesley House was abandoned by the royalists and parliamentarians took 
up residence to watch over Dudley Castle. Sydenham Pointz and the Scots 
established themselves around Belvoir Castle and before the end of 
November had captured the stables. 125 
By the beginning of December, the only royalist garrisons remaining 
were Dudley, Lichfield and Tutbury in Staffordshire, Ashby and the 
besieged Belvoir in Leicestershire, and Newark in Nottinghamshire. Each 
of them had a small parliamentarian force stationed nearby to watch over 
their movements and attempt wherever possible to disrupt their activities. 
With the possible exception of Lichfield the disruption meant the severe 
curtailment of contribution collection. Lord Astley's appointment, in 
December, as Lieutenant General of the Marcher Counties was specifically 
aimed at maintaining the remaining garrisons and relieving and supporting 
Chester, which was again under siege from the indomitable Brereton. 
126 To 
do this Astley and Hastings worked together to build an army from the 
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garrisons of the Marches and from remnants of the North Midlands Army. 
Units of horse from the latter had been already assigned to Sir William 
Vaughan who was attempting to harass Chester's besiegers. By the end of 
October Vaughan's forces had been scattered and he spent the ensuing two 
months trying to weld them together again. 
Hastings and Harvey Bagot fell out at the end of December, probably 
over Hastings' involvement in the renewed Marcher Association. Lichfield 
was, at this time still able to collect money regularly from the majority 
of Offloe Hundred and parts of two other hundreds. Given the general 
condition of the royalist cause, this was quite remarkable especially as 
it covered about seven eighths of the garrison's expenditure. Hastings' 
power to examine the accounts of all the region's garrisons would have 
contravened the local autonomy of the governors, particularly the 
successful Bagot. It is probable that this led directly to the arguments 
in Lichfield in late December and to the expulsion of Hastings and other 
commissioners on the 29th. 127 
Hastings' real authority was now at an end. Astley replaced Bagot 
with Thomas Tyldesley (though Bagot was retained as deputy governor), and 
Kniverton was replaced at Tutbury by the commander of the remains of the 
Northern Horse, Sir William Blakiston. 128 Thus, by January 1646, 
Hastings, cut off from Belvoir and Newark by the Scots and denied command 
of his Staffordshire garrisons, was left with only his forces at Ashby. 
During January., Ashby troops along with some Newark forces were taken by 
Astley to create the Chester relief force. An unspecified number joined. 
him early in-the month but on the 28th, Colonel Roper and Lieutenant 
Colonel Stamford led three hundred foot and three hundred horse out of 
Ashby. 129 News that Ormonde in Ireland had been unable to reach an 
agreement with the catholics, aimed at sending an army to England to help 
the King, changed the situation. Chester, which had been the designated 
landing point for the army, was now redundant and under the extreme 
pressure that it was, the garrison surrendered on February 2nd. A day 
later Belvoir followed suit. The Ashby forces, sent to Astley, drifted 
home. 130 
Throughout January, Hastings had conducted highly successful raids 
on the enemy. He had hindered the progress of the siege of Belvoir by 
capturing ammunition and weapons. On the 19th January, part of the Ashby 
garrison marched through Leicestershire into Northamptonshire and captured 
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Castle Ashby, taking the governor home with them. 131 It would appear that 
this was a flexing of muscles aimed at showing the potential of the 
garrison forces. Hastings, disgruntled by the harsh treatment of the King 
and Astley, appears to have been thinking of surrender. Even as the 
garrison raided the Tamworth area, Hastings' elder brother, the 6th Earl 
of Huntingdon, was at Leicester negotiating terms. On the last day of 
February an agreement was made. Hastings obtained excellent terms for 
himself and his fellow commanders in Ashby - no less than five North 
Midlands Army colonels were in the garrison at the time. The forces as a 
whole had three months to leave the castle under arms, as long as they 
dismantled the new fortifications first. However, not all the garrison 
wished to surrender and fights broke out between those wishing to lay down 
their arms and those who wanted, even at this stage, to continue fighting 
for the King. 132 
Other Colonels also wished to continue the fight. Blakiston at 
Tutbury held out until April, Leveson and Bellasyse until May, and the 
latter only surrendered Newark on the express orders of the King. 
Tyldesley and Bagot kept Lichfield in royalist hands until July. 133 The 
final stages of the first civil war in the midlands was reflected in the 
rest of the country. Parliaments' forces proceeded to mop up pockets of 
royalist resistance which held out in castles and mansions up and down the 
nation. In the north midlands the majority of the work was done by local 
forces particularly those of Sir William Brereton and Gell; the latter 
was more of a hindrance to the former in the case of the siege of Tutbury 
where he attempted to maintain his own siege separate from the one 
established by Brereton! Even though the Scots Army was responsible for 
the capture of Shelford, Belvoir and Newark, local forces who had been an 
ever present menace to Hastings were present at each of the leaguers. 
In this chapter the course of the decline of royalist power in the 
north midlands has been traced. It has been shown that there were several 
factors in this decline. Interference in the North Midland Association 
war effort by outside forces was thoroughly piecemeal and never aimed at 
an overall strategy. Instead, the resources of the area were used to bail 
out other royalist regions which had not been established to the same 
level of success that the north midlands were. Even when the intervention 
was potentially of help to the region, such as Rupert's actions in March 
249 
1643 and March 1644, it was never fully realised. Though Hastings might 
have been able to contain the threat of local parliamentarian action he 
was never able to eradicate it. It was always to be a drain on his 
resources, limiting his ability to provide a solid springboard from which 
to launch a royalist offensive. The potential for Rupert and later 
Charles to help Hastings throw off the parliamentarian albatross was never 
exploited: in all cases the intervention was curtailed by the outside 
armies leaving the area too soon or by military disaster. In many cases 
outside intervention had no useful purpose. The King's personal meddling 
resulted in several instances of disputes breaking out, or being 
aggravated, which though they alone would not have wrecked the system, did 
nothing to strengthen it. 
Probably the chief cause of the defeat of the north midlands was 
the period in May and June 1644 when the area was stripped of resources 
and manpower to provide for the attempt to relieve York. The single 
minded and short sighted nature of this policy rendered the north midlands 
vulnerable to any parliamentarian action. Indeed, as a result, the area's 
future was entirely dependent upon the military victory in the north which 
never came. The resultant deluge of parliamentarian offensives fell upon 
a territory incapable of a successful defence: had Manchester pressed on 
into the area instead of turning into Lincolnshire, the collapse may well 
have come much sooner. However the renaissance of May and June 1645 
revealed the ability of the north midlands activists to re-establish 
themselves in favourable times: even after the disaster of Naseby the 
events in the area during the King's August intervention revealed the 
still present potential for them to do so. 
The individual officers and commissioners of the north midlands 
showed themselves as competent men. What they lacked was a firm 
foundation in which to work. The inability of even Hastings himself to be 
certain that his work was not to be overuled or ignored had severe and 
debilitating effects upon the overall running of the war effort. The 
division of his command, under two superior commanders, was surely a 
contribution to this. It is little surprise that Hastings was 
disillusioned in late 1644 and early 1645, and it is possible that the 
surrender of Ashby has to be also seen in this light. Hastings was 
hamstrung by the fact that his success led to the abuse of the resources 
of the area and his failures brought castigation and illtreatment. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions: The North Midlands and the English Civil War 
During the course of this thesis, five counties have been treated 
as a combined unit, a region. This collection of counties was perceived 
as such a unit by the royalist and, with some geographical differences, by 
the parliamentarian central authorities. There were, within the region, 
diverse localist attitudes which worked either overtly, or covertly, 
against regionalism. It is possible that Gell sought to defy the regional 
commander, Lord Grey, and that the desire to preserve county boundaries 
brought county committees into dispute with each other. On the other 
hand, even Gell realised that united efforts were needed to control Ashby 
de la Zouch's still active garrison late in the war. Similarly, ventures 
against Newark always involved regional forces. For the royalists' part, 
their financial system, whilst recognising, as did parliament's hundredal 
boundaries, was based on a cross county border allotment of territory. 
Whilst parliament's committee sought tot 
nd 
succeeded in, keeping other 
counties' financial demands out of their county, the royalists did not. 
Staffordshire garrisons drew money from Derbyshire and Warwickshire, Ashby 
from Derbyshire whilst Belvoir and Newark were partly financed by money 
from Lincolnshire. Regionalism, as practised by the royalists, was broken 
down by parliament's growing military supremacy, not by inherent localism. 
Dissent by royalist commanders, such as the arguments between Bagot and 
Leveson, were not innate county-based sentiments coming to the fore; they 
were disputes over military needs involving assignments of territory in 
several counties. 
From the middle of 1644, after Manchester entered the region 
following Marston Moor, the indigenous parliamentarians, with the help of 
outside forces, were able to exercise control over increasingly large 
parts of the five counties. This inevitably led to the royalists losing 
the power to co-ordinate actions by their increasingly isolated forces. 
Even so, Hastings continued his regional policy, attempting the 
utilisation of regiments unrestricted by a county based attitude. If in 
this case, 'country' meant anything less than England as a whole, it 
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certainly meant no less than the region. 
The royalist regional policy involved the use of the resources of 
the communities thus embodied, irrespective of their county but based on 
their proximity to fortified towns and garrisons. This system was not, 
for the major period of the war, run on an ad hoc basis and, if the 
evidence from Lichfield in 1645 is not wholly unique, it was never run 
that way. The royalist war effort was based on a system of regularly 
collected taxes taken from the communities in a pseudo-legal fashion given 
its authority by the presence of war. Traditional organs of government, 
the warrant, the offices of sheriff and constable, were utilised in order 
to give the system a validity which was accepted as sufficient to impel 
compliance by all but the most politically motivated members of the north 
midlands communities. Further appearance of legality was given by the 
right of appeal to the commissioners of the peace, members of which were 
incorporated into the commissions of array. Moreover, as the study of the 
membership of the commissions has shown, those involved were part of the 
communities upon which they imposed their taxation system. These men were 
not, for the most part, magnates with huge cross-county landholdings; 
they included representatives of a broad spectrum of gentry society, 
though most of them were esquires and titled gentry. Between them they 
were able to muster no small degree of administrative experience, having. 
held county offices such as sheriff and deputy lieutenants. Many could 
also bring experience of higher education together with legal training to 
the commissions. All of this would have contributed to the efficiency of 
war-time administration,. which had to be an organised system bringing in 
enough money to finance an army and pay for defensive works and other 
materials of war. They also brought to the commissions the vital 
experience of local knowledge, a sense of knowing what the community could 
or would bear and what it would not. 
Parliament's committees in the region were derived from a similar 
social group, although from the outset they utilised a greater proportion 
of people from the lower rungs of the gentry ladder, urban gentry and even 
yeoman stock. Nevertheless, these men were predominantly land owners who 
would have the same qualms as their royalist counterparts about the effect 
of war on the community. The parliamentarian committeemen brought less 
previous experience to their task than did the royalists. Even so similar 
ex officers of the counties were present, although in fewer numbers, and 
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their knowledge could be utilised. Yet, parliament's war effort at the 
outset was less effective than the royalist alternative, but the 
inexperience of local administration was not entirely responsible for the 
dire financial straits that the county committees found themselves in 
during the autumn of 1643. Though failure to collect money would affect 
parliament's military effort, the local royalist military effort was aided 
substantially by the Marquis of Newcastle's intervention. This gave the 
royalists the breathing space to form new regiments to control the 
counties and to put into effect the full rigours of their administration. 
When the tables were turned, it was parliamentary intervention on the part 
of Manchester which gave the county committees the ability to extend their 
system into increasingly larger areas of the north midlands. 
The two systems which operated side by side were, thus, handled by 
men of some experience who had, for the most part, a vested interest in 
the community. Their local involvement ensured that the area would never 
become a waste land like parts of Germany. The instances of actual or 
attempted cooperation, whereby at least one attempt at bilateral agreement 
was made, indicate that both sides were aware of what a thorough 
prosecution of war, regardless of its effects on communities, could 
entail. The fact that many of the villages, whose constables left 
accounts, show that the communities could afford to pay both sides (whilst 
occasionally going into arrears) adds strength to the assertion. The 
point that, despite the constant presence of garrisons manned by both 
sides and two rival war efforts, there were no clubman risings in the 
counties, also indicates that the systems, if not popular, were at least 
tolerable for the largely rural communities upon which they were imposed. 
The study of the county commissioners reveals that the number of 
activists was quite small. Of the royalist commissioners appointed, a 
mere 58% of them were activists, and of the parliamentarian committeemen, 
75.6%. The reasons for the higher proportion of parliamentarian 
activists, chiefly that parliament made its choices once the war had begun 
and could therefore choose potentially active supporters, have been dealt 
with. But this leaves us with no less than 19.5% of appointees to either 
the commissions or the committees who did not take part in the system and 
for whom there appears no reason such as death, disqualification or 
service elsewhere. These men were either passive supporters or more 
likely, men who attempted to maintain a certain distance from the war. 
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These neutrals were the victims of both sides and friends of none, subject 
to financial exactions by both sides during the war and by parliament once 
it was over. If the number of almost 20% does not seem particularly high, 
it must be remembered these were men thought to be dependable supporters 
of one cause or another by those who nominated them. If these men 
remained neutral, those who were not specifically chosen were more likely 
to hold a neutralist attitude or desire merely for self preservation 
during a war in which neither side could attract their active support. 
Yet the figures also show the degree of commitment shown by those 
who did become activists for both parties. Families were willing to risk 
their fortunes in the name of a cause. The numbers of heads of families 
or eldest sons who were active indicate that personal and familial 
commitment was high. Risking not only personal fortunes but the fortunes 
of one's posterity was not an example of flippant opportunism. If it were 
in any way opportunist, then it was a calculated gamble, aimed at 
increasing territorial or political stakes in the community. It is more 
likely, however, that there was a degree of political commitment involved 
and it was this that impelled the activists along their chosen course. 
The royalist war effort in the north midlands met with no small 
success. By the end of 1643, due both to the efforts of its own army and 
that of the Marquis of Newcastle, the royalist war machine came to 
dominate the region. During this period, it not only maintained its own 
growing forces (regiments of Freshville, Eyre and Milward were added at 
this time), but also catered for the Marquis' forces until January 1644. 
Though local disputes and shortages were experienced, the area could 
finance its own army in the field as it did during the relief of Newark. 
The royalists in the north midlands could not raise sufficient troops to 
undertake such a project on their own but neither could their opponents; 
the parliamentarian force at Newark was composed, in part, of regiments 
from outside the region. Hastings never felt confident of his regional 
army's ability to storm the key towns of Derby, Leicester, Nottingham or 
Stafford but he practised the cheaper expedient of denying those places of 
a constant income. It was, then, a limited success, weakened as much by 
lack of forethought on the part of Hastings' superiors as by anything 
else. 
Hastings' greatest problem from the beginning of 1643, and for the 
ensuing eighteen months was, paradoxically, his own success. His ability 
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to raise an army meant that his regiments were constantly required to 
bolster up less successful royalists elsewhere. He helped Capel in the 
west in 1643, Byron in Cheshire and the Lincolnshire royalists at various 
times. In 1644, he was expected to send troops into the north whilst the 
Oxford royalists did little to protect his rear. At least one regiment 
was taken away by the Oxford Field Army. The result was that often his 
forces were scattered and incapable of suppressing problems within the 
north midlands area. The success of the regional financial system led to 
the absurd situation in May 1644, when the area was used as a feeding 
ground by both Goring and the Northern Horse and Rupert's army, whilst at 
the same time providing regiments for both. The result of this dual drain 
was catastrophic. Hastings appeared confident of mustering a small field 
force in July 1644, but only a victory in the north could have saved the 
north midlands. Economic recovery would have required time and the return 
of the regiments sent with Rupert and Goring. The defeat on Marston Moor 
deprived it of both. 
Left on its own, the north midlands royalist war effort had 
provided for the army, which in this thesis had been termed the North 
Midlands Army. This force was, for much of the time, in garrisons 
performing a task roughly equivalent. to that of an armed police force. 
Parts of it would aid in tax collection, guarding convoys and stopping 
carriers to ensure that they were not trading with enemy garrison, as well 
as the purely military tasks of raiding enemy billets and attacking their 
convoys. Whenever necessary, the army could unite in missions to outside 
areas or to act in their own territory as they did successfully at Newark 
or fatally as at Denton. 
The army was officered by men drawn from quite a wide social 
spectrum. Within this officer corps, involvement of the nobility was 
limited, although Hastings and Fitzherbert were of noble birth and in a 
way, they were both representing their fathers. The majority of the field 
officers were esquires but only a small proportion were titled gentry. 
The regimental ranks were peopled by men of very low gentry standing or 
below. There were also the occasional tradesmen, vintners, and shoemakers 
ranking as high as captain. For the most part the regimental officers had 
little to lose by their involvement in the war, unlike the majority of 
their field officers or, more particularly the commissioners of array. 
Conversely they could expect some gains, estates or even minor county 
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office, which, without the 'locomotive of war' they would ordinarily have 
been denied. As it was, they fought for the wrong side and defeat in 1646 
resulted in some of them being fined. It would appear that the majority 
had little wealth upon which to base a fine, either as a result of 
impecunity brought on by war time expenditure or simply because they were 
of generally impoverished origins. Even if their financial loss had been 
slight, defeat denied them the opportunities for any form of reward for 
their services. The return of the monarchy, fourteen years later, did 
not, for the majority, change this circumstance. Seven thousand officers 
who fought for Charles I and his son and who were considered indigent in 
1663, were presented with a meagre £60,000; this, even if divided 
equally, would give them a mere £8-10s each - hardly fit reward for 
staking their pitiful all on the King's cause, and no substitute for lost 
opportunities, which had been as mirages before their eyes. For them the 
war was a means of social advancement which had failed to materialise. 
The royalist war effort in the north midlands was in the hands of 
two distinct groups of men. On the one hand it involved men determined to 
preserve the counties and their communities from the effects of the war; 
on the other it embraced an element of men who wished to increase their 
stake in that society. These men saw the war, and the fighting of it, as 
a vehicle of social advancement. To gain the advantage from it, the 
vehicle had to be driven hard; victory in the war was essential, and it 
must be a military, as opposed to a negotiated, victory. In short, it 
must be one in which these opportunists were seen to play a crucial role, 
a part deserving reward. This brought men like Thomas Leveson into 
conflict with the commissioners and led to the infighting between the two 
elements of the war effort; thus were the swordsmen of the region at odds 
with the administration. Leveson, in particular, was reluctant to do the 
bidding of the commissioners unless ordered to do so by the leading 
swordsman, Rupert. The command of the north midlands never passed into 
the hands of a local man selected purely on his military prowess, as did 
occur in other regions. Hastings, the representative of the great 
magnate, the Earl of Huntingdon, had sufficient ability to ensure that 
this never happened. He himself was never a pure swordsman despite his 
military tenacity evidenced whilst holding on to Ashby in the dark days of 
January 1643 and in his ability to lead effective cavalry charges at 
Hopton Heath and the relief of Newark. Hastings also possessed experience 
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of local government and came from a family with long experience of 
dominating political affairs in Leicestershire as well as being involved 
heavily in the affairs of adjacent counties. The result was that Hastings 
came into conflict with those who had risen in the royalist war effort 
simply due to their military abilities, notably Leveson and Lucas, but 
also Richard Bagot, who, though from a family with experience of local 
government, was a younger son and owed his preferment to his military 
aptitude. When Richard's elder brother, Harvey, succeeded him to the 
governorship of Lichfield he did so by dint of military effort and 
Hastings' preferment. Yet at the end of 1645, he resented Hastings' 
administrative power over his running of the garrison at Lichfield, and 
threw the Lieutenant General out of Lichfield. It is likely that Harvey 
had become very much a swordsman during the war and the expulsion of 
Hastings was perhaps the final act of the swordsman versus administrator 
conflict in the midlands. 
Thus we have the picture of the north midlands at war. A royalist 
war effort run by local men, several of whom had experience of county 
government gained before the outbreak of war. They ran a pseudo legal 
system of taxation, along what was as near to traditional lines as they 
found possible. This system was able to support an army more than capable 
of maintaining control of the region as long as the time all or part of it 
spent outside was kept to a minimum. The war effort collapsed, not 
because of internal strife between the commissioners and officers, 
although these wrangles did nothing to strengthen the system, but because 
of the gross misuse of the territory's resources by central command. 
It is time to turn to the wider aspects of the war and the 
implications which this work had on our understanding of it. The 
financial administration of the north midlands shows that such a system 
was not only possible but viable in an area subject to parliamentarian 
incursion as well as a low level parliamentarian presence. Though the 
constant necessity for a large army within its borders meant that the area 
could not provide for the royalists in the same manner as the relatively 
trouble free Eastern Association could provide for parliament, it does 
indicate that self sufficiency could be achieved. This had implications 
for the royalist cause as a whole. It indicates that, despite not 
possessing the financial might of London, the royalists need not have been 
at a great financial disadvantage compared with parliament. The potential 
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for financing the war effort was within royalist grasp. The reasons for 
their defeat were not entirely financial. Even a flawed collection system 
such as that in the north midlands at the end of 1643 and the early months 
of the following year, could generate enough income not only to function, 
but also to expand. 
County studies have obscured any picture of an overall royalist 
strategy; this study has indicated that there never was one. Whilst 
regional royalist administration was not pragmatic, royalist strategy was. 
Though the original error of draining the north midlands of royalist 
activists in the autumn of 1642 was rectified during the ensuing winter, 
no serious attempt made to help Hastings fully secure his territory was 
ever pushed to a conclusion. Rupert's intervention in April 1643 was 
curtailed as soon as Lichfield was recovered. The Queen's army's 
potential for reducing Derby at the very least, in July 1643, was never 
realised as she marched it away to join her husband, covetous as he was 
for not only his wife but for the soldiers and weapons she had with her. 
Even the Marquis of Newcastle's portentous intervention in late 1643 was 
left unfinished. Again in March 1644, Rupert's march through the region 
ended almost immediately after he and Hastings had relieved Newark. In 
each of these cases the four county towns in parliamentarian possession 
were left virtually undisturbed. Yet had any of these towns been taken by 
one of the royalist commanders who entered the region, the royalist cause, 
as a whole, would have benefited greatly from the enhanced income and 
stability that increased territorial control would have brought. 
The constant drain on the resources of the north midlands war 
effort reveals a piecemeal attitude to the prosecution of the war. It 
made the counties less stable than they could have been, leaving the 
system open to disruption by the local parliamentarians. Conflicting 
instructions which meant that Hastings could not always utilise his full 
potential to tackle any of the military ventures he was ordered to 
undertake outside his own region limited his chances of success. In the 
end, the failure of the Oxford politicians to placate the Scots resulted 
in their entering the war, with devastating consequences. The greatest 
potential for royalist victory was perhaps the period at the end of 1643, 
when the Marquis of Newcastle's forces were in the north midlands. Had it 
proved possible to use this sizable army in the south, the history of the 
civil war might have been very different. However the entry of the Scots 
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rendered this impossible. Newcastle's departure and the subsequent 
collapse of the royalist north resulted in the great Northern Army's 
incapacitation and the necessity for its rescue. Hastings cannot shoulder 
the blame for Bellasyse's defeat at Selby; the commander he instructed to 
march into Yorkshire sought, and possibly received, Rupert's permission 
not to do so. Hastings obviously could not move north himself as this 
would have left his eastern flank under threat and involved him in 
conflict with a force at least equal to his total field army under a 
proven daunting adversary, Thomas Fairfax. The additionalerror of the 
central command, that of draining the north midlands of resources to 
provide for the relief forces of both Rupert and Goring, effectively made 
the region dependent upon a victory in the north. This was not an act 
commensurate with the pursuance of a long term war. Rather it was akin to 
the mentality of autumn 1642, when the war was envisaged as a short, sharp 
shock. The lesson of Edgehill and the ensuing few months had not been 
learned. The royalists had not fully understood that the war was a long 
term feature and which should have been conducted accordingly, not by 
means of a series of pragmatic and damaging measures. 
Despite the deluge which followed Marston Moor, the north midlands 
royalists maintained a grip sufficient to provide resources for the large 
garrisons left to them after the summer of 1644. Any chance of a 
rennaissance was the prerogative of an outside field force. When such an 
intervention occurred in May 1645, the north midlands royalists showed 
themselves more than willing and able to resurrect their war effort. Even 
the lesser interventions of Charles' miniscule army in the following 
autumn showed such potential. Yet little genuine success was achieved at 
perceiving the war in long term aims and objectives and no serious attempt 
was made to re-establish royalist power bases in either the north or the 
north midlands. Just as Peter Newman revealed that the potential to 
regain the northern counties for the royalist cause existed, this thesis 
indicates that this was equally true of the north midlands. 
The collapse of the north midlands royalist war effort, then, gives 
us an insight into the defeat of the royalists in the first civil war. 
The decline of Hastings' command, was due largely to the activities of 
outside influences; royalist malpractise and parliamentarian military 
supremacy gained as a result of that malpractise and the intervention of 
the Scots in January 1644. For there to be any truth in Huttons' 
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assertion that the royalists were defeated by a popular antipathy to the 
war as a whole, then this antipathy must be seen as a final nail in a 
coffin that had already been made. The mortal blow to the royalists came, 
this work would indicate, as a result of the absence of a general strategy 
which brought about a pragmatic military effort which led to military 
defeat. This defeat had little to do with the way the finances of the 
royalist war effort were run at the local level. Parliament's victory was 
won largely on the field of battle, not in the field of economics, where 
they fared little, if at all, better than their adversaries. 
Finally this thesis, through its study of the royalist activists, 
has revealed that the royalist cause appealed not simply to the upper 
ranks of society, who in any case tended to lay fairly low. Active 
support came equally, if not more so, from the lower reaches of the gentry 
and below. Men of low social standing were inspired to stake their all on 
the cause of Charles I. If Joyce Malcolm is right to say that the 
royalists at Oxford saw themselves as purely a social elite, they were 
mistaken to do so. The cause did appeal to lower social groups. 
Hastings' army may have had too many officers, but they were not alone in 
their desire to fight for the King. Beneath them were soldiers ready to 
fight and die for Charles I, on the fields of Hopton Heath, Marston Moor 
and Naseby. Moreover, the scuffles which broke out at Ashby de la Zouch 
in 1646, when Hastings chose to surrender, reveal that many of the 
soldiers wished, even then, to fight on. It was a pity, for them, that 
the Oxford command was not worthy of their trust and loyalty. 
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Notes to the Appendices 
These are not intended to be comprehensive biographies. They are only 
guides to the information used in compiling the statistics presented in 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 
Personal detail abbreviations 
b= born; d= died; m= married; s= son of, ie 2s = second son of; 
bro = brother of 
DL ý Deputy Lieutenant; HS = High Sheriff; JP = Justice of the Peace; 
MP = Member of Parliament. In each case, if known, these are followed by 
the last two digits of the year office commenced 
Ox = Oxford Univ.; Ca = Cambridge Univ. These are followed by year of 
entry or matriculation whichever is known. Then if appropriate degree and 
year; Fel com = fellow commoner; pleb = plebeian; siz = sizar; 
sch = scholar; pens = pensioner 
RC = Roman Catholic 
Source details 
AO; Foster J., ed, Alumni Oxonienses, 1500-1714 , Kraus, 1968 AC; Venn, eds., Alumni Cantabrigienses, 4 vols, Cambridge, 1922-7 
BL; British Library 
Black Docquets; Black W., 'Docquets of Letters Patent', unpub. PRO 
Bod Lib; Bodleian Library, Oxford 
CCAM; Calendar of the Committee for Advance of Money, Kraus, 1968 
CCC; Calendar for the Committee of Compounding, Kraus, 1968 
CSPD; Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series, Kraus, 1968 
DNB; Dictionary of National Biography 
Dore; Dore R. N., The Letter Books of Sir William Brereton, vol. 1,1984. 
DV; Dugdale W., The Visitation of Derbyshire, 1663, London, 1879 
FH 133; Northamptonshire County Record Office, Finch Hatton Mss 133, 
Dugdales Transcripts of Commissioners and Committeemen 
Glover; Glover S., The History of, Gazetteer and Directory of 
Derbyshire, Derby, 1826 
Hutchinson; Hutchinson L., The Life of John Hutchinson, Oxford, 1973 
JHC; Journal of the House of Commons 
JTB; Brighton J. T., Royalists and Roundheads in Derbyshire, Bakewell, 
1981 
HMC Hastings; Historical Manuscripts Commission Report on the Papers of 
Reginald Rawdon Hastings, HMSO, 1930 
HMC Portland; Historical Manuscripts Commission Thirteenth Report The 
Manuscripts of the Duke of Portland, HMSO, 1891 
GA; Foster J., Rylands W., Grantees of Arms, Harleain Society, 1915 
GEC; GEC, The Complete Baronetage, Exeter, 1902 
VL; Fetherstone F. S. A., The Visitation of the County of Leicester, 1619 
Harleain Society, 1870 
Metcalfe Knights; Metcalfe W. C., A Book of Knights, 1426-1600, London, 1885 
PN; Newman P., Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642-1660, 
Garland, 1981 
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NV; Marshall G., The Visitations of the County of Nottingham, in the 
Years 1569 and 1614, Harleian Society, 1871 
Prest; Prest W., The Inns of Court Under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts, 
Longman, 1972 
RS; Harleain Mss, 984, The Notebook of Richard Symonds 
RV; The Visitation of the County of Rutland, Harleian Society, 1870 
IR; Peacock ed. Index of the Name of the Royalists whose estates were 
confiscated in the Commonwealth, Index Society, 1878 
Shaw; Shaw S., The History of the County of Staffordshire, EP, 1976 
Symonds Diary; Long E. R., Symonds' Diary of the Marches of the Kings Army, 
Harleian Society, 1859 
SP; Armytage G., Rylands D., Staffordshire Pedigrees, Harleian Soc. 1912 
Thoresby; Thoresby, The Antiquities of the County of Nottinghamshire, 
EP, 1972 
Wood; Wood A., Nottinghamshire in the Civil War, SR, 1971 
Wright; Wright J., The History and Antiquities of the County of Rutland, 
EP, 1973 
Young Edgehill; Young P., Edgehill 1642, Roundwood Press, 1967 
Young Naseby; Young P., Naseby 1645, Century Press, 1985 
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APPENDIX ONE 
THE COMMISSIONERS OF ARRAY 
DERBYSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
Simon Avery, Bart, Eggington, 1603-1649 
1s, John. App. 27/6/42,21112/43 
b Northants; JP; MP (Leics) 40, Ox, Wadham 18; MT 20; Bt 41; 
At Oxford part of war, Newcastle's sixth Derbyshire Colonel, but served in 
Oxford Parliament. Receiver of Duchy of Lancaster, 1643 onwards. 
Comp, for Eggington Estates. Assessed at £2,000,1645. 
Sources, FH133; AO, 475; CCC, 2448; DV 13; CCAM, 1096; SP 16/405, 
Fisher F, 'The Every Family and the Civil War' DAJ 74,1954, JTB, 23 
John Bullock, Esq, Underwood, Darley and Norton 
is John; JP 11 24 26; HS 16; 
signed '41 petition to King from Derbys. 
Comp, 49; Assessed at £800, Seq for non payment, 1650 
Sources, FH133; CCC, 1132; CCAM, 1068; PRO, CH 193/12; SP, 16/405; 
JTB, 16 
Christopher Fullwood, Esq, Middleton by Youlgrave, 1590-1643 
Is, Sir George, of Holborn, App, 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
Grays, 28; JP 28 36. 
Described as an opponent of Puritan element at Grays. Enlisted in King's 
Lifeguard in 42, Wounded Nottingham Feb, 43. Died at Caulton, Staffs. 
Estate confiscated. 
Sources; FH133; SP 16/405; JTB, 27; Glover, 1, app, 76; Prest, 215. 
Sir John Fitzherbert Kt, Norbury, ? -1649 
Is, Anthony, 17th Lord Norbury, App, 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
JP 26; HS 26; DL 42; (44), Col of H+F; KT 24. 
Roman Catholic. In Stafford garrison in early 1643, at Tutbury 
subsequently, see chapters 5 and 6. 
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Sources; HMC Hastings, 2,91,116,117; RS, 95; CCC, 1598; CCAM, 864; 
Metcalfe Knights, 183; Gell B, 74; FH133; PRO Sheriffs, 31; C193/12; 
Black Docquets, 70; PN, no. 519; JTB, 25; BL Harl Mss, 6852, fl; Gardiner, 
Documents, 279. 
John Freshville, Esq, Staveley, 1607-1682. 
is Peter, App, 27/6/42,21/12/43; 
Ox Magdalene 21; MT 24; MP shire 28; DL 39-40; (MP, 61, Baron 44) see 
Chapters 4,5,6. 
Sources; DRO Gresley, 803m, ff93-97; Derby Gent, 21; HMC Portland, 1,141; 
CSPD, 63-64,226,64-65,73,527; 
. 
EN, 568; GEC Peerage, V, 578-579; Black 
Docquets, 68; RS, f93; DV, 14; JBT, 26,72; GA, 94, AO, 532; FH133 
Sir John_Harpur, Bart, Swarkstone, 1602-1677. 
is Sir Richard, App, 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
Ox Brasenose, 16; JP 36; HS 36; KT 39. 
Comp, Nov 45, Fined £4,583, reduced to £4,000, Assessed, 47, at 1/20th 
Reputed to be richest man in county. Fortified Swarkstone 43, Gov, Burton 
on Trent, July 43 - ? Jan 44. Gave up arms, Aug 44, back in service by 
Naseby, gave up again Nov 45. See Chapters 4,5,6. 
Sources; AO, 625; GEC Barts, II, 2; FH133; CCC, 1921,2107; CCAM, 650-651; 
CJ, II, 662; 10, col. 63; DV, 28; RS, 94; JBT, 32,70; PN, no. 683 
Henry Hastings, Esq, Oakthorpe, Leics, Ashby de la Zouch. 1609-1667. 
2s 5th Earl Huntingdon; App, 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
Ca Queens, 27; DL Leics 38, see Chapters 1,2,4,5,6,7 (and relevant 
footnotes). 
Sources; RS f9lb; AC 2,329; HMC Hastings, 2,83-153; FH133; Dugdale 
Ms 19; Black Docquets, 95,120; Harls Mss, 2043, f26; GEC Peerage, VIII, 
166-168; Luke, 192; Symonds Diary, 176,178,181,184; HMC Portland, 1, 
280; Warburton, 294,297,445,501,503,504,505; 10 co. 187; PN, 691; 
CSPD, 1663-1664,289; DNB; Bennett M., Lord Loughborough, Ashby de la 
Zouch and the English Civil War, Ashby Museum, 1984, 'Henry Hastings and 
the Flying Army of Ashby de la Zouch', Transactions of the Leicestershire 
Archaeological Society, LVI, 1980-1981. 
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Sir Andrew Kniverton, Bart; Bradley, ? -1669. 
is Sir Gilbert, App 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
seq, 46-51; Ass 5th and 20th, cut to £150, in 1648. Died ruined sold all 
estates. 
Col. of H+F Governor of Tutbury, March 1643-Jan 1646. See Chapters 2,4, 
5,6,7. 
Sources;. FH133; Symonds Diary, 175; HMC Hastings, 2,132; CCC, 1578; 
CCAM, 865; GEC Barts, I, 51; RS, 926; 10 col. 180; PN, no. 842; JBT, 34,71 
Sir Thomas Milvard, Kt, Eaton, 1575-1658. 
is William, App 21/12/43. 
Ox Baliol 1591; BA 95; MA 1600; Kt 38; Lord Chief Justice of Chester. 
Comp, 1646,49, fined, £360 at 1/3rd, 1651 assessed at £100. 
Sources; FH133; DV, 1; CCC, 1464; CCAM, 1375; JBT, 39. 
John Milvard (Melvard), Esq, Snitterton, Eaton, 1599-1670. 
2s John, of Ash; HS 35, App 27/6/42 
Col H+F, based at Chatsworth, fought at Marston Moor, laid down arms after 
battle. See Chapters 2,4,5,6. DL 1660; MP Derbys, 1660s. 
Comp, fined £1,000. 
Sources; RS, f95; CCC, 1025; 10, col. 195; HMC Poll Gell Mss, 390; R0, 
Sheriffs, 31; FH133; PRO, MPs, 521; PN, no. 980; JBT, 38,72. 
Sir Eduard Vernon, Kt, Sudbury (Houndshill Staffs), 1585-1657. 
is Walter; App 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
Ox Baliol 02; BA 06; MA 09; Kt 24; HS 27; JP 36; DL 40-42. 
Comp, 45. 
Sources; FH133; CCC, 1038; SP 16/405; Petition of the Derbyshire Gentry 
DAJ, XIX, 22; JTB, 48. 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
John Allard, Esq; Foston. 
2s William, heir of brother Henry; App, 27/6/42,21/12/43. 
HS 39; (JP 55, Committee of Militia, 59; HS 61) 
Only Irish estates sequestered, and those by mistake. 
Sources; FH133; DV, 16; CCC, 2982;, JTB, 13. 
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PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Sir John Harpur of Caulke. HS 42; active in the first month, but 
thereafter avoided all association with cause. The recent aquisition of 
the Harpur/Crewe papers might reveal more but they are not available at 
the time of this thesis being written. See JTB, 33. 
Edward Lore, Esq, Alderwasely; 1592-1653. 
Fined by parliament, £221, plundered by royalists. See JTB, 36 
Sir Henry Willoughby, Bt. 
Though App 27/6/42,21/12/43; DL 1640, appears to have played no role at 
all. FH133. 
Elias Woodroffe, Esq, App 21/12/43. JP, 36? Unidentifiable; FH133. 
LEICESTERSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
George Ashby, Esq; Quenby; 1589-1653. 
is George; App 11/6/42. 
JP 26. 
Sources; FH133; GA, 7; VL, 13; CCC, 110; Nichols, III, 229-300; 
PRO, C193/12. 
Sir John Bale, Kt; Saddington and Carlton; 1594-pre 1650. 
11/6/42,28/11/44 CoP; 
HS 22; DL 40-42; Son William a Lt Colonel. 
Sources; FH133; GA, 12; VL, 142; Nichols, II, 2,539; CCC, 2298. 
Sapcoat, Viscount Beaumont; Coleorton; 1614-1652. 
is Thomas, App 28/11/44, CoP Brought into administration in 43. 
Estates seized in 1650, Assessment in 1651 was £500. Comp 46. Active in 
later stages of war. 
Sources; CCC, 109; VL, 61,121; CCAM, 1046-1047; Black Docquets, 117. 
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Sir Wolstan Dixie, Kt; Market Bosworth; 1576-? 
is John, App 11/6/42,28/11/44, CoP; 
HS 13; MP shire 25; Fell Com Ca, Emanuel 09; Came from a family of London 
Merchants. His son Walter was in the King's Army in the south. 
Sources; FII133; AC, 2,46; VL, 116; CCC, 110; PRO, C193/12; Nichols, IV, 
2,495-507. 
Sir Erasmus de la Fontaine, Kt; Kirkby Bellars. 
App 11/6/42; HS 28-29. 
Arms registered only in 1619; Kt 23; married into Noel family; purchased 
Kirkby Bellars in 03. Family from Essex. 
Seq, 43-45, estate garrisoned by Parliament. Fined £1,000 in 1645. He had 
in 1636 been fined for depopulating parts of his estate. 
Sources; FH133; GA, 73; VL, 4; CCC, 109,3021; Nichols, II, 2,231-232. 
Sir Richard Halford, Kt, Bart; (Edith Weston, Rutland) Wistow, ? -? 1675 
is Edward; App 11/6/44,28/11/44, CoP. 
Ca Christs Pens 13; ? HS Rut 19 31; HS Leics 20; DL 40-42; BT 41; KT 42. 
Imprisoned 1640, for slandering Sir Arthur Hesilridge. Claimed in 1644 
that he withdrew from CoA as soon as he heard it was illegal. Not 
believed, fined £2,000, £3,000 worth of his estate had already been sold 
by parliament during the war. 
Sources; CCC, 109,835-837; AC, 2,285; VL, 144; Nichols, II, 1,869-870 
Henry Hastings, Esq; SEE DERBYSHIRE 
Henry Hastings, Esq, Humberstone, 1578-1649. 
2s Walter (brother of 3rd, 4th Earl of Huntingdon); App 11/6/42; accused 
of being a Roman Catholic. Ox, Lincoln Coll 93; Grays 95; MP shire 01 
04-11 24-25 26. In 1643 brought onto Commission of the Peace. In 1643, 
whilst at Ashby laid about a sentry with his cane. 
Comp 46. 
Sources; A0,671; CCC, 110; CCAM, 1046; Black Docquets, 112; VL, 73; HMMC 
Hastings, 2,122, Du Pont to Hastings, 28/2/44. 
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John Pate, Esq; Sysonby, c. 1600-1659. 
2s Edward; App 11/6/42. 
Ox, Brasenose 15; MA 18; HS 41; 
Colonel of Horse, One of the earliest activists in the county. One of the 
men Hastings gave a Baronetcy to in 1643 when empowered to award three. 
In 1644 appointed High Sheriff, given responsibility to collect the 
£100,000 loan in 44. See Chapters 2,4,5,6. 
Comp 48, fined £1,120, but Oct 49 increased to 1/3rd at £4,316-13s-6d. 
Sources; RS, 94; FH133; CCC, 110,2032,2033; GEC Barts, II, 214; Black 
Docquets, 95; A0,1125; PN, no. 1098; 10, col. 103; Royal Martyrs, 6; 
Peacock, 82; BL TT E345/2 Surrender of Lichfield Close. 
Eusebus Pelsant, Esq; Cadeby; 1610-?. 
? ls of William; App 28/11/44 CoP. 
(Kt Leicester July 1642) 
Brought in the administration in 1643. 
Sources; CCC, 110; Nichols, IV, 2,578; Black Docquets, 117. 
Sir Richard Roberts, Kt, Sutton Cheney, 1564-1644. 
3s Thomas; App 11/6/42,28/11/44 CoP; 
HS 37. Freeholder in Peatling Magna 30. 
Sons in the North Midlands Army. Despite age appears to have been active. 
Sources; CCC, 110; FH133, VL, 118; Nichols, IV, 2,547. 
Sir Henry Skipworth, Kt Bt; Cotes; 1589-?. 
is William; App 11/6/42,28/11/44, CoP. 
Ca Queens 06; Kt 09; Bt 22; HS 36; JP 26; Gent of Privy Chamber 41. 
At the end of the war moved from one surrendering garrison to another, ie 
was at surrender of Dudley and then Hartlebury. 
Comp 46, fined 1/6th, £1,400; Assessed 51 at £600. 
Sources; FH133, AC, 4,87; CCAM, 1388; CCC, 109,2016; PRO C193/12; 
Nichols, III, 2,368-371. 
Richard Turpin Gent, Knaptoft, 1593-?. 
2s William Kt; App 28/11/44 CoP. 
Ox New Coll 11; Grays 13. 
Three sons died in the King's Army, one of them in Ireland in 1649. 
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Brought into administration in 1643. 
Comp 46 at Oxford and elsewhere, 47 fined 1/6th at £930,48 reduced to 
£666-13s-4d, but had to alienate the Knaptoft estates to cover costs. 
Sources; CCC, 111,1515-1516; Black Docquets, 117; Nichols, IV, 1,217-225 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
Edward Farnham, Esq, Quorn, 1594-1654. 
is Adrian; App 28/11/44 CoP. 
Left Ashby in 1645 during the plague, it is not known how long he had been 
there. Claims was present under duress. Kept prisoner at Leicester. 
Comp 45, fined £480, seq 49 as only paid half. Assessment 48 1/5th 
1/20th £45-12s-Od. Was £950 in debt. 
Sources; CCC, 111,941; CCAM, 785; Nichols, III, 1,97-103. 
Henry 5th Earl of Huntingdon, Ashby de la Zouch, probably took no part in 
the war beyond lending money to the King in 1642. Died Oct 1643. 
See Correspondence in HDIC Hastings Vols 2 and 4. 
Ferdinando 6th Earl of Huntingdon, Ashby de la Zouch, was a 
parliamentarian troop commander in the Battle of Edgehill, then laid down 
his commission. Went into the Ashby garrison only, he said, for his own 
protection. Argued he took no part in royalist councils but did sign 
Oxford Parliament's letter protesting at the intervention of Scots. Acted 
as mediator for the surrender of the castle, 1646. See CCAM, 640; CCC, 
1043. 
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Sir Henry Berkley possibly not even in the county at the time. See 
Nichols, II, 1,400,413. 
Sir Thomas Burton, Bt, Stokeston. 
Paid parliamentarian assessment throughout the war. 
CCAM, 165; Nichols, II, 2,817-820. 
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Theophilus Cave, Barrow 
First appears in the CoP of 1644. Does not seem to have acted on it in any 
capacity. 
Nichols, III, 1,68. 
Sir John Cote, Elston. 
His whereabouts cannot be traced for the war years. 
VL, 94; Nichols, III, 2, App. 4,40. 
Sir William Jones, Kt. 
App 11/6/42. Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133. 
Nathaniel Lucy, Hoton. 
Whereabouts unknown, only appointed to the CoP in 44. 
Nichols, III, 2, App. 4,40. 
Sir Thomas Merry, Kt, Gopsall. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Nichols, III, 2, App. 4,40; IV, 1,855. 
Sir Edmund Reeve, Kt. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Nichols, III, 2, App. 4,40. 
Thomas Rowe (Rooe) Gent, Normanton Turville. 
Son in Kings Army, but Thomas's whereabouts unknown. 
Nichols, IV, 2,1005; III, 2, App. 4,40. 
Sir John SkeffinRton, Kt, Bt, Skeffington. 
Cleared of charges of Royalism by Sir William Brereton. 
Estes in Leicestershire sequestered in 1650, possibly by mistake. 
Nichols, III, 2, App. 4,40; Dore, ed., Letter Books of Sir William 
Brereton, 1, p. 218. 
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John Villiers, Viscount Purbeck, Brooksby. 
Whereabouts unknown though was paying assessments by 1646. 
CCAM, 675; Nichols, III, 1,197-198; III, 2, App. 4,40 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
John Digby, Esq, Mansfield Woodhouse (also estates in Yorks and Staffs) 
is John; App 18/6/42,43,45 (Disputes Commis); HS 42; Kt 42. 
Helped Lord Newark raise troops for the King in 1642. Turned Newark into a 
garrison 1642-3. Candidate for governorship in early 1645. Exempted from 
pardon in the Uxbridge Treaty. Gave up arms Jan 1646. Was involved in 2nd 
Civil War. See Chapters 2,5,6. Assessed at £2,000 in 48. 
Sources; FH133; NV, 168; CCC, 1421; Gardiner Doguements, 279; RCHM, 
Newark, 94,76; CCAM, 435,881-885. 
Sir Gervaise Eyre, Kt (Rampton Derbys), ? -1644. 
is Gervaise; App 18/6/42. 
Gained Rampton by marriage; wounded at the relief of Newark March 1644. 
Died in the garrison May 1644. Had regiment of Horse. 
Sources; F11133; NV, 93; CCC, 2744; Wood, 218; Thoresby, 3,248. 
Richard Byron, Esq, Strelley; 1600-1679. 
3s John of Newstead; App 18/6/42. 
Kt Shrewsbury, Oct 42; Given MA Ox, Nov 42; Governor of Newark 1644-1645. 
Gave up arms c. Sept 45. See Chapters 5,6. Became the second Lord Byron on 
death of brother John. Fined at 1/10th £120. 
Sources; FH133; NV, 11; CCC, 1308; Thoresby, 285; RCHM, Newark, 58-59. 
John, Viscount Chavorth of Armagh; Wiverton, 1600-1644. 
is Sir George Kt; App 9/7/42,43-44, Comm Lincs Notts. 
Ca Persehouse 27; Baron 39. Appears to have submitted to Parl Feb 44, but 
claimed that he died in arms. Had been military active, involved in one of 
the royalist captures of Gainsborough 22/10/43. M daughter of Lord Camden. 
Sources; FH133, A0,265; AC, 1,327; NV, 128; CCC, 1357; RCHM, Newark, 93; 
Wood, 217; CCAM, 181-185; Thoresby, 119. 
279 
Sir Roger Cooper, Kt, Thurgarton, ? -1657. 
is William Esq, App 18/6/42,43-44, Comm Lincs, Notts. 
Ca Trinity 09; Grays 11; Kt 24. House at Thurgarton garrisoned, Cooper was 
captured there in 1644, but finished the war at Newark. 
Fined at 1/6th, £2,256, didn't pay until 50. Assessment in 47 was £1,200, 
in 49 £80. By 1650 estate mortgaged to sum of £2,000. 
Sources; FH133; AC, 1,392; CCC, 1325; CCAM, 281-285,806-807; RCH14, 
Newark, 94; Hutchinson, 1,254. 
Sir Gervaise Clifton, Kt, Bart, Clifton, 1586-1666. 
is George; App 18/6/42,45, Committee for Disputes at Newark. 
Ca St Johns Fell Com 03; MA 12; MP Shire 14 20 24 28 61; MP Nottingham 26; 
MP East Retford 40-43. 
Married 7 times! Shared his time between Newark and Oxford as in the 
Oxford Parliament. Surrendered at Newark. Comp 47 1/3rd £7,625-3s-8d. 
Assessed in 43 £500,47 £7,000,49 sequestered for none payment. 
Sources; FH133, AC, 1,356; GA, 54; NV, 18; CCC, 1318; CCAM, 182,996; 
Thoresby, 1,108; RCHM, Newark, 93; Black Docquets, 187; signature on a 
letter of the Newark commissioner, Brown C., A History of Newark on Trent, 
Newark, 1907,74. 
Thomas Holder, South Wheatley, dead before 1650. 
App 1643-44. Sequestered for being a commissioner, wife inherited the 
estate in 1650 when it was still under sequestration. Was active at Newark 
in 1643-4. 
Sources; CCC, 108,2579; CCAM, 1360; RCHM, Newark, 93-94; Wood, 122. 
Robert Sutton, Esq, Aversham, 1594-1668. 
is Sir William; App 18/6/42,45, Disputes Committee. 
Ca Fell Com Trinity 11; JP 26; DL ? 40-42; MP Shire 24-25,40-43. Zealous 
royalist, created Baron Lexington 1645. Present at surrender of Newark. 
Assessed at £3,000 in 43. 
Sources; FH133, CA, 4,187; NV, 143; CCAM, 436,281-285; RCHM, Newark, 94; 
Brown, op. cit., 74; PRO, C193/12; Black Docquets, 280. 
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Thomas Williamson, Esq, East Markham (Gainsborough Lincs). 
is of Sir Richard of Gainsborough; App 18/6/42. 
Awarded a Baronetcy for efforts in war. Surrendered at Newark. Assessed at 
£100 in 46,48 Lincs estates assessed at £123, already paying £296 pa for 
Notts estates. 
Sources; FH133; DV, 98; CCC, 1039; CCAM, 652. 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
Robert Mellish, Ragnall. 
Claimed at surrender of Newark that he had never been in arms of council. 
Sources; CCC, 108,1249-1350. 
Sir Matther Palmer, Kt, Southwell. 
App 18/6/42; HS 23. 
Said to have been a Lieutenant Colonel but service unknown. 
Sources; FH133; Wood, 217; NRO M946. 
William Staunton (Stanton), Esq, Staunton, dead before 1660. 
is Anthoney, App 45 Committee of Disputes. 
Certainly was a Colonel in Arms but no mention of being a commissioner of 
array. Given an MA at Oxford in Nov 1642. 
Fined £40. Assessed at £800 (1/5th and 1/20th) 
Sources; CCC, 1382; CCAM, 817; PN, no. 1366; RCHM, Newark, 78,94. 
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
John Gregory, Gent, Nottingham, ? -1654. 
Whereabouts unknown, possibly never left Nottingham. 
FH133; Thoresby, 2,41,93. 
Robert Grieves, Gent, Nottingham. 
Possibly a prisoner in Newark, thrown off the Nottinghamshire town council 
for suspected royalism. Fined £40 1646. 
FH133; CCC, 1278; Records of the Borough of Nottingham, 425-431. 
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Richard Grieves, Gent, Beely. 
Probably remained at home, too ill to travel in 1648. 
FH133; CCAM, 995. 
Sir George Lassalls, Kt, Sturton and Gateford, ? -1646. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133; NV, 59; NRO DDA5,343. 
Sir Francis Molynenx, Kt, Bart, Houghton, 1602-1674. 
Whereabouts unknown, brother Roger was Colonel in the North Midlands Army. 
FH133; Thoresby, 2,304. 
Robert Mellish, Ragnall. 
Whereabouts and date of appointment unknown. 
Wood, 220. 
John Nevill, Esq. 
Unidentified. 
F11133. 
Nicholas Stringer, Esq. Sutton on Lound, East Markham. 
CCC, 108, FH133. 
John Woodhelder, Esq. 
Unidentified. 
FH133. 
RUTLAND 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
Bryan Palmes, Esq, Ashwell (also Yorks), 1590-1654. 
is Sir Guy, App 2/7/42. 
Ox Trinity 15; MP Stamford 26; MP Aldborough Yorks 40 (Short Parliament); 
Kt (April) 42; Doctor of Civil Law Ox Nov 42. 
Comp 46, fined 47 at 1/6th £681. Assessed 51 at £200. 
Sources; F11133; AO, 1111; CCC, 316; CCAM, 1388; DNB. 
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Sir Guy Palmes, Kt, Ashwell. 
Father of Bryan, App 2/7/42. 
HS07 17 25; MP Shire 21 23 40 (Short Parl. ) 40 (Long Parl. expelled). 
Fined 47 1/2 at £3,905, reduced 49 to £3,317-13s-4d. Assess 46 £1,500, 
49 £800. 
Sources; FH133; CCC, 1316; CCAM, 429; Black Docquets, 187. 
Richard Wingfield, Esq, Tickencote, 1621-1663. 
is John, App 2/7/42. 
Ox Magdalene 36; Kt July 42; uS 62. 
Claimed that was only a royalist because they had possession of his 
estate. Fined 46 £746; Dec 46 in debt to £3,000, owed Committee for Comp 
£112; Assessed 45 at £1,000. 
Sources; F}1133, AO, 1660; CCC, 1056; CCAM, 559-560; Wright, 124. 
Babtiste Noel, Esq, Langham, 1611-1682. 
is Edward Lord Camden; App 2/7/42. 
Ca 28; MA ?;, MP Shire 28 40 (Short Parl) 40 (Long Parl. expelled); 
succeeded father March 43; Col of Horse, captured 45, released 46; JP 61; 
Lord Lieutenant 60-85. 
Comp 46, Fined £19,558,47 reduced to £11,078. 
Sources; F11133, AC, 3,261; GA, 185; CCC, 946-947; CCAM, 401; PN, no. 1051; 
Black Docquets, 59-60. 
Richard BullinRham, Esq, Ketton, ? -1657. 
is Nicholas; App 2/7/42. 
Ca St Johns 12, BA ? 
At Belvoir Castle. Fined 47,1/2 at £375, reduced to £300 with £50 to the 
church. Claimed could not pay, 48 new fine set at 1/6th £100. Assessed 49 
£200. 
Sources; FH133; AC, 1,252; CCC, 1497; CCAM, 1074. 
Sir Francis Bodenharn, Kt, Ryhall, dead before 1644? 
is Sir William; App 2/7/42. 
Ca Sidney Sussex 01; Grays 03; FHS 14; MP Shire 26; JP 26; Kt 16. 
Estates sequestered for delinquency. 
283 
Sources; FH133; AC, 1,172; CCC, 88-90; Wright, 112; PN, no. 146 passim; 
PRO C193/12. 
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OF NEUTRALS 
Thomas Levett, Esq. 
Unidentified but may be the T Levett who was uS 39. 
FH133. 
STAFFORDSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
Sir Simon Avery, Bart. See under Derbyshire. 
Sir Harvey Bagot, Bt, Blithefield, 1591-1660. 
is Walter; App 26/6/42,6/8/42. 
Ox Trinity 08; JP 26; Bt 27; DL 39; HS 42; MP Shire 28-29 40 (Long Parl. 
expelled). 
In the Lichfield garrison where commission generally sat. His 2nd and 3rd 
sons Harvey and Richard were the governors of the town. Sat at the Oxford 
Parliament also. At surrender of Lichfield. 
Fined 47 2/3rds £1,340, reduced 49 to £1,004-17s. 
Assessed 44 at £2,000,48 at £1,745, had debts of £3,120. 
Sources; FH133; AO, 55; CCC, 1476-1477; CCAM, 420; PRO C193/12; Black 
Docquets, 107; SUUC New Series, XI, 1902. 
George Digbp, Esq; Sandon, 1601-? 
is Everard. App 26/6/42,6/8/42; 45 appointed to Marcher Assoc Com. 
Ox Magdalene 20. Accused of being a papist. Didn't comp, fined £1,440. 
Sources; F11133; AO, 402; CCC, 2043-2044. 
Sir Richard Dyott, Kt, Lichfield, 1590-1659. 
is Anthoney; App 26/6/42,6/8/42. 
Ox Corpus Christi BA 07; IT 15 barrister at law; MP Shire 21-22 24-25; MP 
Lichfield 25 26 28-29 40 (Short Parl); Kt Dublin 35 by Strafford; 
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High Steward of Lichfield. 
Reputed to be a Catholic when in 1640 was in the north with the King. Was 
fanatically anti puritan at the IT. At the surrender of Lichfield despite 
being captured and being held as a prisoner at Shrewsbury in 1645. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 76; A0,483; CCC, 89,547; Prest, 215. 
Thomas Lane, Esq, Bentley, 1572-1660. 
ls? App 26/6/42,6/8/42. 
Active until Sept 45. Family not officially armigerous until 1678 and then 
largely in recognition of John's serves. Thomas' son John was a Colonel in 
the North Midlands Army. Comp 46, fined 1/6th at £225. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 152; GA, 149; CCC, 1424; Staffs Hist Coll, 1910, 
174-189. 
Sir Richard Leveson, KB, Trentham (Littleshall Salop), 1598-1661. 
2s Sir John; App 26/6/42,6/8/42. 
Ox Queens 17; MP Newcastle under Lyme 24-25; MP Salop 26; MP Newcastle 
under Lyme (Long Parl. excluded); JP; KB 26. 
Shared his time between Oxford Parliament, Staffs Commission and fighting 
in Salop. After fall of Shrewsbury was a prisoner for 9 months. Comp 45, 
fine £9,846, abated to £3,846, estate at Trentham ruined when used as a 
parliamentarian garrison, losses thereby claimed to be £24,000. Assessed 
44 at £1,500. 
Sources; FH133; AO, 904; GA, 154; CCC, 990,3264; CCAM, 478; SRO D593 
Papers of Sir Richard Leveson. 
Sir Thomas Littleton, Bart Kt, Hagley (Frankley Worcs), 1594-1650. 
is John, App 26/6/42,6/8/42; Comm of Accounts 44 45. 
Ox Balliol 10; IT 13; Kt 18; Bt 18; HS 41; MP Worcs 21-22 24-25 25 26 40 
(Short Parl. Colonel of Horse and Foot, taken prisoner at Bewdley 44, 
imprisoned in the tower. 
Fined £4,000 in 47; Assessed 44 and 47 at £1,000. 
Sources; FH133, CCC, 863; CCAM, 428,781; Dugdale 19,86; Black Docquets, 
229,264. 
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Sir Edward Littleton, Bt, Pillaton Hall, 1599-1657. 
Ox Brasenose 17; IT 18; Bt 27; JP 34-40; MP Shire 40 (Short Parl) 40 (Long 
Parl); HS 38. 
Shared time between county and Oxford, estate sequestered for much of the 
war. Assessed at £1,000 and goods belonging to him were sold by parliament 
in London. Parliament appointed him to their committees until well into 
1643! 
Sources; FH133; CCC, 2080-2081; CCAM, 356-357; Black Docquets, 108-187. 
GeorRe Parker, Esq, Park Hall Caveswall, 1591-1675. 
2s William of Parwich Derbys; App 6/8/42. 
Ca Jesus Fell Com 09; Solicitor at Law and Clerk of Assize in Staffs. 
Claimed never in arms, fined for Commissioner's post £120. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 182; AC, 3,307; CCC, 1028. 
Sir Edward SeabriRht, Kt Bart (Besford Worcs). 
Spp 26/6/42,6/8/42, Comm for Acc 45; JP 26; Made HS in 44, with 
responsibility for collection of the £100,000 imposed by the Oxford 
Parliament. With E Littleon given power to impress county men into the 
army in 43. Claimed that he only sat on the commission until just after 
Edgehill, bribed witnesses but fined £3,618 in 1650 even though he had 
served as high sheriff in 1649! His activism is not, now in doubt. 
Sources; FH133; CCAM, 671-673; CCC, 2606-2610; PRO C193/12; Black 
Docquets, 108,176,264. 
Sir John SkeffinRton, Kt Bart, Fisherwick, 1582-1651. 
is William; App 6/8/42, Comm Accounts 45. 
Ca Jesus 03; MT 04; Kt 24; MP Newcastle Under Lyme 26; Succeeded to Bt 35; 
HS 37. Parliament found actual proof of his guilt as a warrant with his 
signature came to light- such a find was, and is, rare. 
Fined 1/6th 50, £1,132-12s reduced to E961-18s-8d. 
Sources; FH133, AC, 4,84; CCC, 2207; Black Docquets, 246. 
Ralphe Sneade, Esq, Keele, ? -1650. (Sneyd) 
is Ralph; App 26/6/42,6/8/42. HS 21; MP 42; JP 26. 
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Didn't serve at Oxford Parliament, stayed in Staffs raising troops in Leek 
area in 43-44, held rank of colonel. Fined 46 £2,026, abated to £100, 
finally paid £1,500, assessed at £1,000 in 44,47 at £2,500. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 210; AC, 4,118 passim.; CCC, 1033; CCAM, 433; PRO 
C193/12; HMC Hastings, 2,117. 
Sir Robert Wolesley, Bt, Moreton, ? -1646. 
2s John; App 6/8/42, Marcher Comm 45; Clerk of the Peace Staffs 17-26; 
Clerk of the Patent Office. Given powers to impress men in Staffs 43; 
Estate under sequestration until 1647. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 251; CCC, 1771; Black Docquets, 108; Stephens E., 
Clerks of the Counties, 1360-1960, Newport, 1961,158. 
Walter Wrottesley, Esq, Wrottesley. 
App 26/6/42; DL 34; JP; Bt 42. 
Garrisoned Wrottesley as an outpost of Dudley garrison. Petitioned to 
compound 54. For years he was assumed to have been inactive, but his 
commitment to the cause and activism is obvious. 
Assessed 44 £500,45 £1,500,46 £600. 
Sources; FH133; SRO D948/4/6/2-5; CCC, 1056; Coll for Staffs Hist, New 
Series, VI, 2,306. 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
Walter Chetvynd, Esq, Rugeley, Grendon (also Warwicks estates) 1598-1669 
is Anthoney of Grendon; App 26/6/42,6/8/42. 
Was made HS in 48 but then it was realised that he had furnished 
Lichfield, Dudley and Ashby with iron from his works. His land value was 
only £7 pa, but his iron works were £4,000 pa. Fined 1/10th £464 in 1650. 
This may therefore be a case of an excellent cover up. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 49; AP, 269; CCAM, 1184. 
Thomas Crompton, Esq, Bridgnorth, Stone, 1607-?. 
App 26/6/42,6/8/42; MP Shire 28 53; DL 34; Was at Lichfield during the 
war but this is the only link with the administration. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 64; GA, 66; CCC, 1324 (described as commissioner). 
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PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Thomas Broughton, Broughton. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133; SP, 37; CCAM, 783. 
Richard Bowyer, Esq, Siddow Lane. 
Whereabout unknown. 
FH133. 
Sir John Pershall, Bt, Pershall, 1620-1680? 
Whereabouts unknown though was in the tower 46. Plotted with Robert 
Shirley of Staunton Harold Leics and Ralph Sneade in 1649, with the aimbf 
supporting Charles II. In Staffords Gaol in 1680. 
FH133; SP, 186; CCC, 1207; CCAM, 1371. 
Sir William Powell, Kt, Tutbury. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133; CCC, 1985; CCAM, 1388. 
William Hovard, Viscount Stafford 
2s Earl of Arundel. At Oxford? 
FH133. 
Dr Charles Twisden Dr at Law 
Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133; AO, 1526. 
OTHER CATEGORIES OF COMMISSIONERS NOT SERVING IN THEIR COUNTY 
DEAD OR CAPTURED PRE APRIL 1643 
Thomas Broome Notts; arrested early 1643; FH133; Wood, 217. 
Thomas Calthorp Leic; died early 1643; Nichols, IV, 1,49. 
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Griffin Dybell (Divall) Notts; arrested Jan 43; FH133; Wood, 217. 
Sir John Fitzherbert Kt, Derbys; died in August 1644 ; FH133; Wright, 78. 
Henry Noel 2s of above; died in prison London after being captured by 
Lord Grey in Feb 43, d Jul 43; FH133, Wright, 78. 
Phillip Earl of Chesterfield; Garrisoned Bretby Derbys Nov 42, driven out 
went to Lichfield and in March 43 surrendered it to Gell, he went 
into semi voluntary captivity; FH133; JTB, 45. See Chapter 5. 
ACTIVISTS ELSEWHERE 
Sir Thomas Blackwell, Notts; in the south; PN, no. 126. 
Sir John Byron, Notts, Field Marshall in Cheshire, PN, no. 230. 
William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, Derbys, left the country; 
CCC, 2831; CCAM, 402,996. 
William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, Derbys Notts Staffs; Commander 
of the Northern Army. See Chapters 5,6. 
Sir Henry Griffiths, Staffs; in the north. CCC, 1375; CCAM, 809. 
Sir Christopher Hatton, KB, Rut; At Oxford; FH133; CCC, 1581-1582; 
CCAM, 986,1207. 
Edward Heath, Esq, Rut; At Oxford and in the SW; FH133; Wright, 40. 
Sir John Lamb, Kt; Leics; With the Queen and then at Oxford; FH133; 
Nichols, IV, 1,322, III, 1,748. 
Francis Leke, Lord Deincourt, Derbys; At Oxford; FH133; Toynbee M. ed., 
Strangers in Oxford , Phillimore, 1973,57-58. 
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William Lord Paget, Staffs; At Oxford; FH133; CCC, 872-873. 
Isham Parkyns, Esq; Notts; Governor of Ashby de la Zouch. 
See Chapters 4,5,6. 
Henry Pierrepoint, Viscount Newark, Notts; Active in 42 then in the Oxford 
garrison; FH133; CCC, 1482-1484. 
Thomas, Viscount Saville, Leics; In the north; AC, 4,22. 
Sir William Saville, Bt, Notts; In the north; FH133; CCAM, 436. 
Sir Richard Shilton (Shelton), Kt; In Oxford; FH133; SP, 201. 
Robert Tredway, Esq, Rut; Served as a CoA for Lincs; FH133; CCAM, 1073: 
CCC, 1355. 
PARLIAMENTARIANS 
Joseph Bent, Gent. Leics; CCC, 941-942; Nichols, IV, 1,161. 
Robert Buxton; Served on the Notts council throughout; FH133; 
See Records of the Borough of Nottingham, passim. 
James Chadwick, Esq, Notts; See Notts Committee. 
Sir John Coke, Kt, Derbys; MP Westminster; FH133; JTB, 21. 
William Gregory; Served on Nott Council throughout; Records of the 
Borough of Nottingham, 425-431; FH133. 
Sir Thomas Hartopp, Kt; See Leicestershire Committee. 
Richard Hurdment; Nott; Served on Notts Council throughout; FH133; 
Records of the Borough of Nottingham, 425-431. 
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Sir Thomas Hutchinson, died early 43, father of John Hutchinson 
(See Chapters 3,5,6. Thomas was of like mind to his son; FH133; 
Thoresby, 1,159. 
Sir Edward Leach, Kt, Derbys; In Westminster at HoL; FH133; JTB, 36; 
CCAM, 343. 
Martin Lister, Gent, Leics; MP Westminster. See Parliamentarians 
Active Elsewhere. 
John Manners, Earl of Rutland, Derbys; In HoL; FH133; JBT, 37. 
William Nixe, Notts; served as Mayor of Nottingham 43-45; FH133; 
Records of the Borough of Nottingham, 425-431. 
Gervaise Piggott, Esq; Notts; See Notts Committee. 
Francis Toplady, Notts; Served on Notts Council throughout; FH133; 
Records of the Borough of Nottingham, 425-431. 
Sir George Villiers, Bart, Leics; Stayed in Leicester; FH133; 
Nichols, III, 1,197-198. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
COMWT EEMEN 
FWPRYCATPV 
ACTIVE COMMITTEEMEN 
James Abney, Willesley, 1599-1693. 
is George; App 27/3/43, Delinquents Estates. 
Ca Emanuel 16; IT 19; HS 55; Family possibly Drapers. 
Sources; FH133; GA, 1; JTB, 13,58. 
Ralph Clarke, Brampton ? Ashton; 1599-1661. 
3s Ralph; App 1644- 
Ox 11; IT 16; Was a merchant in Brampton, and father's heir. 
Sources; JTB, 19; DV, 25; GA, 53. 
Sir John Curzon, Bt, Keldeston; 1598-1686. 
is John; App 12/3/42. 
Ox Magdalene 18; IT 20; JP 26; HS 37; DL 40; MP Brackely 28; MP Shire 40 
(Long Parl); Bt 41. Receiver of the Duchy of Lancaster. 
Sources; FH133; PRO C193/12; JTB, 23. 
Sir John Gell, Bt, Hopton; 1593-1671. 
is Thomas; App 12/3/42,27/3/43 Delin Estates; 8/4/43 sequest. 
Ox Magdalene 10; Capt Trained Bands 24; HS 35; JP 38; Bt 42; DL 42. 
Governor of Derby after seizing it in 1642. Relentless but not always 
effective opponent of Hastings. Led one of the factions on the committee; 
in 46 flouted Committee of Both Kingdom's instructions and became 
mistrusted by parliament. See Chapter 5,6. 
Sources; JTB, 27-28,58,62; FH133; AO, 556; GA, 98; JHC, 3,556. 
Sir George Gresley, Bt Kt; Drakelow, 1580-1651. 
is Sir Thomas Kt; App 12/3/42,8/4/43 seq. 
Ox Balliol 94; IT 98; Bt 11; Kt 12; JP 14 24; MP Newcastle under Lyme 
28-29; DL 42; uS 45. Refused to pay ship money in the '30s. Supporter of 
Gell in the committee. Kept a detailed copy book of committee letters. 
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See Chapters 5,6. 
Sources; JTB, 31,58; DRO 830 M29; JHC, 3,454. 
Christopher Horton, Gent, Carleton, 1582-1659. 
is Walter; App 12/3/42. 
Ox Balliol 98; BA 1600; MT 02; HS 40; JP 47. 
Sources; FH133; JTB, 33,58. 
Sir Edward Leach, Kt, Shipley, ? 1570-1656. 
is Robert of Chester; 3/12/42. 
Ox Brasenose BA DCL; Grays, called to the Bar; DL 42; HS 54; JP 54. 
Spent some time at the iloL in the war. 
Sources; F11133; JTB, 36,58. 
Francis Mundy, Esq. Markeaton, 1577-1648. 
is ? Mundy; App 3/13/42. 
Ca Corpus Christi 93; HS 17; DL 42. 
Accused of delinquency by Gell in 46. Cleared. 
Sources; FH133; DV, 2; JTB, 40,58. 
Sir Samuel Sleigh, Kt, Pool and Etwall, Ash, 1603-1670. 
is Gervaise; App 3/12/42. 
Ca Christs Fell Com 21; Grays 23; Kt 41; DL 42; MP Essex 54-56; MP Derbys 
Shire 56-58; Clerk of Peace 44. 
Sources; F11133, JHC, 3,627; DV, 8; GA, 231; JTB, 46,58. 
Edward Charleton, Sandiacre, 1604-1659. 
is Thomas; App 1644-. 
Opposed Gell in 1645. Captured by royalists in 1645. 
Sources; GA, 50; JTB, 19,58. 
Thomas Chalmer 
App 1644- seq. 
Almost unidentifed but seems to have been active at some time after 
appointment. 
Sources: JHC, 3,454. 
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Sir Edward Coke, Bt, Longford, ? -1669. 
is Clement; App 3/13/42,44 seq. 
Bt 41; DL 42; JP 47; HS 46. Opposed to Gell, managed to outvote Cell's 
attempt to have him thrown off the committee. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 4,5; JTB, 22,58. 
Richard Dale, Moneyash, 1591-? 
Younger son of Richard of Flagg and Chelmorton. App 45; receiver for High 
Peak. 
Sources; JTB, 23. 
Robert Eyre; Highlow. 
is Thomas of Highlow; App 8/4/44 seq. Captain of Foot. Active 1644-. 
Garrisoned Wingfield 1644 onwards. JP 58; HS 58. 
Sources; JHC, 3,454; JBT, 25. 
Thomas Gell, Esq, Wirksworth, 1594-1656. 
2s Thomas; App 3/12/42,8/4/44 seq; IT Bar 20; Lawyer; Recorder Derby 40s; 
MP 45; Lt Colonel of Gell's Foot. Brother to Sir John. 
Sources; JHC; 3,454; GA, 98; in, 28-29,58. 
Robert Mellor, Derby, ? 1612-1656. 
is Henry; App 8/4/44 seq. 
Opposed Thomas Gelles election to Parliament in 45. Thereafter opposed to 
the Gell faction on the committee. A mercer by profession. Captain of Foot 
Sources; DJ, 31; JHC, 3,454; JBT, 38. 
Rowland Morewood, Gent, Alfreton. 
is Anthony of Hemsworth; App 1644. 
Captured by Hastings in 1643? Accused of Delinquency in 1646 by Gell but 
cleared. 
Sources; DV, 2; JTB, 40. 
John Mundy, Esq, Markeaton, ? 1601-1681. 
is Francis; App 44-; 
Captain in Derby garrison until 43? then active on the committee. 
Sources; JTB, 40. 
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George Pole, Gent, High Edge, 1604-1674. 
Is George; App 1644- 
Committee member for thirteen years. 
Sources; DV, 4; GA, 202; JTB, 41. 
Francis Revel, Esq. Ogston and Carsthwaite. 
is Edward; App 3/12/42,17/3/43 del est.; DL 42 Nov. 
Charged with desertion and helping the royalists, by Gell. However charges 
did not lead to him being thrown off committee, as he served ten years. 
Sources; FH133; JTB, 42. 
Samuel Roper, Gent, Heanor, 1597-1658. 
is Thomas of Appleby, 1644-. 
Ca Fell Com Emanuel 13-14; Lincolns 16; Colonel of Horse. 
Antiquarian, assisted Dugdale. 
Sources; AC, 3,487; JTB, 43. 
Thomas Saunders, Gent, Little Ireton, 1610-1695. 
is Collingwood; App 1643? was absent for part of time until 44-. 
Educated at Repton and Derby. Bitter enemy of Gell throughout the war. 
Sources; JHC, 3,463; JTB, 43. 
Luke Whittington, Derby. 
App 3/12/42,8/4/44 seq. 
Alderman of Derby; Bailiff 30; Mayor 41,43-44; Receiver of plate 42. 
Sources; JHC, 3,454; FH133; JTB, 48. 
Henry Wigfall, Renishaw, 1583-1651. 
3s Henry of Ridgeway; App 3/12/42,8/4/44 seq. 
Ca Caius 99; DL 42. 
Sources; JHC, 3,454; AC, 4,401; JTB, 48. 
John Wigley, Gent, Wigwell, 1617-? 
is Richard; App 8/4/44 seq. 
Ca Magdalen 34. Married Cell's daughter Bridget. 
Sources; JHC, 3,454; DV, 36; JTB, 49. 
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Nicholas Wilmot, Gent, Chaddesden, 1612-1682. 
3s Robert; App 1645- 
Ox Magdalene 26; Grays 37; Barrister at Law; Kt 79. 
Opposed Gell. Canvassed for Mellor in 45 election. 
Sources; GA, 281; JTB, 49. 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
Robert Allestree, Alveston ? -1665. 
? 3s William. Town Clerk in the 40s. 
BV, 15. 
LEICESTERSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMITTEEMEN 
Evers Armyn, Esq, Leicester, ? -1680. 
is William of Osgodby Lincs. App 3/3/43. 
Ca Sydney Sussex 14; Grays 16; Barrister 22; MP Grantham 25-26; JP ? 
Sources; FI1133; CA, 1,39. 
Thomas Babington, Esq, Rothley Temple, 1612 or 1615-?. 
2s Thomas; App 15/12/42,1/4/43, scandalous ministers 44; Militia comm. 
Ca Lincoln 28; BA 31. Fought? at the siege of Leicester. 
Sources; VL, 206; FH133; AO, 52. 
John Bainbridge (Bembrigg), Esq, Lockington, 1616-?. 
is Thomas; App 1/4/43 seq, scand min, 3/8/43 Money for Army. 
Sources; FH133; VL, 182. 
William Bainbridge (Bembrigg), Esq, Lockington, 1604-1669. 
is John; App 15/12/42,9/9/43 seq, 10/7/44 Militia. 
Ca pens Christs 21. 
Cousin of the above. In charge of the slighting of Ashby do in Zouohin 
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1648-1649. 
Sources; JHC, 3,326; AC, 1,69; VL, 182; Nichols, 3,2, App. 2,31,32,33 
Thomas Beaumont, Staunton Grange. 
3s Thomas; App 15/12/42,17/3/45. 
Ox Wadham 13. 
Sources; VL, 61; FH133; AO, 97. 
Richard Brent, Esq, Enderby, Cosby. 
App 15/12/42,3/8/43 Money for Army. 
Sources; ? VL, 159; FH133; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31-32. 
John Browne, 1589-?. 
App May 45. Militia Com. 
Ox Christ Church 06; BA 10; MA 13. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13; AO, 194. 
Thomas Cotton, Esq, Laughton, 1595-1653. 
is Thomas; App 15/12/42,3/8/43 Money for Army, 17/3/45. 
Ca Trinity Pens 09. 
Sources; JHC, 3,50; VL, 192; CA, 1,404; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38; FH133 
Edmund Craddock, Leicester. 
App 164 Militia Corn 45. 
Alderman, Chamberlain 38-39; Steward of the Fair, 41-42; Mayor 45-46. 
Sources: Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38; Stocks, 601. 
William Danvers, Esq, 1593-? 
App 15/12/42,1/4/43 seq. 3/8/43 Money for Army, 17/3/45. 
Sources; VL, 87; FH133; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38. 
Thomas Goddard, Gent, Peatling Parva, ? Croston, 1617-? 
is William; App 17/3/45. 
Ox Lincoln 34; BA 37. 
Sources; VL, 190; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,41. 
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John Goodman (Goodwyn), Esq. 
App 15/12/42,1/4/43 seq, 3/8/43 Money for Army, 44 Militia. 
Unidentified but active on several committees including that sitting 
during the siege. 
Sources; FH133; BL TT E303/13; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38. 
Valentine Goodman, Gent. 
Militia Comm May 45. Unidentified but active in 45. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,42. 
Theophilus Grey, Esq. 
App 44 Militia Comm. 
Captain in Lord Grey's Foot in the garrison at Leicester. Sometime Gov. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,35. 
Thomas Lord Grey of Groby, Groby, Bradgate Park, 1620-1657. 
is Henry Earl of Stamford; App 15/12/42 and on all subsequent committees 
Commander of the East Midland Association 1643-1644. Assisted at Pride's 
Purge, later became a 5th Monarchist. See Chapters 2,3,4,5,6. 
Sources; See Nichols, 3,2, App. 4; Hollings. 
Francis Hacker, Esq, East Bridgford Notts, ? -1660. 
? Is; App 3/8/43 Money for Army, 44 Militia Comm. 
Brother of Major Rowland Hacker of Hasting's Horse. Captured at Melton in 
1644. Became Colonel of Horse, assisted at King's execution. Executed 1660 
as a regicide. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4, passim.; JHC, 3,50,434,444; DNB. 
Sir Edward Hartopp, Kt, Buckminster, 1608-1657. 
is Sir Edward Bt; App 15/12/42,1/4/43,3/8/43,17/3/45. 
Ca Christs 24; Lincolns 27; Kt 34; Bt succeeded 52. 
Commander of the parliamentarian horse at the siege of Newark 1644 and 
therefore, at the Battle of Cotes. See Chapter 5. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31-33; CA, 2,321; GA, 117; VL, 197; 
Bennett M., 'The Civil War Battle of Cotes', The Leicestershire Historian, 
1984-1985; FH133. 
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Sir Thomas Hartopp, Kt, Burton Lazars, 1600-? 
is Sir William; App 1/4/43 seq, Scand Mins, 3/8/43 Army Money, 45 Militia. 
Ca Queens 16; Grays 19; Kt 24. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38; CA, 2,321; GA, 117; VL, 9,197. 
Thomas HesilriRe, Esq, Nosely. 
2s Thomas; App 15/12/42,1/4/42 Scan Mins, 3/8/43 Money for Army, 
44 Militia. Brother of Sir Arthur. Captured at Melton Mowbray 1644. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4, passim.; VL, 16; FH133. See Chapter 6. 
William Hewitt, Esq, Dunston. 
is William; App 15/12/42,1644 Militia. 
? Ca Christs Fell Com 21; Grays 22. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31; BL TT E303/13, FH133; AC, 2,362. 
Richard Ludlam, Leicester. 
App 15/12/42,3/3/43, seq. 3/8/43 Money for Army, 44 Militia. 
Steward of Fair 37-38; Chamberlain 31-32; Mayor 42-43. Argued with Lord 
Grey and sent as prisoner to Burleigh House. Released March 44. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,226; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38. 
William Nowell, Esq, Wellesborough. 
is William; App 15/2/45 Scots Army pay. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,41; VL, 42. 
Archdale Palmer, Esq, Wanlip, 1612-1673. 
Born in London; App 45. 
Ca Sidney Sussex pens ? 30; MT 31. 
Had been high sheriff at the time of the issue of the commissions of 
array. His dithering allowed royalists to send some warrants out in the 
name of his office. Attempted to arrest Hastings, 23/6/42. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,41; AO, 1173; VL, 106. 
William Quarles 
App 17/3/45 General Committee. Perhaps only active briefly. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,41. 
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Francis Smalley, Gent. 
App Sept 43 added to General Comm, May 45. Active at the time of the siege 
Sources: JHC, 3,226; BL TT E303/13. 
William Sherman, Gent, Newalke Leicester, 1585-? 
App 1/4/43 Scand Mins, 17/3/45 added to the General Comm. 
Ca St Johns Pens 04. 
Sources; VL, 204. 
Henry Smith, Esq, Withicock, 1620-? 
App 44,45. 
Ox Magdalene pleb 38; MP County 45-53. Regicide died in the Tower. 
Sources; AO, 1372; GA, 235; VL, 66; BL TT E303/13. 
Arthur Staveley, Esq, Leicester, 1591-? 
is Thomas of Bignall Oxfords; App 15/12/43,1/4/43 seq; 3/8/43 Money for 
Army, 44 Militia Comm.; HS 45. 
Captured at Melton in 44 with Hacker. See Chapter 5. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38; FH133; JHC, 4,45; VL, 136. 
John Stafford, Esq. 
App May 45. 
Active at the time of the siege. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13. 
William Stanley, Leicester. 
App 15/12/42,3/3/43,1/4/43 seq, 3/8/43 Money for Army, 44 Militia. 
Leic coroner 37-38; Steward of the Fair? 04-05,42-43. Alderman. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13; Stocks, 602; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,38. 
John Swynfen, Gent, Sutton$heney, 1595-? 
is Richard; May 45 Militia. Active at time of the siege. 
Sources; VL, 134; BL TT E303/13. 
Peter Temple, Esq, Temple Hall, Leicester. 
App 15/12/42,1/4/43 seq, 3/8/43 Money for Army, May 44, Militia. 
Burgess 41; HS 43; MP 45. Active until recruiter election of May 45. 
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Regicide. Family were London drapers. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31-33; FH133; JHC, 3,354. 
John Whatton 
App May 45. 
Active at the time of the siege. 
Sources; BL TT E303/13. 
UNCERTAIN CASES 
John St John, Esq, Cold Overton, 1623-? 
App 15/12/42. 
Ox Lincoln 38; Grays 40; Does not appear to have acted 42-45 though 
appears to be considered a member in May 45. 
Sources; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31; FH133. 
Simon Ridgley (Rudgley). 
App 15/12/42,1/4/43 Scand Mins. 
Unidentified, does not appear to have been reappointed after April 43. 
Sources; FH133. 
Sir Roger Smith, Kt. 
App 1/4/43, Scand Mins; May 45 Militia. 
Possibly acitve in 45 but uncertain, was not on a major committee between 
April 43 and May 45 and possibly inactive on the Scandalous Ministers Com. 
Sources; GA, 235; BL TT E303/13. 
William Villiers, Leicester. 
2s Clement. App 3/8/43. 
This was his only appointment. 
Sources; VL, 31; Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,32. 
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PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Robert Bilters, Alderman. 
App 3/7/43 added to the seq comm. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,32. 
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 
ACTIVE COMMITTEE 
Eduard Ayscough, Esq, Nutall, 1590-? 
2s Sir Roger Kt; App 7/5/44. 
Ca Caius 08; Grays 08 called to the bar 17; opposed to Hutchinson in 44. 
Sources; JHL, 4,543; Wood, 126,128,130-131; NV, 77. 
James Chadwick, Esq, Nottingham. 
App 3/12/42,27/3/43 del ests. 
Barrister described as being of low origins but clever; Recorder of 
Nottingham, Stafford and Derby. Opposed Hutchinson in 44. 
Sources; Hutchinson, 142; Wood, 223; FH133. 
John Hooper 
App 17/11/45. 
Had been a captain of foot in the garrison previous to this date. 
Sources; JHC, 4,346; Wood, 223. 
George Hutchinson, Esq, Owthorpe, 1618-? 
2s Sir Thomas Bt; App 3/12/42 and every subsequent committee. 
Brother of Joh, Lt Colonel of his brother's regiment. In charge of the 
garrison on brother's absence. 
Sources; Hutchinson, passim., Wood, 29,32,34,58-61,89-91,124, 
127-128,131,135; F11133. 
John Hutchinson, Esq, Owthorpe, 1615-1664. 
is Sir Thomas; App 3/12/43 and every subsequent committee. 
302 
Ca Fell Com 32; MP Shire 46-53 Nottingham 60 excluded. 
Governor of the Castle and town 1643. Seized Nottingham at end of 42. See 
Chapters 2,3,4,5,6. Died in prison at Jersey. 
Sources; Hutchinson; Wood. 
Henry Ireton, Esq, Attenborough, Nottingham, 1610-1651. 
is German: App 22/2/43,27/3/43 del ests. 
Ox Trinity 28; BA 29; MT 29. 
Married Cromwell's daugher Bridgit. Active in Notts until 44. Commissary 
General of New Model at Naseby. Politically active in the army 47-49. 
Regicide; Lord Deputy of Ireland 50, died at Limerick. 
Sources; FH133; AO, 789; JHC, 4,346; See Chapter 6. Wood, 12-13,15,27, 
32,34-36,47,51,93,124,126,128,135,156,158,192; Hutchinson, 
passim.; Young, Naseby, passim. 
John James, Nottingham. 
App 27/3/42 Del Est, 17/11/45. 
Alderman; Mayor 34-35 41-42; Lucy Hutchinson described him as being the 
only parliamentarian of 7 Aldermen. 
Sources; JHC, 4,246; Wood, 15-16,35,124,128-9,133; Hutchinson, 1,69. 
Gervaise Lomax (Lommas, Lomas), Thrumpington, 1607-? 
App 17/11/45. 
Ca Christs pens 24; Captain of Foot. 
Sources; JHC, 4,346; Wood, 32,124,127-128,130-131. 
John Mason, Nottingham. 
App 1644. Rebel on the committee in 44. Captain of Foot. 
Sources; Wood, 126-128,133-134,164,166. 
Gilbert Millington, Felley Abbey, ? 1598-1666. 
App 27/3/43 del est; Barrister; MP ?; Rebel on the committee in 44. 
Sources; Wood, 11,16,25,34,61,90,111,124,127,130-131,156-157, 
175,180-181,183,197; FH133. 
303 
William Nixe, Nottingham, 1590-1650. 
App 14/10/44. 
Alderman; Mayor 36-37 43-44. 
Captain of Foot until 43. Opposed Hutchinson in 44. 
Sources; Wood, 32,124-126; Hutchinson, 75; FH133. 
Richard Pendock, Gent, Tollerton, 1595-? 
is John; App June 1645. 
Active after the county was absorbed into the Northern Association. 
Sources; Wood, 34,126,128-129,131; Firth and Rait, 1,703-714. NV, 107. 
Francis Pierrepoint, Esq, Nottingham, ? -1658. 
3s Robert, Earl of Kingston; App 3/12/42,17/3/43 del ests. 
Only noble representative on the committee; became MP for the town in the 
recruiter elections of 1645. 
Sources; Hutchinson, passim.; Wood, 16,29,32,34,38,50,54,95,124, 
127-130,135,140,144,157,161,164,171,176; DV, 56; FH133. 
Gervaise Pigott, Esq, Thrumpington, 1616-1669. 
is Gervaise; App 15/12/42. 
Ca St Catherine's then Christs Fell Com 32; Lincolns 34; JP ?. 
Sources; Wood, 25,34,124,128,130-131; Firth and Rait, 49-51; 
Hutchinson, 73,74,136,141,145. 
Dr Huntingdon Plumtree, Nottingham, 1601-1660. 
is Henry; App 22/2/43,27/3/43 del ests. 
Ca St Johns 20; BA Trinity; MA 26; D Med St Johns 31. 
Possibly gave up his parliamentarianism in 1643. 
Sources; A0,1173, AC, 3,374; FH133; Wood, 124,128-129,131; Hutchinson, 
26,74,98,149. 
Henry Sacheverill, Radcliffe or Reresby. 
? Is Henry of Radcliffe or is of Raffe of Reresby; App 3/12/42. 
Sources; FH133; NV, 165. 
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Thomas Salisbury, Gent, Nottingham. 
App 27/11/43. 
Secretary and treasurer to the committee. Opposed Hutchinson in 44. 
Sources; JHC, 3,322; FH133; Hutchinson, 73,74,105,120,135,139,144, 
152,153. 
Clement Spelman, Gent, Narborough Norfolk, ? 1598-1679. 
4s Sir Henry of Longham, App June 45. 
Ca Queens Pens 11; Grays 13; Barrister 24; Bencher 60. 
No lands in Notts until the war. Only on the committee after the county 
became part of the Northern Association. 
Sources; Firth and Rait, 1,703-714; Wood, 126,128,130,131. 
Francis Thornhaugh, Esq, Fenton and Gotham, 1622-1648. 
is Sir Francis; App 3/12/42,27/3/43. 
Ox Magdalene 35; IT 37; HS 43; MP East Retford 46-48. 
Killed at Preston in 48. Col of Horse regiment at Cotes. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,354; AO, 1480; GA, 252; NV, 70; Wood, 34-36, 
77-78,85-88. 
Sir Francis Thornhaugh, Kt, Fenton, 1593-1643. 
is John; App 3/12/42,27/3/43, del ests. 
Ca Fell Com Emanuel 06; Lincolns 09; IHS 37; DL 27; Kt 15. 
Father of above. Though died 43 did help put the committee into action. 
Sources: FH133; AC, 3,231; GA, 252; NV, 70; Wood, 11,32,34,38,124, 
126,135. 
Sir Hardolph Watneys, Kt (Wastneys), Hedon. 
is Gervaise; App 3/12/42. 
May have been passive supporter after initial stages. 
Sources; FH133; Wood, 124-125,171. 
Charles White, Esq. Newthorpe. 
App 2/12/42,27/11/43 seqs, 27/3/43 Del Est. 
Raised troop of Dragoons became captain, later colonel. 
? Ca Sidney Sussex pens 24. 
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Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,322; CA, 4,386; Wood, 32,38,57-58,124, 
127-128,130,132,148-150,164-166,176-177,181,202. 
Joseph Widmerpool, Esq, Widmerpool. 
2s George; App 27/11/43 seq, 2/12/42,27/3/43 del est. 
Sources; FH133; Hutchinson, 73,74,104,136,150,184. 
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Nicholas Charlton, Chilwell. 
App June 1645. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Wood, 34,126,130-131; Firth and Riat, 703-714. 
John Gregory, Gent, Nottingham. 
App 27/3/43. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
FH133; Wood, 128. 
Robert Reynes, Esq, Stanford. 
is Nicholas; App 27/3/43 del est. 
/ 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Sources; FH133; Wood, 128-129,171. 
RU LAND 
ACTIVE CONNITTEEMEN 
Samuel Barker, Esq, North Luffenham. 
App 3/12/42,20/6/45. 
Active between appointments and after 1645. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 4,181. 
Abel Barker Esq, North Luffenham, ? -1661. 
is Samuel (above); App 20/6/45. Called 'gent' in JIJC. 
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Ca pens Emanuel 34-35; BA 37-38; MA 41; later rector of Lyndon?; HS 46. 
Sources; JHC, 4,181; AC, 184; LRO DE730 Barker Mss. 
Christopher Brown, Esq, Toulthorpe, Casterton, 1619-1692. 
is John; App 2/12/42,27/3/43 del est, 8/10/44. 
Ca Sydney Sussex fel com 34; Grays 38; MP Shire 46; HS 47. 
Sources; FH133; JIHC, 3,655; AC, 2,232; Wright, 16. 
John Cole, Clipsham. 
App 29/1/44. Served as treasurer. 
Sources; JIIC, 3,381. 
Sir Edward Barrington, Bt, Kt, Ridlington, ? -1653. 
is James; App 3/12/42,8/10/44. 
Ca fel com Christs 98, Sydney Sussex 1600; Kt 09; succeeded Bt 14; HS 21 
36; DL 42. 
Sources; JHC, 3,655; FH133; Wright, 16; AC, 2,318. 
John Hatcher, Esq. 
App 8/10/45. Active but largely unidentified. 
Sources; JHC, 3,655. 
Robert Horseman Senior, Esq., Stretton. 
App 2/12/42,8/10/44. 
Ca Kings 05; BA 08; MA 11; HS 40 (this may be his son). 
Sources; Wright, 16; FH133; JHC, 3,655; AC, 2,336. 
Robert Horseman Junior, Esq., Stretton Kensington, 1615-? 
is Robert (above); App 2/12/42,8/10/44. 
Ca Sydney Sussex fel com 32; Grays 34; HS 40 (this may be the father). 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,655; Wright, 16; AC, 2,336. 
Thomas Levett, Esq. 
App 20/6/45. 
FIS 39; Active in the later stages of the war. 
Sources; JHC, 4,181; Wright, 16. 
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John Osbourne, Esq, Thorpe by Warter. 
App 2/12/42,8/10/44. 
HS 24 45. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,655,4,79; Wright, 16; RV, 18. 
Thomas Waite (White) 
App 27/3/43 del est, 8/10/44. 
MP 45. A Colonel and in charge of the county's military forces. Captured 
Burleigh House from the royalists. Sir James Harrington petitioned 
parliament about his oppositon to the rest of the committee. Waite was 
summoned to Comm of Both Kingdoms in Dec 45. Later became a regicide. See 
Chapter 5. 
Sources; JHC, 3,655,4,365; CSPD, 1645,245. 
Thomas Lord Grey of Groby 
App 20/6/45. SEE Leicester Committee. 
John Green, Gent. 
App 20/6/45. 
Unidentified but active after appointment. 
Sources; JHC, 4,181. 
William Busby, Gent, Barleythorpe, 1616-? 
4s Geoffrey; App 20/6/45. Active after appointment. 
Sources; JIHC, 4,181; RV, 13. 
STAFFORDSHIRE 
(more detailed biographies are available in Pennington and Roots) 
ACTIVE COMMISSIONERS 
Thomas Backhouse, Stafford. 
App 21/2/45. 
Burgess, Mayor 34-35 44-45 54-55. Was an Ironmonger. 
Sources; Pennington/Roots, 349. 
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Leicester Barbour, Gent, Tamworth, 1610-? 
is George; App 7/6/43. Captain in garrison. 
Sources; JHC, 3,119; SP, 17; Pennington/Roots, 349. 
William Bendy, Shutt End Kingswinford, 1620-? 
App 18/10/44. 
Ox Pleb New Hall 34; BA 38; Lincoln's 39; Clerk of Peace 45. 
Chancellor of Law 80. 
Sources; SP, 22; AO, 105; Pennington/Roots, 349. 
Sir William Brereton, Bt, Handforth Cheshire, 1604-1661. 
App 27/3/43. 
Military commander of Cheshire. 
Ox Brasenose 21; Grays 23; BT 27; MP Ches 28-29 40 (Short Parl) 40 (Long 
Parl), Rumper in 59. See Chapters 4,5,6. 
Sources; FH133; Pennington/Roots, 350; A0,176; Dore, The Letter Books of 
Sir William Brereton, Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 1984. DNB 
Edward Broughton, Gent, Longdon, 1610-1674. 
is Edward; App 7/6/43. 
Had legal connections. 
Sources. FH133; SP, 38; Pennington/Roots, 350. 
Lewis Chadwick, Mavesyn Ridware. 
App 4/2/43,7/6/43 seq. 
Governor of Stafford until Dec 44. Supporter of the Denbigh faction. 
Removed from governorship by Brereton largely because of this. Trumped up 
charges of treachery could not stick. Chadwick was present at the Uxbridge 
Negotiations, presumably with Denbigh. Was 'a Colonel. 
Sources; FH133; JHC, 3,119; Dore, op. cit., 19; Pennington/Roots, 350. 
John Chetwood (Chetwode), Hively Cheshire, 1600-1667. 
App 2/2/43. 
Ox Trinity 19; BA 21; MA All Souls 25; IT 19; MP Shire Barebones Parl. 
Family had mercantile connections. 
Sources; FH133; A0,268; Pennington/Roots, 351. 
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Thomas Crompton, Esq, Stone. 
is Thomas; App 18/10/44. 
Lincoln's 21; MP Shire 47-53, Stafford 54 56 59. 
Sources; GA, 66; Pennington/Roots, 351. 
William Foxall, Stafford. 
App 4/12/43; Captain in the garrison. 
Burgess, removed as a suspected royalist, reappointed 49; Mayor 46-47. 
Sources; Pennington/Roots, 352. 
Robert Gregg, Hapsford Cheshire. 
?s Edward; App 25/11/43. 
Collector of the Excise 46. 
Sources; Pennington/Roots, 352. 
Phillip Jackson, Gent, Wall, Stanhope, ? 1593-1675. 
?s Henry; App 7/6/43. 
Ox University College 10; BA 12; JP 75; Captain in the garrison. 
Sources; JHC, 3,119; SP, 138; A0,795; FH133; Pennington/Roots, 352. 
William Jolley, Gent, Caveswall Castle. 
is Thomas; App 30/5/43,7/6/43. 
Mercer and Grocer. His first wife was Henry Hastings' sister Mary. 
Sources; SP, 145; FH133; JHC, 3,119; Pennington/Roots, 352. 
Edward Leigh_, Esq, Rushall, 1602-1671. 
2s Henry of Shawell; App 22/2/43,7/6/43. 
Ox Magdalene 17; MA 23; MT 24; Historian later incorporated at Cambridge; 
MP Shire 45, excluded 48. Colonel. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 156; AO, 897; AC, 3,62; Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Michael Lowe, Pipe Ridgware. 
is John of Lichfield; App 22/2/43; Daughter m L. Barbour (above). 
Sources; SP, 159; FH133; Pennington/Roots, 353. 
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Thomas Pudsey, Siesdon, 1611-1676. 
is Nicholas; App 7/12/43. 
Sources; SP, 190; Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Simon Rugeley, Esq, Hawksyard, Hansley, ? -1665. 
is Richard of Shenstone; App 7/6/43, ditto seq. 
Ca Queens 18; HS43; Colonel in the county. 
Sources; FH133; SP, 197; JHC, 3,119,354; AC, 3,457; Pennington/Roots, 
354. 
John Simcoa 
App 4/2/43. 
Served as treasurer. Ironmonger. 
Sources; Pennington/Roots, 354. 
Henry Stone, Gent, Windmill Walsall. 
App 30/5/43,7/6/43 seq. 
Plymouth merchant who succeeded to Staffs estates. 
Became governor of Stafford after Chadwick displaced. 
Sources; JHC, 3,199; FH133; Pennington/Roots, 355. 
John Swinfen (Swinson), Gent, Weeford. 
App 7.6.43, ditto seq. 
Sources; FH133; DNB; Pennington/Roots, 355; JHC, 3,119. 
PASSIVE SUPPORTERS OR NEUTRALS 
Ralph Addesley 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 349. 
Michael Biddulph 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 350. 
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T-hr Rirrti 
Pennington/Roots, 350. 
Thomas Brough, Gent. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 350. 
Walter Brown 
Unidentified. 
Pennington/Roots, 350. 
Thomas Coke 
Unidentified. 
Pennington/Roots, 351. 
Thomas Daintree 
Unidentified. 
Pennington/Roots, 351. 
Oliver Emery 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 351. 
Richard Flyer (Floyer), Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 351. 
Thomas Fulke, Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 352. 
Richard Grosvenor (Gravenor) 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 352. 
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Edward Mainwaring Junior, Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Mathew Moreton, Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Michael Noble, Gent. 
Whereabouts unknown though possibly sitting in parliament. 
Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Richard Pyott, Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 353. 
Anthoney Rudpard, Esq. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 354. 
Ralph Rudyard, Esq. 
Brother of above, Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 354. 
John Smethfield 
Unidentified. 
Pennington/Roots, 354. 
John Smyth 
Unidentified. 
Pennington/Roots, 355. 
Samuel Terrick, Gent. 
Possibly in Parliament. 
Pennington/Roots, 356. 
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George Thorley 
Acted as a solicitor for sequestrations but not as a committeeman. 
Pennington/Roots, 355. 
John Turton, Gent. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 355. 
Henry Vernon 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 355. 
Joseph Whitehaulgh 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 356. 
Richard Whitehaulgh, Gent. 
Whereabouts unknown. 
Pennington/Roots, 356. 
EX OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 
Basil Fielding Earl of Denbigh; Pennington/Roots, 356. 
Thomas Doleman, Pennington/Roots, 356. 
Colonel John Bowyer; Pennington/Roots, 356. 
OTHER CATEGORIES OF COMMIT EMEN NOT SERVING IN THEIR COUNTY 
DEAD, CAPTURED OR IN ANY WAY INCAPACITATED FROM SERVING 
Sir Thomas Burdett, Derbys, captured by Hastings in Feb 43 then died. 
JTB, 17. 
William Drury, Notts, Alderman. Arrested by Hutchinson for revolt in July, 
held thereafter at Derby. Wood, 54. 
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ACTIVISTS ELSEWHERE 
Colonel Robert Haughton, Staffs, Serving in Cheshire? Pennington/Roots, 
352. 
Sir Arthur HesilridRe, Leics; at Westminster and in Essex's Army. 
Nichols, 3,2, App. 4, passim.; VL, 16. 
Colonel Richard Grevis, Staffs, in south midlands? Pennington/Roots, 352. 
Lt Colonel Daniel Watson, Staffs, on active service. Pennington/Roots, 356 
Lt Colonel Sanders, Staffs, serving out of county, not fully identified. 
Pennington/Roots, 354. 
Nathaniel Hallowes, Derbys, In London, MP. JTB, 58, GA, 111. 
Sir John Coke, Derbys, In London, MP, and at Westminster Assembly 45. 
JTB, 21. 
Sir Martin Lister, Kt, Leics, In London, MP. GA, 186; Nichols, 3,2, 
App. 4,32. 
Henry, Lord Grey ofRuthin, In London, MP, then HoL. Nichols, 3,2, App. 4, 
32; Rushworth, 3,1,626-627 (he still dabbled with royalism in mid 42). 
Sir James Harrington, Rut, In London, MP. RV, 39; FH133; Wright, 16. 
Sir Richard Skeffington, Kt, Staffs. Spent his time on the Coventry 
Committee, Warwicks was his home county. Pennington/Roots, 354. 
ROYALISTS 
John Millington, Notts. Wood, 220. 
William Roberts, Esq, Leics. Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31-32; VL, 118. 
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William Jervis, Leics. Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,31. 
Thomas Merry, Leics. AO, 1004. 
Thomas Brudenell, Esq, Leics. VL, 143. 
Sir George Villiers, Leics. Nichols, 3,2, App. 4,30-31; VL, 171. 
George Ashby, Esq. See Royalist Commissioners for Leics. 
Sir Edward Littleton, Staffs. See Commissioners of Array for Staffs. 
Sir Wolston Dixie, Leics. See Commissioners of Array for Leics. 
Walter Wrottesley, Staffs. See Commissioners of Array for Staffs. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
THE OFFICERS OF THE NORTH MIDLANDS ARMY 
The arrangement of this appendix differs from the two previous ones. 
Though for many of the field officers and some of the regimental officers 
there will be an amount of information similar to that given for the 
commissioners and committeemen, for the vast majority all that is 
available is the rank, name and the source of the information; in many 
cases simply 10 and/or RS. Officers are listed by regiment. Where 
possible, men are grouped into their troops or companies. 
LARD LOUGHBOROUGH (HENRY HASTINGS') RFGIHENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Henry Hastings; See Leicestershire Commissioners and 
Chapters 1,2,3,4,5,6,7. 
Lt Colonel ? Langley ? Present at Edgehill. 
Source; BL TT E83/9 only. 
Lt Colonel William Bale Esq, Saddington, Carlton, 1620-? 
2s Sir John (see Leics commissioners) 
Ox Lincoln 35; IT 37. 
Served earlier under Marmaduke Langdale as a major. Then transferred to 
Hastings then to Pate. Placed as a 'spy' in Belvoir where he annoyed Lucas 
Sources; 10,6,82,87,150; CCC, 110; RS, 92,94; VL, 142; HMC Hastings, 
2,128; A0,61; Burke, Dormant Baronetcies, 33. 
Lieutenant Henry Monk, Clement Danes, London, RC? 
Sources; 10,87; SP 16/495/1-/E 
Cornet William Misson, Leics. 
Source; 10,6. 
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Lt Colonel Edward Stamford, Esq, Perry Hall Staffs, 1619-1675. 
is William; RC; Captain 42; Fined 46 £375.49, in treaty with Venice to 
fight Turks. Captured at Kidderminster 44; exchanged 45. In Jan 46, 
commanded 100 horse to relieve Chester. See Chapter 6. 
Sources; PN, 1356; AP, 216; Symonds Diary, 278; CCAM, 861; CCC, 1192; JHC, 
4,167; Dore, 1,120,402; BL Ms 6852,1; 10,87. 
Major C. Roper (See under ? own regiment) 
Major ? Stanley, Edgehill campaign only; RC? 
Sources; BL TT E83/9, E244/2 
Maior Barnabus Scudamore, Esq, Holme Lacy Hereford, ? -1652. 
Younger brother to John Viscount Sligo; Kt 45; Comp 51 1/6th at £100, cut 
to £87-10s. Estate worth £50 pa. Had been involved in 2nd Civil War. Had 
been a Captain in 1640, in 42 helped Hastings raise Trained Bands. Was 
Hastings' Major in Hopton Heath campaign, left before 1644. Later became 
governor of Hereford. 
Sources; RS, 93; BL Add Mss, 36307; PN, 1291,10 118; PRO SP29/159/45; 
Symonds Diary, 168,195; CSPD, 1645-1647,456; 1648-1649,139; CCC, 897; 
CCAM, 1347; Metcalfe Knight, 203. 
Major Sir HughCalverley , Esq, Lea Hall Cheshire, 1613-? 
is Sir Hdgh; Ox Brasenose 31; Kt 42; Comp £1,855 in 48. Newman did not 
think that Calverley held field rank. 
Sources; RS, 93; PN, 359. 
Major Rowland Hacker. Esq, East Bridgford Notts, Colston Bassett, ? -1674. 
Younger brother of Francis (see Leics committeemen). Replaced Scudamore. 
Governed Trent Bridge Fort and then Wiverton House. Before being in 
Hasting's was a captain in Richard Byron's (see Notts commissioners). 
Sources; 10,87; RS, 93b; HMC Hastings, 2,120; Wood, 219; DNB; Newcastle, 
87; HMC Sutherland, 175; CSPD, 1660-1661,339,494. 
Lieutenant Robert White, Gent, Notts. 
Source; 10,87. 
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Major Edmund or Thomas Bale, ? Saddington, Leics. 
3 or 4s Sir John, bro to William above. One of this name killed at Ashby. 
Sources; 10,87; Fosbrooke, 21. 
Lieutenant Nathaniel Dnncome, Middlesex. 
Sources; 10,87; Fosbrooke, 22. 
Cornet Wolstan Roberts, Gent, Sutton Cheney, Leics. 
s of Sir William Kt. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 110; GA, 215. 
I 
Captain Richard Archer, ? Snelson Derbys, 1608-? 
is John; Ca Queens pleb 26; BA 27; MA 29. Based at Newark in 1644 with his 
troop. May possibly have been a prisoner at Stafford in Jan 44, exchanged 
for Thomas Leving a prisoner at Ashby. 
Sources; 10,87/ HMC Hastings, 2,128; WSL Minute book, 55. 
Lieutenant Henry Bend, Notts. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain edam Claypool, Esq, West Deeping Lincs, ? -1673. 
Ca fel com Queens 38; fined £600 in Dec 45. Three years in the regiment. 
Sources; RS, 93; CCC, 1063. 
Captain Jonathan Cooke, Warwicks. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain James Dupont (Duport), Gent, Shepshed, Leics. 
With Hastings in Nov 42 at Oxford, signed consignment of munitions out of 
Oxford Stores. Described as a servant of Hastings. Wife's estate seized in 
46 as he was not included in the Ashby terms, therefore he had not 
compounded. Was worth £40 pa at the time. He had gone with Hastings 
'beyond the seas'. Was temporary governor of Ashby in 43. 
Sources; Roy, 1,170; 10,87; CCC, 1746; HMC Hastings, 2,119,122. 
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Captain ? Fisher 
At Edgehill. 
Source; BL TT E83/9 only. 
Captain Ralph Fitzherbert, Flints, Staffs. 
is Robert; d before father. 
Source; SP, 87. 
Captain Henry Fleetwood, Staffs. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 2287. 
Captain William Fleetwood, Staffs. 
Garrisoned Wooton Lodge and captured ammunition from Moorlanders early 43. 
Bro to Sir Thomas. 
Sources; I0,87; CCC, 2283. 
Captain ? Fryer 
At Edgehill. 
Source; BL TT E83/9 only. 
Captain Gregory 
With Bale and Archer was to collect rents of the Earl of Rutland and other 
delinquents in Leics. 
Sources; RS, 93; I0,87; HMC Hastings, 2,128. 
Lieutenant Thomas Gilbert, Gent, Thrussington, Leics, 1616-? 
is William. 
Sources; 10,87; VL, 189. 
Captain ? Griffiths, Junior. 
Source; RS, 93. 
Captain ? Griffiths, Senior. 
Source; RS, 93. 
Captain Sir Robert Harding, Kt, King's Newton, Derbys. 
is Nicholas; Ox Lincoln 36; Grays 39; Barrister 45. 
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Joined Hastings at Swarkstone in Jan 43. Impoverished estate alienated. 
Sources; JTB, 32; DV, 27. 
Captain Walter Hastings, Esq, Humberstone, Leics. 
2s Henry. Transferred to Wolesley's. Present at surrender of Ashby. ? Later 
a Col. 
Sources; 10,87,93; PN, 693. 
Lieutenant John Everard, Leics. 
is John of Pickleton. 
Sources; 10,87; VL, 142. 
Captain Hodges 
At Edgehill only. 
Source; BL TT E83/9 only. 
Captain ? Johnson 
Edgehill only. 
Source; BL TT E83/9 only. 
Captain Thomas Manson, Wigston Magna Leics. 
Father Thomas a successful tanner b 1580, bought Wigston in 42. Family 
granted arms 1692. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 108. 
Captain John Middleton, Middleton Hall Westmoreland. 
Killed at Hopton Heath. 
Sources; RS, 93; York City Library, Battalle on Hopton Heath; Y942, Civ 3; 
Young P., 'The Battle of Hopton Heath', JSAHR, 33, part 133. 
Captain ? Rooksby 
Source; 10,87. 
Lieutenant. William Hobman, Yorks. 
Source; 10,87. 
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Captain William Ruddiiigs, Essex. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain Phillip Stanhope 
Cited in 10 by a quartermaster. Could he be one of the Earl of 
Chesterfield's sons, later the Col Stanhope killed at Shelford Ho. 1645? 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain William Squire, Caddesby Leics. 
Ended up at Oxford, fined 48 at 1/10th E40. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 109. 
Captain Geoffrey Stanley 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain George Thorne, Dixley Leics. 
Gave £80 to garrison and 'rode next to Lord Loughborough with a sword in 
his hand'. 
Source; CCAM, 1158. 
Captain William Trimnell, Gent, Stoke Golding, Leics, 1605-? 
is Basil. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 111; VL, 176. 
Captain Poole Turville, Castle Gresley Derbys. 
RC, estate forfeited 53. 
Sources; . ITB, 47; CCC, 3151; IR, 39. 
Captain John Warton. London and Westminster. 
Sources; 10,87; Fosbrooke, 22. 
Captain Daniel Wright 
Source; 10,87. 
Cornet James Harrinstton, Leics. 
Source; 10,87. 
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Cornet Henry Waldron, Leics. 
Both he and above in Wrights'. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain Yates, Leics. 
Possibly bro to Yates in Lucas. Died in war as Hastings refers to father 
in his complaint to Rupert about Lucas. 
Sources; RS, 93; BL Add Mss 18982, W. 
Captain Lt John Caesar, Gent, Lond and West. 
Source; 10,87. 
Lieutenant John Barnvell. Lond and West. 
Source; 10,87. 
Lieutenant Henry Dudley, Swepstone, Leics. 
is Thomas the Vintner. Henry captured at a fight near Melton Mowbray 43. 
Described as 'that great robber of the country'. 
Sources; 10,87; CCAM, 1033; BL TT E69/17, Certain Informations, Sept 25 - 
Oct 2. 
Lieutenant Ambrose Grey, Staffords. 
Source; 10,87. 
Cornet Roger Gibbs, Notts. 
Source; 10,87. 
Cornet ? Lassals, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,87; Fosbrooke, 23. 
Cornet Thomas Mosely, Leics. 
Source; 10,87. 
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FOOT 
Lieutenant Colonel Sir Arthur Gorges, Kt, Chelsea, 1598-1661. 
is Sir Arthur the poet. Ox Christs 16; Kt 21; Fined at 1/2 £806-5s, 
reduced to 1/6th £512. Debts of £5,000 in 1650. 
Was Hastings' agent at Oxford during 43 and 44. 
Sources; RS, 93; Roy, 1,302-303; CCC, 961-962; AO, 588; Metcalf Knights, 
179; CCAM, 1337, HMC Hastings, 2,120. 
Captain John Adler, Leics. 
A Shoemaker. 
Source; RS, 93. 
Captain Thomas Bailey Gent, The Mythe Leics. 
Left service during the plague at Ashby. Fined 1/6th at £412, reduced to 
£352-17s-6d. 
Sources; I0,87; CCC, 110,1373. 
Captain Sigismund Beeton 
Later a colonel and governor of Bolsover. 
Sources; RS, 93; PN, 94. Newman says he was killed in 43. 
Captain Samuel Benchkin, Lond and West. 
Sources; 100 87; Fosbrooke, 22; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
Lieutenant George Loosemore, Cambridge. 
is Henry; Ca Jesus 40; Music Doctorate 65 Trinity. 
Sources; 10,87; AC, 3,104. 
Ensign Laurence Fisher, Lond and West. 
Sources; I0,87; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
Captain Henry Bovman, Leics. 
Source; RS, 93. 
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Captain Henry Butler, Bilston, Leics. 
Ox 16; BA 21. Fined £128-16s in 46. 
Sources; RS, 93; CCC9 1133; AO, 222. 
Captain James Rare, Milson Salop, or Lond West. 
Sources; 10,87; ? CCC, 1613. 
Captain George Hitchcock, Wilts. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain John Holden 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain Daniel Robinson 
A taylor. 
Source; RS, 93. 
Lieutenant William Kelton 
Of Robinson's company. There were three Robinsons! 
Source; 10,87. 
Ensign Daniel Robinson, Leics. 
Again same problem as above. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain Geoffrey Robinson, Notts. 
Either this one or next was governor of King's Mills fort. Bro of below. 
Sources; IO # 87; Fosbrooke, 23; RS, 93; HMC Hastings, 2,112. 
Captäin Thomas Robinson, Notts. 
Source; RS, 93. 
Lieutenant John Dixon, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,87. 
Ensign John Wakefield, Notts. 
Source; 10,87. 
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DRAGOONS 
Captain Daniel Roberts 
Source; 10,87. 
JOHN PATE'S REGIMENT OR HORSE 
Colonel John Pate. See Commissioner of Array for Leics. 
Lt Colonel William Bale. See Hastings' Horse. 
Maior Elias Whalley 
Is in Lichfield garrison in 43, warning Hastings that Lichfield soldiers 
are being incited against him by their officers. He was possibly captured 
at Naseby though he is called a captain. 
Sources; RS, 94; PN, 1552; HMC Hastings, 2,111; BL TT E262/19. 
Captain William Bent, Gent, Narborough Leics, 1618-? 
is John of Enderby. 
Sources; 100 103; CCC, 110; VL, 159. 
Lieutenant Christopher Bent, Enderby or Hoby Leics. 
Source; 10,103. 
Cornet Andrew Randall, Leics. 
Source; I0,103. 
Captain Henry Bowman 
Had transferred frot4 olonel Dudley's. 
Source; RS, 94. 
Cornert Robert Wooland Leics. 
Source; 10,87. 
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Captain Nathaniel DiRb,, Gent, Kettleby Leics, 1610-? 
3s Edward of Holwell. 
Sources; 10,103; CCC, 110. 
Cornet Francis Barnvell, Lincs. 
Source; 10,103. 
Captain George Smith, Gent, Queniborough, Leics. 
s of George of Withicotes? Estate sequest 43-50. Signed the Petition of 
the Indigent Officers under Hastings' name. 
Sources; 10,87; RS, 94; CCC, 2411-2412; VL, 66; Fosbrooke, 23. 
Cornet William Brown, Surrey. 
Source; 10,103. 
WILLIAM NEVILL'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel William Hevill, Esq, Holt Leics, Tottenham Middlesex and 
Cressington Temple Essex, ? -1661. 
is Henry of Holt. Possibly a captain in Hastings' horse in 42, though 
possibly came to take over father's regiments after the fall of Holt in 
Jan 43. Assessed 1/5th and 1/20th at £500. 
Sources; RS, 92; Fosbrooke, 21; 10,99; PN, 1041; Symonds Diary, 225; CCC, 
111; CCAM, 507,699,1376; HMC Portland, 1,87,93,94; BL Add Mss, 19892, 
47. 
Lt Colonel Thomas Nevill, Holt, 1625-1712. 
2s Henry bro to above. Discharged from seq 48. Comptroller of Petty 
Customs at Restoration. Ist Bart. 
Sources; RS, 94; PN, 1040; GEC Barts, 3,203; CCC, 111; CSPD, 1661-1662, 
224. 
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Major Povey (Purvey, Penery, Powey), Gent. 
Surrendered at Ashby in 46. 
Sources; RS, 94; PN, 1156; Fosbrooke, 23. 
Captain Thomas Mason, Northants. 
Source; 10,99. 
Lieutenant Daniel Colston, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,99. 
Captain Lt Robert Davis, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,99. 
Captain. Lt William Ellis, Leics. 
Source; 10,99. 
Cornet Geoffrey Wellstead 
In the same troop as the two above capts It, It is possible that one of the 
above was a successor to the other. 
Source; 10,99. 
Lieutenant Henry Hawes, Lincs. 
Source; 10,99. 
FOOT 
Maior Thomas Bywaters, Lond, West. 
Prisoner at Lichfield in July 1646. 
Sources; RS, 94b; PN, 237; 10,99; BL TT E345/2. 
Captain Thomas Bagshaw, Lincs. 
Source; 10,99. 
Captain James C1aughton, Northants. 
Source; 10,99. 
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Lieutenant William Claughton, Northants. 
Source; 10,99. 
ROWLAND EYRE'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Rowland Eyre. Esq, Bradway and Hassop, Derbys, 1600-1674. 
is Thomas; RC; Ox 17; BA 19; Lincoln's 18; Lessee of Lead mines from the 
King. Raised regiments in late 43 and 44. Fought at Marston Moor, later 
based at Newark, had been based at Chatsworth. Surrendered at Lichfield. 
Estates forfeited as he was a papist in arms. 
Sources; RS, 95b; PN, 494; 10,45; AO, 477. CCC, 62,89,110,2090,2319; 
HMC Hastings, 120; Hutchinson, 442; PRO SP29/159,45; BL TT E345/2; CAM, 
1436; JTB, 24; DAJ, XIX, 22. 
Lt Colonel William Eyre, Esq, ? Hassop, 1603-1653. 
2s Thomas, bro to Rowland; Ox 17; Lincoln's 21. Prisoner at Oxford 1649. 
RC. 
Sources; JTB, 22; PN, 496; AO, 478; 10,45; CSPD, 1649-1650,251,1650, 
263. 
Cornet Matther Barker, Derbys. 
Source; 10,45. 
Maior ? Spratt, Staffs. 
Sources; RS, 95; PN, 1352. 
Captain Howard Brock, Gent, Brough Derbys. 
is Robert; RC; Signed petition of the Northern Horse. 'A very good 
commander'. 
Sources; 10,45; JTB, 71,16; PRO SP29/66,35 A List of Gentlemen in 
Derbyshire and how they stand affected. 
Captain Rowland Furnis, Derbys. 
Source; 10,45. 
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FOOT 
Lt Colonel Tamworth Reresby, Yorks. 
Source; JTB, 71. 
Maior (later Lt Colonel? ) ? Jordan Scots. 
Successor to Reresby, Symonds indicates that he was 'once Major to ye Lrd 
Loughborough' but there is no other verification. 
Sources; RS, 95; JTB, 71. 
Captain ? Allan, Gresley Derbys. 
Possibly seq for delinquency. 
Sources; 10,45; JTB, 71; ? CCC, 3068. 
Lieutenant John Bold, Notts. 
Source; 10,45. 
Captain ? Aston, Derbys. 
Sources; RS, 95; JTB, 71. 
Lieutenant John Bradbury, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,45; JTB, 71. 
Lieutenant Francis Rowland, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,45; JTB, 71. 
DRAGOONS 
stain James Tnnstead. Tunstead Derbys. 
is Francis; RC. In 1650 had £50annuity (as had his father) for taking the 
King's game in Derbys. 
Sources; 10,45; DV, 33; JTB, 47. 
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SIR JOHN FITIHEtBERT' S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Sir John Fitzherbert. See Derbyshire Commissioners. 
Lt Colonel William Fitzherbert, Gent, Tissington, Derbys. 
is Sir John Fitzherbert of Tissington; RC; Garrisoned home in 43 44. 
Served also at Tutbury and Lichfield. Fined £1,000 in 48, reduced to £817. 
Assessed at £200 pa in 49, seq for non payment in 50. 
Sources; 10,48; DV, 13; PN, 521; CCC, 1488,1490; JT, 25-26; 69. 
Cornet Thomas Dizwell. Derbys. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
Captain Charles Barnesly Aldmonkton, Derbys. 
RC; at Tutbury. Fined at 1/2 £800, reduced to 1/6th £20. Assessed 48 at 
E500. seq for non payment. 
Sources; JTB, 69; CCC, 89; CCAM, 958. 
Captain Arthur Bennett, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,48; JIB, 69. 
Captain John Bingler, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
Lieutenant John Statham. Tansley, Derbys. 
is Henry of Morley. Fined 1/6th £29-10s in 49. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
Captain John Eyre, Hathersage, Derbys. 
is Thomas. Earlier in Freshville's. ? RC. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 69. 
Cornet George Eyre, Hathersage, Derbys. 
is John (above). RC. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 69. 
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Captain Reynold Eyre, Yorks. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
Captain Edward Fitzrandolph, Surrey. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
Cornet Richard Wild, Notts. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69; ? GA, 289. 
Captain George Fitzrandolph, Surrey. 
Either this man or above captured on Bosworth Field Sept 45. 
Sources; 10,48; in, 69; BL TT E302/11, City Scout 9. 
Captain Arther Lore, Hazelwood Derbys. 
4s Edward. Bro of John below. He, bro and father fined at 1/6th £221. Both 
at battle of Whilloughby field in 48. 
Sources; 10,48; CCC, 2008; JTB, 69; Glover, 2,7. 
Lieutenant Ferdinando Love, Alderwasley, Derbys. 
?s of Edward, Bro to above. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB,. 37,69. 
Captain John Love, Gent, Alderwasley, Derbys. 
? 2s of Edward, bro of 2 above. Heir to Edward As eldest, Anthoney d at 
Gainsborough. Served at Wingfield then Lichfield until Bagot reduced size 
of garrison. 
Sources; 10,48; JTBI 69; CCCjL 2008. 
Lieutenant Charles Love, Derbys. 
?s of John, bro to 3 above. 
Source; JTB, 37,69. 
Captain Robert Moore, Surrey. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
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Cornet Thomas Hodgson (Hodgekinson), Staffs. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69. 
FOOT 
Lt Colonel Simon Heveningham, Staffs, Lond, West. 
2s Nicholas; RC; bro to Christopher in Leveson's; had served in Leveson's 
earlier, was major before his brother. 
Sources; RS, 95b; 10,48,153; SP, 124; PRO SP16/495,1E; PN, 731; JTB, 69 
Captain John Cawley (Cosley), Lancs. 
'An old soldier'. 
Sources; RS, 95b; JTB, 69. 
Captain ? Anthoney Colleridize (Colwich), Stud, Derbys. 
s of below. 
Sources; RS, 95b; DV, 26. 
Captain ? William Colleridae (Coiwich), Stud, Derbys. 
Sources; RS, 95; DV, 26. 
Captain Thomas Royston, Notts. 
Sources; 10,48; JTB, 69.. 
JOHN FRESHVILLE (FRESCHVILLE)'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel John Freshville. See Derbyshire Commissioners. 
Lt Colonel HenrT Hunlocke, Esq, Wingerworth Derbys, ? -1648. 
is Henry, Ca fell comm Corpus Christi 33; Grays 36; father involved in 
iron mining and smelting. At Edgehill with Freschville, Kt on field for 
bravery. Possibly had garrison at Wingerworth while Freschville at 
Staveley. BT 43. Lost use of right hand in fight at Newstead Abbey 44. 
333 
Surrendered Nov 45. Gell used his mines for 3 years. Fined £1,458. d June 
48 after discovery of fraudulent estate valuation. 
Sources; JTB, 72; Young P., Cavalier Army, ? 142; Black Docquets, 12; CCC, 
1089; AC, 2,432. 
Maior John Beversham, Lond, West, ? -1670. 
Served first in Sir William Savilles; fought against English at Battle of 
the Dunes 58. Styled Col when buried at Westminster Abbey 1670. Seized 50, 
on (correct) suspicion of not having compounded. 
Sources; 10,51,116; PN, 115; JTB, 72; CSPD, 1650,438,1660,195; 
Nicholas Papers, Camden Soc, XXXI, 58. 
Captain Ricard Allsop, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 72. 
Captain John Eyre. See Fitzherbert's. 
Lieutenant Thomas Eyre. 
Bro of above? 
Sources; 10,51; 3TB, 72. 
Cornet George Eyre. See Fitzherbert's. 
Captain John Love, Oldgreave, Hasland Derbys. 1616-1677. 
2s Anthoney? Troop scattered at Marston Moor then joined Newark. Gave up 
arms Dec 45. Fined £133-6s-8d. Assessed at £200 in 49. Claimed that Earl 
of Newcastle seq him for aiding Gell! 
Sources; JTB, 37,73; DV, 30; CCC, 960; Glover, 2,7; 10,51. 
Lieutenant William Fletcher, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 72. 
Captain Edward Nichols, Beds. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 72. 
Cornet Clifton Rhodes, Sturton Derbys. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 72. 
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Captain George Pole (Poole), Gent, Spinkhill, Wakebridge Derbys. ? -1644. 
is Francis; RC; d fighting against parliamentarians. 
Sources; 10,51; DV, 5; Glover, 2,324; JTB, 41,72. 
Lieutenant Ignatius Pole (Poole), Derbys. 
Relative of above? 
Source; 10,51. 
FOOT 
Lt Colonel ? Betteridkes 
Sources; RS, 95; JTB, 72. 
Major John Jammott, Brussels. 
Professional soldier. Recaptured Welbeck in July 45. See Chapter 6. Lucy 
Hutchinson thought he was killed at Cotes in 44. 
Sources; Symonds Diary, 224; J'IB, 72; CSPD, 1650,257; Nicholas Papers, 2, 
205; PN, 804. 
Captain William Bates, Notts. 
Sources; 10,51; JTB, 72. 
SIR JOHN HARPUR'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Sir John Harpur, Bart. See Derbyshire Commissioners. 
Lt Colonel William Bullock Esq, Darley and Norton Derbys, 1617-1686. 
3s John; Ca pens St John's 35; BA 39; MA 42. Fined at 1/6th £40. House 
pulled down during the war. 
Sources; RS, 94; 10,63; AC, 1,253; DV, 22; JTB, 17,70; CCC, 491,1133; 
PRO SP29/66,35. 
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Lieutenant Andrer Scriven, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Lieutenant William Smith, Derbys. 
Either he or above succeeded the other. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Cornet Richard Whinyates, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Major Thomas Bates, Derbys. 
Sources, RS, 94; JTB, 70. 
Captain Durand Allsoy. Chesterfield, ? -1671. 
is Robert; Ca pens Trinity 27; IT 25. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 14,70; AC, 1,24; CCAM, 1233. 
Lieutenant William Ogle, Lond, West. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Cornet Thomas Allsop, Chesterfield, Lond, West. 
Bro of Durand. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Captain Thomas Baker, Leics. 
Fled to Parl in 45 but a Major Baker was taken at Ashby in 46. 
Ca Emanuel 31; BA 35; MA 38; Fellow 35. 
Sources; RS, 95; PH, 60; AC, 1,72. 
Captain John Bullock, Esq, Darley and Norton, Derbys. 
is John; comp 46. Unable to pay Assessment of £800, seq for non payment 50 
Sources; JTB, 16,70; RS, 94; CCC, 1132; CCAM, 1068. 
Captain John Love, Denby Derbys, 1616-1660. 
is Vincent; Comp 47, at 1/6th £480. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70; DV, 30; CCC, 2034. 
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Cornet Richard Mason, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Captain Anthony Mozine, Notts. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Lieutenant John Jellico, Worcs. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Cornet Francis Mozine, Notts. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Captain Robert Sykes, Markfield Leics. 
At siege of Leicester. 
Sources; 10,63; CCAM, 1245; JTB, 70. 
Cornet William Willcocks, Gent, Ashwell Rut, 1601-? 
is William. 
Sources; RV, 10; I0,63; JTB, 70. 
Captain Lt John Whinyates, Notts. 
Belonged to Captain Kniverton's. troop. This indicates that he served 
before the creation of Kniverton's own regiment, possibly under Peter or 
Gilbert Kniverton. 
Sources; 10,63; J'I'B, 70. 
FOOT 
Major Mallory 
Sources; RS, 94; 
, 
RK, 930; JTB, 70. 
Captain Arthur Grant, Derbys. 
Sources; RS, 94; JTB, 70. 
Captain ? Tythal (Tyndal). 
Source; RS, 94. 
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DRAGOONS 
Captain Richard Corbet, Gent, Salop. 
Sources; RS, 94; JTB, 70. 
Lieutenant Andrew Cook, Salop. 
Sources; 10,63; JTB, 70. 
Cornet Andrew Pitchford, Salop. 
Sources, 10,63; JTB, 70. 
JOHN MILWARD/JOHN SHALLCROSS' REGIMENTS 
M= indicates served only in-Milward's; S= only in Shallcross' 
Colonel John Milvard, Esq. See Derbyshire Commmissioners. 
Lt Colonel later Colonel John Shallcross, Esq, Shallcross, Derbys, 
1603-1673. 
is Richard; JP 36; HS 38; (HS 45). Governor of Chatsworth Aug 45. See 
Chapter 4. Fined 1/10th at £400, cut to £100 if paid £200 of a debt of 
£600. Gaoled for debt 51. Active royalist 1659. 
Sources; 10,119; PRO SP29/159,45; PRO List of Sheriffs, 31; Warburton, 
3,71; CCC, 750,1031-1032; CCAM, 791; HMC Portland, 1,578; CSPD, 1651, 
209; HMC Hastings, 2,120; 
, 
EN, 1301; DAJ, 28,1906. 
Captain William Clement, S, Yorks. 
Sources; 10,119; JTB, 72. 
Captain Edward Vernon (Venner), Gent, S, Sudbury Staff, 1624-? 
2s Sir Edward; Ox Trinity 40; pos in Hastings' at Edgehill, was so 
afterwards. Possibly the young Vernon who told Sir Edward Littleton Lord 
Keeper about Hastings plundering those who would not pay voluntarily thus 
starting the attacks on Hastings in the Oxford parliament. Col at 
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Pontefract in 2nd C. W. JP 61; DCL 77. 
Sources; PN, 1497; BL TT E83/9; Fosbrooke, 23; HMC Hastings, 2,121. 
Captain Lt William Penketh, Lancs, S. 
Sources; 10,119; JTB, 72. 
Cornet Thomas Herrod, S, Peak Forest Derbys. 
RC; Leadminer. Goods seized 50. 
Sources; I0,119; JTB, 33,72; CCAM, 1207. 
Captain Lt John Rndyard, Gent, Staffs, 1616-? 
is Thomas; Ox Trinity BA 37. Family had faked arms 1579. 
Sources; JTB, 72; I0,119; GA, 219; AO, 1288. 
FOOT 
Lt Colonel Robert Bonny, M. 
Earlier in Hastings as Major; Virginal player; Lt 40. 
Sources; JTB, 70; PN, 154; RS, 93b. 
Captain Francis Bruce, M, Beds. 
Sources; 10,95; JTB, 72. 
Lieutenant Thomas Polt, M, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,95; JTB, 72. 
Ensign Francis Cotterel, M, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,95; JTB, 72. 
Captain David Ellis, M, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,95; JTB, 72. 
Captain John Todd, M, Lincs. 
'Governor of Wingfield under ye rebels' wrote Symonds. 
Source; RS, 95. 
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SIR ANDREW KNIVERTON'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Andrew Iniverton. See Derbyshire Commissioners. 
Lt Colonel Peter Kniverton, Esq, Bradley Derbys. 
2s Sir Gilbert. Was a major in Fitzherbert's. 
Remained at Tutbury after brother's replacement in 46. 
Sources; 10,80; RS, 92b; PN, 843; JTB, 34,71. 
Cornet Richard Allestry, Gent, Alveston Derbys, 1622-1681. 
is Richard of Uppingham Salop; Ox Christ Church Comm 36; BA 40; MA 43; 
Doctor of Divinity 60. 
At rest was chaplain to Charles II and Regius Prof Divinity Ox. 
Sources; 10,80; JTB, 13,72. 
Maior John Bunnington (Bennington), Barcote Derbys, ? -1645. 
Ca Emanuel 07; Grays 09; later became Major of Prince Rupert's Firelocks. 
Killed at siege of Leicester. 
Sources; RS, 92b; JTB, 72; PN, 208; Royal Martyrs, 7; Symonds Diary, 181. 
Major Gilbert Kniverton, Esq, Derbys. 
3s Sir Gilbert. Prisoner at Derby in Oct 45. Bro of Andrew and Peter. 
Ex captain in Fitzherbert's. 
Sources; RS, 92b; JTB, 34,72; JHC, 4,318. 
Captain Thomas Brough, Staffs. 
Sources; 10,80; JTB, 72. 
Cornet Thomas Kniverton, Gent, Bradley Derbys. 
Youngest bro of Sir Arthur. 
Sources; 10,80; JTB, 35,72. 
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Captain ? Menhill 
Killed 44. 
Sources; RS, 92b; FDIC Hastings, 2,132. 
Captain Henry Merry, Barton Park Derbys. 
? 1s John; RC; may also have had lands at Kegworth, Leics. Claimed never in 
arms! Fined at 1/6th E1,943 in 46; reduced in 49 to £1,600. 
Sources; DV, 31; CCC, 1380; JTB, 38. 
Captain Alexander Walshall (Walthall), Eggington Derbys, ? -1657. 
Cryer at Derby assizes. Fined £164. Surrendered at Tutbury. 
Sources; RS, 92b; CCC, 1315; }MMC Hastings, 2,133; JTB, 48,71. 
Captain Lt Henry Dudley, Lond, West. 
Sources; 10,80; JTB, 71. 
Cornet Roger Fletcher, Derbys. 
Source; 10,80. 
Cornet William Doddington 
Sources; 10,80; JTB, 71. 
FOOT 
The only two surviving names for the foot are those of Lt Col Peter 
Kniverton and Major Bunnington. 
ROGER MOLYNEUX'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Roger Molyneux, Esq, Teversal Notts. 
?s of Sir John Bt. Governor of Wingfield 43-44. See Chapter 6. 
Then moved on to Newark. Fined June 46 £200. Assessed at 1/5th and 1/20th 
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£120 in 47. In arms 48, fined at 1/6th, £250. 
Sources; RS, 96; IDNC Hastings, 2, 
RCHM, Newark, 77; CCC, 1335; CCAM, 
Young P. Naseby, 68. 
114,116,117; PN, 989; 10,95,96; 
788; Burkes Dormant Barts, 361; 
Lt Colonel William Whichcot (Whichcote), Dunston Lincs, 1618-? 
? 2s Sir Haman; Ca Emanuel pens 34; Cray's 37; Captured at the Battle of 
Denton 44. Comp 50 at 1/6th £5. 
Sources; CCC, 2301; Burney's Newspapers, 26, Perfect Occurrences No. 30; 
RCHM, Newark, 77; Young, Naseby, 69; CA, 4,382. 
Major Thomas Eyre, Esq, Dronfield Derbys, ? -1645. 
is Edward; Attorney; Was a major to Sigismund Beeton (See Hastings' Horse) 
when he was a Colonel. Was a Major at Wingfield. Wounded at Naseby and 
taken by Gell to Derby where he died. 
Sources; RS, 96; 10,9,154; PN, 495; Symonds Diary, 196; JTB, 24-25,73 
suggests he was a Lt Col. 
Major Norris Fiennes (Fines), Esq, Christhead and Whitehall Lincs. 
?s of Sir Henry. A hostage at surrender of Wingfield, laid down arms at 
this point. Fined 46 £50. 
Sources; 10,75,95,96; CCC, 1213; PN, 516. 
Captain Anthoney Wilkinson, Lond, West. 
At Wingfield. Promoted from Capt Lt. 
Sources; RS, 96; 10,95. 
Lieutenant Richard Evans, Derbys. 
Sources; 10,95; JTB, 73. 
Cornet John Wilkinson, Lincs. 
Source; 10,95. 
Cornet John Belson, Derbys. 
Source; 10,95. 
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Cornet ? Kernet 
At Wingfield 44. 
Source; DRO 803 m/211. 
FOOT 
Captain ? Basford 
At Wingfield. 
Source; DRO 803 m/211. 
Captain ? Boles 
At Wingfield. 
Source; DRO 803 m/211. 
Captain ? Chippendale 
At Wingfield. 
Source; DRO 803 m/211. 
Captain Henry Statham, Notts. 
Sources; 10,95; RS, 96. 
FERDINANDO STANHOPE/JOHN BARNARD'S REGIMENTS 
S= Stanhope's only; B= Barnard's only 
HORSE 
Colonel Ferdinando Stanhope, Esq, Bretby, 1615-1644. 
4s Earl of Chesterfield; Ca fel com Sydney Sussex 36; BA 36; DCL Ox Dec 42 
UP Tamworth Long Parl. Raised troop in 42 at Edgehill. Returned to Derbys 
in Dec 42. Captured at Hopton Heath. Killed Nov 44. 
Sources; RS, 92; PRO SP28/69,45; AC, 4,146; AO, 1408; Royal Martyrs, 4; 
PN, 1361. 
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Major, later Colonel John Barnard, Northants. 
? CoA Northants. Took regiment south in 44 either all, after death of 
Stanhope, or part as a new Reg before Stanhope's death. Gov of Abbey Cwm 
Hir surr 13/1/45 and later gov of Cannon Frome. He and garrison massacred 
by Scots. 
Sources; RS, 92,92b; BL TT E252/6; 10,6-7; Symonds Diary, 211; ? FH133; 
CSPD, 1644-1645,181; PN, 72. 
Captain Lt Thomas Levin&, Gent, S, Parwich Derbys, 1619-? 
is Timothy; Ox Balliol 36; IT barrister 41; Clerk of Peace Derby 29-45. 
Wounded at Hopton Heath. 
Sources; RS, 92; GA, 155; BL TT E262/9; JTB, 36. 
Captain William Mil'ard, Gent, S, Chilcote Derbys. 
is Sir Thomas of Eaton. Lincoln's ?; At Tutbury under Kniverton at some 
time. Surrendered to Gell in July 45. No order for fine. 
Sources; RS, 92; CCC, 1605; DV, 7; JTB, 39. 
Lieutenant John Mather, Staffs. 
Source; 10,87. 
Cornet Thomas Milward, Staffs. 
Source; 10,87. 
Captain ? Mynn, Gent, S. 
s of Sir Richard. 
Source; RS, 92. 
Captain Lt John Pickering, Gent, B, Lond, West, ? Giles Cripplegate. 
? RC. 
Sources; 10,6; PRO SP16/495,1E. 
Captain Arthur Warren, Gent, S, Wissendine Rut. 
Fined in 47, £450 owed £900, had to sell estates in Bucks. 
Assessed at 1/20th £500. 
Sources; RS, 92; JTB, 71; GA, 268; RV, 35. 
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FOOT 
Lt Colonel Richard Dudley, Gent, B, Swepstone, Leics. 
Ex captain of Hastings' Horse. POW in 44 at Upton Warren Worcs. Exchanged. 
Fined at 1/10th £106 in 49. 
Sources; 10,87; CCC, 108,190,1879; RS, 92b; PN, 455; Fosbrooke, 23. 
Major Thomas Jennings, B, Warwicks. 
Cowgelder and Farmer, according to Symonds. 
Sources; RS. 92b; 10,7; PN, 810. 
Captain John Brisco, B, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,6. 
IISHAM PARKYNS (PERKINS) REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Isham Parkyns, Esq, Bunny Notts. 
is Sir George. Estate of £1,000 pa; JP 42; CoA Notts 
Governor of Ashby de la Zouch. 
Sources; RS, 96; CCC, 111-112; CCAM, 1432; PN, 1119; Fosbrooke, 21. 
Captain Geoffery Trees (Treace), Notts. 
Source; 10,103. 
FOOT 
Captain ? Greene 
Butler and Falconer to Lord Loughborough. 
Source; RS, 96. 
Captain George Stanley 
Source; RS, 96. 
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RICHARD AND HARVEY BAGOT'S REGIMENTS 
R= only in Richard's regiment; H= only in Harvey's 
HORSE 
Colonel Richard Bagot, Esq, Pipe Hayes Staffs, 1619-1645. 
4s of Sir Harvey (See Staffs CoA); Earlier in Paget's Foot; arrived in 
Staffs early 43, or late 42. Gov of Lichfield 43-45; wounded at Hopton 
Heath. See Chapters 2,4,5,6. 
Sources; RS, 93; Symonds Diary, 172; HMC Hastings, 2,115-116; PN, 55; 
Roy, 1,159; Young, Edgehill, 222; LCL Ms Lich 24. 
Lt Colonel, later Colonel Harvey Bagot, Esq, Pipe Hayes Staffs, 1618-1674. 
2s to Sir Harvey; elder bro to above. Ox Trinity 35; MT 37; Capt of 
Trained Bands in 42. Second to younger bro as Richard was a professional 
soldier. Succeeded to colonelcy and at Hastings' instigation, the gov of 
Lichfield on bro's death. Threw Hastings out in Dec 45. Made assistant Gov 
to Tyldesley in Jan 46. See Chapter 6. 
Sources; RS, 93; PN, 54; Symonds Diary, 227; LJRO D30, LIIIB; CCC, 1203, 
1814; A0,55. 
Major Cecil Cooper, R. 
Captured at Whilloughby 48. 
Sources; RS, 93; PN, 342; RCHM, Newark, 79. 
Major William Warner, Northants. 
A clerk. In June 45 accused of plundering £1,000 from tenants on his 
uncle's estates at Thorpe Lubenham, Warwicks. Surrendered at Ashby 46. 
Sources; 10,5; CCC, 37; PN, 1524; Fosbrooke, 22. 
Captain Thomas Bennett, R. 
Yeoman's Son of Staffs. 
Source; RS, 93. 
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Captain William Bodley (Baggeley), Staffs. 
Sources; 10,5; RS, 93; SP, 13; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
Captain William Dibdale, R. 
? Preacher and Chaplain to Richard. 
Sources; RS, 93; BL TT E258/14. 
Captain ? Dinwick, R. 
Possibly in reg April 43. 
Source; LCL Ms Lich 24. 
Captain William Gibbons, Gent, R, Coventry, ? -1646. 
is William; father an attorney; Ca 35; MT 35. 
Sources; RS, 93; 10,5; AC, 2,209. 
Cornet Vincent Scudamore, R, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,5. 
Captain H. RuRely, Gent. 
Source; 10, S. 
Lieutenant Thomas Underhill, R, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,5. 
Captain ? Trevor, R. 
With Bagot in April 43? 
Source; LCL Ms Lich 24. 
Lieutenant Walter Beardmore, R, Staffs. 
Source; 10,5. 
Lieutenant Lewis Milton, R, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,5., 
Lieutenant John Roade, R, Derbys. 
Source; 10,5. 
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Cornet Edward Chiles, R, Warwicks. 
Source; 10,5. 
FOOT 
Marmor Roger Harsnett, Packington Staffs, ? -1663. 
Servant to Prince Charles. In 1660, said to be 'the oldest serving officer 
in England'. 
Sources; RS, 93; PN, 686; LJRO D30, LIIIB; CSPD, 1660-1661,77,1661-1662, 
508,1663-1664,404; HIC Hastings, 2,134. (Called Robert. ) 
Captain Francis Collier, H, Darleston, Staffs. 
is Henry; was only a Lt in 45; by end of year had 15 in his company. 
Lands confiscated in 52. 
Sources; 10,6; IR, 47; Young, Naseby, 88; LJRO D30 LIIIB. 
Ensign Ralph Wuckridge, ti, Salop. 
Source; 10,6. 
Captain Anthoney Dyott, Freeford Staffs, 1617-1662. 
is Sir Richard of Lichfield; Ox 34; IT 52; Barrister and Recorder of 
Tamworth. ? Captured at Naseby. 
Sources; RS, 93; AO, 438; SP, 77; LJRO D30, LIIIB; 10,5; BL TT E262/9. 
Lieutenant Robert Blenhorne, Staffs. 
Only an Ens when captured at Naseby; Lt by Oct. 
Sources; 10,5; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 87. 
Captain Jeffery Glazier, Lichfield. 
A Chorister; was the garrison treasurer; captured at Naseby but 
released/exchanged. Surrendered at Lichfield. 
Sources; RS, 93; CCC, 3,1664; BL TT E262/9; LJRO D30, LIIIB; LCL Ms Lich 
24. 
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Captain Hugh Henne 
Killed at Farringdon? 
Sources; 10,5; Royal Martyrs, 8. 
Lieutenant Michael East, Staffs, 1580-1680. 
Composer and Choirmaster from 1618, at Lichfield. 
Sources; 10,5; LJRO D30 LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 88. 
Captain Zacharia Turnpenny, Lichfield. 
In the Choir at Cathedral; led the citizens' company. 
Sources; 10,5; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 89. 
Ensign Zacharia Bakevell, Staffs. 
Source; 10,5. 
Captain Lt Ralph Swift, York? 
? Captain in Harvey's? 
Source; RS, 93. 
Captain Lt Timothy Startin, Uttoxeter. 
Prisoner at Nantwich Oct 45. Estate confiscated 52. Comp 49 1/6th at 
E171-10s. Asked for review 51. 
Sources; 10,5; CCC, 2010; LJRO D30 LIIIB; RI, 47c; Young, Naseby, 88. 
Lieutenant ? Baggeley, H, Corbyn Hall, Worcs. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 89. 
Captain ? Benskin, H. 
Source; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
Lieutenant ? Burden 
At surrender of Ashby? 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Fosbrooke, 23. 
Lieutenant ? Cowper, R. 
A reformado captured at Naseby. 
Source; Young, Naseby, 87. 
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Lieutenant ? Robinson, H. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 88. 
Lieutenant John Stove, H. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 8. 
Lieutenant Thomas Waldron, H, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,5. 
Lieutenant Alexander Ward, R. 
Captured at Naseby. 
Source; Young, Naseby, 87. 
Lieutenant Richard Warnesley, Staffs. 
Poss only a Lt in Oct 45. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; 10,5. 
Ensign John Byrd, H, Garton Yorks. 
Ca Magdalene 18-35. 
Sources; 10,5; AC, 1,115. 
Ensign ? Butler, H. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 88. 
Ensign Francis Fisher, H, Warwicks. 
Bro to Sir Clement. 
Sources; LJRO D30 LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 89. 
Ensign Walter Petty, R, Staffs. 
Source; 10,5. 
Ensign ? Pyott, H. 
In prison at Nantwich Oct 45. 
Source; -LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
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Ensign ? Sharpe 
Source; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
Ensig. n ? Stanford 
New in Oct 45. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 88. 
Ensign ? Thomas, R. 
Captured Naseby, still in prison in Oct 45. 
Sources; LJRO D30, LIIIB; Young, Naseby, 87. 
DRAGOONS 
Cornet Timothy Eamon, Bucks. 
Sources; 10,5; LJRO D30, LIIIB. 
JOHN LANE'S REGIMENT OF HORSE 
Colonel John Lane, Esq, King's Bromley, Bentley Wolverhampton Staffs. 
is Thomas (See CoA Staffs); earlier in Lord Digby's. Gov of Stafford then 
Rushall 43; surrendered Rushall May 44; wounded at Asherton Fair 44, 
rescued by Hastings. Fined £250. Became MP for Lichfield at Restoration. 
Bro to Jane who helped the young Charles II escape after Worcester 52. 
Sources; 10,16,18; HMC Hastings, 2,98; CCC, 89,112; CCAM, 1252; BL 
Harl Ms 2043,28; PN, 850; Fosbrooke, 21; PRO Return of MPs 1,528; SHC 
New Series XIX, 1910. 
Captain Fulke Grosvenor, Wednesbury Staffs. 
In charge of the church at the siege of Rushall May 44. 
Source; CCC, 1486. 
Captain John Lassalls, Derbys. 
Sources; JTB, 73; Fosbrooke, 23; 10,81. 
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Lieutenant Richard Fairley 
Source; 10,81. 
THOMAS LEVESON'S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Thomas Leveson, Esq, Wolverhampton, ? -1652. 
2s Sir Walter; DL 40; RC. 
Leveson returned from France at the beginning of the war. He was a part of 
the King's initiative in the north midlands in late 42. First he 
garrisoned Wolverhampton then Dudley. He held the latter until the end Of 
the war gaining a reputation as being ruthless, an extension, no doubt, of 
his ability to make himself thoroughly unpopular with his fellow gentry, 
exhibited before the war. Argued at length with Bagot (Richard and 
Harvey), Hastings and the various commissioners. See Chapters 2,5,6,7. 
He like Hastings was labelled 'rob-carrier' by the hostile press. 
Sources; 10,84; Symonds Diary, 168,182; HMC Hastings, 2,104,106,114, 
121,127; PRO SP29/159,45; HMC Portland, 1,570; JHC, 6,700; CCC, 89, 
2483-2486; Black Docquets, 35,108; WSL SMS, 550; RS, 95b; 
. 
EN, 881; CCAM, 
427; CSPD, 1649-1650,41. 
Lieutenant Colonel Walter Giffard, Esq, Hyon Staffs; 1611-1680. 
is Peter of Chillington; RC; Estates confiscated 53. 
Sources 10,84; CCC, 89; SP, 104; IR, 47c; PN, 604, SHC, New Series IV, 
1895. 
Lieutenant Richard Collier, Staffs. 
Source; 10,84. 
Lt Colonel George Parker, Sutton Coney Staffs. 
RC. 
Sources; CCAM, 90,1429; Rte, 321; PN, 1094; SP, 182. 
Lt Colonel Francis Beaumont, Barrow on Trent, Derbys, 1599-1661. 
is William; In charge at Dudley in Leveson's absence during the Marston 
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Moor campaign. 
Sources; RS, 95b; 10,84; Shaw, 1,62; PN, 88. 
Major Christopher Heveninpham, Gent, Pipehill, Staffs, 1616-? 
3s Nicholas bro to Simon (See Fitzherbert). 
Captain in 43; promoted following transfer of bro to Fitzherbert's. 
Ox Trinity 32; BA 32; MA 35; Comp 48. RC. 
Sources; RS, 95; CCC, 1804; CCAM, 1415,1433; SP, 124; 10,84; A0,699. 
Lieutenant Francis Fortesgue, Warwicks. 
Source; 10,84. 
Major Simon Heveningham 
Preceded Christopher H. (See Fitzherbert's. ) 
Major ? Mole 
'An officer in Ireland'. 
Source; RS, 95. 
Captain Richard Astley, Esq, Patshull Staffs, 1625-1688. 
1s Walter; Kt during war; Bt 62. Garrisoned father's house until it was 
captured Feb 46, then he went into Dudley. Perhaps had been in Hastings' 
before in Leveson's. Pious RC. 
Sources; CCAM, 1415; PN, 40 (as a Lt Colonel); Young P., Roffe M. The 
English Civil War Armies, Osprey, 1979,21,33, plate C. 
Captain William Carlos (Carless, Carlosse), Gent, Bromhall, Staffs, ? -1689 
RC; commanded Tong garrison. Became a Colonel after Ist C. W. At the battle 
of Worcester 51; hid with Charles II in tree. 
Sources; GA, 46; PN, 246; WSL, Chetwynd Papers, AL 565. 
Captain John Potts, Staffs. 
RC. 
Sources; 10,84; CCAM, 141. 
Lieutenant Richard Caney, Staffs. 
Source; 10,84. 
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Captain Thomas Gifford, Esq. Chillington Staffs. 
?s of Peter. RC. 
Sources; 10,84; SP, 104; GA, 100. 
Ensign Walter Stanford, Staffs. 
Source; 10,84. 
Captain Lt Charles Colles, Lond, West. 
Source; 10,84. 
Lieutenant Francis Colles, Gent, Lond, West, ? Silverstreet. 
? RC. 
Sources; TO, 84; PRO SP16/495,1E. 
Ensign John Rumney, Lond, West, ? St Martins in the Fields. 
? RC. 
Sources: 10,84; PRO SP16/495,1E. 
Lieutenant ? Johnson 
Prisoner at Stafford 44. 
Sources; WSL Minute Book of the Committee at Stafford, 58; Young, Naseby, 
90. 
DEVEREAUX WOLESLEY' S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Devereaux Wolesley, Esq, Orme Staffs, ? -1663. 
Governor at Bagworth May 43. See Chapters 4,5. Surrendered at Ashby. 
Sources; RS, 91; HMC Hastings, 2,103; Fosbrooke, 21; PN, 1600; 10,144. 
Captain Walter Hastings, (See Hastings' Horse) 
Cornet Edward Aston, Staffs. 
Source; 10,144. 
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FOOT 
Lt Colonel Knapper 
'Clerk to Lord Chief Justice Banks when he was an Attorney'. 
Sources; RS, 91; 10,144; PN, 838. 
Lieutenant Hopkin Matthews, Glamorgan. 
Source; 10,144. 
Major Thomas Roberts, Gent, Sutton Leics (and Cheltenham and Hereford). 
5s Sir William; bro to Wolstan (See Hastings' Horse - cornet). 
Peter Newman suggests he is John Roberts. RS say Tho. 
Sources; RS, 91; CCC, 110; VL, 118; PN, 1211. 
Captain ? Masters 
Source; RS, 91. 
Captain William Orme, Gent, Longdon Staffs, 1615-1665. 
is William. Ox Corpus Christs pens 31; IT 32; 46 fined at 1/10th £1,395; 
49 reduced to £558 to be only £372 if tithes of £18 pa settled on local 
minister. June 51 discharged from seq and tithes and assessment of £500. 
Sources; CCC, 1684; SP, 178; GA, 186. 
GERVAISE LUCAS' REGB ENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Gervaise Lucas, Gent, Fenton Lincs, 1611-1668. 
is Anthoney. Gov of Belvoir 43-46. Bart 44, one of Hastings' creations? 
Argued with Hastings. See Chapters 2,4,5,6,7. Commissioner for 
surrender of Lichfield where he had gone after sur of Belvoir. Governor of 
Bombay after Rest. 
Sources; 10,87-89; RS, 92b; HNC Hastings, 2,110,114,135; 
Symonds Diary, 228,278; BL TT E345/2; GEC Barts, 2,226; Warburton, 2, 
98; Black Docquets, 230; CPSD, 1601-1661,72,1667-1668,278; PN, 916. 
356 
Major George Plunkney (Plunkett), Ibstones Staffs, ? -1643. 
? RC; had been a captain in regt. Described as (a) an ex Irish rebel now 
fighting for the protestants, (b) when he was killed at Sproxton Heath in 
Dec 43, as the 'vilest villain of all the cormorants at Belvoir Castle or 
Newark either'. Several Plunketts had been MPs in Ireland. 
Sources; RS, 92b; Royal Martyrs, 6; HMC Portland, 1,165; CCC, 110; BL TT 
E81/8; Nichols, 2,1,52; PN, 1143; Kearney H. F., Strafford in Ireland, 
MUP, 1961,260-261. 
Major James Hardy, Grimsby Lincs. 
Possibly major following Plunkney's death. Had been a captain in the reg. 
Comp 46, fined £120. 
Sources; RS, 92b; PN, 681; CCC, 1449; BL TT E345/2. 
Captain ? Archer, London. 
'Used to sell gloves at the Cheapside Cross'. 
Source; RS, 92b. 
Captain ? Barton 
Source; 10,89. 
Cornet Edward Bates, Northants. 
Source; 10,89. 
Captain William Corby, Rut. 
Source; 10,89. 
Lieutenant Anthoney Wright, Yorks. 
Source; TO, 89. 
Captain ? Deane 
'Came from the parliament'. 
Source; RS. 92b. 
Captain ? Gregory 
Attorney. His troop attempted to quarter in Stathern but were bribed off 
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by the constable. 
Sources; RS, 92b; Guilford E., 'The Accounts of the Constables of 
Stathern', AJ, 69,1912,148. 
Captain ? Harding 
Source; 10,89. 
Captain Timothy Lucas, Cent, Fenton Lincs, ? -1652. 
?s of Anthoney. When Gervaise was at Bolsover in the winter of 43-44, 
Timothy was in charge of the castle and argued with William Bale. Ca fel 
com Peterhouse 26. Comp on Newark Articles. Fined at 1/6th £750 in 47. In 
49 begged leave to pay £300 and rest after Michaelmass, granted. June 50 
discharged. 
Sources; Linc Pedigree, 615; HMC Hastings, 2,110; CCC, 1330; AC, 3,114. 
Captain Thomas Mason, Ashwell Rut. 
Parson. The 'commander of the Fen Robbers' (Oct 45). Imprisoned many times 
for reading the common prayer. His quartermaster regularly collected 
contribution from Waltham on the Wolds and from Branston. See section on 
contribution in Chapter 2. 
Sources; RS, 92b; Nichols, 2,52; LRO Waltham CA, 68-70, Branston CA, 
60-62. 
Captain Peter Needham, Staffs. 
Source; 10,89. 
Cornet William Rawson, Lincs. 
Source; 10,89. 
Captain ? Yates, Leics. 
Killed at Melton. Son of the Mr Yates Lucas was collecting money from 
despite having lost two sons in the cause. Bro to Yates in Hastings. 
Sources; RS, 92b; Royal Martyrs, 10; BL Add Mss, 18981,47. 
Cornet Gervaise Jackson 
Source; CCAM, 1361-1362. 
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FOOT 
Captain George Brellisford, Harleston Lincs, Lond, West. 
Estates confiscated in the 3rd Confiscation Act. 
Sources; 10,89; IR, 45a. 
Captain Andrew Broome, Grantham Lincs. 
Apothecary. 
Sources; 10,89; CCC, 881,2766. 
Lieutenant Joseph Locker, Essex. 
Source; 10,89. 
Captain John Stevens, Lincs. 
Source; 10,89. 
Lieutenant Henry Page, Leics. 
Source; 10,89. 
FRANCIS WHORTLEY'S DRAGOONS (PERHAPS LATER DUD DUDLEY'S) 
Colonel Francis Whortley, Esq, Whortley Yorks, 1620-1665. 
is Sir Francis the first person to raise horse for the king. Under 
Hastings at the beginning of 43. See Chapter 5. Fined at 1/6th £671-13s-4d 
reduced to £408-6s-8d if he would compound for another royalist who owed 
£1,850 to his wife. Active in 50s. 
Sources; PN, 1609; CCAH, 779. 
Major Dudley Dudley of Dudley, 1599-1684 (also of Tipton Staffs). 
2s illegitimate of Edward Lord Dudley. Iron Master supplied iron to Staffs 
garrisons and Oxford. Was active in North Staffs in late 43, suggesting 
that he and Whortley returned to the area with the Northern army, having 
gone north after Hopton Heath, not, as Edward Nicholas suggested to 
Hastings, before. At Colchester in 2nd C. W. Sentenced to be shot but 
escaped twice. Estates confiscated in 52. Were worth £200 pa in late 40s. 
Sources; 10,146; IR, 47d; PRO SP29/159,45; SP, 45; PN, 435; CCC, 89, 
261, DNB; CSPD, 1660-1661,45,73-74,220. 
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Cornet Jeffery Dudley, Rushall Staffs. 
Married to Dud's sister. 
Source; 10,46. 
Cornet Robert Heaton, Worc. 
Source; 10,146. 
JOHN CORBET' S REGIMENTS 
HORSE 
Colonel Sir John Corbet, Esq, Stoke Adderley Salop, 1620-? 
is Sir John; Ox 34. Had been captain in Hastings' horse, was Col by 44, 
operated in the Marcher Cos after this. Fined. in 50, £1,000, imprisoned 
but released on £2,000 bail with sureties for good behaviour. Bt 62. 
Sources; RS, 93b; CCC, 735,205; PN, 345; GEC Barts, 2,33; Symonds Diary, 
252; CSPD, 1650,519; 10,31. 
FOOT 
Captain ? Hawley, Leic. 
Source, 10,10. 
? COLONEL CHRISTOPHER ROPER'S FOOT 
This regiment may be either a part of Hastings' regiment given to Roper in 
1645, or a creation of the 2nd Civil War. 
Christopher Roper, Aston on Trent Derbys and Leic. 
In Lord Moore's Reg in Ireland 41; Poss MP for Dingle, Munster in Irish 
pari 40. In Nov 43 he came over to England to be the major in Hastings' 
Foot. There were (possibly) abortive attempts to bring his company over as 
well. He had a Foot unit in early 46 which he led towards Chester but the 
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town's surrender resulted in him leading it back to Ashby where he 
surrendered in Feb. This may have only been part of Hastings' reg. 
Sources; 10,110; CCC, 112; Symonds Diary, 278; WSL SMS, 550, Hastings to 
Rupert, 29/11/43; Bod Lib, Carte Calendar, 12,580; IIMC Ormonde, 1,140; 
PN, 1226; Kearney, op. cit, 261; Fosbrooke, 21. 
Captain Lt Charles Smith, Salop. 
Source; 10,110. 
OTHER OFFICERS WHO APPEAR TO HAVE SERVED AT SOME TIME IN THE NORTH 
MIDLANDS ARMY, BUT WHOSE REGIMENT IS UNKNOWN 
Maior Thomas Brudenell, Stanton Wyvill, Leics, 1613-? 
is Thomas. Cornet in 41. 
Sources; PN, 198; CCC, 109; Fosbrooke, 21. 
Major John Trevor, Llys Trefor, Denbighshire, ? -1658. 
At Bolt Castle in 43; surrendered at Ashby; died in Wrexham Gaol. 
Sources; Fosbrooke, 21; 10,100; PN, 1453. 
Captain Robert Poudrell, West Hallam Derbys, 1623-1662. 
Was an officer at Dudley and a Papist. 
Source; CCAM, 1433. 
Captain Edward Beck, Frasby Staffs. 
Was a captain as early as Edgehill. In the garrisons of Ashby, Tutbury and 
Lichfield. Involved in an attack on Bagworth when it was in 
parliamentarian hands. 
Source; CCAN, 1909. 
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